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ABSTRACT 
 
Kazakh and Russian Identities in Transition: The Case of Kazakhstan 
 
This dissertation concerns the development and interaction of Kazakh and Russian 
identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. My research questions were: (1) what was the 
character of these identities in 2003/04 (the time of my research); (2) how have these 
identities interacted to form dominant and subordinate identities, and (3) how can the 
character of these identities and their interaction be explained? In order to research these 
questions I used a general questionnaire followed up by open ended interviews of a 
representative sample of Kazakhstani citizens. While my research findings show continued 
uncertainty and provisionality in both Kazakh and Russian identities, which confirms the 
broad trend of previous surveys, they also indicate signs of change in the emergence of 
more consolidated dominant and subordinate identities in the less Russianised areas like 
Chimkent and among the younger generation, while by contrast the older generations of 
Russians, particularly in the more Russianised areas, find it difficult to accept the 
delegitimation of their dominant status as reflected in the nationalizing policies pursued by 
the new state. In theoretical terms these findings confirm the importance of the study of 
ethnic stratification, which has not received sufficient attention in previous research in this 
area. In explaining these developments I found that the character of the transition and also 
of the ‘prior regime type’ in Kazakhstan has had a significant effect on ethnic relationships, 
but also that international factors, such as those presented in Brubaker’s triadic model, and 
internal factors, elaborated by Schermerhorn and Horowitz, were also important. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I shall first outline the general aims of the thesis and explain why this 
research is important and what considerations led me to take up the topic (1.2). Next I shall 
discuss my research methodology and sources and summarise my analytical framework 
(1.3). Then I shall give a general overview of the literature I have used in researching the 
background of my thesis, showing how my work attempts to fill an under-researched niche, 
which lies at the intersection of several academic literatures (1.4). Finally, I shall give a 
breakdown of the structure and chapters of my thesis. 
 
1.2 Presentation and Justification of General Research Aims 
  
The subject of this dissertation is national and ethnic identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. 
The aims of this thesis are to determine the character of Kazakh and Russian national 
identities1 (and also the possible emergence of a Kazakhstani national identity) since 
independence and to explain the factors determining these identities and their interaction. 
These identities are new in the sense that there has been a status reversal2 between 
Kazakhstan’s ethnic groups since independence in 1991, with previously politically and 
economically subordinate Kazakhs becoming the dominant ‘state-bearing’ nation, while the 
former ‘elder brother’ of the USSR, the Russians, becoming a ‘national minority’ in a 
potentially ‘foreign’ state. This radical transformation presented two different problems for 
both groups. That is, Kazakhs have had to get used to their new ‘hegemonic’ status and to 
                                                
1 As explained in Chapter 2, by the word ‘national’ here I refer to the link between group’s or individual’s 
ethnic identity and the state in terms of their dominant and subordinate positions. 
2 As discussed more fully in Chapter 2, the idea of the social stratification of ethnic groups and the interaction 
in terms of power relationships between dominant and subordinate groups has been studied intensively in 
sociological literature, most notably by Shibutani and Kwan (1965) and Horowitz (1985). By ‘status reversal’ 
I refer to the situation in which after a revolution or successful achievement of independence a previously 
subordinate indigenous group finds itself in a dominant position over the previously dominant ‘imperial’ or 
‘colonial’ ethnic group. 
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reassert themselves in the political, economic, cultural and ethnodemographic spheres, 
while the Russians of Kazakhstan have had to either (1) assimilate into the titular 
nationality, (2) build a new, but subordinate identity in Kazakhstan, still feeling ethnically 
Russian, but Kazakhstani of a subordinate status or (3) emigrate and go to what is now 
technically their motherland state (Brubaker, 1996, Laitin, 1998, Smith 1998, Hagendoorn 
et al 2001).  
 
The time-frame of my research is 1991-2004, with my empirical research being carried out 
in 2003 and 2004, although I shall occasionally refer to events or publications after 2004 
where these are particularly relevant trends I have identified. The reason for including the 
period 1991-2002 within my time-frame is that in order to understand and explain my 
‘snapshot’ of the state of identities in 2003-4 I had to consider the evolution and interaction 
of these identities since the Soviet period, using empirical research carried out in this 
period. 
 
The theoretical puzzle which prompted this research is as follows. The general situation in 
multi-ethnic states, which have recently gained independence is a rapid increase in ethnic 
tension as the various groups struggle and bid for dominance, which usually results in open 
conflict or even war, producing a very sharp reorientation of ethnic identities (Horowitz, 
1985, Linz and Stepan, 1996, Snyder, 1999). There is a particular problem where there is a 
large ‘settler’ population from the former imperial power, now ‘stranded’ in an ‘alien’ state. 
This may be illustrated by the experience of Latvia and Estonia in the post-Soviet zone and 
elsewhere by the pieds noirs in Algeria. Yet in Kazakhstan there has been no overt conflict 
and previous survey research conducted from 1995 to 2002 (Masanov, 1996, Malkova, 
Kolstø and Melberg, 1999, Hagendoorn et al, 2001, Kurganskaya and Dunaev, 2002, 2003) 
has shown that despite the status reversal and the limited nationalising policies initiated by 
the elites, Kazakh attitudes to these processes remained rather ambivalent and uncertain, 
while Russians were not completely disapproving of them. What I wanted to do was to 
establish whether this was still the case and, if so, to try to explain this rather anomalous 
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situation, which clearly has important implications for patterns of post-imperial 
development and national and ethnic identity formation. 
 
The research is new and important for various reasons. Firstly, it is the first research, which 
directly confronts the issue of national and ethnic national identities in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan and the interaction between these identities. Previous survey research was 
primarily interested in issues of ethnic conflict or social integration and not in identity as 
such. Why are these Kazakhstani identities important? Partly because, as mentioned above, 
they appear to be a rather anomalous case in the general pattern of inter-ethnic relations in 
newly independent states. But they are also important because of the importance of 
Kazakhstan in its regional context. Kazakhstan is the largest Central Asian state and has 
enormous potential economic strength because of its oil and gas resources. It is in a crucial 
strategic position in a very unstable area between Iran, Russia, Afghanistan and China. Yet 
it has maintained a stable, secular, if undemocratic, government with peaceful and stable 
relations with its neighbours. In such a state ethnic identities and their associated 
interrelations can have great significance for the stability of the whole region. 
 
1.3 Methodology, Sources and Analytical Framework 
 
My three main research questions are: (1) how can we characterise the new Kazakh and 
Russian national identities which have emerged since independence, particularly in terms of 
status reversal or dominant/ subordinate relations? (2) how have they interacted in the 
period since independence? and (3) why have they interacted in the way that they have? 
The first two questions are descriptive or mapping in nature and the third one is analytical, 
trying to explain these developments. With regard to my first two questions what interests 
me is the status reversal in power relationships, which has taken place between these 
identities since independence. What I shall be analysing is the emergence of new dominant 
and subordinate national identities, which are the product of interaction between ethnic 
groups. I shall also analyse the nature and development of the official Kazakh/Kazakhstani 
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national state project and the impact that has had on both ethnic groups. My third research 
question tries to outline how this identity interaction can be explained with reference to 
three sets of factors: long-term historical factors as part of Kazakhstan’s Soviet and pre-
Soviet heritage (‘prior regime type’), international factors such as relationship between 
homeland and nationalising states in Brubaker’s terms and finally by internal factors, such 
as the character of Kazakhstan’s political and perhaps economic transition. 
 
The principal way I am going to test my first question is by the survey that I carried out in 
Kazakhstan in 2003-2004. My survey was partly inspired by surveys published by Masanov 
(1996), Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg (1999), Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tumanov (2001), 
Kurganskaya & Dunaev (2002), and Kurganskaya, Dunaev and Aitkhozhin (2003), which 
provide a general basis for examining the socio-political climate relating to ethnicity, 
nationalism and ethnonational interaction in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and which I shall 
discuss in the next section. All these surveys were based on mass multiple-choice 
questionnaires without follow-up interviews. My survey, in contrast to the above surveys, 
involved a smaller-scale sample with a semi-structured questionnaire of 59 questions that 
was directly related to ethnonational interaction between Kazakhs and Russians (see 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). It was administered to 23 Kazakhs and 20 Russians in four of 
the main cities of Kazakhstan - Almaty, Astana, Petropavlovsk and Chimkent in Spring 
2003. Following the analysis of initial data and after winnowing out serious 
inconsistencies, which included unanswered questions and evidence of a lack of 
comprehension of questions and concepts, I carried out in-depth interviews with 24 
Kazakhs and 18 Russians in Winter and Spring 2004. The ‘snowball’ sampling technique 
was employed in obtaining the interview sample with restrictions on the use of multiple 
family members and the general objective of finding respondents from different ages, 
genders, occupational and educational backgrounds. 
 
As for the number of my respondents, I interviewed 85 people (47 Kazakhs and 38 
Russians). I tried to achieve a reasonable spread of age, gender, and socio-economic group 
(see Appendix 1). I also tried to take account of the ethnic mix of the four cities, thus in 
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Chimkent I naturally interviewed more Kazakhs and in Petropavlovsk more Russians (see 
below). In Almaty I interviewed more Kazakhs because sometimes it was difficult to find 
an ethnic Russian of a certain age (e.g. between 18-25) in the governmental institutions. 
The total number of my respondents was mainly determined by the nature of my method of 
research – the semi-structured in-depth interview. Unlike the mass multiple-choice 
questionnaires, each of my interviews was tailored to a particular respondent (i.e. if a 
person wanted to elaborate on some point I allowed him to do that) and the interviews 
typically lasted between one and three hours. I was also restricted in terms of time (as I 
stayed in each town approximately 2-4 weeks both in 2003 and 2004) and the ability to 
source the relevant respondents easily given that the topic of my research was sensitive. 
This partly led to slight overrepresentation of respondents in the age bracket between 25-35 
and between 45-55 in Almaty and Astana, and in Astana, given that I interviewed a number 
of people in governmental institutions, to an overrepresentation of people who came to 
Astana from Almaty with the move of the capital.  
 
With regard to the geographical distribution of my respondents, I selected Petropavlovsk, 
Astana, Almaty and Chimkent to reflect the complex and uneven demographic settlement 
patterns of Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan and to capture the differences of opinion 
towards the nationalising policies between the regions. Specifically I selected Chimkent 
because it is a Kazakh-dominated city (55.7% Kazakhs and 15.7% of Russians3) in the 
South of Kazakhstan, while Petropavlovsk is a Russian-dominated town (48.9% of 
Russians and 23.3% of Kazakhs) in the North of the republic situated close to the Russian 
border. Almaty (35.5% of Kazakhs and 34.7% of Russians) and Astana (25.5% of Kazakhs 
and 43.3% of Russians) (the former and the current capitals of Kazakhstan respectively) 
were included in the survey automatically because, firstly, the impact of nationalising 
policies would be, arguably, stronger and clearer in the capital cities and, secondly, because 
both the capital and the former capitals are natural magnets for people from a more rural or 
remote areas in search of jobs and hence the possibility to have a more diverse sample of 
the population. My selection of cities was also influenced by the surveys that were carried 
                                                
3 Data derived from 1999 National census of Kazakhstan (www.president.kz). 
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out in these locations in the 1990s for the purposes of comparison. Of course I was unable 
to cover the rural areas, and this skewed my results somewhat (at any rate for Kazakhs – 
Russians are mainly urban-based), but I tried to achieve a reasonably representative sample 
of the urban areas, bearing in mind the limited opportunities I faced in Kazakhstan as a 
single researcher.  
 
With regard to the general merits and de-merits of the particular surveys methods, in 
contrast to the highly structured mass surveys that provided an averaged reflection of the 
Kazakhstani population, my survey was, of course, much more limited in scope, but on the 
other hand my semi-structured interviews allowed respondents to make revealing 
comments and express candid emotional reactions. Even though some of these responses 
were contradictory and showed lack of understanding of a question, they were much more 
revealing than the average large-scale questionnaire can be. Indeed, when one is dealing 
with such subtle and sensitive issues as identities and changes in status, in-depth semi-
structured interviews can provide a better means of revealing people’s mood and fears than 
mass surveys with very clear-cut yes-no questions. Of course, my survey and interviews 
strictly speaking present simply a snapshot of the situation in 2003-2004, however, I tried 
to compensate for this by comparing my findings with previous surveys since 
independence, with the development of the Kazakhstani national project and with relevant 
academic work emerging from the region. The limitations of my in-depth interviewing 
technique in terms of scope were determined by what I could achieve as a single researcher. 
This makes the conclusions derived from my survey inevitably somewhat tentative, but, 
nevertheless, I hope to show that the survey produced some useful material and that its 
advantages outweighed its disadvantages in relation to my research questions.  
 
It must finally be emphasized that the nature of the political regime in Kazakhstan makes 
any survey research very problematic in terms of its possible scope, the nature of the 
questions, which can be asked and the reliability of the responses. As a single researcher 
and as a Russian Kazakhstani citizen I had considerable difficulties in obtaining interviews 
with a representative range of respondents and with conducting my research without 
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political interference. Nevertheless, I was able to use personal networks to obtain what I 
consider to be a reasonably representative sample in terms of age, social position, ethnic 
affiliation and geographical spread, which would make my survey results valid and 
interesting.  
 
To answer my second question about the nature and development of interaction between 
these identities, the identities will be ‘mapped’ using the schema of changing ethnic 
stratification derived from the work of R. Schermerhorn (1970) and D. Horowitz (1985). 
The analysis in this section will operate with concepts of nationality, ethnicity, minority, 
identity, dominance, subordination, etc. which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Two. The object of this ‘mapping’ is to clarify, on the basis of the material derived from 
my survey, the direction of the trends of interaction between the principal ethnic groups in 
Kazakhstan since independence.  
 
To answer the third question a range of possible explanations will be explored. Various 
theories, including transition theories, will be used to explain the trends and developments 
in Kazakh and Russian identities. Specifically, to explain the lack of consolidation4 of 
identities, the analysis will look at specific factors in the Soviet and pre-Soviet history of 
Kazakhstan which still have salience (‘prior regime type’) as well as use theories of 
political, economic and national transition and comparative data in transition studies (Linz 
& Stepan, 1996, Snyder, 1999, Kuzio, 2001) and the geopolitical model of minority-
majority interaction devised by R. Brubaker (1996) and elaborated by G. Smith (1999). To 
explain increasing ethnicisation and status differentiation of identities references will be 
made to theories of reactive and interactive nationalism, and some use will be made of A. 
Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ syndrome.  
 
It has to be stressed that the answers to my third question can only be tentative and 
exploratory: no definite answer is possible in view of the large number of variables and the 
                                                
4 By ‘consolidation’ of identities I mean the emergence of stable and consistent patterns of thinking and 
behaviour with regard to the state and other ethnic groups.  
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complexity of their causal interaction. With all these explanatory factors it is very difficult 
to separate one type of explanation from another because they are all interconnected and 
there is constant interaction going on at all levels. Thus, for example, the theories of 
transition might be useful in explaining not only the flux in Kazakh and Russian identities 
when people were unsure about the character of the new state (early transition), but also to 
provide some insights into the gradual ethnicisation of identities when the state has become 
more established and the elites have become more confident in stressing an ethnic element 
in the Kazakh national project (late transition). Likewise the limited nature of the 
democratic transition and the very gradual character of the economic transition may explain 
the slow ethnicisation of identities. In this respect the time factor is very important for 
understanding the short-term and long-term character of identities, as factors that interact 
between each other may change over time and bring in other factors that could make the 
character of identity relations very different.  
 
Primary sources will be used wherever possible to answer the above questions. The main 
primary sources are, of course, the material from my survey, but in addition to that I will 
use documentary primary sources, particularly in the chapter on the national project of 
Kazakhstan, which has not been much analysed before. Here I would particularly mention 
the book ‘In the Current of History’ (V potoke istorii) (1999) by N.A. Nazarbaev, which 
looks at the wide-ranging issues of national and state identity in Kazakhstan, and other 
compilations of speeches and interviews of Nazarbaev published in 1998 and 2003, which 
likewise have not received much attention from researchers. This primary material in 
relation to all three research questions will be supplemented wherever relevant with the 
critical use of secondary sources both from other surveys and other documentary sources.  
 
To sum up, the main points of my analytical framework will be as follows: first, I will use 
the concepts related to ethnicity and nationalism (discussed in Chapter 2), while bearing in 
mind the differences in the understanding of these concepts in Soviet and post-Soviet 
context and assess how they are perceived by both Kazakh and Russian respondents. 
Second, I will map Kazakh and Russian identities using the schemas developed by 
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Schermerhorn (1970) and Horowitz (1985); and third, I will try to explain Kazakh–Russian 
identity interaction with reference to three sets of factors: long-term historical factors as 
part of Kazakhstan Soviet and pre-Soviet heritage (prior regime type), international factors 
such as relationship between homeland and nationalising states in Brubaker’s and G. 
Smith’s terms and finally the character of Kazakhstan’s political and economic transition. 
This theoretical framework will be combined with analysis of my survey data and analysis 
of primary sources (documents, books, speeches relating to Kazakhstani national project) 
and secondary material from academic works.  Much more detailed discussion of this will 
be carried out in Chapter 2.   
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
There has been a vast literature on post-independence Kazakhstan and a number of surveys 
which have been very useful for my research, but none of them bring together the 
theoretical and scholarly framework that addresses the question of interaction between 
Kazakh and Russian identities and their increasing status differentiation. My research falls 
at an intersection of several academic disciplines: historical, sociological and political 
analysis. In my background reading for the topic I have drawn on several academic 
literatures, including works on Soviet and post-Soviet nationality developments, 
comparative theoretical and analytical works on ethnicity and nationality, ethnic interaction 
and transition. I have tried in my analysis to draw on the insights of these various literatures 
to produce a rounded picture of the development of Kazakh and Russian national identities.  
 
a) General Academic Literature 
 
My knowledge and understanding of Kazakhstan and its minorities, both historically and in 
the independence period, have been greatly influenced by numerous studies on Kazakhstan 
and more generally on Soviet and post-Soviet nationality studies. Here I would like to 
mention the works of Akiner (1995), Olcott (1995, 2002), Schatz (2004), Cummings (2005) 
and Dave (2007) because they supplied me with a lot of background material about 
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Kazakhstan, touched upon national and state identity issues and helped to generate ideas for 
my research. Olcott’s (2002) work had a useful chapter on the national-state identity project 
of Kazakhstan and on the attitudes of both Kazakhs and Russians to the construction of the 
Kazakhstani nation. Cummings (2005) provided some important material on the 
transformation of the Kazakhstan’s political elites from being biethnic to virtually 
monoethnic and indigenous. This has been useful for the purposes of mapping Russian and 
Kazakh identities over time. Dave (2007) looked at the development of national identity 
and statehood in Kazakhstan, arguing that Russification and Sovietization was not simply 
imposed in a ‘top-down’ fashion, but that it provided opportunities for grass root initiatives, 
and that Soviet nationality policies have had a lasting effect on the development of national 
identities in Kazakhstan.  
 
There has also been an abundance of studies on Soviet and post-Soviet nationality policy 
which have greatly influenced my thinking in this area. Here I would particularly mention 
the excellent work of R. Karklins (1989), partly because she provides very good material on 
the interethnic relations in the Soviet Union at a key period, very near the end of the Soviet 
Union.  In particular her survey gives a valuable snapshot of Russian and titular relations in 
the final years of the USSR which is very useful for the purposes of mapping identities over 
time. On post-Soviet nationality development I would highlight the volumes edited by 
Bremmer and Taras (1994), Szporluk (1994) and G. Smith (1998) where the wide-ranging 
contributions offer analysis of the post-Soviet situation in the various post-Soviet states. All 
these works were written in the early to mid – 1990s and their conclusions are quite 
tentative, but nevertheless they make some very important points and give an overview of 
how the various republics emerged out of the Soviet Union and what their initial problems 
were. The works that I found most useful relating to the new Russian minorities of the post-
Soviet era include Melvin (1995), Kolstø (1995), Chinn and Kaiser (1996) King and 
Melvin (1998) and Hosking (2004, 2006). Laitin’s (1998) work provided very valuable 
insights into the importance of one particular aspect of nationality development – language 
policy. On the general interpretation of the dynamics of Soviet and post-Soviet nationality 
interaction I would highlight Brubaker’s geopolitical model linking nationalising state, 
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national minority and homeland state and will discuss his concepts and approach in more 
detail in Chapter Two. 
 
My thinking on the nature of ethnicity and nationality and the interaction of ethnic groups 
has been greatly influenced by a large comparative literature on the subject. This will be 
discussed in detail in chapter Two, but here I would just like to highlight the particular 
importance of several authors for my methodology and analytical framework. On the 
conceptual part which includes the debate about the origins of nationalism and ethnicity I 
found the classical works of Gellner (1983), Smith (1991), Geertz (1963), Anderson 
(1991), Hobsbawm (1990), Connor (1994) and Greenfeld (1992) particularly useful. Other 
works that offered valuable insights into the concept of dominant ethnicity, ethnic 
stratification and ethnonational interaction, especially through conflict, include Shibutani 
and Kwan (1965), Schermerhorn (1970), Horowitz (1985), Smith (1991), Hennayake 
(1992), Doane (1997) Kaufmann (2004), Wright (2004) and Wimmer (2004). For mapping 
ethnonational relations between Russians and Kazakhs and for analysing trends in the 
interaction of identities in Kazakhstan I found Schermerhorn’s (1970) typology of 
integration and Horowitz’s (1985) model of ethnic stratification very useful. These models 
provided me with a means to locate the status type of Kazakhs and Russians at different 
points in Soviet and post-Soviet history and indicate changes in their status over time. 
These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
 
There has also been a growing literature on imperialism and post-imperialism which, 
although indirectly relevant, provides important insights in the interpretation of my theme. 
Here I would particularly mention the volumes edited by Dawisha and Parrott (1997) and 
Barkey and Von Hagen (1997) where the wide ranging contributions discuss the collapse of 
the Soviet regime in a comparative perspective. Other works that offer interesting broad 
ideas and cases in which the Kazakh case can be seen in perspective include Lieven (1995, 
2002, 2003), Beissinger (1995) and Hosking (1997, 2004, 2006). I would also like to 
highlight the work of G. Smith (1998) who drew on numerous strands of post-colonial and 
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post-imperial theory and linked them explicitly to national identity and post-Soviet 
developments.  
 
Similarly the huge literature on the political and economic transition of post-communist 
states, as explained further in chapter 2, has helped me understand the distinctive dynamics 
of Kazakhstan’s nationality development, supplying one of my main hypotheses. Here I 
would highlight works of Rustow (1970), Dahl (1989), Diamond and Plattner (1994), Linz 
and Stepan (1996), Canovan (1996) and Pridham (2000), partly because they stressed the 
importance of national unity for sustaining the transition state’s integrity and making 
democracy possible. Linz and Stepan (1996) and Snyder (1998) offered further insights into 
this area by arguing that in multiethnic states politics tends to be quickly ethnicised given 
the conditions of democratic bargaining. It has to be noted, however, that although there is 
a lot of discussion about the impact of democracy in multinational states, they have not 
been explicitly linked to identity and that has not been properly studied. The same can be 
said about the economic transition literature which dwells mainly on the technical processes 
of establishing market economy in post-communist states, but says very little about how the 
economic transition impacts on people and how that impacts on politics. 
 
b) Surveys 
 
The literature, which is most immediately relevant to my work, is the surveys on national 
identities in Kazakhstan, which have already appeared. It is important to establish the key 
points of their aims, methods and results in order to differentiate them from my project. In 
this section I will look at five surveys that were organised and published by Masanov 
(1996), Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg (1998), Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tumanov (2001), 
Kurganskaya & Dunaev (2002) and Kurganskaya, Dunaev and Aitkhozhin (2003). I will try 
in each case to show how I learnt from both their achievements and limitations to build a 
research project that would draw on their work but have distinctive aims and methods. 
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The survey published by Masanov (1996) was carried out between August 1995 and Spring 
1996 with an aim of assessing the attitudes of the Kazakhstani urban population relating to 
the sphere of interethnic relations and to identify factors that could contribute to interethnic 
conflict in the future.5 The survey indicated that there were significant differences in the 
way the titular and non-titular groups perceived the nationality question in Kazakhstan. 
That is, Kazakhs generally supported most nationalising policies and practices, but were 
flexible on all other issues unrelated to the national project of Kazakhstan, while Russians 
directed their efforts not at preserving their ethnic dominance in the country, but rather at 
attaining at least formal equality in the socio-economic and political spheres. They also 
tended to dwell on the Soviet past or look towards the Russian Federation rather than 
actively engage in the political life of the new sovereign Kazakhstan. These factors, in 
Masanov’s opinion, were a worrying sign that could potentially contribute to the 
deterioration of interethnic relations in the future. One of the limitations of this survey is 
that it was done very early in 1996 and that there is no indication whether Masanov 
conducted a qualitative survey prior to testing his questionnaire on a big sample. Hence 
some of his multiple choice options appear to be rather rigid, repetitious or too 
academically phrased. Another problem with Masanov’s survey is that he used certain 
concepts in his questionnaire (e.g. indigenous, national minority) without defining them 
and this led to the ambiguous results and conclusions.6 Yet, despite certain flaws in the 
formulation of questions and provision of response options, this survey provides a very 
useful sample of opinions related to the topic from this period.  
 
                                                
5 The survey was sponsored by ARKOR International with a grant from National Endowment for Democracy 
and covered 3,000 respondents in five cities of Kazakhstan, including Petropavlovsk, Chimkent, Ust’-
Kamenogorsk, Ural’sk and Almaty. 
6 For example, to find out people’s views on who should be considered indigenous in Kazakhstan, Masanov 
used the word combination ‘inidgenous inhabitant (korennoi zhitel’). This approach, however, is fraught with 
difficulties, since the word ‘indigenous’ can have both civic and ethnic connotations when paired with the 
word ‘inhabitant’ (e.g. korennoi zhitel’ Kazakhstana, korennoi zhitel’ Almaty) and an ethnic connotation when 
linked with words ‘nation’ or ‘group’ (korennaya natsiya, gruppa). The latter usually refers to the members of 
the titular group who are primordially connected to each other and to their ethnic homeland. Hence, if 
Masanov had phrased his question using the concept ‘indigenous nation’ rather than ‘indigenous inhabitants’, 
the answers to this question would have been quite different, and also, possibly, his conclusions.  
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The comparative survey published by Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg (1999) was carried out 
between May and October 1996 and aimed to examine the attitudes of titular and non-
titular groups pertaining to the possibility for social integration in Kazakhstan and Latvia.7 
The survey showed that there was a greater willingness among the Kazakhs to accept and 
integrate the Russians into Kazakhstani society, while Russians were more ambiguous on 
this matter. On the one hand, they did not seriously challenge the political superiority of the 
Kazakhs, but on the other, they did not wholeheartedly transfer their cultural and political 
loyalty to Kazakhstan. The authors argued that the integration of Russians in Kazakhstan 
would be a lengthy and difficult process given that the cultural divisions between the two 
groups were so deep and that amalgamation of their culture into one was not a possibility. 
The main limitation of this survey is that it was done very early in 1996, but on the other 
hand it provided a good snapshot of the beginning of ethnonational interaction between 
Kazakhs and Russians and its data roughly correlates with Masanov’s findings.  
 
The large comparative survey published by Hagendoorn, Linssen and Tumanov (2001) was 
organised by INTAS (International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with 
Scientists of the Former Soviet Union) between June 1995 and June 1997 and its main aim 
was to determine the likelihood of potential conflict between Russians and titular groups in 
five post-Soviet states: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kazakhstan. The survey 
indicated that Russians in Kazakhstan were pressured to adapt to the new political and 
socio-cultural environment if they wanted to preserve their economic positions and 
safeguard their children’s future. Alternatively they had the option of leaving for the 
Russian Federation. The authors argued that Russians had little opportunity to develop a 
more distinctive Russian identity given that Kazakhstan was moving away from Russia and 
Kazakhs saw the Russians as potential fifth columnists and feared the potential Russia’s 
intervention in the future. All this created negative conditions for Russians in Kazakhstan 
                                                
7 The Kazakhstani part of the survey was conducted among 1000 respondents in urban and rural settings of 
Kazakhstan, including Kzyl-Orda, Zhambyl, Akmola [Astana], Semipalatinsk, Atyrau, Karaganda and 
Almaty and their surroundings.  
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whose ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ strategies and the response of the titular group to these 
strategies would determine the interethnic dynamics in the future.  
 
The survey published by Kurganskaya and Dunaev (2002)8 revealed, firstly, that most 
ethnic groups in Kazakhstan were not ready or willing to integrate into the new 
Kazakhstani culture based on Kazakh language and traditions. This trend was the most 
prominent among Russians and Germans, while the Kazakhs – the new state-bearing group 
of Kazakhstan – were the most eager to establish their culture as a baseline for all 
Kazakhstani citizens. Secondly, the survey highlighted that, although all ethnic groups 
expressed a high degree of tolerance to members of other nationalities, there was a lot of 
tension between titular and non-titular groups in the sphere of state governance. The latter, 
the authors argued, was the result of state personnel, cultural and language policies as well 
as other factors such as the increasing pressure of Kazakh family and clan structures on 
power structures, corruption and the perception of non-titular groups as potentially disloyal 
to Kazakhstan. These policies and unofficial practices, in the authors’ view, have 
strengthened ethnic identities of both titular and non-titular groups, decreased the level of 
inter-ethnic tolerance and contributed to migratory moods among the Russian or the 
Russophone non-titular population. The main limitation of this survey is the lack of a 
methodology section. There was also, arguably, a noticeable pro-minority bias in the 
interpretation of the data, although not in the actual data. The bias, however, had its 
advantages for the purposes of this research as Kurganskaya and Dunaev provided a very 
sensitive and perceptive analysis of the Russian situation in Kazakhstan and gave numerous 
recommendations that could ameliorate their anxieties and fears.  
 
The survey published and organized by Kurganskaya, Dunaev and Aitkhozhin (2003) was 
carried out to assess the situation pertaining to the question of legal protection and 
                                                
8 This survey was sponsored by the European Commission and carried out in April 2001 by the Kazakhstani 
NGO ‘Centre for Humanitarian Research’ and the Kazakhstani Institute for Socio-Economic Information and 
Planning. 
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observance of minority rights in Kazakhstan.9 The survey showed that national minorities 
in Kazakhstan have been marginalized to the periphery of state-political life, although 
legally they were not discriminated against. They have been estranged from the ideological, 
political, economic and socio-cultural resources of power and over the years of 
independence this alienation has been strengthened and fostered by the ethnic elements in 
the national-state building. The main limitation of this survey is that its sample does not 
adequately reflect the social, demographic and territorial structure of the population of 
Kazakhstan. Yet, despite these drawbacks, the results of the survey closely correlate with 
other surveys and add a new dimension given the relatively recent date of the research. The 
authors also recommended abandoning the division between the titular and non-titular 
groups and proclaim all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan as ‘state-bearing’. They, however, did 
not specify how these changes should be implemented and how it would impact the 
ethnonational interaction in the future.    
 
All the above surveys have been very useful for my research because they tackled, although 
indirectly, the question of the alteration in status between newly dominant and newly 
subordinate groups. The first three surveys (Masanov (1996), Malkova, Kolstø and 
Melberg (1999) and Hagendoorn et al (2001)) were carried out not long after Kazakhstan 
gained its independence (between 1994-1997) and although their conclusions are quite 
tentative, these surveys indicated how things were in the early 1990s and reflected the 
beginning of the ethnonational interaction between titular and non-titular groups. The 
surveys carried out by Kurganskaya and Dunaev (2002) and Kurganskaya, Dunaev and 
Aitkhozhin (2003) were done after 2000 and hence represent the next stage of 
ethnonational interaction – a helpful secondary source when I come to map Kazakh and 
Russian identities.  
                                                
9 The survey covered 1405 respondents in five oblasts of Kazakhstan, including Almaty, the north (Petropavlovsk and the 
North-Kazakhstani oblast), the south (Chimkent, the South-Kazakhstani and Almaty oblasts), the centre (Astana and 
Akmolinskaya oblast), the east (Ust-Kamenogorsk and East-Kazakhstani oblast) and the west (Atyrau and Atyrauskaya 
oblast). Kazakhs and Russians were somewhat underrepresented in this survey (17.9 and 18.6% respectively) while 
smaller ethnic groups over-represented (64.5%) which in authors’ opinion was justified by the nature and the purpose of 
the research (i.e. to assess the situation in the sphere of protection and observance of minority rights in Kazakhstan).  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One (Introduction) describes the rationale for the dissertation, explains the research 
puzzle and outlines the research design in terms of methodology and analytical framework. 
It also gives a brief overview of literature and a breakdown of the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two (Theoretical Background) explores three separate, yet interrelated strands of 
literature that help to structure both the puzzle and the theoretical framework of the 
research. The first section discusses general concepts of nation, nationalism and ethnicity 
and the different interpretations of them, which exists in the Soviet tradition. The second 
section looks at the question of interactive nationalism and ethnicity and ethnonational 
interaction mapping techniques. The third section outlines the theories of transition, which 
provide the general context for the development of identity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. This 
section also discusses the issues of post-colonialism and post-imperialism as a subtype of 
the political transition, which Kazakhstan has been undergoing.  
In conclusion it explains how the various theoretical strands of the literature are brought 
together into the analytical framework. 
 
Chapter Three (The Development and Interaction of Kazakh and Russian Identities in the 
Tsarist and Soviet Periods) provides some historical background to the identities of 
Kazakhstan – both Kazakh (titular) and Russian (ex-dominant, minority). It focuses on the 
historical and structural governmental factors which affected and partly produced both 
identities. The chapter considers three periods: (1) early steppe history, namely, since the 
ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ first emerged in the 15th century up to the beginning of the 18th 
century, (2) the period of Russian colonialism and (3) the period of Sovietization and their 
impact on both Kazakh and Russian identities. 
 
Chapter Four (The National-State Identity Project of the Republic of Kazakhstan) outlines 
the describes and analyses the attempts made by the Kazakh national elite to develop a new 
national-state identity. The first section examines the character and development of the 
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official Kazakh/Kazakhstani national state identity project with its rather contradictory 
civic and ethnic ‘Kazakh state elements. The second section describes and assesses the 
actual implementation of selected key ‘nationalising’ policies, to which my Kazakh and 
Russian respondents reacted. It also examines how far this project fits the definition of 
‘nationalising state’ proposed by Brubaker (1996). 
 
Chapter Five (Emerging Hegemonic Identity? The Kazakh Response to the National-State 
Identity Project of the Republic of Kazakhstan) investigates on the basis of my survey 
material whether Kazakhs – the newly empowered group of Kazakhstan – have developed a 
coherent hegemonic identity and looks at the factors that contribute or inhibit its 
consolidation. The first part examines how Kazakhs interpret various concepts that relate to 
the nationality issues (natsional’nost’ (nationality), natsiya (nation), etnicheskaya gruppa 
(ethnic group), etc.), which will be followed by two more sections that focus on the 
‘external’ and ‘internal’ aspects of Kazakh identity. The ‘external’ factors include the 
attitudes of my Kazakh respondents to the creation of independent Kazakhstan and to key 
foreign states and peoples, and the ‘internal’ factors include the attitudes of Kazakhs to the 
Soviet past, to the nationalising policies and practices of the new state and to the questions 
of loyalty, integration and out-migration of the Russian population.  
 
Chapter Six (An Emerging Minority Identity? The Russian Response to the National-State 
Identity Project of the Republic of Kazakhstan) looks at whether the Russians – the newly 
subordinate groups of Kazakhstan – have developed a coherent minority identity and at the 
factors that contribute to or inhibit its consolidation. Specifically, I will explore, on the 
basis for my survey materials, how Russians interpret various terms that relate to the 
nationality issue and then in two section will examine the different ways in which a new 
Russian identity is being and can be crystallised in Kazakhstan. That is, I will look at how 
Russians have reacted to the creation of an independent Kazakhstan and its new position in 
the world (external identity) and at how they view various nationalising policies – 
linguistic, cultural, economic and demographic (internal identity). 
 
 26 
Chapter Seven (Trends of Ethno-National Interaction between Kazakhs and Russians) looks 
at the patterns of ethnic stratification and ethno-national interaction between Kazakhs and 
Russians during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Specifically, I will ‘map’ ethnic 
stratification in Kazakhstan by using the model devised by D. Horowitz (1985) and 
elaborated by A. Juska (1999) and by extrapolating two additional models from it that will 
attempt to capture the changes of ethnic re-stratification between the Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods. I will also supplement the developments in ethnic stratification by ‘mapping’ 
ethnonational relations between Kazakhs and Russians and locating their type in a 
generalized scheme of types of ethnic interaction, developed by R.A. Schermerhorn (1970). 
This will help to indicate changes in status over time by locating the status position in the 
Soviet period and the likely future position towards which the status relations are moving.  
 
Chapter Eight (Conclusion) reviews the argument, summarises the main new findings and 
methods of the research, and discusses the implications of this study for further research in 
this area. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I shall analyze the concepts and theories, which I propose to use in the 
analysis of my empirical work. Given that there is no a ready made methodology for 
analyzing national identity, I propose to bring together concepts, ideas and theories from 
various types of disciplines because national identity is a complex and many-sided concept 
and it cannot be tackled from one particular angle. First, I am going to discuss general 
concepts of nations and nationalism and ethnicity and the very different interpretation of 
them, which exists in the Soviet tradition. Secondly, I am going to look at the question of 
interactive nationalism and ethnicity and ethnonational interaction mapping techniques. 
Thirdly, I am going to look at theories of transition, which set the general context for the 
development of identity in Kazakhstan and in connection with that I will also look at a 
particular type of post-imperial transition that Kazakhstan has been undergoing. Finally, I 
will bring together various theoretical strands at the end of the chapter into some analytical 
framework, which I make use of in my analysis.  
 
2.2 Discussion of Main Concepts in the Analysis of Nationalism and Ethnicity 
 
Nation, nationalism 
Although there is no consensus on the exact time when the term ‘nation’ came into being, 
most scholars agree that its modern use developed roughly from the time of the French 
Revolution to mean an active citizenry in a state able to determine the character of their 
political system. In other words, a nation is a political community, which is linked to a 
particular territory, culture, and an existing or potential statehood. This means that from the 
very start the term nation has been closely associated with the principle of self-
determination, democracy and belonging to a state and had an emotional connotation of 
status: a ‘nation’ is more than a ‘people’, it is a sovereign people.  
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The term nationalism came into use in the 20th century to denote an ideology and a form of 
political behaviour. The ideology of nationalism builds on people’s awareness of 
nationhood (or national self-consciousness) and promotes the idea of ‘national self-
determination’ or ‘home rule’, especially in a colonial setting. As a form of political 
behaviour, nationalism can mean either a movement to gain statehood for one’s nation or to 
assert aggressively one’s own ‘national’ interests over those of others. In this way it is 
closely linked to ethnocentrism – a tendency to view the in-group members (be that an 
ethnic group, nation or race) in a positive light and the out-group members (other ethnic 
groups, nations or races) in a negative light – and patriotism – a strong commitment of 
citizens to their state or an overzealous promotion of state interests by its elites (Kellas 
1991:3-5).  
 
The term ‘nation’ is frequently used interchangeably with the term ‘state’: thus the 
adjective ‘national’ comes to mean ‘belonging to the state’ and ‘nationality’ denotes an 
official status of belonging to a state. It is important to notice, however, that in ethnic 
nationalisms, nationality becomes ‘a synonym of ‘ethnicity’ and national identity is often 
perceived as a reflection or awareness of possession of ‘primordial’ or inherent group 
characteristics, components of ethnicity, such as language, customs, territorial affiliation, 
and physical type’ (Greenfeld 1992:12). This is not to say that ethnicity in itself is 
conducive to nationality, but rather its elements can be used in various ways in constructing 
any number of identities, including national. Nationality, by contrast provides an 
organizing principle (the principle of popular sovereignty and the principle of fundamental 
equality of membership in the community) that can be applied to different contexts, fusing 
and transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity (ibid.: 13,14).  
 
Identity, national identity, identity in transition vs consolidated identity 
Elusive and misappropriated, identity is at a minimum a troublesome concept. It will be 
understood here as ‘a provisional stabilization of a sense of self or group that is formed in 
actual historical time and space, in evolving economies, polities, and cultures, as a 
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continuous search for some solidity in a constantly shifting world – but without closure, 
without forever naturalizing or essentialising the provisional identities arrived at’ (Suny, 
1999/2000:144). Some observers have noted (Laitin, 1998, Suny, 2001, Opalski, 2001) that 
sensitivity to both the fluidity and historical constructedness of identities and to the popular 
and nationalists’ apprehension of identities as fixed, internally harmonious and marked by 
historical longevity, if not rooted in nature, can help the researcher to avoid, first, 
essentialism and, second, reification. Essentialism can be defined as the attribution of 
particular thinking or patterns of behaviour to the innate, fundamental and in extreme cases 
biologically determined nature of a person or group. Identity theory offers an alternative to 
essentialism by stressing that rather than having a fixed and immutable identity, persons or 
groups tend to inhabit multiple, overlapping and situational identities that are produced in 
inter-subjective understandings. Reification can be defined as the presentation of the 
products of human activity as if they were not the products of human activity, but the facts 
of nature, the results of cosmic laws or manifestations of divine will. Identity theory instead 
points to the centrality of human agency in the construction of any identity.  
 
Identities can be of very different kinds, denoting loyalties to various groups, which are not 
mutually exclusive – personal, cultural, political, class etc. 'National' identity essentially 
means identification with a ‘nation’ or ‘nation-state’. In this respect the term ‘national 
identity’ has the same ambiguity as the term ‘nation’ has. It can refer either to a people in a 
state, i.e. citizenry of the state, or to a people wanting a state. National identity comes to 
mean a set of characteristics expected of a member of a particular nation or state. These can 
be a matter of discussion and change, but tend to revolve around features such as language, 
culture, political allegiance, religion or territorial origins. Thus, national identity is 
fundamentally complex and multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a single element. 
It can draw on elements of other types of collective identity – class, religious, or ethnic – 
and be linked with ideologies such as liberalism, fascism and communism (Smith 1991:14). 
 
All identities, including the national one, are constantly changing with changing 
circumstances, but there are times when elements of identity are much more in flux and 
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there are other times when a relatively stable or ‘consolidated’10 set of characteristics is 
observable. A ‘consolidated’ identity can be defined as a new type of identity, which 
becomes developed and stable around a particular principle or status. A national identity 
can be called ‘consolidated’ when it coalesces or crystallises around a new concept of 
nationhood or a new national status (e.g. when there has been a shift from a dominant 
national status to a subordinate minority status, which will be discussed later). It has to be 
noted that the word ‘consolidated’ does not mean that identity has become ‘fixed’ or 
‘complete’, but rather it means that it stabilized into some kind of equilibrium. The 
principle behind the concept of ‘consolidated identity’ is inspired by the concept of 
‘consolidated democracy’, which is commonly used in democratization literature. It 
essentially means that the basic new institutions are working and there is a consistent 
system, which has developed11. Identity and national identity works on the same principle. 
It becomes ‘consolidated’ when there are periods of stability or equilibrium in between 
constant flux, which is a normal state of affairs. 
 
The concepts of ‘consolidated’ identities and identities in transition can also be loosely tied 
to the concepts of banality and extremity of national identity (Billig, 1995, Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001). That is, during the periods of relative stability the identities of individuals 
and groups tend to stay in the background and people are unable to see ‘how they frame the 
ways in which [they] order their priorities, the ways in which [they] define the relevance of 
phenomena, the ways in which [they] relate to and evaluate others and, most importantly, in 
which others order [them] about’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001:222). During the periods of 
transition and flux, by contrast, the events may be construed as putting ‘banal’ identities in 
question and people may feel that what they took as a solid structure or base is in fact fluid 
and uncertain. At that point their identities come to the foreground and acquire special 
significance. Reicher and Hopkins have usefully pointed out that individuals and groups 
can ‘get very emotional about events that impinge on [their] national identit[ies] because 
                                                
10 For definition of this concept see note on p. 13. 
11 According to Linz and Stepan, democracy becomes ‘consolidated’ if it has in place five interacting arenas – 
civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society – to reinforce one another in 
order for such consolidation to exist (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 7-15). 
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national identity makes everyday life possible in a world of nations’ (ibid.). The latter 
statement may perhaps be viewed with a bit of irony by some secure communities like the 
English in the UK, but not by the East European minorities and all ethnic groups in the 
post-Soviet space who would take it very seriously. This is because the senses of their 
national selves are still relatively unstable and they are still unsure whether their interests 
and fears will be taken into account. There are signs that their identities are gradually 
consolidating around the new concepts of nationhood, but they have not become ‘banal’ yet 
in Billig’s sense of the term. 
 
Ethnicity, ethnic group 
The concept of ethnicity is also relatively new, emerging in social science discourse only in 
the 20th century (McCrone 1998:22). At the beginning it was used in social anthropology to 
denote ‘people’ (Greek ethnos), while ‘ethnography’ was related to the act of observing the 
behaviour and mores of various peoples and producing a written description thereof 
(Marshall 1994:202). After the Second World War the adjective ‘ethnic’ was applied to the 
new immigrants of the industrial states, notably the United States, who differed 
considerably from the core population. Anthony Smith stressed that ethnicity was reserved 
for numerical and sociological minorities and never to numerical and sociological 
majorities, even if they were not indigenous (Smith 2004:17). Later on the term ethnicity 
was used to classify various groups of the population according to their cultural traits or as 
representatives of various peoples. In this sense, an ethnic group stood for a part of a named 
population living in a multiethnic state. The dichotomy between non-ethnic ‘us’ and ethnic 
‘them’ continued to haunt the concept of ethnicity well into the late 1980s - early 1990s 
when it started to be applied to majorities and minorities, host and immigrant communities 
alike.  
 
There is no agreed definition of the term ‘ethnicity’. In the contemporary political usage, 
however, the term is primarily restricted to ‘a quasi-national kind of “minority group” 
within the state which has somehow not achieved the status of a “nation”’ (Kellas 1991:4). 
If understood in these terms, an ethnic group is different from a nation. It is smaller and 
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more exclusive or ascriptive, meaning that membership in such a group is restricted to 
those who share certain characteristics, like language, religion, traditions and even physical 
type. This is not to say that ethnicity is completely static and exclusive. It has a dynamics of 
its own and can change up to a certain point provided the change is considered ‘authentic’ 
among the members of the in-group (Fishman 1994). By contrast, nations are more 
inclusive and can be both culturally and politically defined. Another important 
characteristic of ethnicity is that it is not necessarily attached to territory or a political unit, 
unlike nationhood, or as Timothy M. Frye put it:  
 
ethnic groups may or may not feel a sense of nationalism, that is they may or may not seek 
the creation of a nation-state that corresponds to a given territory. The sense of nation has a 
territorial aspect absent from ethnicity, since a member of an ethnic group living abroad can 
share a sense of identity with a co-ethnic in the home country quite apart from feeling an 
attachment to a nation-state (Frye 1992:602-603).  
 
Ethnic groups with a territorial link are termed ‘indigenous’, ‘primary’, ‘autochthonous’, 
‘host’, ‘territorially-based’ or ‘titular’, while those without it are ‘immigrant’, ‘secondary’ 
‘extraterritorial’, ‘dispersed’, ‘non-indigenous’ ‘non-titular’. Territoriality usually tends to 
determine whether the group would politicize their culture or integrate (Smith 2004:19) and 
it also provides people with a ‘much more distinct historical and cultural identity as well as 
more clearly identifiable cultural, economic and political interests’ (Karklins 1989:6).  
 
By and large scholars agree that although ethnic and nationalist politics are different, this 
differentiation can be overcome if the political agenda of an ethnic group is linked to the 
nationalist doctrine of self-determination and the creation of a nation-state corresponding to 
their territorial homeland. Kellas, for instance, has pointed out that nationalism focuses on 
‘national self-determination’ or home rule, while ethnic politics is largely concerned with 
the protection of rights for members of the group within the existing state with no claim for 
a territorial homeland (1991:6). Therefore, ethnic groups may form the core of nationalist 
movements, and when they do, they shift from being ethnic to (ethno) national groups.  
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The concept of dominant (or hegemonic) ethnicity 
Another important concept that is useful for this research is the concept of dominant 
ethnicity. Eric Kaufmann has defined dominant ethnicity as a ‘phenomenon whereby a 
particular ethnic group exercises dominance within a nation and/ or a state. It is a living and 
breathing ethnic community that may give birth to, but is by no means coterminous with 
the nation-state’ (Kaufmann 2004:1,3). This is possibly why the nation and the dominant 
ethnic group are usually conflated in popular mind and in the scholarly literature (for 
example, the French in France, Germans in Germany, Russians in Russia). The concept of a 
dominant ethnicity indeed overlaps with the concept of a nation, but it should not be 
reduced to either a background or an ethnonational force. After all, ‘not all nationalist 
movements are driven by a single ethnic group, nor do all ethnic revivals lead to a 
campaign for national sovereignty’ (Frye 1992:603). A dominant ethnicity is better defined 
as an active sub-national player that  
 
exercises power to create and maintain a pattern of economic, political and institutional 
advantage, which in turn results in the unequal (disproportionately beneficial to the 
dominant group) distribution of resources. With respect to inter-group relations, a key 
element of dominance is the disproportionate ability to shape the sociocultural 
understandings of society, especially those involving group identity and inter-group 
interactions (Doane 1997:376). 
 
The origins of ethnic dominance lie in historical processes of conquest, colonialism and 
labour migration. These situations fostered inter-group contact, resource competition, and 
power differentials and usually resulted in a system of ethnic stratification (Lieberson 1961, 
Shibutani and Kwan 1965, Schermerhorn 1970). It is important to notice, however, that 
dominance of an ethnic group is not absolute and not all members of the group will have 
similar levels of identification and will be involved in-group mobilisation. Moreover, 
without the existence of a rigid caste system, the dominant group’s power becomes 
restrained by the subordinate groups’ actions (Schermerhorn 1970, Horowitz 1985, 
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Hennayake 1992, Weber 1991). Therefore, dominant-subordinate relations should be 
considered as a dialectical process that structures power levels and institutional 
arrangements through inter-group struggle (Schermerhorn 1970, Smith 2004).  
 
Varieties of dominant ethnicity 
Ethnic groups can dominate a nation or a state in a variety of ways. In pre-1960s Quebec, 
for instance, pure laines Québécois dominated politically and culturally, but not 
economically. It is important to emphasise that the dominant ethnic group does not have to 
dominate the state in which its nation resides. This is the case with the Scots and the Welsh 
who dominate their respective Scottish and Welsh nations, but not the British state. In fact 
it is possible for a culturally dominant nation to be politically subordinate (for instance, the 
Basques and Catalans under Franco’s Spain or the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians 
under the Soviet rule.)  
 
Today many ethnic minorities like Chinese, Indians, Jews and Whites in developing 
countries control the economy, but have no political power. This makes them vulnerable to 
discrimination and in rare cases even genocide in a world of popular democratisation and 
economic liberalisation (Chua 2003). Indeed, ‘if a national group has full language rights 
and control over immigration, education, and resource development policy, then its long-
term viability is secured, if it lacks these rights and powers, its long-term viability [could 
be] in … jeopardy’ (Kymlicka 1999:140). In many colonial settings, settler groups like 
Afrikaners, Rhodesians, Baltic Russians and earlier Baltic Germans used to enjoy political 
and economic, but not cultural dominance. Their position has been recently challenged by 
the renewed legitimacy of the democratic self-determination principle and all of them share 
a sense of loss and face a crisis of ethnic legitimation. Demographic dominance is also 
uncertain and illusory. Despite the fact that ‘numbers count in the quest for political 
domination’ (Horowitz 1985:194), dominant ethnies like pre-2003 Iraqi Sunnies and pre-
1999 Kazakhs did not even comprise a plurality of the population. This supports 
Brubaker’s argument that dominant or minority status is not determined by an ‘objective 
 35 
fact of ethnic demography’, but channeled and shaped by the national scheme of social 
classification that is institutionalized by a particular state (Brubaker 1996:48).  
 
Elements and sources of dominant ethnicity 
As argued above, ethnic dominance can be found in all sorts of different contexts and ways 
and there is no agreement among scholars on the necessary key ingredients of ethnic 
dominance. R. A. Schermerhorn (1970), for instance, looks at the political power of ethnic 
groups and their ranking within ethnic power systems. Donald Horowitz (1985) and Ashley 
W. Doane (1997) emphasize politico-economic hegemony, while Anthony Smith argues 
that it is indigenousness that constitutes the key determinant of dominant ethnicity. The 
latter argument is especially relevant in the modern, post-imperial age where ‘foreign’ rule 
is deemed illegitimate. Other elements may include the distribution of moral worth 
(Horowitz 1985, Weber 1991) and demographic preponderance of a particular ethnic group, 
especially in the context of a severely divided society. None of the above factors, however, 
is decisive on its own and it is possibly political-military power combined with either 
economic power or indigenous entitlement that is generally decisive. The distribution of 
moral worth can be considered as a by-product of a political-military power when the group 
has the ability and the resources to construct and restructure the socio-cultural 
understandings of society and protect the desired narrative from deconstruction. As for 
demographic preponderance, although it is desirable, there are a number of cases where the 
lack of it has not prevented the groups from being dominant.  
 
Minority ethnicity, ethnic minorities, national minorities 
The term ‘national minority’ is also complex and has various interpretations by different 
scholars. Louis Wirth, for example, defines an ethnic minority as a ‘group of people who, 
because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the 
society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard 
themselves as objects of collective discrimination’ (in Marshal 1998:420-421). Anthony 
Giddens similarly stresses that members of a minority group are usually ‘disadvantaged as 
compared with the majority population and have some sense of group solidarity, of 
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belonging together. The experience of being the subject of prejudice and discrimination 
usually heightens feelings of common loyalty and interests’ (Giddens 2001:248). 
 
One important characteristic of the term ‘minority’ is that it is mainly used in relation to a 
group’s subordinate position within society rather than its numerical representation. Thus a 
national minority is ‘not simply a group that is given by the facts of ethnic demography’ 
(Brubaker 1996:60), but a group, which is ‘marginal in terms of [its] access to power’ 
(Marshal 1998:420-421). The study of ethnic and national minorities has recently been 
linked to the broader study of exclusion, labelling, stigma, racism, sexism, homophobia and 
authoritarian personality. 
 
Rogers Brubaker has usefully identified three elements that are typical of a national 
minority political stance. In particular national minorities tend to 1) publicly claim that they 
belong to an ethnocultural nation different from the numerical or politically dominant 
ethnocultural nation; 2) demand that the state would recognise their distinct ethnocultural 
nationality; and 3) assert, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, that they are entitled 
to certain collective cultural or political rights. The latter may range from limited demands 
for education and administration in the minority language to far-reaching claims for 
territorial and political autonomy and even secession. The minorities may also opt for full 
participation in the institutions of the host state, including participation in coalition 
governments, or alternatively favour a separatist and non-cooperative stance. Some 
minority members would try to demonstrate their loyalty to the state in which they live and 
hold citizenship and avoid making contacts with external parties, while others may openly 
look for help and support from their external national homeland, other states or 
international organisations (Brubaker 1996:60-61). 
  
General theories of nationalism and ethnicity 
The above discussion of key concepts regarding nations, nationalism and ethnicity should 
be seen, of course, in the context of broader theories of nationalism. I am not going to 
discuss these in detail here, because in my work I am not directly applying or testing any of 
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these theories. This is because my work looks primarily at the development of national and 
ethnic identities within an existing state and the interaction between majority and minority 
identities, whereas most of the theories of nations and nationalism are mainly concerned 
with the ultimate origins of nationalism in general. It might be useful, however, if I briefly 
made my position clear on some of the main debates and also specified which theories 
provided the most useful insights for my research. 
 
Perhaps the most central debate in theoretical discussions of nationalism and ethnicity has 
been that between ‘primordialism’ and ‘modernism’, or in other words, between national 
and ethnic continuity with the past and the construction/ invention/ imagination by elites of 
a new type of community appropriate for the industrial age. It will be obvious from my 
argument, which has stressed the primordialist understandings of ethnicity and nationalism 
in the post-Soviet context, that this is highly relevant for my work. Without going into the 
detail of this debate I should make clear that my position is a synthesis of these views, 
which is broadly similar to that espoused by Anthony Smith in his discussion of this 
question. Specifically Smith argued that the concepts of nations and nationalism are largely 
modern and that they have been subjected to much ‘construction’, ‘invention’ and political 
manipulation by elites, but at the same time these concepts are also based on a broad 
substratum of preexisting cultures and history, or ethnies, without which they cannot 
generate a sense of solidarity and purpose in a modern era (Smith, 1986, 1991). Some 
observers have pointed out Smith definitions of nations and nationalism are too restrictive 
and overloaded with a list of characteristics, but nevertheless his discussion of national 
identity has been very useful for my research and I have made some use of his concept of 
an ‘ethnie’ as a pre-national type of community. This intermediate position is becoming 
increasingly common, as can be seen in the revival of interest in the work of 
'ethnonationalists' like Walker Connor (see Conversi 2002) and in the recent work of David 
Laitin (2007). Nevertheless, the work of the 'modernists' such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and 
Anderson still offer important insights to which reference will be made in this work.  
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There has also been a related debate over the 'civic' or 'ethnic' character of nationalism, or 
in other words, whether these terms should be seen as logical opposites or as mixed in 
theory and practice. There is a growing acceptance that ethnocultural neutrality of civic 
nations is a myth both historically and conceptually and that both ethnic and civic 
nationalisms have a cultural or ethnic component. Will Kymicka, for example, claimed that 
the newly established states of Eastern Europe have used many of the same nation-building 
strategies that ‘civic’ nations of the West have. These include: 
 
1. official language policies; 
2. attempts to create a uniform system of national education; 
3. migration and naturalization policies – that is, favouring co-ethnics in admissions decisions; 
requiring migrants to adopt a common national identity as a condition of naturalization; 
4. the redrawing of administrative districts to dilute the weight of minorities in each of them; 
5. the centralization of power, so that all decisions are made in a context where the dominant 
group forms a clear majority (Kymlicka, 2001:53) 
 
Hence, Kymlicka proposed to view nationalisms not in terms of their ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ 
character, but rather in terms of their ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ orientation. Kymlicka suggested 
that ‘liberal’ nationalisms usually use a smaller degree of coercion to promote national 
identity; have a ‘thinner’ and more inclusive definition of a national community and share 
public space with those national minorities that consistently and democratically insisted on 
their national distinctiveness (ibid. 54-58). George Schöpflin has similarly argued that in 
Western ‘civic’ nationalisms, ethnicity is not somehow left behind, but rather it is contained 
and contextualized by the strong state institutions and civil societies, which ensure that 
ethnicity is not the only source of political power. In Eastern ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, by 
contrast, the state and civil society are weak and ethnicity is required to fulfill the roles that 
it cannot discharge (such as, e.g. providing the criteria for citizenship) and this gives rise to 
the situation whereby all or virtually all power is exercised by ethnic criteria (Schöpflin, 
2000:44, Introduction, Chapters 2 and 3). Schöpflin’s definition of a nation and his 
distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms are particularly useful for 
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understanding the ethnicisation of politics in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states. The 
civic – ethnic debate is also relevant to my discussion of the Kazakhstani national project in 
chapter 4 and to my respondents’ responses to the nationalizing policies.  
 
The two general approaches to nationalism and ethnicity, which in some ways I have found 
most useful are the 'political' approach of writers such as Breuilly (1993) and the concept of 
historical 'ressentiment' as developed by Greenfeld (1992). Breuilly's insight has been to 
see nationalism and ethnicity very much as a political phenomenon, in which political elites 
manipulate the cultural and sociological heritage for their own internal interests and in the 
broader interests of state-building. This fits in very well with my discussion of what 
Brubaker calls 'nationalising policies', i.e., measures taken by the political elites in newly 
independent states to boost their political position by policies designed to revive and 
develop 'national' identity based on the dominant ethnic culture. Greenfeld's (1992) insight 
was to understand nationalism and ethnicity as a competitive and imitative international 
process deeply concerned with feelings of the status and self-confidence of communities 
which resent previous cultural (often imperial) domination and whose elites, anxious to 
reinforce their own status, set out deliberately to revive an older culture while denigrating 
the previous dominant culture, in order to stimulate national revival and independence. It is 
clear that this approach is highly relevant to my work on status reversal amongst identities, 
and I shall frequently make use of it in my analysis. 
 
Soviet etnografiya (ethnography): Soviet approaches to ethnicity and nationalism  
Another important issue that has to be briefly addressed in this section is the question of the 
Soviet approaches to the theories of ethnicity and nationalism, which are still deeply 
ingrained in the popular understanding of these questions as well as in post-Soviet 
academia and political decision-making.  
 
The Soviet academic debate on ethnicity, national identity and nationalism (known under 
the broad title of etnografiya) took place within the framework of a Marxist-Leninist 
theoretical perspective, which prescribed an inherently deterministic and evolutionist 
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approach to nationalities theory. It was argued that the first communities of people were 
clan and tribal ones, based on blood relationships, and associated with the Marxist-defined 
‘primitive’ and ‘communal’ systems of organization. With the development of the early 
‘slave-owning’ and ‘feudal’ class societies, a new type of community, the narodnost’ (an 
untranslatable Soviet term denoting something between a tribe and a nation – perhaps like 
Smith’s ethnie), emerged. The narodnost’ possessed a certain linguistic, cultural and 
territorial unity, but in a significantly less developed and less stable way than the ‘nation’ 
(natsiya). Nations themselves first emerged during the rise of capitalism, initially as 
‘bourgeois nations’. A nation is defined as ‘a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make up, manifested in a common culture’ (Stalin, quoted in Hutchinson and 
Smith, 1994:20-21). 
 
Under the socialist system, bourgeois nations (characterized by class conflict, distrust and 
hatred of other nations and oppression of national minorities) become socialist nations, 
(which are classless and stand for equality and friendship between peoples). In addition, 
under socialism, earlier forms of community can move directly to the socialist nation stage, 
bypassing capitalism all together. However, not all narodnosti are expected to transform 
into nations, with the less stable and least developed groups often undergoing a ‘merging’ 
(sliyanie) with a developed ‘nation’ they are in close economic and territorial contact with. 
The concept of the ‘Soviet people’ (sovetskii narod) was based on this principle in the 
sense that with socialism’s establishment, the proletariat of different Soviet nations would 
experience gradual ‘sblizhenie’ (coming together) and eventual ‘sliyanie’ (merger). 
Ultimately, the nation is seen as a ‘historical category’ with a beginning and an end. Indeed, 
after the inevitable global victory of socialism, and the creation of a single world socialist 
economy, all socialist nations merge into one whole. As part of this process, national 
languages and formerly oppressed nations will initially develop and flourish, leading to 
greater trust and friendship between peoples. Finally, individual nations will disappear 
altogether, and a single international culture will emerge (Central Asian Review, 1962:317-
318) 
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Perhaps the two individual scholars that have had the strongest influence on the theories of 
ethnicity in the Soviet period were Yulian Bromlei and Lev Gumilev.  Central to Bromlei’s 
analysis was the concept of the ‘etnos’. Bromlei  defined an etnos as ‘a historically stable 
entity of people developed on a certain territory and possessing common, relatively stable 
features of culture (including language) and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity 
and of their difference from other similar entities (self-awareness) fixed in a self-name 
(ethnonym)’ (1981:27). In addition, Bromlei invented a taxonomy of overlapping terms to 
describe different elements of ethnic identification. The first of these is the Ethno-social 
organism or ESO - a territorial, economic and ethnic community, which perhaps comes 
closest to the western definition of a dominant ethnicity in a nation-state. The second one is 
etnikos – an etnos who live in different states outside their ESO, which perhaps correspond 
most closely to the western term ‘diaspora’ or ‘national minority’. Lastly, Bromlei 
identifies ethnolinguistic (or ethnocultural) and ethnoreligious elements to ethnicity, such 
as the Slavic or Turkic-speaking groups, or even Islamic identity.  
 
Despite its sensitivity towards aspects of identity and self-awareness, Bromlei’s etnos 
theory was mainly based on such factors as exclusive group membership and status 
reflected in titular statehoods granted to the major non-Rusian nationalities in the Soviet 
Union. Those who had their ‘own’ union or autonomous republics were considered 
‘socialist nations’, the highest type of ethnos. Those with a lower status of administrative 
autonomy (like the Northern indigenous peoples), or who did not have any status at all (like 
Volga Germans) were dismissed as narodnosti. Thus, according to Bromlei and his 
followers, ‘nation’ is not an ethnic group with a titular statehood – it is exclusively that part 
of the group, which resides on its ‘own’ national territory. To more adequately address 
Soviet realities and the ideological innovation of a ‘new entity of people – the Soviet 
people’ (sovetskii narod) – ethnographers had to invent a notion of ‘meta-ethnic 
community’ (Bromlei, 1987:37) echoing Gumilev’s rhetoric on‘super-etnosy’ such as 
Eastern Slavs or Turks.  
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Lev Gumilev – the second well-known influential author – has gained enormous popularity 
in the late Soviet and especially post-Soviet period. Some of his highly controversial works 
– The Geography of the Nation and Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth - were 
banned until the late 1980s and became bestsellers when they were finally published in 
1989 and 1990. For Gumilev ‘ethnos’ is ‘a form of existence of Homo sapiens as a species’ 
and ‘a phenomenon on the border of biosphere (biosfery) and sociosphere (sotsiosfery) 
which has a special function in the structure of the biosphere of the Earth (v stroenii 
biosphery zemli)’ (2004:17). Gumilev included in the category of ‘ethnos’ virtually all 
historically known cultural, political, religious and other formations, including rodovoi 
soyuz (a possible translation is a clan unit as a sub-tribal entity), plemya (tribe), narodnost 
(ethnic group), narod (people) and natsiya (nation), and narod (people). Depending on 
landscape, ‘energy resources’(!) and particularly internal ‘passionarism’ (passionarnost’)12, 
etnosy, as described by Gumilev, lived their own lives of about 1200-1500 years passing 
through the various stages or ‘phases’ of ethnogenesis - rise, breakdown, intertia, and 
finally death.  
 
Gumilev distinguished three types of relations among etnosy. The first, ‘symbiosis’ 
(simbioz), amounted to a peaceful coexistence of self-contained etnosy occupying specific 
ecological niches and preserving their cultural distinctiveness. The second, ‘xenia’ 
(kseniya), was a parasitic relationship in which a smaller ethnos lived on the ‘body’ of a 
larger ethnos. As long as the guest-ethnos inflicted no harm on the host-ethnos, interethnic 
peace could be preserved. ‘Xenia’, however, easily slipped into ‘chimera’ (khimera), the 
third pattern of inter-ethnic relations, which made bloody conflicts unavoidable, and 
typically resulted in the annihilation of one of the sides. Etnosy grew deep territorial roots, 
but only one ethnos, the indigenous one, could lay claim to a specific territory. To establish 
the socio-cultural development of ancient etnosy, which usually began with the discussion 
of archaeological artifacts, anthropologists and ethnographers spent decades tracing the 
evolution of etnosy from Neolithic times and mapping their material culture. 
                                                
12 By ‘passionarism’ Gumilev meant a hightened activity of a ‘young’ ethnos, asserting its distinctiveness and 
the right to preserve and reproduce their culture. 
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Valery Tishkov severely criticized the works of Gumilev and argued that they were ‘ridden 
with construed pseudo-scholarly terms and categories which could never be placed in any 
disciplinary discourse or tested seriously’ (1998:3). At the same time he acknowledged that 
Gumilev was one of the few scholars who drew attention to previously ignored factual 
materials regarding the role of other cultures and peoples in Russia’s past, as well as 
mutually enriching cultural interactions and cooperation. This represented a step away from 
the traditional myth of a national history full of ‘invaders’, ‘the yoke’, ‘patriotic wars’ and 
other clichés of official Russo-centric Soviet historiography. These aspects of Gumilev’s 
work explain, in Tishkov’s view, his popularity among non-Russian audiences in general 
and among a segment of non-Russian intellectuals and elites in particular.  
 
With the emergence of ethnic politics in the crumbling USSR, and especially after the 
break up of the Soviet Union, the 'primordial' understanding of ethnicity and nationalism 
took on an added dimension which had implications for the construction of new identities 
as well as for the purposes of political discourse. The term ethnos became a central theme 
in intellectual and political debates of that time. Today the historical records are being re-
worked and reinvented on a massive scale by ethnic elites seeking to elevate the status of 
their groups in the political hierarchy of etnosy (Suny, 2001, Opalski, 2001).  
 
The differences between Soviet and western conceptions of nationalism, ethnicity and 
related concepts, still very influential amongst the post-Soviet populations, academics and 
political leaders, represented a constant problem in my research interviews and I shall refer 
frequently to these discrepancies in my research chapters. 
 
2.3 National Identity Formation and Interactive Nationalism 
 
Before looking at theories of interaction and formation of national identity, it is important 
to note that the very notion of an identity implies an ‘other’ from whom one is different. If 
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identity is about sameness, about identifying with those who are similar, it is also about 
difference, about distinguishing oneself from those who are dissimilar. This section will 
argue that the development of national identity involves selecting and mobilising particular 
types of differences, contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that can justify and ensure a desired 
trajectory for a nation. These differences can be ‘hardened, fixed into value-laden absolutes 
of various kinds, and lead to or require the construction of boundaries and barriers, both 
material and symbolic whose intent or effect is to exclude a negatively defined ‘other’’ 
(Spencer & Wollman 2002:57). This, however, is not a natural and organic process that 
happens, as presented by political and cultural entrepreneurs, by itself. Rather it involves 
‘the deployment of powerful agencies, messages and symbols for particular purposes and 
may involve conflict and contestation between existing and potential nations, between 
competing nationalists and between nationalists and others’ (ibid.: 58). This section, 
therefore, will pay particular attention to those factors that frame the ‘significant’ or 
‘hostile’ other and make identity salient. 
 
In general, Shantha K. Hennayake (1992) has distinguished between two types of 
nationalism that are relevant for our case study, namely, hegemonic (civic) and ethnic. 
Hegemonic nationalism offers a degree of integration to ethnic minorities as it promotes 
equality under law, universal adult franchise and secular political parties. Ethnic 
nationalism, on the other hand, comes about when the dominant group resists integration of 
ethnic minorities and fears that cultural norms will be diluted by ethnic strangers. 
Hennayake claims that elements of ethnonationalism are employed in virtually all nation-
states (e.g. language laws, demographic engineering, etc.), although their intensity and 
content may vary from case to case. If, however, majority ethnonationalism becomes very 
explicit, it is usually attributed to several factors. In particular it occurs:  
 
1. when the present majority nation has been subordinated previously under colonialism 
and/ or imperialism – for example, the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; 
2. where the majority ethnonationalism, especially its popular element, has been 
suppressed – as was the case in pre-revolution Iran; 
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3. when the majority nation is threatened by external forces – for example, pre-
Bangladesh East Pakistan – or by internal forces – for example, growing Hindu 
nationalism in India in the face of growing Islamic fundamentalism; 
4. when the economic resources of a multi-ethnic nation-state are limited – for example, 
the situation of the Malays in Malaysia; 
5. to solicit support for the adventurist politics of the state – as in Nazi Germany; 
6. to regain lost pride – as in post-war France; 
7. when the survival of the majority nation is threatened – as in Israel today (Hennayake 
1992:529). 
 
Hennayake has pointed out that nationalism on the part of the ‘majority’ nation is ‘the 
major causal factor in the emergence of minority ethnic nationalism’ (ibid. 527). In other 
words, when majority nationalism becomes both ‘overt’ and ‘exclusionary’ (i.e. when the 
majority tries to openly assert its hegemony in the state as with ‘nationalising policies’), a 
reactive nationalism is stimulated among ‘minorities’ in the state.  
 
It is important to note that not all ethnic groups are able or willing to counter majority 
ethnonationalism, or at least not to the same degree. Some may find that majority’s policies 
have little or no effect on their material and symbolic well-being or that they have no 
resources or ‘territorial link’ to develop an ethnonationalist agenda. Moreover, this 
approach implies that interethnic tensions between the majority and minority groups are not 
inevitable, but amenable to management and negotiation. Indeed, if the majority nation can 
adopt exclusive policies to establish its hegemony in the state, it can also adopt more 
conciliatory policies and include all ethnic groups as full and equal participants in the 
socio-economic and political life of the country.  
 
Interactive nationalism theory provides a good theoretical basis for the analysis of the 
relationships between the titular nations and Russians in the post-Soviet states. Yet this 
relationship contains a further complicating factor – the role of the external national 
homeland – Russia. An international triangular interactive process, including ‘titular’ 
nationalism, ‘counter-hegemonic’ nationalism of local Russians and Russia’s homeland 
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nationalism, provides a better picture of interaction than the two dimensional ‘chain-
reaction’ approach (Brubaker 1996). Rogers Brubaker has argued that contentious 
relationships are based on 'nationalising' states, ‘ethnically heterogeneous, yet conceived as 
nation-states, whose elites promote (to various degrees) the language, culture, demographic 
predominance, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing 
nation’ (1996:57)13. This new nationalism is triggered by the status reversal between the ex-
hegemonic metropolitan and the newly empowered peripheral groups and the perception of 
the latter that it is in a weak cultural, economic and demographic position because of their 
past subjection to colonial rule. In response to the nationalism of the new state the external 
national homeland elites claim that they have the right, and even the obligation, to support 
their co-ethnics abroad and to protect their interests. Furthermore, sandwiched between 
these two political claims are the national minorities themselves – ‘sharing citizenship but 
not (ethnocultural) nationality with the nationalising state, and sharing nationality, but not 
citizenship with the external national homeland’ (ibid. 111). They tend to resist (to various 
degrees) any actual or perceived policies of assimilation or discrimination and may look 
towards their external homeland for support, particularly if the actions of the nationalising 
state have resulted in, or seem to lead to, their redefinition as victim groups. This in turn 
may negatively affect the nationalist policies of the host state. 
 
Graham Smith (1999), however, has pointed out that the three-dimensional model tells only 
part of the story in post-Soviet borderlands. Rather the system is at least quadratic or four-
                                                
13 Graham Smith also uses the term ‘nationalising policies which he borrows from Brubaker, but he draws 
attention to the three broad groups of policies used by the post-Soviet states and their elites. The first is de-
Sovietisation. This is the process of eliminating symbols, institutions and personnel that represent a possible 
return to the Soviet Union. Second, post-Soviet elites are trying to reinvent the core or titular group. This 
process has three elements: 'essentialise', 'historicise' and 'totalise'. Elites ‘essentialise’ when they single out 
those intrinsic or primordial characteristics that represent the group (e.g. language, culture, homeland), and set 
it apart from the negatively defined ‘other (e.g. colonizers/ colonized). Next, elites ‘historicise’ when they try 
to rediscover an ethnic past, and especially a ‘Golden Age’, in order to emphasise the potential of the core 
group. Finally, elites ‘totalise’ when they turn relative differences between the groups into absolute ones.  
This helps to create a distance between the colonial past and the post-colonial present, the immigrants and 
indigens, the ‘chosen people’ and ‘fifth columnists’.  The third nationalising policy involves an attempt at 
cultural homogenisation of the new polity. This effort is rooted in the belief that ‘linguistic, cultural and 
educational standardization’ will produce a ‘more efficient national economy, a ‘scientific state bureaucracy 
and … a more harmonious and loyal citizenry’ (1998:17). 
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dimensional, combining the nationalising state, diaspora group, the external national 
homeland and transnational political institutions (TPI) (Figure 2.1)14. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The institutional arena of diasporic politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Smith, G. 1999:505.  
The added dimension of Western-dominated political institutions makes a considerable 
impact on the interactive dynamics between the nationalising state, national minorities, and 
external homelands. This is manifested in, inter alia, the transnational pressure on 
nationalising states and external homelands to moderate their ‘nationalising’ and 
‘homeland’ nationalisms and comply with the Western prescriptions and norms of the 
citizen-homeland. To achieve these objectives the TPI can 
 
use the economic and technological dependence of East European societies on Western 
Europe as a source of leverage … some combination of European community as [a] magnet 
                                                
14Parrott 1997:14-16; Brubaker (1996), Schoepflin (2001), Kymlicka (2001) – ethnicity in EE both before and 
after the collapse of the SU has been considered through the prism of security and not minority rights.  
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and CSCE (now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as [an] 
encompassing framework of rules [that] would seem to be the proper institutional antidote 
to the danger of hypernationalism in Eastern Europe (Keohane 1990:10, emphasis added). 
 
The four-dimensional model, arguably, goes beyond other nationalism models and provides 
a better explanation for the unfolding relationship between the titular nations and the 
Russians in the Soviet successor states. It pinpoints the ways in which the external 
homeland ‘attempts to “diasporize” the Russians, the West seeks to secure individual 
liberties through homeland-citizenship and “de-diasporisation” while the nationalising 
regimes envisage a homeland-nation in which there is no space for diasporic identities’ 
(Smith 1999:520). It has to be noted that the role of the TPIs is less relevant to minorities in 
Kazakhstan, than, for example, to Russian populations in Latvia and Estonia. Up to now the 
TPIs had a very limited impact on developments in Kazakhstan, whereas, for example, in 
Latvia and Estonia they were responsible for changing a Constitution. 
 
The international reactive model can be usefully supplemented by the model of reactive 
strategies elaborated by the economist Albert Hirschman. Originally developed to describe 
the dynamics of achieving stability within business organisations, it was later applied by 
Hirschman to the question of mass emigration and the collapse of the GDR (Hirschman 
1970, 1978). He argued that groups of the population had three main options to address a 
decline in their status and a change in national climate: exit (out-migration), voice (protest) 
and loyalty. I found these concepts very useful and make frequent reference to them in my 
analysis. The choices of strategies that minorities make to address a decline in their status 
can also be affected by a number of internal factors and patterns of ethnonational 
interaction with the host or dominant group. Looking at the patterns of linguistic 
assimilation in post-Soviet states, David Laitin (1998) identified several (un)favourable 
conditions that make an impact on the assimilation pattern. Specifically, he argued that 
assimilation shifts are likely to occur (1) when members of a minority group can expect 
greater lifetime economic returns if they attempt to integrate/assimilate (e.g. learn the 
language) (expected economic returns); (2) when the minority community is divided and 
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does not put a lot of constraints on their members to remain a tight-knit community (in-
group status) and (3) when the dominant group accept as one of their own (on the marriage 
market, in social affairs) those minority members who have attempted to assimilate (out-
group status) (Laitin, 1998:29). The prospects of successful assimilation can be further 
strengthened if both dominant and minority groups view their power relationships as 
legitimate, if they are relatively congruent in cultural terms and if they have a similar 
understanding of their future within the framework of one state (Schermerhorn, 
1970:Chapter 2). 
   
2.4 Mapping Ethnonational Interaction 
 
In this section I will look at comparative methods of mapping ethnonational interaction in 
diagrammatic patterns of change. This will help to answer my second research question 
(How have Kazakh and Russian identities interacted in the post-Soviet period and what 
mutual effects has that produced on their identities?) and to work out where the 
Kazakhstani case fits. The problem with these models is that they are not designed to map 
the interaction between ethnonational identities. Schermerhorn (1970), for example, is 
primarily interested in developing a research framework for investigating problems of 
integration in multi-ethnic societies, while Horowitz (1985) is concerned with the sources 
and patterns of ethnic conflicts and how they can be mitigated. Both of these theories have 
extensive explanatory variables, but they are designed to explain integration in the one case 
and conflict in the other. It has to be noted that the aims of my research are very different 
(i.e. to map Kazakh and Russian identities and explain the patterns of their ethnonational 
interacation), but in the absence of an extensive comparative literature on identities I will 
make use primarily of the ‘mapping’ techniques of the literature on ethnic interaction and 
conflict, and of some insights on explanatory factors for identity formation.  
 
R.A Schermerhorn’s aim, as noted earlier, was to develop a research framework for 
investigating problems of integration in multi-ethnic societies. He argued that both 
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functionalist systemic theory (related to modernization theory and seeing integration as an 
inevitable and crucial process in the stabilization of modern societies) and power conflict 
theory (seeing integration as an active conflictual process the outcome of which may be 
integration (assimilation) or disintegration) are relevant for researching integration 
(Schermerhorn, 1970, Chapter 1). He outlined three schematic taxonomies for patterns of 
ethnic interaction based on both these ideas (ibid. Chapter 2), which I am making use of in 
the mapping process. Schermerhorn does not talk about identity formation as such, but his 
theories and models can be usefully applied to probe the identities of both dominant and 
subordinate groups and sketch the trends in their possible development. He defined 
integration as ‘a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active 
and coordinated compliance with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant 
group’ (ibid., 66) and identified three main factors that could affect this process, namely (1) 
legitimation; (2) cultural congruence and (3) reciprocal goal definition of dominant and 
subordinate groups. 
 
(1) Legitimation 
Legitimation is of course a highly contested topic in political science, but in itself I am not 
interested in it, except in so far that it is one factor affecting mutual attitudes between 
Kazakhs and Russians in Kazakhstan15. Integration as a problem of legitimation, according 
to Schermerhorn, is based on the assumption that ‘when two groups with different cultural 
histories establish contacts that are regular rather than occasional or intermittent, one of the 
two groups will typically assume dominance over the other’ (ibid: 68). Schermerhorn’s 
argument in support of this assumption is logical rather than empirical: ‘complete equality 
of power is the least probable condition – a kind of limiting case’ (ibid.) The inequality of 
power, in its turn, raises a question of how this authority will be viewed by the members on 
both sides. Thus, legitimacy becomes an important factor that helps to determine whether 
                                                
15 The issue of legitimacy, which will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, links up with the argument 
of the general acceptance of ‘primordialism’ by my Kazakh and Russian respondents. That is, both 
Kazakh and Russians tend to agree that Kazakhs are the ‘titular’ and ‘indigenous’ group in 
Kazakhstan and therefore it is ‘their’ state and they have a legitimate right to constitute and develop 
it as they see fit.  
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‘feelings of hostility arising out of an unequal distribution of privileges and rights [will] 
lead to conflict’ (Coser, 1956:37). To map the power relations between dominant and 
subordinate groups Schermerhorn identified three positions on the continuum of 
legitimacy: (L) Legitimate, (PL) Partly legitimate and (I) Illegitimate and arrived at a nine-
fold table of possibilities (Figure 1). He also suggested that these options could be used to 
map dominant-subordinate relations not only at one particular point in time, but also over 
time. 
Figure 2.2  Paradigm of social domination and legitimacy perspectives 
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Source: Schermerhorn, 1970:70. 
 
 
 
For the purposes of my research I will assume that the more groups view their power 
relations as legitimate, the less their identities will be pronounced and salient and vica 
versa. Of the five cells that Schermerhorn considers ‘viable’ – 1,2,3,5 and 616, only cells 1 
and 5 appear to be based on consensus of views. This indicates that by using legitimacy as 
                                                
16 Out of nine options cells 7,8 and 9 appear to be ‘empty’ as it is difficult to find a case where the dominant 
group considers its own rule completely illegitimate. Cell 4 also seems to be ‘improbable’ because the 
subordinate groups attribute more legitimacy to the power relations than the superordinates. 
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the sole variable, the most likely form of integration is an imperfect type based on 
reciprocal compromise. However, there is also another case of imperfect integration that is 
found in cell 2, which empirically applies to Lieberson’s ‘migrant subordination’, or to the 
case of the newly arrived immigrants to the United states or other industrial countries.  
Provided the immigrants accept the goal of assimilation, the power relations will move 
from cell 2 to cell 1 where both groups resemble each other in their views of legitimation, 
but if they resist assimilation, several options could open up – cell 5, cell 6 or even cell 3.  
(2) Cultural congruence 
It has to be stressed that Schermerhorn’s main concern here is with social integration, but 
clearly cultural congruence17 or the lack of it has a strong impact on the development of 
national identity, which is a subject of my research. Thus, a high degree of cultural 
congruence will tend, in the right circumstances, to produce less distinctive identities, 
whereas strong cultural divergence will tend to strengthen identities. In particular, large 
power differentials can reinforce cultural divergence in the formation of identity.  
 
Schermerhorn has argued that when the subordinates have a similar value system to that of 
the superordinates, integration will be faster and easier, while if it is different, integration 
will be slowed down or stalled. To make comparisons on the dimension of cultural 
congruence he linked the contexts in terms of the power differentials involved (Figure 2):  
 
Figure 2. Paradigm representing legitimacy definitions of unequal power distributions 
where cultural variations occur   
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17 By cultural congruence is meant a high degree of commonality/ shared cultural norms and practices; in 
particular a shared language, but also common religious, moral and political values, shared historical 
experience and even shared beliefs about the physical characteristics of the group.  
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C Small power differentials                 
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Source: Schermerhorn 1970:75 
 
The combination of large power differentials and relative cultural congruity (sector B) has 
the best potential for integration (and for less distinctive and politicised identities) and can 
be illustrated by the example of immigrants of European descent to the United States or 
‘migrant subordination’ (Lieberson 1961). The pattern of large power differentials and 
relative cultural incongruity (sector A), on the other hand, is marked by intense conflict, 
especially in the early stages of conflict, and can be empirically applied to the white 
invasion and subordination of indigenous populations of Australia, Canada and the United 
States, or ‘migrant subordination’ (ibid.). It is notable that in sectors C and D, where power 
differentials are small, conflict tends to be endemic no matter how small or how big cultural 
differences. The status of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia provides an example for 
sector C (Schermerhorn labeled this type of migration ‘migrant intermediation’), while 
dominant urban Sunnis and subordinate rural Shiites of Iraq as well as Catholics and 
Protestants of Northern Ireland seem to reflect the pattern in sector D.  
 
(3) Reciprocal goal definition 
Of crucial importance for the development of an ethnic relationship (and ethnonational 
identities) is also the compatibility of group goals. The various possible goals, which a 
subordinate group can strive toward, Schermerhorn divided into two opposite tendencies – 
centripetal and centrifugal. Under the first tendency fall all strivings for cultural 
assimilation and structural incorporation, under the latter, calls for autonomy, separation, 
federation, and secession. Both among the dominant and the subordinate group each of 
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these two orientations may be prevailing. If the goals converge, this will lead to integration, 
Schermerhorn stresses, but if the goals are incompatible, conflict will arise. If a majority in 
the subordinate group want to be assimilated and this ambition is resisted by the dominant 
group, this will inevitably lead to tension. The opposite combination may also frequently 
arise: the dominant group insists on assimilation, while the subordinates want to retain their 
separate identity, and, for that reason, demand cultural autonomy (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Congruent and incongruent orientations towards centripetal and centrifugal 
trends of subordinates as viewed by themselves and superordinates 
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Source: Schermerhorn 1970:83 
 
Schermerhorn concludes that if we look at both upper and lower groups in reciprocal 
interaction we get the four-fold matrix depicted in Figure 3. Wherever there is an 
incongruency of goal orientations – the centripetal or centrifugal trends of the subordinate 
group being opposed and frustrated by the dominant group – conflict will be endemic or 
intermittent (sectors C and D). Whenever both groups favour a centripetal policy, this will 
facilitate integration (sector A). And ‘if both groups favour a centripetal policy, this too will 
foster integration, though of a different kind’ (such as ‘live and let live’) (ibid., 82-83).  
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The question then arises of how far Schermerhorn’s theory and schemas can help explain 
the changes in identity interaction. On the one hand Schermerhorn has a completely 
different set of research aims: he is concerned with the prospects for integration, whereas I 
am concerned with the development of (new) ethnonational identities and the interaction 
between them. So obviously the causal variables Schermerhorn cites correspond to his aims 
and not mine: for example, he offers as ‘independent (causative) variables’ (1) repeated 
sequences of interaction between dominant and subordinate groups (annexation, migration, 
colonisation); 2) degree to which subordinate groups are shut off from general institutions 
of society (enclosure); 3) degree to which dominant groups control access to scarce 
resources by subordinate groups (1970:15). Points 2 and 3 could be relevant to my case, 
that is, if Russians are or feel excluded, cut off and shut out from the operation of the new 
state this would increase their sense of cultural distinctiveness and therefore their sense of 
identity, facing a hostile, excluding ‘other’; if the Kazakhs restrict Russian access to key 
professional areas or try to restrict their access to other goods (foreign travel, general 
economic advancement, etc.), this would have the same effect.  
 
So, although Schermerhorn has a different set of research aims and therefore a different set 
of explanatory variables, and I am primarily interested in his 'mapping' schemas and not in 
his explanations, actually several of his variables could help to explain the development and 
interaction of Kazakh and Russian identities and do chime in with my responses, i.e.; (1) 
degree of legitimacy of the new state; (2) degree of cultural congruence (low- therefore 
identities more distinct, but more de facto cultural congruence as long as Russian is 
dominant culturally and economically and as long as there is a post-Soviet shared group of 
values by Kazakhs and Russians); (3) exclusiveness or exclusion of minorities or restriction 
of their access to professional or economic advancement. Schermerhorn’s discussion of 
'intervening variables' (that is, the general context) could also potentially be useful, i.e, 
agreement between dominant and subordinate groups on collective goals (in my case there 
initially had been a lot of agreement on a 'civic' model by both Kazakhs and Russians, but 
this was gradually and covertly undermined by the policies of the new state) and relevance 
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of other culturally and politico-economically similar societies (this could be relevant to 
other Central Asian states or other post-Soviet states in transition).  
 
With regards to Donald Horowitz (1985) again his aims are clearly very different from 
mine. He is explicitly looking at sources and patterns of ethnic conflict and how they can be 
overcome. Nevertheless, his discussion of group ranking and ethnic stratification schema 
(ibid., Chapter 1) and a discussion of explanatory variables (ibid., Chapter 5 and 
Afterword) are partly relevant to my research aims. Working in the same tradition as 
Schermerhorn, D. Horowitz suggested that coincidence or non-coincidence of social class 
with ethnic origins determines whether the group is dominant or subordinate (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Ranked and Unranked Ethnic Systems 
   Ranked Groups     Unranked Groups 
 
          Hierarchical Ordering     Parallel Ordering 
Source: Horowitz 1985:22. 
 
As the above figure shows, ranked ethnic systems exist when ethnic groups are 
hierarchically ordered. In this situation social stratification is synonymous with ethnic 
membership and opportunities for social mobility are restricted by group identity. In fact, 
the dominant group is usually prevailing over the subordinate group socially, politically and 
economically. By contrast, in an unranked system, groups are not hierarchically ordered, 
but coexist in a parallel fashion. Horowitz has noted that the ‘unranked’ systems tend to be 
quite unstable as both groups have an equal amount of resources and no ritualized way of 
interacting. He also stressed that distinction between these two types of systems and within 
systems are blurred in practice. It is most unlikely that all members of Group A could be of 
upper class standing while all members of Group B are rigidly in a class below. Within 
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limits, ranked ethnic systems can tolerate discrepancies between the economic status of the 
groups and that of its individual members, but if carried too far they may be destabilising to 
the system (Horowitz 1985:26). The above typology can be also used in a longitudinal 
perspective and reflect the changing status of the newly dominant and minority groups18.  
 
With regard to a discussion of explanatory variables, Horowitz looks at the issue of 
legitimacy, which is based on ‘prior occupation’ (ibid., 201-204) and ‘right to succeed 
colonial power’ (ibid., 205-9). He also discusses symbolic politics and ethnic status, 
especially language (ibid., 216-24) and the ‘civil service issue’ (ibid., 224-26). This fit quite 
well with Schermerhorn’s explanatory factors. The other important point that he makes is 
about the often disastrous effect of introducing democracy into multi-ethnic societies which 
chimes in with the transition/ democratization literature (ibid., 681) which will be discussed 
in more detail in the next section.  
 
To sum up, Schermerhorn and Horowitz provide useful ‘mapping’ techniques that will 
allow me to trace patterns and sequences of ethnonational interaction between Kazakh and 
Russian identities. They also offer extensive explanatory variables, but they were designed 
to explain integration in the one case and conflict in the other. And as it happens several of 
these explanatory factors are relevant to my research responses, and hence they will appear 
in my analytical framework as factors derived from ethnic interaction theory (i.e. 
legitimacy questions, cultural congruence and exclusion). I have to stress, however, that my 
aims are very different, but given the absence of an extensive comparative literature on 
identity I will make use primarily of the ‘mapping’ techniques that Schermerhorn and 
Horowitz provides and also of some insights on explanatory factors for identity formation.     
                                                
18 One can argue, for example, that during the Soviet time the position of the Russians and the titular groups 
was ambiguous and uncertain and resembled the unranked ethnic system in the Horowitz typology. After the 
break up of the Soviet Union the titular groups were given the power to improve their achievement 
capabilities relative to their past status and relative to other national communities. Russians, on the other 
hand, were downgraded to a minority in the new states, and although their expectations have remained 
relatively high, their capabilities have been declining – in some places dramatically (Chinn & Kaiser 
1996:27). Therefore, the post-Soviet scenario is best characterized by the movement from the unranked ethnic 
system to the ranked one. 
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2.5 Transition, the National Factor and Identity 
 
2.5.1 Types of Transition and the National Factor 
 
Theories of ‘political transition’ were first developed in the 1980s (O’Donnell, Schmitter 
and Whitehead,1986) after the collapse of authoritarian rule in Latin America. From 1989 
they were applied to the post-Soviet area. These comparative theories were concerned with 
the practical transformatory processes of democratisation and formed a reaction against the 
functionalist theories of democratic ‘pre-requisites’ or ‘preconditions’ which tended to 
stress the long-term determinants of democratic development (S.M.Lipset 1960, etc.). 
These theories have aroused much controversy, but can still be useful for the current 
analysis in setting the general context in which identity change and interaction are going on 
in Kazakhstan and in generating research questions which may prove helpful in explaining 
these developments. 
 
One of the first questions which arose was whether ‘transition’ is a single process or 
whether there are various ‘transitions’ or ‘types of transition’ taking place. Initially, most 
political theorists working on post-communist transitions (hence ‘transitologists’) looked 
primarily at the processes of democratisation and marketisation, and ignored two critical 
factors – the state and the nation (or political community). Such analyses have been 
disproportionately focused on the technical and institutional processes of post-communist 
transformations, with an almost tacit assumption that building a capitalist democracy is not 
much more than a set of technical changes. Yet, as Katherine Verdery (1999) has noted, 
post-communism is more than this, for it involves the redefinition of almost the entire 
fabric of everyday life. Thus, post-communism involves ‘transformations of culture, 
identity, traditions, history and symbols – which are not always immediately obvious 
through an analysis of macro-processes of political and economic reform, but which are 
intimately related to such changes’ (Young & Light, 2001:942).  
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Linz and Stepan have argued that state and national questions were largely ignored in the 
first half of the 1990s because they were not important factors in the earlier transitions in 
Latin America and southern Europe. In the classic study of Latin American transitions by 
G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (1986), for example, the issue of statehood 
was dismissed as these transitions were primarily post-authoritarian and regime-based and 
took place in the context of a relative national consensus. Gradually, however, scholars 
have come to realise that many post-communist states inherited weak states and institutions 
which prevented democratic institutions from functioning and, therefore, a third factor, 
namely ‘stateness’, was required to better understand the transition processes. With the 
addition of stateness to the framework, post-communist transition became a ‘triple 
transition’ (Skocpol, 1985, Offe, 1991, Linz & Stepan, 1996, Pridham, 2000), in contrast to 
the ‘double transition’ that post-authoritarian states had to come to terms with in southern 
Europe and Latin America.19  
 
Democratisation literature values nationhood as a source of social and territorial consensus 
for transition states. Back in 1970, Rustow established that democratic transition requires, 
as its only precondition, ‘national borders and consequent absence of mental reservations as 
to which political community the people belong to’ (Rustow, 1970:350). Linz and Stepan 
agree that ‘democracy requires statehood; without a sovereign state, there can be no secure 
democracy’. Dahl similarly suggests that democratisation in the absence of agreement on 
the proper boundaries of the political unit will not be consolidated (Dahl, 1989:207). All 
these arguments stress the necessity of consensual nationhood for sustaining transition 
states’ integrity and making democratisation possible.   
 
Apart from sustaining the state, the democratic role of nationhood is also seen in its ability 
to generate collective power, create a ‘we’, and to produce people who are ready to make 
the highest sacrifices for a political community that is both modern and based on some 
ethno-cultural and historical factors. Margaret Canovan has argued that ‘to make sense, 
                                                
19 Hall’s ‘double transition’ closely resembles the ‘triple’ transition of Offe and Linz & Stepan, but he divided 
his typology into two broad elements which included a) democratisation and marketisation and b) nation and 
state-building (Hall, 1996:22). 
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democracy requires a ‘people’, and social justice a political community within which 
redistribution can take place, while the liberal discourse of rights and the rule of law 
demands a strong and impartial polity’ (Canovan, 1996:2). David Miller similarly stressed 
that ‘trust’ is needed for any democracy to function effectively. A shared national identity 
(or nationality) is a precondition to achieve certain political aims such as social justice and 
democracy. Trust, therefore, requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, 
and this in turn depends upon a common identity that nationality alone can provide (Miller, 
1995).  
 
Despite the importance of the national factor in post-communist transitions, the ‘triple 
transition’ model has been primarily used to mean democracy, market and the state 
(Kubicek, 2000) and applied to Central-Eastern Europe (Przeworski, 1995) – a region 
dominated by three more or less monoethnic states (Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic) where the nation-building processes were not complicated by cultural, linguistic 
and religious diversity, and most importantly, by the status reversal of ethnic groups. The 
near congruity of national and state units in these cases encouraged a lack of appreciation 
of the fact that the majority of citizens of the former USSR and former Yugoslavia have 
multiple identities (linguistic, regional, inter-cultural and Soviet/ Yugoslav) that compete 
with the allegiance required of them by the new national states. This means that the 
processes of transforming ‘old’ identities or/ and ‘un-mixing populations’ (Brubaker, 1996) 
would take up energy and time that could have been used on political and economic reform 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996:29).  
 
Taras Kuzio has built on the ‘triple transition’ by separating the national and stateness 
issues and has argued that although both processes are highly interrelated, they should be 
separated into a ‘third and fourth transition’ (Kuzio, 2001a). Stateness, according to Kuzio, 
can be ‘resolved by legislatures and decrees and in a shorter timeframe than consolidating 
national identities in people’s hearts and minds. The time-frame for the former may be 
counted in decades, while the latter is likely to take generations’ (ibid.: 175). In this sense, 
the post-colonial ‘quadruple’ transition model best fits the case of former Yugoslavia and 
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the former Soviet states because they have to come to terms with questions of stateness, 
nationality, the relationship of the former ruling ‘other’ and national minorities. This 
‘quadruple’ transition includes democratisation, marketisation, state-institution building 
and nation-building.  
 
The simultaneous ‘double’, ‘triple’ and ‘quadruple’ transition facing post-communist 
countries as seen by Hall, Offe and Kuzio respectively, is defined by them as ‘daunting’, 
‘unique’ and ‘without precedent’. Motyl believes that, ‘the simultaneous construction of 
states, markets, democratic rule of law, and civil society – was historically unprecedented 
in its magnitude’ (Motyl, 1997:53). Offe adds that ‘this upheaval is a revolution without a 
historical model and a revolution without a revolutionary theory’ (Offe, 1991:866). Indeed, 
the post-communist space  is a ‘region where, for reasons of recent history and not merely 
‘primordial sentiments’, there are disagreements about who is the demos, what is the polis, 
and, most of all, what, in Robert Dahl’s sense, are the proper units for decision-making and 
state sovereignty’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996:29). 
 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that only a small minority of post-
communist states are monoethnic. The majority inherited national minorities, secessionist 
threats, the need to define ‘we’ and reassess the relationship with the former ruling ‘other’, 
to obtain legal recognition of inherited borders and establish a constitutional framework in 
a short period of time. Civil society, fully functioning institutions and national unity are 
largely absent within them. Given that the majority of post-communist states inherited 
weak nations and weak societal culture, there has been a strong need to develop communal 
values that would hold society together. These values, however, are not usually morally and 
culturally neutral because they promote one type of behaviour, that is, the values of the core 
or ‘titular’ nation. The nation-state ideal has been perhaps the most politically profitable in 
the new states, in considerable part because of the institutionalized expectations of 
‘ownership’ that the successor states inherited from the Soviet nationality regime and 
because they have had all necessary mechanisms and mentalities to achieve it (Roeder, 
1991, Brubaker, 1996, Snyder, 1998, Bunce, 1999). Moreover, acquiescence in the 
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centrality of a core ethnicity, even within allegedly civic national-states throughout the 
world, is more the ‘rule’ than the ‘exception’, and is certainly the case in post-communist 
states, including Kazakhstan. 
 
Linz & Stepan have argued that political elites in control of the state may initiate 
majoritarian nationalising policies in a culturally and linguistically diverse context and not 
violate human rights or Council of Europe norms for democracy. However, these policies 
may harm or slow down democratic transition by affecting five areas of the polity - civil 
society, political society, state bureaucracy, the rule of law and economic society (1996:36-
37). Other students of democratization also see the downside of nationalising policies in a 
situation of ethnic diversity, as they may potentially disrupt transition states. Roeder 
believes that ‘democracy is unlikely to survive in ethnically plural societies and stable 
democracy falls off with greater ethnic diversity’ (Roeder, 1999:855-860). Offe similarly 
names ‘territorial disputes, migrations, minority or nationality conflicts, and corresponding 
secessionist longings’ and the ‘difficulty of defining citizenship rights’ as the major 
challenges of transition (Offe, 1991:868-871). If the state elites are nevertheless interested 
in democratic transition and consolidation they have to consider the particular mix of 
nations, cultures and awakened political identities present in the territory and try to develop 
less majoritarian and more consensual policies (Linz & Stepan, 1996:37.). Snyder,  
however, noted that while in the long-term democratic processes can help to resolve ethnic 
tensions, in the short-term democratic contention in institutions can produce a sharp 
increase in ethnic assertion and conflict (Snyder, 1998:5). 
 
The situation is different, however, if democratisation is not the goal. In a non-democratic 
regime, a national majority – linguistic, religious, ethnic or cultural – frequently imposes its 
rule or conception of the state on minorities without threatening the coherence of the state. 
The government, ‘claiming to represent the people’, cannot be challenged in the course of 
normal politics (that is through potentially authoritative and binding institutional channels 
like courts and open and free elections) because in a non-democracy such channels do not 
exist. The problems of ‘exclusion’ of minorities from the electoral process or the rights of 
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full citizenship are also not politically important because in a non-democratic setting 
everyone is normally excluded from such rights. This, however, may produce frustration 
amongst subordinate ethnic groups and an assertion of the ethnic factor in social tension, 
which means that authoritarianism offers no long-term solution to ethnic diversity within a 
state, but simply puts ‘conflicts on a long fuse’ (Snyder, 1998:5, Motyl, 1998) and in 
authoritarian states the possibilities of catering for minorities through, e.g. decentralization 
or consociationalism are limited. 
 
Attempts have been made, notably by Freedom House, to develop a comparative schema 
for the democratic transition performance of post-Soviet states, which might enable to 
locate roughly the current position of Kazakhstan in this respect. The post-Soviet states 
(excluding the Baltics) predominantly cover the categories of consolidated and semi-
consolidated authoritarian regimes in Freedom House’s table of democracy rankings. The 
highest category they reach is hybrid regimes, and in that they are below the post-
communist states of Central and Eastern Europe (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1. Regional trends in reform: Former Soviet Union (Democratisation score) 
Country Democracy Score 
1997    1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005   2006 
Dynamics 
Hybrid regimes 
Georgia 4.70 4.55 4.00  4.19 4.44 4.69 4.83       
Ukraine 4.00 4.25 4.31  4.44 4.69 4.50 4.88       
Moldova 3.90 4.00 3.88  3.94 4.19 4.38 4.88       
Semi-consolidated regimes 
Armenia 4.70 4.80 4.50  4.56 4.56 4.56 5.00       
Russia 3.80 4.10 4.25  4.63 4.81 4.88 5.25       
Azerbaijan 5.60 5.55 5.50  5.56 5.44 5.31 5.63       
Kyrgyzstan 4.65 4.70 4.88  5.13 5.38 5.63 5.67       
Tajikistan 6.20 5.95 5.69  5.44 5.50 5.50 5.71       
Consolidated authoritarian regimes 
Kazakhstan 5.30 5.35 5.38  5.56 5.88 6.13 6.25       
Uzbekistan 6.35 6.45 6.44  6.50 6.56 6.56 6.46       
Belarus 5.90 6.20 6.44  6.56 6.56 6.63 6.54       
Turkmenistan 6.94 6.94 6.94  6.94 6.94 6.94 6.88       
Data derived from Freedom House report 2003, see Karatnycky, Motyl, Schnetzer 2003:16; 
Freedom House Press Release 24.05.2004. (The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress)  
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None of the post-communist regimes, however, formally rejects or challenges democracy, 
most likely because ‘it is the only legitimate political regime’ in the present day world 
(Nodia 2002:15). The formal lip service to democratic principles and institutional imitation 
is often the farthest they travel along the democratic path. Their democratic deficits, as 
presented by Carothers, include ‘poor representation of citizens’ interests, low levels of 
political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of law by government officials, 
elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, 
and persistently poor democratic performance by the state’ (2002:9-10).  
 
These comparative discussions of the various modes of transition and the problems 
involved in achieving them, even though they are not explicitly linked to the analysis of 
ethnic identity, are important for the analysis of interacting identities in Kazakhstan in 
several ways. Firstly, they help to place Kazakhstan’s post-independence experience in an 
international context of states with a broadly similar experience of social, political and 
economic change. Kazakhstan is not unique, although, as it will be discussed in the next 
chapter, it has many distinctive features in its legacy and situation, which need to be born in 
mind in analysing its developing identities. Secondly, the transition theories generate a 
questions and puzzle which is one of the main starting-points for my research: 
transitologists have agreed that national consensus and an absence of ‘stateness’ problems 
are crucial prerequisites for successful transition and that the embarking on a full-scale 
transition in multi-ethnic states is fraught with dangers of conflict and instability. Snyder's 
warning about the potential impact of democratisation in such states is particularly striking. 
For the purposes of my research the implication is that such conflict would lead to ethnic 
polarisation and the rapid differentiation and consolidation of new stratified ethnic 
identities within the state. Yet this has not proved to be the case in Kazakhstan, where there 
has been little conflict and where dominant and subordinate identities are still largely 
uncertain and ‘provisional’ (or they were still ‘provisional’ at the time of my research in 
2004).  
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Thirdly, the transition theories also suggest explanations for this situation which will be 
later looked at in more detail: 1) the postponement of democratic transition, as is the case in 
Kazakhstan, can in the short term mitigate the ethnic conflict which would consolidate 
identities; in particular, the dangerous combination of economic and ethno-political 
polarisation can be temporarily avoided (Offe, 1991, Snyder, 1998, Roeder, 1999); 2) these 
studies emphasise the crucial role of elites  (both national and international) in these 
situations: a cautious and consensual approach adopted by dominant elites, the adoption of 
sound institutional choice and shrewd internal (e.g. the character of ‘nationalising policies’) 
and foreign policies, together with support from foreign countries and international 
organisations, can considerably reduce the potential for ethnic conflict (Linz & Stepan, 
1996) and, therefore, of identity differentiation; 3) the character of its ‘transition path’ (i.e., 
the manner of its transition process, whether it was violent or peaceful, gradual or sudden) 
has a strong effect on the character of its transition and, in particular, on ethnic conflict 
(thus peaceful, uncontested transitions, such as was the case in Kazakhstan, and also 
gradual ones (also the case since the start of reform under Gorbachev), tend to avoid the 
polarisation involved in sudden, contested and violent transitions) (Dawisha & Parrott, 
1997, Lieven, 2003); 4) lastly,  the nature of the ‘prior regime type’ (that is, the nature of a 
state’s previous authoritarian government and national traditions) has an important effect 
on the character of its transition (Linz & Stepan, 1996, Parrott, 1997, Tilly, 1997), and it is 
to this that I turn now separately in the next section.     
 
2.5.2 ‘Prior Regime Type’ and the Legacy of Imperialism 
 
Linz and Stepan, in their classic analysis of transition theory, put particular emphasis on the 
character of the ‘prior regime type’ as determining to a considerable extent the prospects of 
successful transition, since less oppressive, modernising regimes can facilitate the initial 
development of civil society, rule of law, economic reform, etc., which prepares the society 
for the tasks of transition (1996, ch.4). Linz and Stepan classified these prior authoritarian 
regimes into sultanistic (the most extreme), totalitarian (i.e. full-blown Stalinism), 
authoritarian (where political control in the form of a dictatorship or oligarchy may be 
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combined with considerable social and economic freedom) and post-totalitarian 
(representing the modernising, reforming totalitarianisms of the period between Brezhnev 
and Gorbachev in the USSR).  
 
As part of the generally ‘post-totalitarian’ USSR Kazakhstan would seem to have offered a 
relatively favourable situation for the development of various aspects of transition, such as 
‘pacts’ between contesting groups and the emergence of civil society. Yet here the 
limitations of this classification become apparent. It does not take into account the 
considerable variation in the way that reformist ‘post-totalitarianism’ operated in different 
Soviet republics, from the liberal westernisers of the Baltic to the far more traditional and 
authoritarian societies of Central Asia, where in the Brezhnev period a strong korenizatsiya 
or ethnification developed under the aegis of party control which resulted in the general 
retention of authoritarian government in this area. Nor does the classification pay sufficient 
attention to the survival of deeply entrenched traditional social and personal values (such as 
the role of the clan and the family) in these areas. Finally, it does not give any credit to the 
impact of imperialism as a ‘prior regime type’ for all the Soviet republics (Tilly, 1997). Of 
course, as will be discussed in the next section, ‘empires’ can be of various types of 
authoritarian and even democratic government, which crosses the boundaries of Linz and 
Stepan’s classification. But the experience of empire makes it more than just a type of 
authoritarianism and thus merits separate analysis. 
 
But what is an ‘empire’ and was the USSR an empire, and if so of what type? The concept 
of ‘empire’ is highly contested and a very emotive term, making it difficult to define. 
Nevertheless the discourse of ‘imperialism’, ‘colonialism’ and ‘exploitation’ has become 
very important for newly independent states and can potentially have a big impact on the 
formulation and development of dominant and subordinate identities in these states 
(Beissinger, 1995, Smith 1998). Dominic Lieven offers a historian's definition based on the 
classic territorial empires. He argues that empire is 
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a great power which makes a big impact on the international relations of its age. It is a 
polity which rules over wide territories and many peoples, since the management of space 
and multiethnicity is among empire’s greatest challenges. An empire is also a polity that 
does not rule by the explicit consent of its subjects, which does not necessarily imply that it 
has to be illegitimate in their eyes (Lieven 2002:24).  
 
Michael Doyle, by contrast, offers a much broader political scientist's definition:  
 
Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the 
effective sovereignty of other political societies. They include more than just formally 
annexed territories, but they encompass less than the sum of all forms of international 
inequality. Imperialism is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire (Doyle, 
1986, 19).  
 
This definition is intended to cover forms of non-territorial ‘informal’ empire, which some 
analysts would want to describe as ‘hegemony’, and also controversially lays stress on the 
modern concept of ‘sovereignty’, which would not be appropriate for many of the peoples, 
which empires have contained. I will not go into the numerous ramifications of the debate 
on the nature of empires, imperialism and colonialism, but its essential parameters are clear 
enough for the purposes of this research: 1) the involuntary incorporation of peoples into or 
control by another, large state; and 2) the economic and political control of these peoples by 
the elites of the dominant state in the interests of this dominant state rather than in the 
interests of the peoples themselves. 
 
In these terms, was the USSR an empire? Again this has been a matter of big debate, and I 
will just sketch the main points here. The great irony of the USSR was that it consistently 
pursued an ‘anti-imperialist’ stance in world politics, supporting newly independent states 
in Africa and elsewhere against the ex-colonial powers, while on its own territory and in 
Eastern Europe pursuing policies of authoritarian control and exploitation of sovereign or 
potentially sovereign peoples in a manner which very much fits the definition of an 
‘empire’ (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996, Parrott, 1997). In Eastern Europe its ‘imperial’ expansion 
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was clear in the 1940s, from a ‘sphere of influence’ to a region in which the form of 
government and the internal and external policies of the states were totally dominated by 
the USSR. The formation of the USSR was a complex process, since after the Civil War the 
new Republic annexed militarily virtually all the territories of the former Russian Empire 
except those, which had become independent by international treaty. In the struggle for its 
existence the USSR was thus forced to replicate to a degree the structures and policies of 
the former tsarist empire. Under Stalin in particular, from the mid 1920s to the early 1950s, 
there were pursued authoritarian and exploitative policies which were typical of the classic 
territorial empires: total reconstruction from the centre of the economic, political and social 
character of the country without any regard for national differences; ruthless punishment of 
opposition to these changes (the crushing of resistance in Ukraine and Kazakhstan); 
deportation of 'troublesome' peoples (the Caucasian peoples and Volga Germans in WWII); 
development of exploitative monocultures (Central Asia) and the general disposition of the 
most advanced industry and best living and social conditions in the central Slavic areas of 
the country; maintenance of concentrated Slavic political and military control while 
allowing only lower-level political and economic decision-making to non-Slavic peoples 
(Olcott, 1995, Zaslavsky, 1997, Edmunds, 1998). 
 
But on the other hand the USSR was not a typical empire. While all effective political, 
economic and military control was concentrated in the Slavic centre, it did offer a system of 
pseudo-federalism for the larger constituent peoples whereby the country was divided into 
15 Union republics which by the later Brezhnev period came to have extensive control over 
local affairs and in which the policy of korenizatsiya gave political and administrative 
experience to large numbers of the titular population and provided the potential for later 
separate governments. This also involved increasing use of the local languages, the use of 
which was encouraged in education and the arts in a controlled way (Suny, 1993, Chinn & 
Kaiser, 1996, Brubaker, 1996, Smith, 1998). In the same way the USSR pursued nation-
wide policies of education, economic development, social and housing improvements and 
welfare provision which were comparable to and often better than the policies of similar 
modernising states. Thus the legacy of the Soviet 'empire' was highly ambivalent, and this 
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ambivalence, as will be argued in chapter 5, had an enormous effect on identity formation 
and interaction in the newly independent states which clearly exemplified in the comments 
of my respondents: while the Kazakhs resent the general subordination of the sovereignty 
and culture of their people and the exploitation of their natural resources they are grateful 
and even nostalgic for the economic and social modernisation which they experienced, the 
development of literacy, education and economic infrastructure and, in particular, the 
development of health and welfare provision for all. This ambivalence about the ‘imperial’ 
past, as it will be seen, is one of the factors which explains the uncertainty and 
provisionality of Kazakh identity today. 
 
The study of empires and imperialism and, in particular, the comparative study of the 
disintegration of empires and the emergence of 'post-colonial' states has generated a huge 
literature which deserves to be considered by students of the USSR and the post-Soviet 
states. I do not have space to examine and expound on this literature in detail, but I will 
draw attention to some of the main arguments and patterns, which relate to the subject of 
the development of interactive identities in Kazakhstan. I shall take as my main basis the 
excellent collective comparative study edited by K.Dawisha and B.Parrott ‘The End of 
Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective’ (1997), which 
reviews many of the main arguments. The main factors which Parrott (1997:14) highlighted 
as influences on the outcomes of imperial transformations include: ‘1) the nature of the 
international environment (that is, the views of the international community on imperial 
control and the support of leading powers or international organisations for decolonisation 
and the newly independent states); 2) the character of nationalism among the dominant and 
subordinate nationalities (that is, the existence of a national liberation movement and 
general relations between ‘indigenous’ peoples and ‘colonial settlers’ in the regions 
concerned); 3) the role of political violence in the creation and maintenance of empire (that 
is, the memory of extermination, deportation and general oppression]; 4) the liberalization 
of the empire’s political structures; 5) the armed forces behaviour and level of cohesion; 6) 
national economic resources and international economic relations; 7) the political and 
economic strategies of peripheral societies during and after the break-up of the empire. 
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In what follows I shall briefly discuss the relevance of the above factors to my research 
question of identity interaction in Kazakhstan. Clearly the international environment was 
supportive of the break-up of the Soviet ‘empire’ and the emergence of new ‘successor 
states’, which was made clear by their rapid acceptance as full members of the UN (Olcott, 
2002). The role of international organisations has in general been supportive in terms of aid 
for development, while the action of such bodies as the OSCE has been rather hesitant, 
partly because of the mandate of that body based on consensus and non-interference in 
internal affairs, and partly out of respect for the continued influence of Russia in her sphere 
of influence in the ‘near abroad’. But obviously the general influence has been towards the 
mitigation of ethnic conflict (Melvin, 1995, 1998). The character of existing national 
feelings amongst dominant and subordinate groups also had an impact on identity: there 
was no national independence movement in Kazakhstan. While the emergence of dislike of 
Russian dominance amongst Kazakhs was noted in the riots following the appointment of 
Kolbin, a Russian by nationality, in 1986, it is clear that in general relations between 
Kazakhs and Russians have been good, if not exactly close (because of cultural differences) 
(Zaslavsky, 1997). This is another factor producing uncertain and provisional identities. 
The role of the memory of considerable violence against Kazakhs in the collectivisation 
period of the 1930s is potentially a factor in the accumulating post-imperial discourse 
(Sarsembaev, 1998, Seidimbek, 2001, Gali, 2002), but at the moment is too much overlaid 
by more positive experience of modernisation and welfarism to figure prominently in the 
development of identity (Cummings, 2005). As already mentioned, the ‘empire’s’ political 
structures were liberalised in the Gorbachev period, but probably the impact of this was 
much more limited in Central Asia compared with other parts of the Soviet Union, which 
meant that traditional authoritarian political and social structures, which became deeply 
entrenched in the Brezhnev period, could linger on there preventing any moves from 
democratic transition (Cummings, 2002, Ishiyama, 2002). The role of the armed forces was 
limited in the Soviet case because of the political dominance of the party over the military, 
so the role of the military played virtually no role in the transition in Kazakhstan except by 
their non-participation (Lieven, 2002) (i.e. unlike in Yugoslavia no attempt was made by 
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the metropolitan elite to use the military in Kazakhstan to retain control or influence 
political development in that area). 
 
The economic resources and economic relations of the country could have an even greater 
impact. On the one hand an awareness of previous economic exploitation of resources by 
the metropolitan elite is a factor amongst a growing number of Kazakhs, and the 
consciousness of their possession of huge oil and other mineral resources which may 
generate enormous wealth in the future has influenced the policies of the governing elites 
and the general confidence and self-assertion of the Kazakh population. So far the 
distribution of this potential wealth has not produced ethnic economic polarisation, partly 
because of the important role skilled Russian labour played in the economy, but it is an 
important potential factor, which could greatly increase ethnic conflict and therefore 
identity consolidation in the future. Lastly with regard to the strategies of the elites, this is 
also a very important factor. While Nazarbaev has stalled democratisation, his 
pronouncements and policies have been cautious and conciliatory both in the internal and 
external arenas: his concession to the Russian language of the status of a 'language of inter-
ethnic communication' and later the status of ‘official language’ and his generally 
conciliatory policies towards Russian settlers, while doing his best to ‘camouflage’ the 
gradual Kazakhization of political structures and the economy (Bohr, 1998, Karin & 
Chebotarev, 2002), and his cautious and cooperative international stance, maintaining close 
ties with Russia while developing economic and political relations with the west, China and 
his neighbours in Central Asia, have done much to make Kazakhstan one of the stable 
success stories of post-Soviet development, thus mitigating internal ethnic conflict and 
polarisation. 
 
Thus several of the factors highlighted by students of imperialism and post-imperial 
development have a strong relevance to the general situation in Kazakhstan and some of 
them have a direct impact on identity interaction and will be used in the general analysis.     
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2.6 Conclusion and Analytical Framework 
 
In this last section I shall outline the main concepts and arguments which I shall be using in 
the analysis of my research data and relating them to my research questions and to the 
theories discussed in this chapter. 
 
My first two research questions are largely descriptive in character, that is what is the 
current (at 2004) state and character of Kazakh and Russian identities in Kazakhstan and 
how have they changed and interacted since the later Soviet period. For the first question I 
shall be making use of the various aspects of national and ethnic identities discussed in the 
first section, while bearing in mind the substantial differences in the understanding of these 
concepts in the Soviet and post-Soviet context. For the second question I shall be making 
use of the concepts of ethnic interaction and stratification discussed by Schermerhorn 
(1970) and Horowitz (1985) and using their diagrammatic schemas to ‘map’ the current 
state, past changes and likely future developments of this interaction, as revealed in my 
respondents’ comments. As I have noted in section 2.4, these schemas were originally 
applied to the studies of integration and conflict, but I think they can be usefully and 
illuminatingly applied to the study of interacting identities. 
 
My third research question is explanatory, that is why have Kazakh and Russian 
ethnonational identities developed and interacted in the way they have and why is their 
current state still quite uncertain and provisional after 15 years of independence (this was 
my original puzzle). This question is problematic. It is not easy to research national identity 
in terms of clear-cut independent (causal) variables, as is perhaps the preferred method of 
social science, since identities are elusive, ever-changing and multi-faceted phenomena, 
which require a more holistic explanation, more characteristic of historical explanation. 
Indeed, my research interviews were open-ended and wide-ranging in character in order to 
grasp the broad character of identity. So this was not the sort of research where I could 
rigorously investigate the impact of one or two independent variables (say language and 
economic factors), and indeed if I had done so it would have produced a very one-sided and 
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partial analysis of the identities concerned, since there are so many long-term and short-
term factors which influence the formation of identity. Many of these factors could only be 
investigated properly by a large-scale survey, and in some cases would have been very 
difficult to research in the current political and informational climate of Kazakhstan. 
Instead I have tried to trace in the comments contained in my wide-ranging interviews 
features which have been highlighted by comparative theories as being important in the 
development of identity and then tried to assess their relative salience, thus producing in the 
end a broad explanation for my research data, at various levels of explanation. 
 
At the most general level my initial hypothesis was that the puzzling provisionality and 
uncertainty of both Kazakh and Russian identities was linked with the general character of 
political and perhaps economic transition in Kazakhstan, i.e. that the ‘stalled’ character of 
democratic transition in Kazakhstan (which transition theorists argue tends to lead to sharp 
ethnic political confrontation in multi-ethnic states (see Horowitz, 1985, Linz & Stepan, 
1996, Snyder, 1999) had a ‘dampening’ effect on the interaction and consolidation of new 
identities, while the ‘prior regime type’ of Soviet ‘imperial’ rule (bringing together many 
important long-term historical features affecting ethnographic and economic development) 
created ambivalent positive and negative attitudes which are still apparent in people's 
assessments of their identity. On this basis I have used arguments from the comparative 
literature on post-Soviet transition and on post-imperial de-colonisation (Dawisha & Parrot, 
1997, Lieven, 2004) to help locate and explain the current situation with regard to both 
identities. I will argue that identities in Kazakhstan are still as much 'in transition' as other 
aspects of Kazakhstan's political and state development and in many ways reflect these 
processes. 
 
But of course there are many other factors highlighted by various comparative theories 
which I shall try to use to produce a more detailed explanation. These theories may be 
divided into those highlighting external (international) or internal (intra-state) factors. With 
regard to 'external factor' theories I shall make particular use of the 'triadic nexus' theory of 
Rogers Brubaker (1996) and its additions by Graham Smith (1999) and others. The purpose 
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of this theory was, like those of Horowitz and to some extent Schermerhorn, to predict and 
explain the emergence of conflict, but I shall argue that it can be usefully applied to the 
analysis of identity. Discussions of national identity have long emphasised that a hostile 
'external other' is one of the classic determinants of identity (Greenfeld, 1992, Prizel, 2001). 
To some extent I shall ‘invert’ these arguments by suggesting that the fact that good, close 
relations have been maintained between Russia and Kazakhstan (so that Russia has not 
become formally a hostile ‘external other’), and that the 'exit' option of out-migration of 
Russians to the Russian Federation are important factors explaining why Kazakh and 
Russian identities have not become excessively polarised in Kazakhstan, even though it is 
possible to see the gradual emergence of a ‘post-imperial’ ‘hostile other’ mentality despite 
good inter-state relations. I shall try to trace this ambivalence towards the Soviet past and 
the contemporary Russian state in the comments of my respondents and try to show that 
attitudes to the outside world generally, and to Russia in particular, reveal much about the 
identities of Kazakhs and Russians. 
 
As regards theories stressing internal factors the theories of ethnic interaction offer several 
insights into the development of identity, which I shall try to use. Schermerhorn's 
independent variables (1970:15) of sequences of power interaction between ethnic groups 
(i.e. colonial dominance and then the role reversal with independence), the degree of social 
separation of subordinate groups and the extent of control of resources by dominant groups 
are all very salient to the study of identity and find echoes in the comments of my 
respondents. Also helpful are his suggestions that cultural congruence and attitudes towards 
the legitimacy of power are very important and I shall try to investigate these ideas in my 
analysis. Also illuminating as regards internal factors are Brubaker's (1996) concept of the 
'nationalising policies' introduced by newly independent governments to strengthen national 
cohesion and their own legitimacy, and I shall pay particular attention to this aspect in my 
discussion of my research into the development of Kazakhstan's ‘national project’ in 
chapter four, since it was the reaction of Russians and Kazakhs to these policies which was 
one of the key focal points in my assessment of the consolidation of their identities. 
Likewise I have frequently used the concepts of 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty' which Albert 
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Hirschman (1970, 1978) originally developed to explain the behaviour of firms and later 
applied to the crisis of the latter days of the GDR. Finally I shall refer to the work of David 
Laitin (1998, 2007) and others on the impact of language, since the status of Kazakh and 
Russian is one of the crucial issues in contemporary Kazakhstan and language has long 
been held to be a crucial determinant of national and ethnic identity. 
 
Thus it is this combination of external and internal, long-term and short-term factors which 
form the analytical framework, which I will use in the description and explanation of the 
character, development and interaction of Kazakh and Russian identities in Kazakhstan. 
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3 THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERACTION OF KAZAKH AND RUSSIAN 
IDENTITIES IN THE TSARIST AND SOVIET PERIODS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to provide some necessary historical background to the identities of 
Kazakhstan – both titular (Kazakh) and minority (Russian). This is not intended as a 
general history of the rise of Kazakhs or the causes of imperial Russia’s expansion in the 
Kazakh steppe and its subsequent Sovietization. The focus instead is on the historical and 
structural governmental factors which affected and partly produced both Kazakh and 
Russian identities. The chapter considers three periods: (1) early steppe history, namely, 
since the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ first emerged in the fifteenth century up to the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, (2) the impact of Russian colonialism on both Kazakh and Russian 
identities; and (3) the impact of Sovietization. As with all historical periods, they are 
somewhat arbitrary and inevitably overlap. It is the third period which provides the focus of 
this chapter. This is the period in which the modern Kazakh identity was crystallised and 
the imperial Russian identity strengthened. And these are the identities that the new 
Kazakhstani regime has tried to reshape and redefine after the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991.  
 
3.2 Early History of Kazakhs  
 
3.2.1 Origins and Early Development of the Kazakhs 
 
The area of present-day Kazakhstan, known as Descht-e-Kipchak in the Middle Ages and 
as the Kazakh or Eurasian steppe in the tsarist period, was inhabited by a complex mixture 
of peoples, cultures, languages and religions generating a variety of political and social 
institutions. But underlying them all, from the Mongols of the 11th -12th centuries to the 
Kazakhs in the 15th to 18th centuries, was a nomadic pastoral type of socio-economic 
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organization which changed little over the centuries (Khazanov, 1984: xxiii, Masanov, 
1995, 2001). 
 
There is no consensus over the chronology or precise circumstances of the Kazakh origins. 
The term Kazakh as a form of self-identification came into use by the residents of the area 
as early as the end of the fifteenth century and certainly by the mid-sixteenth century 
(Masanov, 2001). It was not an ethnic category but rather meant a person who led a free 
and unencumbered life-style associated with nomads. Many theories have been put forward 
to explain the origin of the term. Some speculate that it can be traced back to the Turkish 
verb qaz (to wander), because the Kazakhs were wandering nomads, or that it comes from 
the Mongolian word khazaq – a wheeled cart used by the Kazakhs to transport their yurts 
(felt dwellings) and belongings. As to the origins of the people themselves, the most 
celebrated explanation is that of the mythical Alash (or Alash(a) khan). In various popular 
songs and tales Alash is described as the founder of the Kazakh people, whose sons each 
established one of the three Kazakh zhuz or clan agglomerations – Elder (ulu), Middle 
(orta) and Younger (kishi). This legend has always played an important unifying role for 
the Kazakhs (Olcott, 1995:4, Seidimbek, 2000).  
  
In order to distinguish the Kazakh nomads from the new Cossack settlers in the steppe, 
tsarist administrators referred to Kazakhs as ‘Kirgiz’ (whom they saw as essentially similar 
in clan structure and language) and this name persisted in all official correspondence 
between the Kazakh elites and colonial administrators during the period of the Russian 
empire. Some Russian ethnographers and geographers started to label steppe nomads as 
kirgiz-kaisak or qazakh to differentiate them from kara-kirgiz (mountain Kirghiz) and 
buruts (Kirgiz). Chokan Valikhanov, for example, wrote in the mid 19th century:  
 
The Great, Middle and Small kirgiz-kaisak hordes constitute one Kazakh people, which 
should be differentiated from the ‘Kirgyz’ who are referred to as burut by the Chinese and 
‘mountain’ (dikokamennye) or black (kara) by the Russians. Even in the physiognomy of 
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the burut (Kirgiz) there is something distinctive, non-kaisak (non-Kazakh) (Valikhanov, 
quoted in Masanov, 2001:57). 
 
Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the 20th century kara-kirgiz were considered to be 
one of the kirgiz-kaisak tribes and during the first universal census of the Russian empire in 
1897 Kazakh and Kirgiz were lumped in as one people. It has to be stressed that none of the 
above ethnonyms were understood in ethno-national terms. Indeed, the Kazakh ‘national’ 
consciousness started to develop only at the beginning of the 20th century, when the leaders 
of the first Kazakh nationalist movement Alash Orda started to refer to their people as a 
narod or natsiya, adopting Leninist terminology on the subject (Suny, 2001, Sabol, 2003, 
Dave, 2007:31). 
 
3.2.2 The Early Kazakh Socio-Political Organisation  
 
A unified, although loose and decentralised Kazakh Khanate was the only common 
political formation among the steppe nomads, which existed from the mid-15th to the late 
16th century. This disintegrated in the 16th century into a tripartite structure of 'hordes' 
(zhuz) or clan agglomerations related to the three climatic zones of the steppe: the Elder 
Horde in the south and east, the Middle Horde in the northern and part of the central 
regions and the Younger Horde in the west, from the Caspian Sea south of the Urals to the 
Aral Sea. The Middle Horde was the largest and Younger Horde the smallest in population 
terms. But all three stressed their common origins in their mythical common progenitor, 
Alash (ibid: 32). 
 
Political authority in these hordes was fluid, diffuse and highly localized. Traditional 
Kazakh society, to cite Bacon (1980), was ‘conical’ in shape, or ‘pyramidal’ to use the 
taxonomy developed by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1963). The small part at the top 
represented the Kazakh hereditary stratum, the ak suiek or ‘white bone’, while the wider 
lower segment consisted of the non-hereditary masses, the kara suiek, or ‘black bone’. 
‘Bone’ here refers to lineage and the colours ‘white’ and ‘black’ were inherited from 
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Mongol practice. At the top of the hierarchy were the sultans, presiding over local clan (ru) 
organizations, who claimed direct descent from Genghis Khan. Also part of the top 'white-
bone' (aq suiek) stratum, known as tore, were the clergy (hoja), who were of Arabic origin 
and claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed. They had great influence in their role as 
tutors to the sultans and khans but did not have high material status.  The khans who 
headed the hordes were not hereditary rulers but were elected by a gathering of sultans, 
judges (bi) and clan elders (aqsaqals). The judges, clan elders and poets (aqyn) were closer 
to the people (kara suiek) and helped to maintain social cohesion within the system (ibid.). 
 
The lineage system of the Kazakh clan (which lay at the heart of the nomadic social 
organization) was of the ‘segmentary’ type, i.e. a patrilinear unit tracing descent from a 
single ancestor but divided by 'segmentation' into smaller sub-units of parent lineages 
(Khazanov, 1984). These lineages were central to nomadic life, having extensive social, not 
merely biological associations, and nomads were expected to be able to name ancestors at 
least to the seventh generation, with some, of the highest status, going back forty 
generations. Lineages exercised various functions. Firstly, they functioned as a marker of 
exogamy, i.e. marriage among nomads was permitted only in the seventh and in some cases 
in the eighth or tenth ascending generation. Secondly, as a socio-legal unit, the lineage, 
used interchangeably with 'clan', affected the issue of property. The property of an 
individual who died without any immediate relatives simply passed to the clan. Moreover, 
without written chronicles or monuments these transmitted lineages were essential to 
nomadic group identity (Dave, 2007: 33).  
 
The clan and tribal organization of the Kazakh nomads was very fluid and adaptable as it 
had to preserve their way of life in the face of the harsh environment and the threat from 
new settlers. Both Masanov (1995) and Olcott (1995:69) argue that, although nomadic 
pastoralism originated as a means of survival and an ecological adaptation, it became 
through its epics and folklore a system of values and a way of life in itself. Even 
sedentarisation did not immediately undermine this culture. As Armstrong points out 
(1982:16), some ex-nomadic groups retained a strong ‘nostalgia’ for the old ways, 
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preserving 'a persistent image of a superior way of life in the distant past. Such nostalgia 
and collective memory became more enduring than the material circumstances of life’. 
 
3.3 The Tsarist Period 
 
3.3.1 The Tsarist Incorporation and Administration of the Kazakh Steppe 
 
For centuries the Kazakh steppe has been an area of frequent encounters and intermingling 
between numerous nomadic tribes and semi-nomadic and agriculturalist communities. 
Military weakness, derived from the inability to support a standing army, was one of the 
biggest problems of nomadic society, as was reflected in the decline and the disintegration 
of the Kazakh Khanate. Eventually this led the leaders of the Younger, Middle and Elder 
hordes to swear allegiance to the tsars in the 18th century (1731-1742), by which they 
obtained protection from attacks but in return they had to pay tribute and protect Russian 
borders and caravans. The Younger and Middle Hordes were fully absorbed into the 
Russian Empire by the mid 19th century, and the Elder Horde was incorporated only a 
quarter of a century later following the Russian conquest of Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara 
and Kokand in the 1860s-1870s (Dave, 2007:34-5). 
 
In the 18th century the rapidly expanding tsarist empire still had very fluid borders and a 
flexible, decentralized system of governance. In contrast to the Christian groups, whom the 
Tsars either tried to assimilate (Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians) or to attract with 
concessions (Georgians, Armenians), the animistic Kazakh nomads were regarded as aliens 
(inorodtsy) who were not to be integrated but, on the contrary, excluded from the army, 
leading educational establishments and administration (Laitin, Petersen and Slocum, 
1992:129-68; Weeks, 2006). Catherine II actually encouraged the Islamization of the 
Kazakh nomads and other similar tribes in order to promote a more settled, and therefore 
governable, way of life. She was aiming 'not at the introduction of Mohammedanism' as 
such, but was using Islam 'as a bait to catch fish with', to consolidate Russian control of the 
Central Asian borderlands (Bobrovnikov, 2006:206-7). The Kazakh nomads, however, 
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became Muslims much earlier, but their Islamic institutions remained less formal than 
among the neighbouring sedentary populations and therefore less comprehensible to the 
colonial administrators and scholars (ibid., Masanov, 2001).  
 
In the second half of the 19th century there were some limited attempts to promote reforms 
and ‘civilise’ (i.e., Christianise and educate in Russian) some Islamic groups, such as the 
Bashkirs and Kazakhs. The Russian Orthodox missionary Nikolai Il’miniskii and his 
Kazakh pupil Ibrai Altynsarin, for example, had tried to convert a small group of Kazakhs 
in the 1860s, but their efforts had only small impact on the steppe nomads in general. They, 
however, managed to create a Cyrillic-based alphabet and a grammar for the Kazakhs 
(Kreindler, 1979:5-26). As the above attests, the tsarist authorities were unable to direct 
enough human and financial resources to govern the region and to bring culture and 
‘civilisation’ to the inorodtsy. Struggling to transform their own feudal-agrarian society 
into a modern, industrial and consolidated European state, they came to treat their Islamic 
Central Asian subjects as a cultural 'other' which actually strengthened their own rather 
weak sense of 'European' identity and fitted in well with the limited amount of resources 
they could devote to the development of the region (Bassin, 1991: 1-17; Khalid, 1998: 51; 
Dave, 2007: 36).  
 
It was, however, the Russian conquest of Turkestan in 1865 and the consequent imposition 
of tsarist administration and laws which introduced the Kazakhs for the first time to 
centralised political control. In 1868 the Kazakh steppe lands were divided into three 
administrative units called gubernii (governorships) – Orenburg, West Siberia and 
Turkestan – which were in turn subdivided into oblasti (provinces), uezdy and volosti, with 
the lowest unit being the village (aul). The volost boundaries were drawn up on a purely 
territorial basis, crossing tribal or clan affiliations, in a typical ‘divide and rule’ fashion 
(though in fact this division stimulated clan conflict in the election of administrative 
offices) (Khalid, 1998: 69). Broadly speaking, the Younger Horde came under the 
jurisdiction of the Orenburg guberniya, the Middle Horde under the West Siberian and the 
Elder Horde under the Turkestan gubernii, which drove a wedge between the steppe-nomad 
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tradition of the Middle and Younger Hordes and the southern Kazakhs of the Elder Horde, 
who had closer contacts with the Uzbeks and Turkmen (for more detail see Weeks, 2006). 
 
3.3.2 The Impact of the Russian In-Migration into the Kazakh Steppe  
 
From the later 19th century settler in-migration transformed the character of the steppe 
populations and their nomadic civilisation. This process had started with the settling of the 
Cossacks as a privileged military caste who became agents of tsarist colonisation and 
Russification and it intensified after the liberation of the serfs by Alexander II in 1861 with 
the influx of poor peasants in search of arable land, with additional pressure coming from 
political exiles and convicts and also from Old Believers (starovertsy, staroobryadtsy) and 
non-Orthdox Christians (Poles, Balts) (Bekmakhanova, 1986; Dave, 2007: 37). With the 
increasing agricultural crisis of the later 19th century the tsarist authorities became 
preoccupied with guaranteeing a sufficient supply of arable land in the area: a decree of 
1868 allowed the State to take over pastoral land and confined livestock grazing to specific 
areas. But the peasant land hunger continued, and after the 1905 Revolution the Stolypin 
reforms, making a 'wager on the strong', allowed any 'excess' pastoral land to be used for 
farming (Dave, 2007: 37; Erofeeva, 2001).  The cumulative effect of these measures was to 
destroy the already weak nomadic economy (Olcott, 1995: 90-91). 
 
As pointed out above, the nomadic way of life had been a form of ecological adaptation, 
with stable nomadic populations and livestock herds maintaining a natural equilibrium with 
the resources of the grazing area. In the northern area the population density was 4-5 
persons per sq. km. and in the central desert lands about 1 person per sq. km. (Masanov, 
1999: 122-152). The arrival of settlers (some 35,000) from European Russia in the later 19th 
century created pressure on land and water resources which reduced the area available for 
nomadic pasturage. According to the first (and admittedly rather inaccurate) imperial 
census of 1897 'Kazakhs' (Kirgiz) formed 81.7% of the steppe population (about 3.39m.) 
and settlers 15.7%. But after the Stolypin reforms, the percentage of settlers in the 'Kazakh' 
steppe had risen to 41.6% (some 3 m.) (Olcott, 1995: 83, 90). 
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3.3.3 Later Tsarist Nationality Policy: from Exclusion to Partial Assimilation 
 
As we saw above, earlier tsarist nationality policy classified 'Kazakh' (Kirgiz) nomads as 
inorodtsy, or inassimilable aliens, and presumed a fundamental difference between the 
nomadic and settled ways of life. In practice the boundaries between the two were more 
fluid and nomads used the same climatic zones with settled people and lived side by side, 
but not together (Bacon, 1966; Khazanov, 1984). Nevertheless, despite the important links 
between nomadic and agricultural communities and the partial overlap between their 
identities, the nomadic and the sedentary peoples embodied two different principles, 
representing separate myths and symbols (Armstrong, 1982:40, Dave, 2007:38). Nurbulat 
Masanov gave a concise portrait of Kazakhs of the 16th to the beginning of the 20th century: 
 
Kazakhs were all those who were leading a nomadic life style and… who were ‘loyal to the 
ancestors’ precepts’ and did not turn to the settled way of life. Kazakhs were all those who 
‘wandered away’ from the state and did not accept the state control. Kazakhs were all those 
who were well aware of their difference from the sedentary people and agriculturalists and 
… who looked at them [the sedentary] with a sense of superiority [sverkhu vniz]. Kazakhs 
were all those who considered their culture and way of life as the best and the only possible 
in the whole world (Masanov, 2001:66).  
 
It has to be stressed that these parameters did not yet had a connotation of ethnicity. This 
identity category became available only at the end of the 19th and begninning of the 20th 
century, when the tsarist administrators started to classify their diverse population 
according to race, nationality and language (Khalid, 1998: 83).  
 
As mentioned above, a small group of mainly Bashkirs and Kazakhs were targeted for 
conversion to Christianity and education in Russian language and culture, in the belief that 
their weak civic awareness and the lack of a literary tradition would make them more likely 
to embrace the European civilization and that thereby they would become more manageable 
Russian subjects. This did not at first involve eliminating their ‘ethnicity’ or language, 
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though Russification, i.e. assimilation to Russian culture, faith and language, was clearly 
the ultimate aim (Steinwedel, 2000: 78; Altynsarin, 1975: 24). In 1916, confronted with the 
outbreak of the First World War and the urgent need for military recruits, the tsarist 
authorities overcame any idea that the Kazakhs were inorodtsy and inassimilable and 
authorized their general military conscription into the Russian imperial army. This led to 
extensive protests by Kazakhs, who were already dissatisfied with the continued Russian 
in-migration and which, they believed, had put increased pressure on already strained water 
and grazing resources, and produced frequent outbreaks of famine in the steppe. Joining the 
Russian imperial army was, therefore, viewed by many Kazakhs as a way to finally 
undermine their nomadic way of life and increase their subordination within the tsarist state 
(Sabol, 2003, Dave, 2007:40).  
 
Lastly, the Kazakh traditional identity which was conceived along clan and zhuz lines came 
increasingly under pressure. As noted above, the first imperial Russian census of 1897 
classified the diverse population of the tsarist empire on the basis of ‘nationality’ 
(natsional’nost’), which was closely linked with language and Kazakhs were increasingly 
pressured to replace their ‘zhuz’, ‘clan’ and ‘lineage’ allegiances with the one of 
‘nationality’. Although there was a strong correlation between the closely related varieties 
of their spoken language and their group boundaries, neither language nor a shared 
‘nationality’ were crucial identity markers for Kazakhs, for whom nomadic life-style and 
traditional symbols and imagery together with the status of clan lineage were still the main 
markers of identity. Language, as Dave noted, became an important identity marker for 
Kazakhs considerably later when the Kazakh elites and the Bolsheviks started to discuss the 
question of literacy and the choice of script (Dave, 2007: 40-41). 
 
Thus, despite limited efforts to promote state-building through border demarcation and 
administrative centralization, the tsarist policies towards the Kazakh steppe remained 
largely colonial, exploitative and segregationalist. Seizures of nomadic pastural lands, 
pressure from the Russian in-settlers and conscription of Kazakhs into the Russian imperial 
army exacerbated the crisis of the pastural nomadic economy and contributed to the 
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development of a collective consciousness of being persecuted and colonized among the 
Kazakhs. 
 
3.3.4 The Development of a Kazakh Ethnonational Identity up to the Soviet Period 
 
In the second half of the 19th century the tsarist state was beginning to experience what 
Dominic Lieven has labelled ‘the dilemma of modern empire’ (2003:50-51; 2006:19), 
which involved the tension between the preservation of a system of traditional authoritarian 
rule and the increasing challenge from the newly emerging modern ideology of nationalism 
and popular sovereignty. This drove the tsarist state by the reign of Nicholas II to rely 
increasingly on an appeal to Russian nationalism to boost its popularity. In addition 
increasing socio-economic modernization meant that the traditional tsarist policy of alliance 
with peripheral elites would not be sufficient to keep the empire together. As the state itself 
started to interfere more deeply in society to respond to the challenges of modernity, new 
social groups emerged and new, sensitive issues developed related to the question of 
language, literacy and education in state employment (ibid.).  It was against this 
background that a Kazakh national identity started to develop.   
 
Some have pointed out that traditionally Kazakhs and their culture showed no awareness of 
what might be called ‘political’ concerns in the western sense of the term. As Olcott 
(1995:109-110) notes: ‘[Until] the mid 19th century, it [Kazakh epics and folklore] showed 
no evidence of political consciousness or even sub-national loyalties. It was very parochial, 
dealing only with families.’ It was only in the early 20th century, under influence of the 
example and competition from similar emergent ‘national’ groups, responding to the tsarist 
policies outlined above, that leading Kazakh intellectuals started to use the discourse of 
nationality to promote the idea of Kazakh unity and the conception of a Kazakh ‘nation’ in 
order to achieve some cultural and even territorial autonomy within the framework of the 
Russian imperial state. Out of this arose the first Kazakh national movement, the Alash 
Orda. This tried to combine Turkic, Islamic and nomadic elements of Kazakh identity, but 
its vision and understanding of Kazakh national identity was clearly geared towards Russia, 
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although they imagined Russia as a different political entity from the disintegrating tsarist 
empire (Dave, 2007:41). 
 
As argued above, the increased interaction between tsarist administrators, Russian settlers 
and nomads had had the effect of unifying the Kazakh elites and general population in 
outbreaks of protest. These interactions were usually of an infrequent and localized nature, 
but they created the perception among Kazakhs (both the elites and the masses) that they 
were persecuted and dispossessed (Kirev and Kolodin, 1957). Furthermore, the crisis of the 
nomadic pastoralism forced the Kazakh elites to come to the conclusion that traditional 
skills were no longer sufficient to survive in the face of diminishing pastoral lands and they 
encouraged their fellow nomads to embrace literacy and acquire education as the new 
survival mechanisms in the modern time (Buleikhanov 1910, cited in Dave, 2007: 42).  
 
The leaders of the Alash Orda movement advocated cultural and territorial autonomy 
within the boundaries of the Russian state. They hoped that this would allow them to regain 
control over pastures, to cancel various taxes and dues on land and to reorganize the 
existing administrative borders to serve the needs of the nomad economy. To achieve a 
degree of consensus on the above issues, the Alash Orda leaders, who themselves hailed 
from various clan, zhuz, social rank and educational backgrounds, had to be involved in a 
complex process of negotiation. Firstly, with all the clan groupings and political factions 
within them with whom they discussed and defined a general ‘Kazakh’ national position; 
secondly, with their Turkic neighbours with whom they had a similar intellectual and 
ideological orientation within the framework of the Muslim (Jadid) movement; and lastly, 
with the Russian authorities who were vacillating between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and 
advancing different proposals for the restructuring of the Russian empire and establishing a 
post-revolutionary and post-imperial order. The political alliances and loyalties of the Alash 
Orda leaders, however, remained fluid and shifting as the practical considerations usually 
changed the political and ideological positions.  
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Some observers have argued that by the beginning of the 20th century many Kazakhs had 
started to organize politically and express their concerns over, and remedies for, tsarist 
colonization and Russification practices, economic and social dislocation and national-
cultural deterioration (Olcott, 1995, Kendirbaeva, 1999, Sabol, 2003). The efforts of the 
newly formed Alash Orda to stop Russian in-migration and to restore their lands for pasture 
created bonds of fraternity and solidarity between the Kazakh elites and ordinary nomads 
and contributed to the development of a common national consciousness (however limited).  
The February Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent formation of the Provisional 
Government were generally welcomed by most sections of Kazakh society (Olcott, 
1995:129-55). There was a general agreement among the different strata of Kazakh 
population that extensive socio-economic reform was required, because nomadic pastoral 
organisation had become increasingly unsustainable and had to adjust itself to modern 
conditions.  
 
S. Sabol (2003:4-5) has argued that the development of the pre-revolutionary Kazakh 
nationalist movement resembled that of other national movements in Europe and Asia. 
Their efforts – political, social and organizational – conform to Miroslav Hroch’s theory of 
national revival which contains three distinctive stages or ‘phases’. Phase A was a period of 
scholarly interest; Phase B was the period of patriotic agitation; and Phase C was the rise of 
a mass national movement (Hroch, 1985: 22-23). The Kazakh national intelligentsia was 
aiding the transition from Phase A to Phase B, when the WWI broke out and significantly 
impaired their efforts. The 1917 Russian revolutions propelled them into Phase C, although 
the majority of the Kazakh population were possibly not ready for their leadership or type 
of nationalism. Indeed, it could be argued that gradual, if incomplete transition to Phase C 
after 1917 was used as important background material that the Soviet authorities tried to co-
opt and transform through the Soviet nationalities policies in the 1920s (Sabol, 2003:4-5). 
 
3.3.5 The Development of Russian Ethnonational Identity before 1917 
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The emergence of Russian national identity can be attributed to probably the second half of 
the 19th century. Until the second half of the 19th century the political legitimacy of the 
Russian empire was based not on popular sovereignty expressed through the Russian 
nation, but on tsarist dynastic rule. Early ideas of Russianness and Russian identity were 
bound up with Orthodox Christianity, the political world loosely defined by the ruling 
dynasty and were contrasted to ‘others’ at the periphery, namely the Catholics of the West 
and the non-Christian nomadic peoples of the Volga region and Siberia. While the 
expansion of the Russian empire may have diluted the territorial sense of Russia, it did not 
pose a direct threat to the underpinnings of this political system.  
 
In the later 19th century, nationalist agitation by intellectuals and the introduction of a 
deliberate policy of Russification by the government began to foster a sense of Russian 
national identity among the mass of the population. As a result, despite the lack of 
consensus among Russian elites about the actual extent of ‘Russia proper’, Russian 
nationalism started to emerge as a significant political force. Some observers have noted 
that there were some important ethno-nationalist components to this process, but there is 
some evidence that this new identity was based on a multicultural and cosmopolitan (civic) 
view of Russianness which was gradually supplanting the traditional one of loyalty to Tsar 
and Orthodoxy (Brooks, 1985, Melvin, 1995). Thus, although the last few decades of the 
19th century and the beginning of the 20th century were marked by a rise in Russian national 
consciousness, the basis of this identity remained shifting and ambiguous.  
 
R.G. Suny (2001) usefully suggested four reasons for the inability to forge a clear-cut and 
well-defined Russian national identity in tsarist Russia. The first one was the vast 
geographical expanses, limited resources and low population and communication density of 
the Russian state which made it very difficult for the authorities to exercise their will on 
their subjects very frequently. Moreover, in the non-Russian peripheries indirect rule was 
usually the norm and little effort was made until late in the 19th century to interfere with the 
culture of the non-Russians. Second, with the emergence of the discourse of the nation by 
the beginning of the 19th century and the ability of non-Russian elites to conceptualise their 
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peoples as ‘nations’ (with all the attendant claims of political rights, cultural recognition 
and even statehood), it had become increasingly difficult for the tsarist state to assimilate 
various peoples into the dominant nationality. To make matters even more complex, many 
Russian speaking non-Russian subjects found their upward mobility in the civil service 
blocked to a degree. This frustrated mobility of the peripheral elites, or what Benedict 
Anderson (1991) labelled as ‘cramped’ or ‘vertically barred’ pilgrimages among Creole 
functionaries, encouraged them to reshape the political and economic sphere in which they 
could operate with fewer restrictions.  
 
Thirdly, Russia was a state and an empire in which its population was divided horizontally 
among dozens of ethnicities and religions and vertically between ruling and privileged 
estates and the great mass of the peasant population. As argued earlier, the Russian state 
maintained vital distinctions between Russians and non-Russians, and whole peoples, 
labelled inorodtsy, were subject to special laws, among them Kazakhs, Kalmyks, peoples of 
the North Caucasus and various peoples of Siberia and Central Asia. Such hierarchies and 
divisions inhibited the development of the kinds of horizontal bonds of fraternity and 
solidarity that already marked the rhetoric of the nation in the West. And fourthly, there 
was the failure of Russian elites to articulate a clear idea of the Russian nation, to elaborate 
an identity distinct from a religious (Orthodox) imperial, state, or narrowly ethnic identity. 
Russia was never equated with ethnic Russia; almost from the beginning it was something 
larger, a multinational ‘Russian’ state with vaguely conceived commonalities – religion, 
perhaps, or loyalty to the tsar – but the debate among intellectuals and state actors failed to 
develop a convincing, attractive notion of Russianness separate from the ethnic, on the one 
hand, and the imperial state, on the other (Suny, 2001:43-44). 
 
3.4 The Soviet Period  
 
It is now widely acknowledged that the Soviet rule played an important role in the 
formation of both modern Kazakh and Russian identities (Olcott, 1995, Akiner, 1995, 
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Gleason, 1997, Roi, 2000, Masanov, 2002, Dave, 2007, Hosking, 2004, 2006, Lieven, 
2002, Tolz, 1999). Indeed, the Soviet regime tried to re-define senses of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
in a way that helped to further the goal of building socialism and to replace the previous 
sources of belonging based on people’s relationship with the national group, church and 
state. A key ideological target was to homogenise society and to create a socialist nation in 
which the Communist Party could thus claim to represent everyone (Young and Light, 
2001, Pipes, 1994, Ashwin, 2000) To understand how both Kazakh and Russian identities 
interacted with the Soviet structures and with each other, I will first look at the basic 
features of the Soviet administrative system which will be followed by a historical 
background to the question under investigation.  
 
3.4.1 The Soviet Administrative System  
 
The Soviet administrative system was nominally federal, divided into four levels of 
regional, ethnically-based administrative political units. Fifteen national groups were 
granted the highest status of Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) or ‘union republics’, which 
together constituted the entire Soviet Union. Directly accountable to and within the 
territories of the union republics were twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSRs), eight Autonomous Regions (oblasti) and ten Autonomous Areas (okruga) (Table 
3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Ethno-federal units of the USSR 
Union republics Autonomous republics 
(ASSRs) 
Autonomous oblasts 
(regions) 
Autonomous okrugs 
(districts) 
USSR    
RSFSR Bashkiria 
Buryatia 
Chechnya-Ingushetia 
Chuvashia 
Dagestan 
Kabardino-Balkaria 
Kalmykiya 
Kareliya 
Komi 
Mari 
Mordvinia 
North Ossetia 
Tatar 
Adygai 
Gorno Altai 
Jewish (Birobijan) 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia 
Khakassia 
Agin-Buryat 
Komi-Permyat 
Koryak 
Nenets 
Taimyr 
Ust-Ordyn-Buryat 
Khanty-Mansi 
 
 
Chukot 
Evenk 
Yamalo-Nenets 
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Tuva 
Udmurtia 
Yakutia 
Ukraine    
Belorussia 
Moldavia 
   
    
Transcaucasia    
Azerbaijan Nakhichevan Nagorno-Karabakh  
Georgia Abkhazia 
Adjaria 
South Ossetia  
Armenia    
    
Central Asia    
Uzbekistan Karakalpakia   
Kazakhstan    
Tajikistan  Gorno-Badakhshan  
Kyrgyzstan    
Turkmenistan    
    
Baltic    
Lithuania    
Latvia    
Estonia    
Source: Sakwa, 1998:240. 
 
The rights and obligations of each of these units were stipulated in the Soviet Constitution 
(1936, 1977), including areas of dependence, guaranteed institutions, rights of autonomy 
and – in the case of union republics – secession. The criteria for inclusion as a union 
republic were established by Stalin in 1936 when fifteen autonomous republics were 
elevated to a union republic status. These included: (1) sufficient population, nominated to 
be over one million; (2) compactness of population, and (3) location on the borders of the 
Soviet Union, in case of secession.  
 
Graham Smith (1998:4-8) has argued that the nature of Soviet federalism was based on four 
main principles. First, the union republics were denied the right to national determination 
de facto, although this right was enshrined in the Soviet constitutions of 1936 and 1977. 
The centre, however, granted the local elites a limited degree of political flexibility in 
running their republics provided they ensured that nationalism did not become part of their 
republic’s agenda. The republican elites were also able to exert some leverage in the sphere 
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of fiscal federal politics, especially throughout the post-Stalinist years, and to highlight the 
republic’s economic interests and needs. These efforts, however, were subjected to frequent 
checks and balances and the local elites tried to comply, in most cases, with what the centre 
considered politically acceptable. It has to be noted that the right to national self-
determination was largely a legacy of the early Bolshevik period. The promise of a union 
that it would be possible to leave and that provided room for solving grievances at the local 
level encouraged numerous non-Russian nationalities to rejoin the fold. In the long-term, 
however, the Soviet authorities hoped, drawing on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, that 
inter-national and inter-regional equalization would homogenise various social groups and 
make national differences a thing of the past (Kaiser, 1994, Chinn & Kaiser, 1996). Hence, 
the right to national self-determination proved to be largely symbolic and the constitution’s 
emphasis on the unity of the Soviet state made this right virtually meaningless, at least until 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and democratisation policies after 1986 (Sakwa, 1998).  
 
Second, the particular nature of Soviet federalism ensured that there was a paradoxical co-
existence of two nation-building projects at both the all-union (obshchesoyuznyi) and 
republican (respublikanskii) levels. That is, on the one hand, the Soviet elites were engaged 
in creating the all-union symbols of statehood and nationhood and promoting, starting with 
Khrushchev in 1950s, the all-union Soviet identity which was based on the ideas of 
internationalism, communism, the knowledge of Russian language and identification with 
the Soviet state. While on the other hand they also provided some institutional space at the 
republican level that allowed local elites to carry out limited nationalising policies. This 
manifested itself, inter alia, in the practice of promoting the titular nationalities in the 
sphere of higher education and employment (the policy of korenizatsiya) and in defining 
the republics as ‘the states of and for particular [titular or indigenous] nations’ (Brubaker, 
1996:38). These polices had both intended and unintended consequences, but their 
overwhelming effect was ‘to accelerate the nationalisation of ethnic indigenes’ and ‘make 
the national problem more intractable over time’ (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996:69). The existence 
of a nation-building strand at the republican level also created a tension with the union-
wide nation-building effort that tried to centralise and homogenise the Soviet Union as a 
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whole. This situation was resolved only in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and 
republics were able to ‘decolonise’ themselves by promoting the culture and language of 
their respective nationalities (Brubaker, 1996, Linz & Stepan, 1996). 
 
Third, the federal nature of the Soviet Union had important implications for both Russia 
and the Russians. The Russian situation was quite unique in the Soviet Union. On the one 
hand, they were the dominant nationality of the USSR, effectively controlling key party and 
state institutions and infusing the Soviet identity with their language and culture. But on the 
other hand, unlike other nationalities, they did not have a clearly demarcated national 
territory endowed with their own national institutions, such as, for example, the Communist 
Party, the Academy of Sciences or KGB. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
(the RSFSR), itself a composite entity, ‘was not taken seriously by Russians as the Russian 
nation-state or the national homeland of the Russian people’, (Szporluk, quoted by Smith, 
1998:6). Hence, they tended to identify with the Soviet Union as a whole and see 
themselves as part of (or central to) what Khrushchev referred to in the 1950s as the Soviet 
community.20 Some observers have noted that Russians tended to identify with the Soviet 
Union because, firstly, they did not have a choice of sub-state national identity like other 
titular nationalities (Brubaker, 1996) and secondly, because their national identity was 
totally fused with the Soviet structures of power and the supra-national Soviet identity 
(Melvin, 1995, Laitin, 1998, Hosking, 2004, 2006). This situation started to change only 
after the break-up of the Soviet Union when the titular nationalities began to nationalise 
their newly independent polities, and Russians, in reaction to that, started to identify 
themselves as members of the Russian nation (Melvin, 1995:127). 
 
And fourth, although all union ethnorepublics had the same level of institutional support as 
part of the Soviet federation, they were not all treated similarly by the centre. These 
relationships were based on the different nature of incorporation into the Soviet Union, 
                                                
20 Surveys conducted before the dissolution of the USSR showed that more than two thirds 
of Russians, no matter where they lived, indicated that the Soviet Union, not Russia, was 
their motherland (Drobizheva, 1991)  
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which ranged from ambiguous to outright violent, on the ethnic proximity between the 
Russians and various titular groups and on the perceived economic relations (or 
exploitation) with (by) the centre. The more Russians and other titular groups saw 
themselves as being ethnically close, working on mutually beneficial terms and being 
incorporated voluntarily, the less they tended to view their situation in negative terms and 
develop a strong national identity and vice versa (Smith, 1998:4-8). All the above features 
of the Soviet administrative system, as enumerated by Smith and echoed by other 
observers, deeply affected and partly produced both Kazakh and Russian identities. The 
historical background to this tripartite interaction – between the Soviet federal system, the 
Kazakh and the Russian identities – will be provided in the next section. 
 
3.4.2 The Development of Soviet Nationality Policy and its Impact on Kazakhstan  
 
The federal structure of the USSR was the consequence of the Bolsheviks’ pragmatism 
during the period of the consolidation of the Soviet state in the 1920s. They believed that in 
the short to medium term the federal system would help to attract and mobilize the diverse 
population of the Russian empire and to destroy the tsarist rule, and in the long-term, with 
national and class antagonisms resolved and individuals socialized towards ‘international’ 
socialist community, the national identities would be voluntarily supplanted by the 
‘international’ Soviet socialist identity (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996, Young and Light, 2001). 
In 1924-5 the formal National Delimitation of Central Asia was carried out during which 
the borders of Kazakhstan were marked out; it is these borders that have now become the 
international frontiers of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Thus, by delimiting the boundaries of 
Kazakhstan and introducing a number of affirmative action programmes, the Bolsheviks in 
effect created the Soviet federal state and provided the guidelines for transforming the 
‘oppressed’ peoples into ‘socialist’ nations (Cummings, 1998).  
 
To win over the Kazakh population, the Soviet authorities introduced a far-reaching policy 
of social and political reforms. To give at least an impression of regional autonomy, Soviet 
Kazakhstan was granted regional statehood and the right to secede from the Soviet Union. 
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At the same time, the Soviet authorities expected to establish a trans-republican, all union 
Soviet identity. This, as we shall see later, would result in a dual policy and dual identity – 
identification with the Soviet state and encouragement of a national self-definition 
(Brubaker, 1996, Smith, 1998, Cummings, 1998, 2005). In practice, however, although the 
Bolsheviks were theoretically committed to the policies of internationalism, most of their 
administrators in Kazakhstan were of Russian or Slavic origin and they had little or no 
experience outside the Russian Federation. As a result, the subsequent political and 
economic changes for many Kazakhs strengthened the feeling that one colonial regime was 
merely supplanted by another (Sakwa, 1998, Anderson, 1997:27). 
 
The famine and destruction resulting from the years of revolution and civil war had 
devastated the Kazakhs and effectively destroyed nomadic pastoralism (Olcott (1995:159) 
estimates 750,000 Kazakhs died, McCauley (1976:18) around a million). The Soviet state 
advocated sedentarisation, but it could not provide enough human and financial resources 
to aid this process. Sedentarisation of Kazakhs was in many ways a continuation of the 
process initiated under the tsarist rule, but now it had become a central element of the 
Soviet policy. The Soviet authorities exhibited no hesitation unlike their tsarist 
predecessors and once they were in power they demanded rapid and radical change. In 
1926-7 they started an intensive campaign of seizing arable land from tribal leaders and 
redistributing it among the poor. In 1928 the Soviets confiscated and redistributed 145,000 
animals, marking the beginning of collectivization. In the first years 50,000 Kazakh 
families were settled in collective farms and by the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the 
sedentarisation of Kazakhs was considered officially complete.  
 
In 1929 the Soviet authorities nationalized Kazakhs’ property and forced them into the new 
collective farms. This process was accompanied by the impoverishment, exile and loss of 
Kazakh tribal elites. The farms which Kazakh were forced to join were usually in the arid 
and inhospitable areas of the republic and the state usually did not provide them with 
adequate tools and seeds to function as farmers. Furthermore, many Kazakhs killed their 
animals rather than hand them over to the state and the result was famine. All in all, the cost 
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of sedentarisation and collectivization campaigns in terms of human and animal losses was 
catastrophic. Jasny, in his classic study of Soviet collectivisation, estimates that the Kazakh 
population dropped by about a million from 3,968,289 in 1926 to 3,098764 in 1939. He 
adds that Kazakhs by 1939 should have numbered 4.6 million and stated that as such 
collectivization caused a population drop of 1.5 million (Jasny, 1941: 323). Akiner, citing 
the Kazakh demographer Makash Tatimov, similarly notes that 
 
out of a Kazakh population of approximately 4,120,000 in 1930, some 1,750,000 had died 
from starvation, epidemics and executions by 1939 – over forty percent of the entire 
population (this is in addition to deaths from natural causes). 200,000 fled into 
neighbouring countries and remained there (another 400,000 fled, but later returned) and 
453,000 took refuge in neighbouring Soviet republics, also to remain there permanently 
(Akiner, 1995:45).  
 
However, despite the human and animal cost, 98% of the rural Kazakhs lived in collective 
farms by 1938 and collectivization was believed by Moscow to have been successfully 
completed. 
 
In political terms, the period before and during the sedentarisation and collectivisation 
campaigns was marked by the efforts of the Soviet state to co-opt the Kazakh elites into the 
Soviet power structure and to Sovietise the region. The leaders of the Alash Orda national 
movement had recognized the Soviet power in 1919 and were already absorbed into the 
Soviet administrative structures. Most of them, however, did not lose their nationalist 
agendas and saw communism and socialism as a useful strategy to advance their political 
interests (Benningsen & Wimbush, 1979:27-30). The Soviet government had also tried to 
promote a policy of korenizatsiya in order to attract local national cadres and to establish a 
genuine loyalty among the Kazakh population. This involved the allocation of a percentage 
of the administrative posts which was proportional to the percentage of Kazakhs in the 
republic and the introduction of Kazakh as the official language in the republic (Olcott, 
1995:211).  
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By the late 1920s it had become increasingly obvious that the Soviets’ commitment to the 
ideas of internationalism was hollow. Some observers have noted that the traditional 
feelings of superiority of Russians towards Kazakhs were easily combined with the new 
Soviet ideology and this led Kazakhs to believed that they just exchanged one Russian 
empire for the other (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1966:134). Indeed, the 
Russians did not want to renounce their dominant position in the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan and to share the right to determine the course of the revolutionary process. The 
Moscow government and the local Russian communists, for example, were strongly 
opposed to the creation of a parallel Turkic Communist Party in the region and to the return 
of lands seized by Russians during the tsarist period. Moreover, the very nature of the 
Bolshevik government, which was a government of and for the proletariat, was 
instrumental in excluding a considerable number of Kazakhs from the Party who were still 
a predominantly rural population.  
 
In 1927 korenizatsiya policies were officially ended on the grounds that indistrialisation of 
Soviet Kazakhstan required highly qualified personnel that Kazakhs could not readily 
provide. This was accompanied by the extensive purging of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan, mainly because their commitment to the ideological principles of communism 
was believed to be hollow and because they represented ‘nationalist’ and ‘bourgeois’ 
elements of the traditional Kazakh hierarchies. Naturally, the Great Terror Campaign of the 
late 1920s –early 1930s eliminated anyone with links to the Alash Orda movement, which 
effectively destroyed the nationalist aspirations among the Kazakh elites. The Communist 
Party of Kazakhstan, however, was soon repleshinsed by the new Kazakh members who 
were loyal to the Stalinist political system and largely untarnished by the ideas and events 
of the previous two decades (Edmunds, 1998:77, Olcott, 1995:220). 
 
The Kazakh SSR also became strategically important as a ‘dumping ground’ for those 
groups that the Soviet regime considered disloyal or untrustworthy: Russian and Ukrainian 
kulaks at first, and before and during the Second World War Crimean Tatars, Volga 
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Germans and Koreans (Rashid, 1994:107). By 1939 Kazakhs had become a minority in 
their ‘own’ republic: if in 1926 they comprised 58.2% of the population, in 1938 that 
percentage had dropped to 36.4%. Only in 1989 did Kazakhs achieve a plurality again in 
the republic, when the Soviet census put the Kazakh percentage at 39.7% as opposed to 
37.8% Russians. Lastly came the ‘Virgin Lands’ Campaign in 1954 designed by 
Khrushchev to transform the remaining pastoral lands of northern Kazakhstan into a Soviet 
breadbasket. This brought in about 650,000 Russians and Slavs in the guise of 
administrators, agitators, technicians, ‘fraternal helpers’ and ‘enthusiasts’, which 
profoundly altered the ethnic mix of the republic and helped form the basis of modern 
Kazakhstan’s diverse population (McCauley, 1976:177).  
 
When Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev in 1964, who was seen within the republic as 
pro-Kazakhstan, the Virgin Lands Campaign was reassessed. He appointed the Kazakh, 
Dinmukhammed Kunaev, his protégé and close associate, as the 1st Secretary of 
Kazakhstan who became responsible for reviving korenizatsiya policies and clan patronage 
networks leading eventually to Kazakh dominance of party and state administrative 
structures (Olcott, 1995, Cummings, 2005). The political power of Kazakhs during this 
period of revival of Kazakh fortunes, however, was still largely dependent on the goodwill 
of the Moscow leadership and the constraints of the Soviet state structure. As Khazanov 
puts it: 
 
The Kazakh political elite’s privileged position in the local power structures 
depended on their compliance with all of Moscow’s demands and goals…. In 
addition, they had to embrace the Russian language and – at least in public – some 
of Russian culture and lifestyle. In return, Moscow gave them the right to run 
internal affairs in Kazakhstan, and to distribute preferential treatment and high-level 
jobs. In order to secure their support, the Soviet regime reserved a significant 
percentage of these jobs for Kazakhs (Khazanov, 1984:252). 
 
Rywkin similarly observed that  
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Specific controlling jobs are reserved for Europeans. These include positions of 
Second Party Secretaries, heads of special sections, heads of security, directors of 
factories of ‘all-union importance’… an even larger number of managerial jobs are 
reserved exclusively for Moslems: positions of First Secretaries, of Secretaries for 
Agitation and Propaganda, top governmental and Soviet positions, republic 
relations… and directorships of most of the non-essential enterprises (Rywkin, 
1979:45). 
 
With the death of Brezhnev in 1982, Kunaev’s power started to decline and he became 
increasingly sidelined under the brief incumbencies of Andropov and Chernenko. When 
Gorbachev came to power in 1986, Kunaev was dismissed from his position as the 1st 
secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and replaced by a Russian, Gennadii 
Kolbin, who had no previous links with the republic. It was against this backdrop that the 
December riots broke out. These were harshly suppressed with many deaths and injuries. 
The circumstances of these events still remain uncertain. What is clear, however, is that, 
firstly, they were the result of general unease amongst the Kazakhs that their political 
power was being downgraded, and, secondly, that this became a crucial ‘mythic moment’ 
for the development of the Kazakh national consciousness and aspirations for autonomy, 
now constantly referred to in the new Kazakh history (Akiner, 1995, Nazarbaev, 1999, 
Seidimbek, 2000, Gali, 2001, Masanov, 2002, Karin & Chebotarev, 2002), In the 
subsequent months many Kazakhs as well as Russians started to feel that the December 
demonstrations marked a crucial point in Kazakh-Russian relation and this understanding 
led to ‘a distinct divergence between the political interests of the two groups’ (Edmunds, 
1998:88). In the Kazakhs’ case, ‘this merged with the growing awareness of ethnic political 
identity, providing the impetus for the emergence of a nationalist trend in public opinion’ 
(ibid.). In the Russians’ case, this similarly highlighted their precarious status as an ethno-
national minority in the republic despite the fact that they were the dominant or state-
bearing nation in the Soviet Union as a whole. These feelings and aspirations were 
shrewdly managed by N. Nazarbaev when he replaced Kolbin in 1989 and became a 
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colleague of Gorbachev in the Politbureau, soon to become in 1991 the first President of 
independent Kazakhstan. 
 
3.5 Conclusion: The Development and Interaction of Kazakh and Russian Identities 
in the Tsarist and Soviet Periods 
 
This chapter has outlined the development and interaction of Kazakh and Russian identities 
from earliest times to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both Russians and Kazakhs were 
relatively late in developing clear national identities and these identities remained qualified 
in various respects before 1917. The Russian national identity started to emerge in the 19th 
century after the Russian experience in the Napoleonic wars and under the impact of the 
rising ideology of nationalism and popular sovereignty in Europe (Greenfeld, 1992). In the 
later 19th century the tsars came to increasingly rely on an appeal to the national feeling of 
the Russian population of the empire and the benefits of industrial and agricultural 
modernization to support their weakened regime. However this national identity was still 
bound up with commitment to empire: as with other 'core' ethnic groups of land-empires 
Russians did not see their 'national' identity as separated from their territorial and cultural 
control of a multinational empire (Lieven, 2000, Hosking, 2004, 2006).    
 
A Kazakh identity started to emerge from the 15th century with the coalescence of the three 
nomadic clan hordes into a cultural grouping with a more or less stable ethnonym and 
agreed common lineage (Alash). The incorporation of these steppe nomads into the tsarist 
empire and the consequent interaction with Russians consolidated this identity, but it was 
not till the later 19th and early 20th centuries, as increasingly intrusive tsarist national and 
economic policies impacted on the Kazakhs, that this ethnic identity acquired a political 
dimension as a 'national' identity. This was largely the product of the activity of newly 
emergent Kazakh intellectuals who formed the Alash Orda Kazakh national movement. 
This elite group advocated restoration of a modernized nomadic economy based on their 
traditional territory, increased literacy and education in Kazakh (based on Arabic script) to 
enable Kazakhs to share the benefits of modernization and a degree of autonomy within the 
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tsarist state (not independence) which would remove many tsarist taxes and dues and allow 
the Kazakhs freedom to flourish and develop. These policies started to find a response 
amongst the mass of Kazakhs who were increasingly discontented with oppressive tsarist 
administration, particularly in terms of the elimination of their traditional nomadic land by 
colonisation. In the revolutionary years the Alash Orda leaders abandoned the tsarist state 
and saw their aims as best promoted by a pragmatic alliance with the Bolsheviks, who at 
that time advocated national self-determination and an end to tsarist imperial oppression. 
But at this time we can only speak of an incipient national identity, not fully shared 
between elite and masses and still retaining an attachment to pre-modern nomadic and clan 
structures. 
 
During the Soviet period this incipient sense of Kazakh national identity was further 
expanded and elaborated to provide the basis for a national narrative that traced the 
‘inevitable’ (in the Marxist-Leninist sense) evolution of the Kazakhs from an amorphous 
collection of tribes into a fully-fledged ‘socialist nation’ (Akiner, 1995:34). The Soviet 
nationality policies, in this respect, were supposed to inculcate a double identification 
among Kazakhs – with the national group and with the Soviet state – which was based 
paradoxically on a ‘self-conscious repudiation of nationalism and ethnic identities’ (Dave, 
2007:71). That is, on the one hand, the Soviet elites provided Kazakhs with all necessary 
attributes of nationhood – national boundaries, national government structures and national 
language – but on the other hand, they integrated and subordinated this new national 
identity within the larger (hierarchical) structure of the Soviet empire-state. Thus, despite 
the fact that Kazakhs were able to enjoy the benefits of their territorialized nationhood 
(which were associated primarily with the affirmative action (or korenizatsiya) policies and 
intangible sense of being the legitimate ‘owners’ of the Kazakh SSR), their national identity 
nevertheless was embedded in the Soviet empire-state and hence was subordinated and 
provisional.  
 
The relationship of Russians and their identity to the new Soviet regime was also 
ambiguous. The Soviet regime relied on the political acquiescence of the Russians who 
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were encouraged to regard the successes of the Soviet Union as advancing the interests of 
Russian people. This close relationship between the Russian and Soviet identity ensured 
that Russians enjoyed a powerful but not completely dominant position in the USSR: they 
had advantage rather than guaranteed privilege (Brubaker, 1996, Kolstø, 1995). The 
position of advantage was reinforced by the centrality accorded to a depoliticized Russian 
culture in the Soviet system and the role assigned to the Russian language, which was not 
only the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, but also the language of success. Moreover, 
Russo-Soviet culture served as the primary means by which other ethnic groups were 
assimilated into a general Soviet way of life; it was therefore central to the regime’s 
ultimate goal of creating the Soviet people. This was reinforced by the dominance of 
Russians (and Ukrainians) in the top levels of key institutions – the Party, the KGB and the 
military.  
 
Expansion of the Russian linguistic and culture space under Soviet rule was further 
strengthened by the migration of Russians, other Slavs and Russian-speakers to urban 
industrial regions outside the Russian Federation and the linguistic Russification of non-
Russians who lived in these enclaves. This process, however, slowed down and even 
reversed in the 1970s and 1980s due to the demographic indigenization of the republics and 
the increase in national identification of the titular populations. In Kazakhstan, for example, 
the Kazakh population nearly doubled between 1959 and 1979, increasing from 2.8 million 
to 5.3 million. The Russian population, on the other hand, increased from 4 to 6 million, but 
declined proportionally from 42.7% of Kazakhstan’s population in 1959 to 40.8% in 1979. 
These demographic changes occurred primarily because of a much higher birth rate among 
Kazakhs than among Russians in Kazakhstan. In addition, the Russian in-migration that 
had continued from the time of the original conquest of the Kazakh lands slowed during 
1960s and was reversed during the 1970s, from which time there has been a net out-
migration of Russians from the republics. 
 
Some authors have argued that Russians started to leave Kazakhstan because better 
economic opportunities existed in Russia and because they were concerned that the 
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affirmative action programmes, designed to promote Kazakhs within their own republics, 
put them at a relative disadvantage (Karklins, 1989, Kolstø, 1995, Chinn & Kaiser, 1996, 
Brubaker, 1996, Dave, 2007). By the late 1980s Kazakh over-representation in higher 
education and political representation and the dramatic shift towards higher Kazakh 
participation in all sectors of the economy provided an added incentive for Russians to out-
migrate. All the above factors contributed to the rise of Russian ethno-national identity in 
Kazakhstan alongside the Soviet one. It has to be noted, however, that this identity 
remained comparatively weak because Russians lacked a clearly demarcated national 
territory – a homeland – other than the Soviet Union as a whole (Melvin, 1995). It was only 
with the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, and especially after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, that Russian identity in Kazakhstan really began to undergo significant change. 
 
To sum up, by the end of the Soviet period both Kazakhs and Russians were equipped with 
provisional ethno-national identities that presented them with two different problems. 
Russians’ ethno-national identity in Kazakhstan had paradoxically both dominant and 
subordinate elements to it in a sense that it was vested in the political structures of the 
whole Soviet Union, but at the same time it had to coexist and tolerate the insitutionalized 
‘titularity’ (titul’nost’) of the nominally state-bearing Kazakh nationality. Kazakhs’ ethno-
national identity, on the other hand, was nominally dominant within the boundaries of the 
Kazakh SSR (this was manifested in the fact that the Kazakhs were the legitimate ‘owners’ 
of their national republic and could enjoy both institutionalised and unofficial preferential 
treatment as a titular nationality), but at the same time they understood that their national 
identity was rooted in and hierarchically subordinated within the overall structure of the 
Soviet state. These two ethno-national identities were at least partially (and latently) in a 
constant competition for the cultural-political space within Kazakhstan – a competition 
which was institutionally supported by the structures of the Soviet federal system. After the 
break-up of the Soviet Union this competition has continued with a renewed force, although 
the emphases, contents and interpretations of both ethno-national identities have changed 
significantly. These changes will be looked at in more detail in the next chapter.  
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4 NATIONAL-STATE PROJECT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the attempts made by the governing elites of post-
Soviet Kazakhstan to develop a new national-state identity. This project is fundamental to 
the research on Kazakh and Russian identities in this thesis, since it provides a point of 
reference to which the dominant and subordinate ethnic groups react and by which they 
assess their own identities. In my in-depth interviews a number of my questions were 
specifically designed to elicit the reactions of respondents to specific aspects of this state-
identity project, and their reactions were very revealing about the state of their own 
identities. Therefore it is important to understand what the Kazakhstani elites have been 
trying to achieve and what have been the main trends of change in the development of the 
project in the years 1991-2004. In what follows I have used almost always primary sources 
for my material: official statements, the writings of President Nazarbaev and published 
articles by leading intellectuals and public figures involved in the development of the 
project. It is important to stress that what I am looking at is the officially approved and 
directed state identity project. While it is clear that the details of this have provoked 
considerable disagreement amongst advisory experts, and the published texts undoubtedly 
represent compromise between different viewpoints, nevertheless it is to the officially 
sanctioned statements and policies that the dominant and subordinate ethnic groups react in 
the development of their separate identities, and this is the subject of this research. 
 
In the following sections I shall, firstly, look at three broad categories of national-state 
identity projects that exist in the theoretical literature (4.2), secondly, I shall analyse the 
character and development of the official Kazakhstani national identity project using 
primary sources (4.3), thirdly, I shall examine the official justification of this project and 
describe and assess the actual implementation of selected key policies (4.4) which will be 
followed by a conclusion. 
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4.2 National-State Projects: Views and Models  
 
Before embarking on the description and analysis of this project it is important to set the 
general theoretical context by referring back to and summarising the discussions of these 
questions in chapter two. The whole concept of a deliberate national-state identity project 
has raised considerable controversy. The classic historical model has been that of Third 
Republic France, which after the chaos of the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods 
deliberately set about the integration and unification of the country to convert a patchwork 
of regional identities into the shared linguistic and symbolic secular culture of ‘France one 
and indivisible’, in other words to convert ‘Peasants into Frenchmen’ in the terms of the 
classic analysis by Eugene Weber (1979). This was a straightforwardly top-down, state-
elite led process, involving considerable use of both carrot and stick, and achieving by the 
first decades of the 20th century a considerable amount of success and hence imitation by 
other states.  
 
In terms of modern scholarship there have been broadly two trends of analysis of national 
unification projects. The first may be labelled the liberal-consensual or multicultural 
approach of Will Kymlicka (2001). Here the emphasis is placed on consultation and the 
respect for the cultural rights of all the various groups in the country, resulting in a 
compromise between the groups. The other approach is what may be called the 
‘nationalising policies’ approach exemplified by Rogers Brubaker (1996). This approach 
argues that in newly independent multi-ethnic states the tendency is for the newly dominant 
titular group to impose on the population as a whole a series of cultural policies which are 
aimed at reinforcing the dominant position of this group and at correcting the cultural 
injustices done to this group by the previously dominant imperial power: these he calls 
‘nationalising policies’ and include measures to restore the ‘national’ language, rewrite 
national history and refashion education, promote personnel from the titular group in 
politics, state administration and economic life and to refashion national symbolism (flags, 
hymns, festivals, street and place names, monuments, etc.) around the culture and values of 
the core indigenous group. Clearly the term ‘nationalising’ has strong pejorative 
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connotations, and the impact of these policies on subordinate ethnic groups can be expected 
to be negative, developing amongst them a closer bond with their ‘motherland’ state (often 
the old imperial metropole).  
 
One of the questions that will be asked in this chapter is how far the actual practice of the 
Kazakhstani national identity project approximates this ‘nationalising’ model. In the case of 
Kazakhstan the previous Soviet regime, as was discussed in the previous chapter, tried to 
develop policies of national cultural unification around the idea of the ‘Soviet person’, and 
it will be shown that the legacy of this approach is still quite strong in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan. Dave (2007) and Martin (2001) have pointed out that in most cases post-Soviet 
elites have been much more uncertain in their approach to national identity than Brubaker’s 
model suggests, since they lack the solid base of legitimacy which many post-colonial 
governments have derived from liberation struggles, which means, as Dave puts it, that the 
new elites have contented themselves with a symbolic nationalisation of the state rather 
than attempting a real nationalisation of the citizenry, thus concentrating on what Chatterjee 
has termed the ‘outer’ rather than the ‘inner’ domains of  national identity.  
 
A final point in this debate about national identity policies is the tension between ‘civic’ 
and ‘ethnic’ elements, which were also discussed in chapter two, since this figures largely 
in the overall scheme of the Kazakhstani national identity project. In that chapter it was 
argued that, while theoretically the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ approaches are clearly distinct, in 
practice they are inevitably interlinked in the necessity of using as a basis a single linguistic 
and value culture (often in a concealed or implicit way, such as with English and  ‘WASP’ 
culture in the United States), and indeed, as Smith has argued, such a link with a historical 
ethnic culture is indispensable for the success of even a civic-oriented national project (a 
point recently taken up by Kazakhstani scholars (e.g. Kadyrzhanov, 2007). 
 
In the following analysis we will bear in mind these theoretical approaches and in the 
conclusion make an assessment of the character and trends of the Kazakhstani project with 
reference to them.  
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4.3 The National-State Project of Kazakhstan: Concepts and Values  
 
Since independence the national state project of Kazakhstan has controversially combined 
and balanced two main viewpoints – the ethnocultural rights of the core or titular nation 
and the civic rights of all citizens of Kazakhstan irrespective of their ethnic background. 
President Nazarbaev has publicly stated on numerous occasions that the multicultural and 
multiconfessional nature of the republic requires an inclusive conception of citizenship and 
that the state’s task is to create an inclusive, state-centred ‘Kazakhstani’ identity, rather 
than an exclusive, narrowly defined, ethnic ‘Kazakh’ identity. Nevertheless, despite 
Nazarbaev’s repeated pronouncements that all peoples residing in Kazakhstan are 
Kazakhstani citizens and equal before the law, it is obvious that it has been difficult to 
maintain this balance between ethnic and civic nation building policies.  
 
The 1993 Constitution of Kazakhstan, for example, controversially defined Kazakhstan as 
‘the form of statehood for the self-determined Kazakh nation’ (forma gosudarstvennosti 
samoopredelivsheisya kazakhskoi natsii) (Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1993,1), 
which relegated all non-titular groups to an inferior position within the state. Even the 1995 
Constitution, refashioned to sound more ethnically neutral, contained an only slightly more 
subtle indication of the primacy of the Kazakh ethnic group in the formation of the 
Kazakhstani nation. The preamble to the revised Constitution reads: ‘We, the people of 
Kazakhstan, united by a common historical destiny, constituting a state on the primordial 
Kazakh land (na iskonnoi kazakhskoi zemle)…’ (Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, 
1995:1). By defining the territory as ‘primordial Kazakh land’, the new Constitution 
underscored the intimate connection between the Kazakh nation and the territory of the 
present-day state (Bohr, 1998), indirectly pointed to Kazakh ‘ownership’ of this territory 
and covertly characterized all other non-indigenous and non-titular groups ‘as subject to the 
titular community’s hospitality (i.e. the formation of a ‘host-state’ structure’)’ (Diener, 
2004:23). 
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The attempts by the Kazakh elites to nationalize the socio-political space have clearly been 
Kazakh-centric, and although rarely openly exclusive, have contributed over the last fifteen 
years to the establishment of the ‘host-state’ structure. Promotion of the Kazakh language 
over the virtually universally spoken Russian, de-Russification of public symbols and 
toponyms, re-evaluation of history, appointment to public office of ethnic Kazakhs, 
repatriation of the Kazakh diaspora and promotion of the Kazakhisation of the state in 
terms of population distribution represent the three components of Willams and Smith’s 
(1983) theory of nationalizing social space - manipulation of the environment, abstraction 
of the land and hardening of space. These state-sponsored and officially approved 
expressions of ethnonationalism and their perception (at least partly) as conscious acts of 
discrimination by non-titular groups have allegedly engendered a number of discordant 
social processes during the first fifteen years of independence. 
 
Rustem Kadyrzhanov (2007), a Kazakhstani academician, has pointed out that Kazakh 
national elites have had to combine and balance between civic and ethnic approaches to 
nation-building because they have dominated, almost in their pure form, the socio-political 
sphere of Kazakhstan since independence. The ‘ethnic’ or ‘titular nationalism’ approach 
implies that it is undesirable, if not impossible, to build one nation in a multiethnic society 
because ethnic identities of individuals will always predominate over their civic, state 
identity and identities of other ethnic groups. Hence, the national state project of 
Kazakhstan should be essentially a Kazakh national project and Kazakhs have to be 
considered the only ‘legitimate’ nation in Kazakhstan, while all other groups should be 
relegated to the status of diasporas. The second ‘civic’ approach to nation-building, by 
contrast, elaborates that the national-state project cannot be the idea of only one ethnic 
group in a multinational state, but should be an all-national project which aims to unify all 
ethnic groups into one nation on the basis of their citizenship. The adherents of the Kazakh 
national idea, according to Kadyrzhanov, are almost exclusively drawn from the Kazakh 
ethnic group, while the proponents of the civic approach happen to be usually the 
representatives of the non-indigenous, mostly Slavic ethnic groups, although a considerable 
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number of Kazakhs also subscribe to this idea (ibid., 97)21. Kadyrzhanov also stressed that 
Kazakh national elites tried to combine ethnic and civic strands of the national state identity 
project largely ‘by trial and error, guided by practical necessities and with little or no 
theoretical support from the academic community’ and as a result they ‘put into practice the 
model of the civic Kazakhstani nation which they based around the state-forming Kazakh 
ethnic group (gosudarstvoobrazuyuschego kazakhskogo etnosa) (ibid., 101). In this way the 
elites have tried to ‘resolve’ the contradictions inherient in both civic and ethnic nation-
building strategies.  
 
There have been numerous attempts by the Nazarbaev regime to define and capture the 
essence of the national-state project of Kazakhstan (Nazarbaev, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 
Kontseptsiya formirovaniya gosudarstvennoi identichnosti respubliki Kazakhstan, 1996a), 
but perhaps the most clear definition and detailed elaboration of this idea has been offered 
in the President’s book ‘In the current of history’ (V potoke istorii) (Nazarbaev, 1999), 
                                                
21 Amrekulov and Masanov (1994: 164-67) came up with a similar, although somewhat 
more elaborate typology of the members of the Kazakh intelligentsia (and by extension of 
the Kazakh population) with regard to their viewpoint on the construction of the 
‘ethnocratic’ state. Specifically, they argued that in crafting nationalizing policies, Kazakh 
national elites are primarily guided by the members of the first and most numerous group of 
Kazakhs (about 62%), which encompasses rural members of the educated classes, born 
mainly in Kazakh towns and villages with a traditional-patriarchal structure. Members of 
this group tend to perceive Russian culture as alien and even if they become integrated into 
urban life they tend to retain their traditional world outlook, which sets them in natural 
opposition to a linguistically and otherwise Russified urban milieu. The elites also take into 
consideration the interests of the second group (approximately 38%) who have assimilated 
both Kazakh and Russian cultures to a nearly equal degree (being generally of rural origin 
but having been educated in Russian-language primary and secondary schools) and are 
therefore characterized by an ‘ethnocutural and linguistic dualism’. The members of these 
two groups usually fill the ranks of the state apparatus, promoting the notion of a strong 
ethno-national state. Carrying with them the memory of past injustices, they seek to redress 
those grievances in the form of new nation-building measures. The primary targets of their 
nationalizing measures are not only ethnic Russians and other non-titular groups, but also 
their Russified co-ethnics (mankurty) – a third and the least numerous group (about 5%), 
which includes the urban Kazakhs, who are not only linguistically Russified but also 
estranged from Kazakh culture and regard Russo-European culture as their own. The third 
group, according to Masanov and Amerkulov, usually supports the civic ‘all-inclusive’ 
conceptions of the nation and the introduction of Russian as the second state language. 
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where he devoted a whole chapter to the issue of national identity, and I have generally 
used this text as a benchmark for his ideas. Specifically, the President has argued that the 
successful development of national identity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan requires a two-tiered 
approach. The first tier is connected to the development of the notion of the ‘people of 
Kazakhstan’ (naroda Kazakhstana) as a single and multi-ethnic entity, and the second tier 
is related to the promotion of ethnic Kazakh self-consciousness that would eventually 
consolidate the Kazakhstani nation (kazakhstanskuyu natsiyu). 
 
When talking about the first tier, Nazarbaev has noted that he is talking about the ‘people’ 
(narod) of Kazakhstan and the development of a unified civic and political entity (edinaya 
grazhdanskaya i politicheskaya obschnost’) and not the development of a ‘supra-ethnic 
entity’ (superetnicheskaya obschnost’). He equated the latter with the ‘Kazakhstani nation’ 
and believed that it is premature to implement it in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: 
 
Why is it too early to talk about the development of a single Kazakhstani nation (o edinoi 
kazakhstanskoi natsii)? And why do I prefer to talk about a civic and political unity rather 
than an ethnic unity? First of all, the ethnic diversity of contemporary Kazakhstan does not 
allow us to talk about the development of a single ethnic identity (edinoi etnicheskoi 
identichnosti) in the nearest future. One has to be a realist and understand that we can be 
united first and foremost by the political values, although Kazakh language, as a cultural 
integrator, should play an important role here. Speeding up the development of a single 
ethnic consciousness (edinogo etnicheskogo soznaniya) can have dramatic consequences 
for all Kazakhstanis. Secondly, we have recently seen that the assimilation model of the 
Soviet Union  - the attempts to unite everybody in one language, ideology and culture - had 
failed… In a democratic state assimilation mechanisms are also present, but they work 
naturally and evolutionally and not by force. Thirdly, the Kazakh nation itself has to gain 
the experience of independent development and has to become stronger on the way to 
national consolidation and the revival of a single ethnic consciousness. It is important to 
strengthen and foster the unity of ethnic Kazakh consciousness. And this is an absolutely 
natural position (Nazarbaev, 1999:187-188).  
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The above quote indicates that the President projects the idea of a Kazakhstani nation onto 
the concept of the ‘Soviet people’ (sovetskii narod) in that in the short to medium term all 
ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, including Kazakhs, will develop their cultures and national 
self-consciousness (this approximates to the Soviet concept of flourishing (rastsvet) of all 
nations) and in the long-term they will gradually merge into the new historical community 
of the Kazakhstani nation (this roughly approximates to the Soviet concept of 
rapprochement (sblizhenie) and merger (sliyanie) into one historical community of the 
Soviet people). It is also clear that the President has allocated the role of the leading ‘elder 
brother’ or ‘primus inter pares’ to the Kazakh ethnic group, around which all other 
members of the ‘people of Kazakhstan’, while retaining their identity, are supposed to 
gradually merge to form an identity as a Kazakhstani nation. (This, indeed, bears a strong 
resemblance to the role of Russians in the Soviet national project). The quote above also 
indicates that the President understands the notion of ‘Kazakhstani nation’ in ethnic rather 
than civic terms, equates it with the idea of becoming Kazakh (or being assimilated to 
Kazakh culture) and roots it in the Soviet primordial understanding of ethnicity and 
nationhood, which renders, as will be discussed later, the concept of the national identity 
project controversial and contradictory.  
 
Thus, the essence of the first tier of identity is the development of a basic civic and political 
identification with the state of Kazakhstan, which protects the interests of all citizens 
irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, while the second tier is linked to the development of 
Kazakh national consciousness and Kazakh national identity. Nazarbaev believes that the 
task of the second tier is central to the national-state project of Kazakhstan and it is 
informed by three main factors. Firstly, he argued that Kazakhs had achieved a majority 
status by the turn of the century and their ‘youthful’ demographic profile (the average age 
of Kazakhs is 25 years old) puts them in a good position to become the leading 
ethnonational force in Kazakhstan. Secondly, Kazakhs are represented at all levels of social 
life and they successfully explore new social niches related to the functioning of the new 
state bureaucracy, military sphere, diplomacy, national capital, etc. And thirdly, Kazakhstan 
has been acknowledged at the international level as the national homeland of Kazakhs, 
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which indicates that Kazakhs as the titular or core nation have a legitimate right to 
nationalize it as they see fit. Specifically, the President has pointed out that Kazakhs 
deserve special attention by the state because the very existence of Kazakhstan is dependent 
on their existence as a nation:  
 
In legal terms, the territorial independence of present-day Kazakhstan flows naturally from 
the ethnopolitical genesis of the Kazakhs. This nation, which is legitimized by its historical 
destiny, constitutes, and will always constitute, the ethnopolitical basis for the state 
independence of the republic of Kazakhstan, and for this reason should be recognized as 
such by all Kazakhstanis and by the world community without being suspected of 
nationalism. After all, what is a tree without roots, and what it the present without the past? 
(Nazarbaev, 1996a:165) 
 
It has to be noted that Nazarbaev does not explicitly elaborate on how the civic and the 
ethnic projects will eventually mix or meet, apart from the idea that all the ethnic groups of 
Kazakhstan will gradually and voluntarily merge into a Kazakhstani nation. He, however, 
gives some indication that Kazakh culture and language and Kazakhs as a titular or core 
group will be the main integrating factors of the new national community. ‘Kazakh 
culture’, said Nazarbaev 
 
is a culture of the majority of the population of the state and it has a whole set of 
institutional mechanisms. It is a culture that developed genetically (geneticheski 
sformirovavshayasya) on this territory and by and large determined the character of the 
historical development of Kazakhstan. It is, finally, a contemporary culture with all its 
attributes and connections to the world cultural process. Therefore, there is nothing 
paradoxical or politically incorrect about the integrating role of Kazakh culture and it is 
necessary to say that straightforwardly and without any ambiguity (Nazarbaev, 1999:140).  
 
The President has taken care to clarify that the state will support all cultures and encourage 
intercultural interaction, influences and borrowing, but it also expects all representatives of 
the non-titular groups to ‘diligently internalize the culture of the Kazakhs as the Kazakhs at 
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one time internalized and absorbed Russian culture’ (ibid., 194). As for the language issue, 
the President similarly stressed that although all languages are welcome in Kazakhstan, the 
representatives of non-indigenous and non-titular groups are expected, alongside their own 
language, to gradually master Kazakh (Nazarbaev, 2003:227). And finally, the President 
has noted that the Kazakhs as the titular and core group of Kazakhstan are uniquely placed 
and destined to unify all other ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan: 
 
For the first time in modern history, independence has given the Kazakhs the chance to 
assume a leading role in our country; it has given them a real possibility to rule their state, 
to transform the economy and revive the national culture, tranditions and language. Only 
the Kazakhs can, and should, assume the responsibility for the fate of the multi-ethnic 
populaton of Kazakhstan, helping people from other national groups to adapt to the new 
circumstances, creating together an atmosphere free from any attempts to destabilize 
society and encouraging unity. After living for two centuries under Tsarist domination, and 
then for seven decades under the Soviets, the Kazakhs as a nation are uniquely placed to 
guarantee that no individual national group will ever be oppressed again (Nazarbaev, 
1998:125). 
 
The President finally put together two components of the national-state project and argued 
that they did non contradict, but mutually reinforced each other and moved along the same 
trajectory: 
 
When solving the problems of the Kazakh national identity (natsional’naya identichnnost’ 
kazakhskoi natsii), one should not forget about the other identity level – the political and 
civic identity (politicheskaya i grazhdanskaya identichnost’) of the people of Kazakhstan. 
These are different levels of identitification and there is a need to say it quite openly. There 
is no contradiction about it. There is a historical right: the aspiration of Kazakhs to achieve 
a well-defined national identity in order to preserve their national ‘I’ in a rapidly changing 
world. There is also a historically objective and absolutely necessary movement of all 
Kazakhstanis towards common civic identity (obschegrazhdanskaya identichnost’). 
 
 114 
The trajectories of both components of the national-state project are well defined, but stand 
sharply apart at the moment. They are intended to meet in the future, as is implied by the 
designers of the state-identity project, but this will happen only when the Kazakh nation 
develops a strong national consciousness and becomes capable of consolidating the other 
ethnic groups of Kazakhstan and when these groups are willing to be consolidated by the 
titular nation and merge into one Kazakhstani nation. But how is this Kazakh ethnic 
consolidation and the achievement and cultural dominance within Kazakhstan to be 
achieved? This brings us to a consideration of the so-called ‘nationalizing policies’ pursued 
by the governing elite. I will not go into great detail about the content and development of 
these policies. What I shall try to do is to establish some key points in some of the main 
important policies to which my respondents reacted. For this purpose I have selected, the 
following policies: the promotion of a justificatory ideology for the national Kazakh state; 
language development, changes in national symbolism and iconography, promotion of 
demographic development, and state personnel policies in the state sector.  
 
4.4 The National-State Project of Kazakhstan: Nationalizing Policies 
 
The nationalizing policies in Kazakhstan can be understood to encompass a state policy 
directed at the revival, and promotion of the language, culture, demographic 
preponderance, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the Kazakh nation 
(Brubaker, 1996). A. Bohr has argued that some nationalizing measures designed to secure 
the cultural and political revival of the titular nation have been promoted openly (the 
upgrading of the local language, re-writing of history, re-invention of national holidays) 
while others have been ‘tacit’ and implemented in accordance with the unwritten rules of 
the game (1998:142). Karin and Chebotarev similarly noted that nationalizing policies or 
the policy of Kazakhization have been largely denied at the state level, poorly integrated as 
a coherent and visible state policy and implemented under the ideological guise of the 
revival of the titular language, culture and tradition, on the one hand, and neo-Soviet 
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rhetoric of internationalism and friendship of peoples on the other (Karin and Chebotarev, 
2002).  
  
4.4.1 The Ideology of the National State 
 
The elites of post-Soviet Kazakhstan have employed two main types of justification to 
support the nationalising policies. The first type involves the idea that the promotion of 
national identity (meaning ethnic or ethnonational identity) development is natural and 
legitimate and can be seen in the experience of many other states and ethnic groups. This 
type of justification could be viewed as a defence against the negative associations of the 
concept of nationalism, which were established in the Soviet period. The second type 
relates to the re-writing of history by the new dominant group, in which the main theme is 
what Aurel Braun (2000) has called, ‘majority victimisation’. Instead of the previous Soviet 
version in which Kazakh history was seen as the progressive development of Kazakh 
culture and statehood in the framework of the Soviet Union, the new interpretation of 
history, while not completely rejecting the positive aspects of Russian dominated 
development, confronts the negative and tragic experiences of the Tsarist period and Soviet 
totalitarian legacy as partly justifying policies, which redress Kazakh dignity and status. It 
is important to stress, however, that the tone and content of this justification varies 
depending on the character of the audience to whom it is addressed. That is criticisms of the 
Tsarist and Soviet periods are more muted when addressed to the Russian-speaking groups 
within the country, and much more frank and direct when made to Kazakh-speaking 
audiences and to the international community. What we see here is the gradual 
development of an official ideology22 justifying the national project and its nationalizing 
policies. 
  
a) Ethnonational Development as Natural and Legitimate 
 
                                                
22 By ideology I mean an organized system of ideas used by governing elites to legitimize 
their rule.  
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When talking about the development of the Kazakh national consciousness and the feeling 
of belonging to Kazakh culture, Nazarbaev has been keen to stress that this is not dangerous 
nationalism, but an absolutely normal and legitimate position to be found in most existing 
states. For example, when talking about the ethnic priority of the state, he says that ‘there is 
no need to hide it or think of diplomatic excuses here. It is an absolutely normal state of 
affairs. Why hide it? Every people (narod) creates their own special spiritual field and feels 
proud of it’ (Nazarbaev, 1999:190). Elsewhere he expressed the hope that the Kazakh 
nation would soon revive its ethnic consciousness: ‘It is necessary to strengthen and foster 
a unified ethnic Kazakh consciousness. And it is an absolutely natural position’ (ibid., 188). 
As Billig (1995) has noted, the success of any national identity project depends largely on 
the ability of its designers to hide all signs of its artificial construction and to present 
national development as a completely natural and normal process. To substantiate the 
‘normality’ of feelings of national identity President Nazarbaev draws on the experiences of 
other ethnic groups. For example, he cites Russian national identity 
 
The best sons of Russia with pride and love fostered and felt their ‘Russianness’ (russkost’), 
and I do not have the heart to accuse them of so-called nationalism. This feeling of national 
identity has not prevented them from respecting other cultures and ethnic consciousnesses. I 
fully understand the contemporary entrepreneurs of Russian culture who openly and 
proudly assert the greatness of the Russian national spirit (ibid. 190). 
 
It is interesting to note that Russian ethnic identity is also evoked by Nazarbaev in other 
contexts when he is dealing with the suppression of Kazakh identity during the Tsarist and 
Soviet periods. As with any constructed state national identity, the elites pick and choose 
those elements that are likely to resonate with people’s feelings and memories. Russian 
ethnic identity is therefore used as an example of consolidated ethnic consciousness to be 
emulated by Kazakhs as well as a reminder of the threat when this identity was politicised 
and imposed in a top-down fashion by the totalitarian regime. 
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In the same way, when the President talks about a demographic shift in favour of the 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, he declares that this is an important event to be proud of. He cites 
example from other ‘core’ nations that constitutes a majority in their states and considers 
that this process is in the order of things: 
 
Why does everybody consider as absolutely normal the preponderance of the French in 
France, Russians in Russia and Germans in Germany? And why should the demographic of 
Kazakhs in their native land raise any questions? (1999:194).  
 
Presumably Nazarbaev has in mind here biologically determined and primordially defined 
ethnic groups, the ‘core’ nations that formed the contemporary German, French and 
Russian nations.  
 
b) Re-writing of History - the Theme of Historical Grievance 
 
One important justification for affirmative polices of ethnonational development is the 
rhetoric of ‘majority victimisation’ and the need to redress the damage done to national 
identity during the period when the Kazakhs did not have their own state. But as noted 
above, the picture in Kazakhstan is somewhat contradictory since the political elites do not 
have a consistent set of attitudes towards the historical past. The theme of ‘majority 
victimisation’ is selectively used with reference to certain major issues and events in the 
Tsarist and Soviet periods, such as sedentarisation, collectivization and aspects of 
demographic preponderance of Kazakhs. 
 
The President presents the independence of Kazakhstan as giving Kazakhs the opportunity 
to feel their ‘Kazakhness’ (kazakhkost’) for the first time. The period prior to independence 
is referred to as a time of ‘fractures’ (nadlomy) followed by ‘periods of inertia’, which 
lasted for centuries and had a profound effect on Kazakh national awareness. This was the 
result of insufficient institutional protection to ensure the ethnocultural reproduction of 
Kazakh life. Therefore, a re-evaluation of the historical past is needed to make the right 
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‘diagnosis’ of the current state of Kazakh identity and to bring it back to the required level. 
(ibid.: 191-192). Kazakh history in this sense is not ‘a cemetery of facts, but an enormous 
motivational and explanatory force’ (ibid.: 238). 
 
It is important to stress that the official use of the ‘majority victimisation’ rhetoric varies in 
different contexts, depending on the intended audiences and the nature of the occasion. For 
example, in his book ‘In the Current of History’, which is intended for internal mass 
consumption, the President addresses ‘victimisation’ issues relatively cautiously. He tries 
not use the words ‘colonialism’ or ‘colonial’ when referring to the Tsarist or Soviet periods 
and instead uses softer euphemisms that depict colonial experiences without labeling them 
directly (for example, ‘totalitarianian’ rather than Soviet or Russian). He deliberately 
refrains from condemning the Russian/Soviet past too much because it would not only 
offend their own Russian population and observers within Russia itself, but would also 
implicate their own elites’ Soviet past. In addition, such nationalist rhetoric would not 
resonate positively with the many Russified Kazakhs who have positive memories of the 
Soviet period.  
 
There are however certain cases where the President employes a stonger version of 
‘majority victimisation’ rhetoric together with an emotional appeal to get to the hearts and 
minds of its listeners. For example, his speeches at the First and Second World Kurultais 
(gatherings) (1992, 2002) as well as certain books intended for foreign audiences. The 
President calls both the Tsarist and Soviet periods ‘ruthless’ and 'colonial’ and claims that 
with independence the ‘chains’ that have bound the Kazakhs for centuries have been 
broken’ (Nazarbaev 1992). What is important, however, is the qualification that the 
President makes to this statement. He distinguishes between the system as such and the 
population as a whole who should not be associated with these crimes: 
 
Every person tries to further the betterment of his nationality. But we should not do that at 
the expense of discrimination, humiliation and rejection of other nationalisies that live in 
our republic. This includes Russian people. They are not responsible for the misfortunes of 
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our people. The responsibility for what has happened lies on the policies and the society of 
that period that endorsed these policies (ibid., 3)     
 
This qualification may be explained by the fact that in 1992 the Slavic population 
comprised more than forty per cent of the Republic’s population and the President was 
careful not to alienate them. In 1998 in his book My life, my times and the future, he, 
however, was more open about the role of Russians in the Soviet system and explained why 
so many non-Russian groups were antagonized by the Soviet nationalities policies. 
 
One of the reasons why ethnic tensions have continued in Kazakhstan is the way that the 
damaging nationality policies, which were carried out during the Soviet period, were 
associated in the minds of many Kazakhs with the Russians. This is not surprising. These 
attempts to unify the way of life, traditions and culture of the peoples of the Soviet Union, 
to create a truly ‘Soviet people’, were carried out in a Russian form and in the Russian 
language. This attempt at forced assimilation could not fail to antagonize the Kazakhs, and 
indeed virtually all the other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. …After Kazakhstan 
gained independence in 1991, a substantial proportion of the Kazakh people felt a kind of 
euphoria that we had somehow scored a victory over the Russians (Nazarbaev 1998, 124). 
 
In addition to forced cultural assimilation, the erosion of Kazakh national identity is linked 
to the forced sedentarisation and collectivization campaigns of 1930s and the Virgin Lands 
Campaigns of the 1950s. The President has pointed out that the traditional way of life of the 
Kazakhs was undermined by the imposed goal of an alien cultural and economic system 
(1999). This marked the beginning of the public discussion of the suffering of the Kazakhs 
endured during this period which was an important historiographical point for the new 
state. Yet the Kazakhstani authorities realize that they can ill afford to engage in, or allow 
nationalist groups to engage in, openly anti-Russian rhetoric. Similarly, the President 
blames the decline of the Kazakh language – a crucial element of Kazakh national 
consciousness, to be due to the insufficient social and institutional protection prior to 
independence:  
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We have seen that the educational system was built on the principle that the Kazakh 
language was unimportant and residual. During that time it was impossible to enter the 
most mobile and competitive professions using the Kazakh language. As a result the 
Kazakh nation and especially its elites did not have the motivation to use their own 
language. This has a direct impact on the national consciousness and was the result of the 
minimization of institutional protection for the national ‘I’ (1999:193).  
 
Hence, he urges people to understand the current policies to revive what had been 
‘minimised’ in the past and hopes that this process would be correctly understood by the 
people of Kazakhstan (ibid., 194). 
 
4.4.2 Language 
 
Language in multiethnic and multicultural contexts is usually an ‘entitlement issue’ and a 
‘symbol of domination’ because it ‘links political claim to ownership with psychological 
demands for the affirmation of group worth, and it ties this aggregate matter of group status 
to outright careerism, thereby binding elite material interests to mass concerns’ (Horowitz, 
1985:222). In Kazakhstan, as in many other post-Soviet states, there was a strong cultural 
justification and popular support, mainly from the Kazakh population, for making the 
indigenous language the state language in place of the established Russian – the Soviet 
lingua franca.  
 
Since the passing of the 1989 Language Law within the Soviet framework, a number of 
other decrees and laws were put in place to strengthen the status of Kazakh. The Decree on 
Education passed on 18th January 1992 confirmed Kazakh’s status as the state language and 
indicated that, by 1995, all the state and official communication were to switch to Kazakh. 
In 1993 the first Kazakhstan Constitution defined Kazakh as the ‘state language’ 
(gosudarstvennyi yazyk) and Russian as the language of ‘interethnic communication’ (yazyk 
mezhnatsional’nogo obshcheniya), effectively a lingua franca, consistent with the 1989 
Language Law. The codification of Kazakh as state language in the Consitution had already 
elevated its legal and symbolic status, causing considerable angst among Russian-speakers. 
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Subsequent decrees and directives took a more conciliatory approach towards Russian and 
offered concessions to Russian-speakers, a category that included a vast number of 
Kazakhs, especially the youth and urban residents.  
 
In April 1995, Parliament ratified Nazarbaev’s proposal that the requirement for all state 
employees to be proficient in Kazakh be postponed for fifteen years. The first indication of 
a compromise on the status of Russian came in the 1995 Consitution. Article 7.1 confirmed 
Kazakh as the state language and Article 7.2 stipulated that the Russian language shall be 
officially used on a par with the Kazakh language in state institutions and local self-
administrative bodies. A year later, the ‘Conception of Language Policies of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan’ issued on 4 November 1996 called for ‘creating appropriate conditions for 
developing Kazakh as the state language in order to generate an increase in its demand and 
functions’, while affirming that Russian can be used as an ‘official’ language. This 
amounted to a de facto recognition of bilingualism, but a de jure status as the state language 
was reserved only for Kazakh.  
 
The adoption of the Law on Languages in July 1997 reiterated that Russian shall be 
‘officially used’ on equal grounds along with Kazakh in state and local administration 
institutions, and that other national languages are to be used ‘side by side’ with the state 
language. Kazakh nationalists had proposed adding the phrase that Russian be used ‘only 
when necessary’, but this proposal was deleted. The law further required official bodies to 
prepare a majority of formal documentation in Kazakh and mentioned that at least 50 per 
cent of all television and radio broadcasting should be in Kazakh.  
 
The passage of language legislation has allowed Kazakhstan to muffle the limited, albeit 
intense societal debate on the issue. Its seemingly moderate and pragmatic stance reflects 
an attempt to depoliticise the language issue, while acquiring the tacit support of the 
majority group, the Kazakhs. Indeed, as Bhavna Dave aptly noted, 
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The priority for the Kazakhstani ruling elite was to adopt a language law that accorded at 
least a symbolic supremacy to Kazakh, without undermining their own position, or 
disrupting societal equilibrium. The proclamation of Kazakh as the sole state language 
allowed them to establish the non-negotiability of a Kazakh ethno-cultural orientation of the 
state and the notion of titular primacy. By dispensing with any rigorous requirements, such 
as mandatory knowledge of the state language and tests to determine Kazakh language 
proficiency, the ruling authorities have managed to appease a large stratum of Kazakhs, as 
well as non-titular groups. The weak and formalistic implementation of the language 
legislation has considerably reduced the potential for both inter-ethic and intra-ethnic 
conflict by allowing individuals to pursue their own preferences, while nominally 
complying with the language policy (Dave, 2007:116) 
 
4.4.3 Symbols / Iconography 
 
Changing state symbols and renaming streets and towns have also been an important way 
of transforming national perceptions and converting the country into a national territory in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan (Savin, 2001, Karin and Chebotarev, 2002, Masanov, 2002, Kaiser, 
2004). Changes of this type, according to Horowitz, usually have little or no ‘direct effect 
on the distribution of tangible resources among the contending groups, but they usually 
connote something about future treatment: who will be discriminated against and who will 
be preferred’ (1985:216). Horowitz adds: ‘Although all political systems must cope with 
some such claims, in a multiethnic society the size and intensity of the symbolic sector, as a 
fraction of all demands, constitute an excellent indicator of malintegration’ (ibid., 217). 
  
To create a unified and distinctive nation and impart a sense of unity and common destiny 
to its members, Kazakh national elites have tried to unearth and exploit the ethnosymbolic 
material that was available at their disposal, namely toponyms, customs, historical myths 
and iconography. Specifically, they accorded great meaning to the ideology of unity of the 
titular ‘core’ group and the strengthening of this identity by the introduction and wide use 
of official symbols that draw on the culture and traditions of the titular nation. That is, for 
example, the state flag of Kazakhstan contains graphic images directly connected to the 
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national culture of the Kazakhs: the steppe eagle and the vertical stripe with the national 
ornament. The state emblem similarly depicts a shanyraq (the smoke hole of the yurt, a 
Kazakh dwelling) and mythic horses. The elites have also launched a campaign of 
wholesale renaming of Russian and Slavic-sounding place-names and street-names by 
Kazakh names, even in areas of a preponderance of Slavs (Kolstø, 1999, 2000, Savin, 2001, 
Masanov, 2002, Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). By doing this the elites have tried to recover 
the past, symbolize a change in the ownership of the land (Bohr, 1998), and convert the 
land into national territory (William and Smith, 1983, Kaiser, 2004).   
 
4.4.4 Personnel Policies  
 
An important component of the nationalization process in post-Soviet Kazakhstan has also 
been the gradual displacement of the Russian and other Russophone non-titular population 
from leading positions in the public sector (Anderson, 1997, Bohr, 1998, Laitin, 1998, 
Holm-Hansen, 1999, Kolstoe, 1999, 2000, Savin, 2001, Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). 
Having circumscribed their social mobility and participation in political life, the practice of 
concentrating power in the hands of the titular nationality has been a greater source of 
resentment for the Slavic and Russophone non-titular communities than perhaps any other 
aspect of nationalization, with the possible exception of language indigenization.  
 
The ‘squeezing out’ of non-titular members from leading positions to make room for 
members of the titular nationality was the main device for distributing political and 
economic power well before the advent of independence. To be sure, the Soviet nationality 
policy ‘did not just shape the cultural salience of nationality, but also turned it into a central 
criterion for distribution of socioeconomic benefits’ (Dave, 2003:125). That is, one’s 
attachment to nationality was imbued with ‘perceptions of power and entitlements, the 
latter shaping access to housing, jobs, and education, as well as career mobility and security 
of tenure’ (ibid.). Yet it was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the achievement 
of independence that the practice, albeit tacit, of according preferential treatment to the 
titular nation was fully legitimated in the eyes of most titular nationals. The practice of 
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indigenizing power has been highly visible in the legislature of post-Soviet Kazakhstan, 
where the ethnic composition of the parliaments is heavily weighted in favour of the titular 
nationality. The commanding heights of executive as well as legislative power have been 
indigenized. The vast majority of senior presidential staff, ministers and deputy ministers 
are members of the titular nation. According to V.N. Khlyupin, the state institutions that 
have undergone the most extensive Kazakhization include the economically and politically 
vital ministries of oil and gas, information and press and justice, all of which have become 
approximately 80% Kazakh (1998:52). Karin and Chebotarev put these figures even higher, 
estimating that 80 to 90% of the administrative elite are consituted by the representatives of 
the indigenous nation (2002:52).  
 
As has been discussed above, the indigenization of the public sector is often carried out 
using ‘tacit’ nationalizing methods. These include, as noted by A Bohr, general lay-offs, 
after which most of the same positions are reinstated and preference is given to the titular 
members during the re-hiring process; the practice of issuing official memorandums, stating 
that the knowledge of a state language is required in order to qualify for employment or 
promotion; and financial incentives (pay increases) to those who have a knowledge of the 
state language (Bohr, 1998:142). The language requirements have been particularly 
instrumental in this process as they ‘effectively eliminat[ed] the overwhelming majority of 
Slavs and other Russophones from consideration’ for employment (ibid.) and ‘enhanced the 
autonomy and power base of the titular elites as a way to counteract the actual or perceived 
hold of Russians on the institutions of power’ (Dave, 2003:126).  
 
The situation is further complicated by the deep-seated corruption and both familial and 
ethnic nepotism that have become particularly rife in Kazakhstani business and government 
since independence. Karin and Chebotarev assert that the current Kazakh nomenklatura 
usually consists of new arrivals from villages, where ‘family-tribal traditions play a 
defensive role in the social transformation’ and ‘communal blood ties have become a form 
of survival and adaptation to contemporary circumstances, serving to extend their powers’ 
(2002:52). As a result of the close connection between the nomenklatura and major state-
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directed business interests, the wide-scale personnel cuts and the on-going optimization of 
the structures of governmental organs, the opportunities for social advancement for non-
titular nationals in Kazakhstan have been significantly limited and have entrenched the 
boundary markers between titular and non-titular groups.   
 
4.4.5 Russian Out-Migration  
 
Probably the most noticeable manifestation of Russian and other non-titular Russian-
speakers’ dissatisfaction with the new socio-political situation in Kazakhstan has been the 
tendency of certain sections of community to out-migrate back to their ‘historical 
homelands’. This trend has been especially pronounced amongst educated Russians and 
amongst Kazakhstan’s sizeable community of ethnic Germans. Moreover, significant 
internal migration has taken place within the boundaries of Kazakhstan, whereby many 
Russophones have tried to move away from the Kazakh-dominated South to the northern 
region. Combined with these trends, there has been a dramatic increase in the ethnic 
Kazakh population of the republic. This was mainly the result of a higher Kazakh birth-rate 
and substantial in-migration of the Kazakh diaspora from Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Turkey 
and Afghanistan (Cummings, 1998, Diener, 2004).  
 
At the time of collapse of the Soviet Union Kazakhstani Russians constituted 70 percent of 
the Russian diaspora outside the Russian Federation. As a state-bearing group of the Soviet 
Union, they used to view the entire Soviet Union as their home, as a natural continuation of 
Russia (Melvin, 1995). After the break up of the USSR, they were reduced to a ‘beached’ 
minority (Laitin, 1998), amongst perhaps the most disadvantaged groups in the newly 
independent states. Not only did they not possess institutional channels for articulating their 
grievances and demands, they also did not have a territorial framework or autonomy – the 
kind of ‘territorialization’ that all titular nations had experienced under Soviet nation-
building (Melvin, 1995, Brubaker, 1996, Smith, 1998). Dave has noted that those 
‘minorities in the new post-Soviet states that lacked an existing, that is, a Soviet-
established, framework for territorial autonomy have gradually, albeit grudgingly come to 
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accept the primacy of the titular ethnic group in the new state’ (Dave, 2007:127). And this 
was certainly the case with the Russian community in Kazakhstan.  
 
Kymicka has argued that as the process of nation-building undoubtedly privileges members 
of the majority culture, this means that members of minority groups have four main options 
to deal with the situation. They can (1) emigrate en masse, (2) accept integration into the 
majority culture, (3) seek some from of cultural or/ and territorial autonomy, or (4) accept 
permanent marginalization. This roughly corresponds to Hirschman’s ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and 
‘loyalty’ options for minorities when they are faced with a decline of their ethnic status in 
the changing socio-cultural and political environment. Most Russians in Kazakhstan opted 
to emigrate en masse rather than integrate (Kolstø, 1999). The option of ‘voice’ or the 
possibility to seek some sorts of rights and powers of self-government to maintain their 
own societal culture has been mostly unavailable. The state created institutions of ethnic 
representation, such as, for example, the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, which did no 
more than co-opt the leaders of various non-titular ethnic groups into the Kazakh power 
structure (Holm-Hansen, 1999, Kolstø, 1999, 2000). The option of out-migration from 
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, depends on a variety of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. As Bhavna 
Dave noted ‘the perception among Russian-speakers of a profound ‘civilisational divide’ 
between themselves and the titular Kazakhs made integration into a Kazakh-dominated 
state an unattractive and undesirable option’ (2007:127). Furthermore, ‘their reduction from 
the state-defining people into a beleaguered minority compelled the vast majority of 
Russians in Kazakhstan to grapple with a wide gap between their historical status, self-
perception and their actual condition’ (ibid.). In total about 2 million Russians out-migrated 
from Kazakhstan in the first decade of independence. This caused a dramatic drop in the 
combined European share of the population from over 53% in 1989 to under 40% in 1999.  
 
The factors that ‘pushed’ Russians to opt for out-migration include the expectation of a 
decline of their socio-economic, cultural and political status after the insitutionalisation of 
Kazakh as the state language and the attendant fear that their children would be treated as 
‘second-class citizens’ in the state dominated by Kazakh-based power structures. Some 
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observers have noted that Russians still position themselves as a cultural ‘axis’ around 
which all other groups used to consolidate and they are still unwilling to accept their new 
minority status and to protect their interests as such. And yet, the prospects of Russians and 
other Slavs to consolidate themselves as a ‘counter-hegemony’ to Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, 
slim to start with, have dwindled. The current Kazakh elites have tried to prevent the 
development of a common Russian-speaking identity by promoting a linguistic and 
ethnocutural revival as well as ‘ethnic re-identification’ among the minority groups that 
share a broad Russophone identity (Dave, ibid, Nazarbaev, 1998,1999, 2003, Laitin, 1998, 
Holm-Hansen, 1999). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed with reference to the original official documents the 
Kazakhstani national identity project as it developed between 1991 and 2004. We saw that 
from the start it set out to be a deliberate compromise between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ 
approaches: the ‘ethnic’ approach because the Kazakhs had a right to their own ‘national’ 
state and the ‘civic’ approach because of the inescapable fact that Kazakhstan is a multi-
ethnic country where the rights of minorities need to be respected (Kadyrzhanov 2007). But 
the interpretation of this compromise is interesting: Kazakhs are seen as having the right to 
use their Kazakh culture as the leading core around which a civic ‘Kazakhstani’ multi-
cultural structure is built. We have seen that much effort has been spent in developing an 
ideology to justify these particular policies. This very much recalls the approach of the 
Soviet national identity project, in which the ethnic Russians were seen as the leading 
‘elder brother’ around which the other members of the Soviet family, while retaining their 
identity, would gradually merge together to form an identity as ‘Soviet people’. However, 
the ‘elder brother’ role of Russians was only overtly declared in the wartime period under 
Stalin, and the USSR itself was never seen as the Russian national state (the RSFSR 
nominally performed that role). But still in many ways it is a very ‘post-Soviet’ project. 
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Apart from its post-Soviet character, how should one assess the Kazakh national identity 
project in terms of the key civic and ethnic elements which it claims to combine? We have 
seen that the balance between these two elements was inherently unstable from the start 
because of the decision to build a civic identity around an ethnic Kazakh core culture. Does 
this mean that the civic elements in the project are simply window-dressing as Dave (2007) 
has argued? Dave takes an extreme position, arguing that no civic project is possible 
without democratic structures. Since the democratic transition in Kazakhstan never truly 
materialized, Dave comes to the conclusion that in reality this is a directly ethno-national 
project, although she argues that the lack of confidence of the elites with regard to attitudes 
of their own Russian-speaking Kazakhs means that they have not seriously tried to 
nationalize, what Chatterjee terms the ‘inner sphere’ of the population as a whole. This 
position, while close to that of Rogers Brubaker, is not shared by the majority of Western 
scholars who see the civic elements of the project as being still significant, despite the 
admitted preponderance of ethno-cultural domination. For example, Sally Cummings 
(2005) emphasizes the importance of several civic elements for both national and 
international consumption. The fact is that both the nature of the project and its 
implementation are highly contradictory and uncertain. We have seen that in several of the 
nationalizing policies the state appeared to have made concessions and adaptations. 
However, in other policies, which are more covert and not publicly discussed, such as 
personnel policies in administration, the ethno-cultural pressure seems to be stronger. The 
whole process is subject to change both in its content and in its implementation depending 
both on internal pressures and pressures from the international community.  
 
Yet when the actual implementation of the national identity project is examined,we can see 
that in terms of key policy areas (symbolic changes, language, re-evaluation of history, 
personnel policies in public sector and demographic policies) there has been an increasing 
tendency to pursue policies which, though in a more muted and gradualist form, bear a 
strong resemblance to the ‘retributive’ ‘nationalising policies’ discussed by Brubaker, and 
indeed are justified in a similar way (restoring Kazakh status after previous injustice, etc.). 
The more muted, cautious character of the policies is explained, as Dave (1996; 2003, 
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2007) has pointed out, by the lack of confidence characteristic of many post-Soviet 
governing elites. But as the confidence of these elites grows with the successful survival 
and stability of the state and the promise of considerable prosperity derived from oil and 
gas revenues, so this trend of ‘Kazakhisation’ seems likely to increase. 
 
It is to this situation that ethnic groups in Kazakhstan have reacted as they attempt to 
consolidate their separate identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: the Kazakhs have to learn 
their new role as a ‘nation-forming’ dominant culture and the Russians have to accept a 
new subordinate role in a Kazakh national state in which the official culture will 
increasingly be based on Kazakh, rather than Russian language and culture. In my open-
ended interviews conducted in 2004 I explicitly asked for reactions from Kazakhs and 
Russians to the implementation of these policies and their responses were very revealing 
about the current state of their national/ethnic identities. It is to an analysis of these 
identities that we now turn in the next two chapters. 
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5 THE EMERGING DOMINANT IDENTITY: KAZAKH RESPONSE TO THE 
NATIONAL-STATE IDENTITY PROJECT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHSTAN  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will try to investigate whether Kazakhs – the newly empowered group of 
Kazakhstan – have developed a coherent (dominant) identity and to look at the factors that 
contribute to or inhibit its consolidation. The second section will look at how Kazakhs 
interpret various concepts relating to the nationality issue (e.g. national’nost’ (nationality), 
natsiya (nation), etnicheskaya gruppa (ethnic group), kazakhstantsy (Kazakhstanis), 
titul’naya gruppa (titular group), korennoi (native, indigenous), natsional’nye men’shinstva 
(national minorities)) and at the inconsistency and uncertainty of their interpretations. The 
third and the fourth parts will focus on the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ aspects of Kazakh 
identity. As noted in Chapter 2, any national identity is formed partly as a result of 
interaction with and differentiation from an external environment and partly as a result of 
‘internal’ or domestic discussions and institutional arrangements. The external factors that I 
covered in this chapter include the attitudes of my Kazakh respondents to the creation of 
independent Kazakhstan and to key foreign states and peoples and the internal factors 
include the attitudes of Kazakhs to the Soviet past, to the nationalising policies and 
practices of the new state and to the questions of loyalty, integration and out-migration of 
the Russian population. This will be followed by a short conclusion.   
 
5.2 Problems of Terminology 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the post-Soviet concept of natsional’nost’ does not correspond 
neatly to the western concept of ‘nationality.’ During the Soviet period natsional’nost’ 
denoted ‘an ethnic identity referring to membership of a people’ while grazhdanstvo 
(citizenship) was ‘a civic identity referring to membership in a state’ (Karklins 1989:22). 
This pattern of sharply distinguished dual identities was inherited by all post-Soviet states, 
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including Kazakhstan. In the West, on the other hand, ‘nationality’ is generally regarded as 
a hybrid identity that refers to both ‘a legal relationship involving allegiance on the part of 
an individual and protection on the part of the state’ and ‘a people having a common origin, 
tradition, and language and capable of forming or actually constituting a nation-state’ (ibid. 
44). Some of my Kazakhs respondents, who had travelled abroad, noted the discrepancy 
between these terms. Said a 28 year old female lecturer from Petropavlovsk: 
 
A friend of mine went to Italy and tried to explain that her nationality (natsional’nost’) was 
Russian. The locals, however, couldn’t understand it and called her ‘Kazakh’ (kazashkoi). 
Once she got really upset and said: ‘I don’t understand why you call me Kazakh when I am 
Russian, but please tell me if Africans come to Italy and give birth would their children be 
Africans?’ And the Italians said, confusing my friend even further: ‘No, they would be 
Italian.’ (P-2) 
 
Some of my Kazakh respondents similarly noted that ‘westerners couldn’t understand why 
your nationality could be Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar or German if you were born and lived 
in Kazakhstan all your life.’ (Alm-3) And this happens, as R. Karklins correctly noted, 
because nationality in the West refers to the membership of a state and its public culture, 
while in post-Soviet states it refers to the membership of a people or an ethnic group.  
 
Interestingly, Kazakh respondents admitted that Russians had a lot in common with 
Kazakhs, but ‘physically’ (Ast-1)23 and ‘genetically’ (Alm-10) they still belonged to the 
Russian nationality. ‘They are really Kazakhs, but a different type of Kazakhs’ (Ast-8). 
And even ‘if they leave Kazakhstan for their national homeland, they will always have 
some Kazakh culture in them. Of course, it is not ‘their’ culture, but it has become part of 
them’ (Alm-5). There was also a belief among the respondents that each nationality has a 
core that even the most dramatic assimilation cannot change.24 One of these permanent 
elements, as noted above, is the ‘genetic’ make-up of each nationality and another is a 
                                                
23 For details of my Kazakh respondents see Appendix 1.  
24 For an excellent discussion on how primordialism is constructed by both ethnonationalists and ordinary 
social actors see Suny 2001, 2004; Laitin 1998:10-19, Khazanov 1995:7-15, Dave 1996, 2003. 
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cultural and psychological profile of a group that remains supposedly unchangeable. A 24 
year-old male TV presenter from Petropavlovsk noted  
 
we are all people and we are all similar in many ways, but there is one ‘but’ here. The very 
fact that a Russian is a Russian and a German is a German implies that they have certain 
qualities peculiar to their nationalities only. Everybody notices that Germans are very 
punctual and honest. We [Kazakhs] are not that punctual, but we are very hospitable and 
generous. It is in our genes. (P-1) 
 
The above examples show that nationality (natsional’nost’) in the post-Soviet context 
refers to an ethnic identity understood as a fixed essence rather than a fluid and resilient 
marker. The term does not necessarily give an indication of where the person was born and 
socialized, although it links him to the putative national homeland, even if he never lived 
there. In the West, on the other hand, nationality usually points to the state and society 
where the person was born and of which he holds citizenship.25  
 
It is worth noting that natsional’nost’ is not the only term that can be used to denote an 
ethnic identity in the post-Soviet context. Other terms like natsiya (nation), narod (people), 
narodnost’ (an ethnic group evolving into a nation – something like A.Smith’s ethnie) and 
etnicheskaya gruppa (ethnic group) can also be used. Despite slight differences in the 
definitions of these terms, my respondents treated them as synonyms applying equally to 
Kazakhs, Russians or any other ethnic group. For example, a 25 year old surgeon from 
Petropavlovsk noted that ‘Kazakhs are united by the same things as all other nationalities 
(natsional’nosti). The very fact that you belong to one nation (k odnoi natsii), that you are a 
                                                
25 This peculiarity of the Soviet and post-Soviet definition of ‘nationality’ partially explains why the term 
‘nationalism’ is infused with such negative overtones. It is believed to advocate national (read ethnic) 
antagonisms, exclusivity and superiority of one’s own nation (ethnic group) and promote chauvinism and 
xenophobia. There is no positive side to nationalism unless it transcends its limitations and transforms inself 
into ‘internationalism’. The latter stands for tolerance and respect between nations (ethnic groups) that are 
capable and willing to live within the boundaries of one state. The above two terms can be equated, although 
imperfectly, to the western concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism.  
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Kazakh, keeps you together’ (P-7). Similarly, a 30 year old journalist from Almaty pointed 
out that   
 
people in Kazakhstan respect traditions of all nations (natsii) – be they Koreans, Russians, 
Germans or Tatars. My friends, for example, invite us to celebrate Christmas, Easter and 
Shrove Tuesday and I treat these holidays as my own. We invite them for Ait and other 
Muslim holidays. (Alm-5)  
 
It has to be stressed that the terms ‘natsional’nost’, ‘etnicheskya gruppa’ and ‘narodnost’’ 
can be used only in an exclusive and ethnic sense, while the terms ‘natsiya’ (nation) and 
‘narod’ (people) can have both exclusive and inclusive connotations. This is partly the 
legacy of the Soviet time when all inhabitants of the Soviet Union, irrespective of their 
ethnic origin, were considered to be the Soviet people (sovetskie lyudi, sovetskii narod) and 
partly because these terms are now frequently used in the Kazakhstani media 
(kazakhstanskii narod, and possibly less frequently kazakhstanskaya natsiya).  
 
Other terms that my respondents used to denote a civic identity were kazakhstantsy 
(Kazakhstanis), sootechestvenniki (compatriots, fellow-countrymen), zemlyaki (people who 
reside on the same land) and grazhdane (citizens). The word kazakhstantsy (Kazakhstanis) 
perhaps has the strongest resemblance to the western concept of ‘nationality’. It refers to all 
the people that reside in Kazakhstan and partake in its public culture. My respondents 
talked about the ‘Kazakhstani football team’ (kazakhstanskaya futbol’naya komanda) of 
which they were proud (Alm-2, Ch-4), ‘Kazakhstani Olympic champions (kazakhstanskie 
olimpiiskie chempiony) that glorified the new sovereign state (P-1,3, Alm-6,7,9, Ch-1,3) 
and ‘Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis (kazakhi i kazakhstantsy) who feel comfortable abroad 
because they are not associated with Russia and its problems, but with Kazakhstan.’ (Ast-2) 
Some of my respondents, however, believed that the idea of Kazakhstaniness had not been 
sufficiently internalised by the population in general and the non-titular groups in 
particular. A 28 year-old Kazakh lecturer from Almaty said:  
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In America people are proud that they are American (amerikantsy) and in Kazakhstan 
people don’t even use the word ‘Kazakhstanis’ (kazakhstantsy). When you ask somebody: 
‘Who are you?’ he will say: ‘I am a Russian from Kazakhstan’ and never ‘I am a 
Kazakhstani’. Our state should do something to change it. People should be proud that they 
are Kazakhstanis, but what can they be proud of at the moment? Nothing! Our economy is 
weak and our people live badly. (Alm-9) 
 
A 25 year old male IT programmer from Chimkent similarly said:  
 
Our national anthem should be like the anthem of the Soviet Union. What was it about? It 
was about the unity of all the people who lived in fifteen republics, the rapprochement of 
peoples (sblizhenii narodov), and the importance of being patriotic. In America all people 
think that they are American (amerikantsy). They don’t think that they belong to separate 
nationalities anymore. We should do something similar in Kazakhstan and teach people that 
they are Kazakhstanis (kazakhstantsy), rather than Kazakhs or Russians as you see in the 
hymn. The anthem should be written in such a way that all people who live in Kazakhstan 
would love our country, our language and our culture. (Ch-1) 
 
The term kazakhstantsy can be also used in an ethnic sense of the word, as my respondents 
sometimes did not see the difference between the civic and ethnic meanings of the term. 
The same can be said about the words sootechestvenniki (fellow-countrymen) and zemlyaki 
(people that reside on the same land). The latter may also have a sub-ethnic connotation and 
refer to co-tribesmen who were traditionally linked to a particular territory.  
 
All the above terms, however, do not explicitly point to the issues of dominance and 
subordination between ethnic groups. This relationship is reflected in terms like titul’naya 
gruppa/natsiya (a titular group/ nation), korennaya/ nekorennaya gruppa/ natsiya (native/ 
indigenous group/ nationality), natsional’nye menshinstva (national minorities) and 
diaspory (diasporas), etc. Interestingly, my respondents did not use the word ‘titular’ 
(titul’nyi) as much and preferred the word korennoi (native, indigenous) to denote 
themselves. When asked about the term, most of them did not know what it meant: 
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‘Titular? Who is it?’ When explained that it is a group in whose name the republic is 
named, they said: ‘Ah… That’s us, then!’ (Alm-3). The term korennoi (which means 
native, indigenous or rooted in a particular territory) was generally understood as a 
synonym for Kazakhs. A 28 year old lecturer from Petropavlovsk, for example, said that  
 
it would be nice if all people knew the language and culture of the people who are native (korennye) 
to this land. I don’t mean that they have to study in Kazakh, but it would be nice if Russians would 
learn more about the Kazakh culture and language (P-2). 
 
Some respondents believed that the division into natives and non-natives (delenie na 
korennykh i nekorennykh) should be abandoned as it has a discriminatory overtone: ‘I don’t 
divide people into ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ said a 30 year old journalist from 
Almaty. ‘I don’t do this. I cannot say that Kazakhs are indigenous and Russians are not. It 
is not right. We were all born and lived together’ (Alm-5). A 28 year old marketing director 
from Almaty similarly imbued the term korennoi with a civic rather than a primordial 
meaning: 
 
I think that not only Kazakhs, but all people who live on the territory of Kazakhstan are 
indigenous (korennye). And non-indigenous are those who came here only recently and 
usually they don’t adapt well. I have talked to an oralman from Mongolia and he could not 
understand a thing. These people don’t understand anything because they never lived in the 
Soviet Union. We watched the same films, sang the same songs and listened to the same 
reports of the CPSU. We understand each other without effort (s poluslova). I think they are 
unhappy people, these oralmans. You cannot mix them with the native population for many 
reasons. They have to live with us for many years, understand many things, and only then 
they will become truly ‘native’. I will never compare them with the Turks who came to 
Kazakhstan in the late 1980s or Germans who came in the 1940s. These are different 
things. (Alm-16) 
 
A 24 year old Kazakh programmer from Chimkent also claimed that only an indigenous 
resident (korennoi zhitel’) can become the President of Kazakhstan: ‘he does not have to be 
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Kazakh, but he has to be indigenous to the country, to be born here, to speak the language 
and understand our culture and traditions’ (Ch-1). There is, indeed, a great variety of 
interpretations of the term korennoi which makes it ambiguous and ‘suspect’ for the 
purposes of any research. This uncertainty is reflected in Masanov’s early survey (1996) 
where he asked his respondents to identify indigenous and non-indigenous groups in 
Kazakhstan: 
 
Table 5.1 Who should be regarded as native or indigenous residents of Kazakhstan? 
(Multiple Answers Possible) 
 # of respondents % Kazakhs (%) Russians (%) Others (%) 
1. Kazakhs 101 9.8 24.1 2.1 3.2 
2. all people who were born 
in Kazakhstan 
458 44.5 55.2 39.7 37.8 
3. there shouldn’t be any 
division i.e. all citizens are 
indigenous residents 
522 50.7 24.4 64.5 62.8 
4. n/a 14 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.3 
Total 1095 106.4    
Data derived from CMIR survey, see Masanov 1996, p. 18, 108 
 
As we can see from the Table 5.1, there is a relative congruence between the Kazakh and 
non-Kazakh views on who is indigenous in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Kazakhs, however, 
came up with a higher percentage (24%) than Russians (2.1%) and others (3.2%) in their 
belief that they are native to the republic. In all other respects, the overwhelming majority 
of Kazakhs attributed considerable value to ‘being born in a place’ as a criterion of 
indigenousness (55.2%), or believed that the division between the indigenous and non-
indigenous population should be abandoned (24.4%). Masanov used these figures to argue 
that Kazakhs did not position themselves as a dominant group when the state elites 
launched, what he called, a ‘programme of political ethnocentrism’ (programmu 
politicheskogo etnotsentrizma) (Masanov 1996:18). This question, however, posed as it is 
by Masanov, asked for a subjective statement of ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’. It is, 
therefore, useful only to the extent that both Kazakhs and other ethnic groups attach 
particular importance to the idea of being ‘born in’ a place but support a ‘Kazakhstani’ or 
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‘territorial citizenship’ approach.26 Moreover, Masanov used the word combination 
‘korennoi zhitel’ (indigenous resident), rather than korennaya gruppa, natsiya or 
natsional’nost’ (indigenous group, nation or nationality) which, if used, could have 
produced a different result, more geared towards the Kazakh group.  
  
Given the uncertainty of the word korennoi, I believe that the best term to denote a Kazakh 
group and its relationship to Kazakhstan is ‘titular’ or ‘titular nationality’. The word 
‘titular’ is a Soviet concept that refers to a nation in whose name the republic is named. 
This, in many ways, resembles Smith’s concept of an ethnic core or ethnie – a pre-national 
group that usually ‘shapes the boundaries of the nation’ and gives a state ‘a name and a 
cultural character’ (Smith 1991:39). Moreover, the term ‘titular’ is becoming the accepted 
label in the current literature on the former Soviet Union (see Laitin 1998, Smith et al 1998, 
Hagendoorn et al 2001), which makes it an attractive option in itself.  
 
As for the terms that refer to the subordinate groups, there was also a lot of confusion as to 
whom my respondents should consider national minorities, diasporas, non-titular or non-
indigenous groups. ‘I am not sure who belongs to a minority in Kazakhstan’, said a 46 year 
old civil servant from Almaty, ‘Maybe all these small nationalities? During the Soviet days, 
we had Chukchas and Eskimos who lived in the Far North and in Kazakhstan we had no 
minorities. … Yes, we had different nationalities, but we were all equal’ (Alm-15). There 
was also an understanding that the term ‘national minority’ has a negative connotation. A 
41 year old company director from Astana commented: ‘What is a national minority? We 
have several Russian specialists in our department. How can I call them ‘minorities’ when 
they are very respected people?’ (Ast-3).  
 
The confusion and uncertainty of my respondents somewhat echoes the results of Malkova, 
Kolsto and Melberg’s survey (1999) who asked their respondents to identify minority 
groups in Kazakhstan: 
                                                
26 This argument is supported by the findings of Hagendoorn et al. who claimed that 95% of Kazakhs opted 
for a civic definition of citizenship as opposed to 20% who agreed with an ethnic definition. (Hagendoorn et 
al. 2001:110-111) 
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Table 5.2 Who are considered to belong to a minority group? 
 Total Kazakhs Russians 
1. All, except Kazakhs 12.3 15.9 15.3 
2. All, except Kazakhs and 
Russians 
32.3 42.5 43.8 
3. There are no national 
minorities in Kazakhstan 
29.6 40.9 39.3 
# of respondents 1000 376 408 
Data derived from GI survey, see Malkova, Kolsto and Melberg 1999, 229  
 
As we can see from the table 5.2, only 15.9% of ethnic Kazakhs reserved the category of 
‘non-minority’ for themselves. 42.5% in this group believed that they shared this status 
with Russians, and 40.9% still had the ‘Soviet’ attitude to the nationality issue: ‘We have 
no national minorities’. Interestingly, the Russian response to the same question was almost 
identical to the Kazakh response: 15.3% for ‘all except the Kazakhs’, 43% for ‘all except 
Kazakhs and Russians’ and 39% for ‘no minorities’. According to Malkova, Kolsto and 
Melberg, these results show that the attempts of the new elites and certain Kazakh 
intellectuals to raise the Kazakhs to a status of a ‘dominant’ or ‘state-bearing nationality’ 
were not met positively even among ethnic Kazakhs, let alone the population at large 
(Malkova et al. 1999:23). These data, however, can also mean that the respondents have not 
yet internalized the meaning of the concept ‘national minority’ and still resort primarily to 
the Soviet understanding of the term. The data also represent a good snapshot of how 
Kazakhs and other ethnic groups attempt to pinpoint and possibly reconsider their national 
status in the new context of post-Soviet Kazakhstan and their attempts reflect both the still 
present Soviet status quo and the beginning of a reassessment process.  
 
These issues of terminological confusion and uncertainty and the attempts to reconsider 
one’s identity will be explored in more detail in the next sections, when we examine first 
the external aspects, then the internal aspects of identity as reflected in the statements of my 
respondents. 
 
5.3 External Factors 
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Ilya Prizel has argued that national identity provides a link not only ‘between the individual 
and society, but between society and the world’ (1998:19). It has long been known that 
national identity is usually formed or reinforced by contact with an ‘alien other,’ often a 
‘hostile other’, which serves to highlight perceived differences with the ‘core’ or ‘home’ 
group. This is often brought about by war (this is perhaps the most quick and effective way 
of engendering a national identity), but can also be developed by the prolonged contact 
with other cultures, in-migration of foreigners, travel or by international communication 
through the media or internet or simply by media reports. In this section I will not go into 
detailed justifications for Kazakh foreign policy orientations, but rather briefly look at the 
attitudes of my Kazakh respondents to Kazakh (Kazakhstani) independence and to key 
foreign states and peoples. It has to be noted, however, that these popular opinions (about 
the ‘other’) must not be equated with official foreign policy pronouncements and actions of 
the state: while these have an impact on the popular perceptions of foreigners and while 
governments try to inculcate their attitudes in the population, the responsibilities of state 
frequently mean that governments have to take realistic and pragmatic decisions when 
dealing with foreign governments, which differ considerably from popular views about the 
states and peoples concerned.  
 
5.3.1 The Impact of Independence 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and Kazakh independence in 1991 meant that Kazakhs 
have had to readjust to a new socio-political and cultural environment and to remould their 
identity in a way that would reflect their status as a new ‘state-bearing’ group. The majority 
of my Kazakh respondents viewed independence very positively, which is to be expected in 
a newly empowered titular group trying to establish their distinctiveness and national 
identity. There was a clear awareness that independence has had a positive impact on their 
ethnonational status and on interethnic relations in general. Sixty seven per cent of 
Kazakhs, for example, felt that interethnic relations had improved since independence, 8% 
said that they remained the same and 26% felt that they deteriorated (Table 5.3)  
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Table 5.3 Have interethnic relations improved, deteriorated or stayed the same since independence? 
(%) 
 Improved Deteriorated Stayed the same Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 17 2 0 6 
Astana 15 6 0 0 
Almaty 17 13 8 0 
Chimkent 17 4 0 0 
 67 26 8 6 
 
Some of my respondents equated independence with ‘democratisation’ and ‘freedom of 
speech’ that enabled Kazakhs (and other non-Russian ethnic groups) to speak their mind, to 
reassert their national values and to relieve a lot of tensions that accumulated during the 
Soviet period. A 28 year-old Marketing Director from Almaty explained:  
 
During the Soviet time the national question was a political topic. People tended to hide and 
avoid it at all costs. They never touched it or discussed it at any levels of society. After the 
break up of the Soviet Union these questions suddenly resurfaced and it was possible to 
hear somebody’s opinion on the subject, it has become an inalienable part of human 
relations. The fact that we have started to talk about interethnic relations, that the national 
‘difficult’ question has been dragged from the ‘cellar’ into the open and has become better 
defined and understandable – just because of this I believe that interethnic relations have 
improved. It is better to say what you think than to keep it inside. (Alm-16) 
 
Independence was also thought to strengthen Kazakhs’ position in Kazakhstan and to 
restrain other nationalities and especially Russians and other European groups, from being 
overtly disrespectful towards Kazakh culture, language and people. Said a 33 year-old 
female painter from Almaty: ‘After independence all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan started to 
respect Kazakhs as something special and the discrimination as it used to be is unfeasible 
now.’ (Alm-1) A 34 year old male teacher from Almaty similarly stressed that ‘people now 
treat the nationality issue with care because they’ve understood that it is a very dangerous 
subject (eto ochen’ opasnaya tema). They’ve understood that if they want to live and 
flourish in this country they have to be careful about what they say [about Kazakh culture 
and people].’ (Alm-2) 
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There was also some relief that Kazakhstan was no longer part of Russia, but a separate 
state recognised by the United Nations and the whole international community. Some 
respondents, mainly from Chimkent and in the age bracket between 18-30, were 
particularly proud that independence let the whole world know that Kazakhs exist as a 
separate nation. There was also an appreciation that Kazakhs were now capable of making 
their own decisions both in the domestic and international spheres. A 23 year-old nurse 
from Chimkent said: ‘What was Kazakhstan during the Soviet period? A Soviet periphery 
that nobody knew… But after gaining independence we’ve become a separate state able to 
determine its own future.’ (Ch-4) A 28 year old civil servant from Astana similarly noted: 
‘During the Soviet Union Kazakhs were subordinated to Moscow and all decisions were 
made for us. But now we are free and we can decide what is better for us’ (Ast-6). 
Independence in this respect has had a major impact on Kazakh identity in the sense that it 
enabled Kazakhs, in Clifford Geertz’s terms, ‘to be recognized as responsible agents whose 
wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions ‘matter’’, to ensure that their ‘identity [is] publicly 
acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of self as ‘being somebody in the world,’ 
and beyond that to ‘play[] a part in the larger arena of world politics,’ or ‘exercise[] 
influence among nations’ (1963:108). 
 
5.3.2 Attitudes to Key Foreign States and Peoples 
 
To probe where my Kazakh respondents’ regional and international preferences were, I 
asked them to indentify a country or countries that Kazakhstan should build its future with 
and countries that represent the biggest threat to Kazakhstan. The results were as follows: 
 
Table 5.4 What country or countries should Kazakhstan build its future with? 
 % 
Russia and 
post-Soviet states 
53 
62 
The West 66 
South-East Asia (China, Japan) 20 
Non-Soviet Islamic states 11 
 
Table 5.5 What country or countries represent the biggest threat to Kazakhstan? 
 % 
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South-East Asia (China) 69 
Non-Soviet Islamic states 64 
Russia  
and post-Soviet states 
 
30 
The West (USA) 20 
 
As we can see from the tables, the majority of my Kazakh respondents wanted to see 
Russia and other post-Soviet states (53% and 62% respectively) and the countries of the 
West (66%) as the main future partners of Kazakhstan, while only a small minority of 
respondents thought that Kazakhstan should develop closer links with South-East Asian 
(20%) and Non-Soviet Islamic (11%) states (Table 5.4). With regard to perceptions of 
threat, my respondents identified China from the South-East Asian region (69%) and 
Muslim states (64%) as raising the biggest concern, followed by Central Asian states and 
Russia from the post-Soviet pace (30%) and the USA from the western region (20%) (Table 
5.5). 
 
Russia, of course, emerged as a crucial ‘defining other’. There was a clear conflation of 
attitudes towards Russia, the Soviet Union, the Russian people inside and outside 
Kazakhstan, the Moscow metropole and the Russian/Soviet ‘empire’ in general. However, 
the Soviet Union emerged as in general better than contemporary Russia, as we shall see in 
our discussion of attitudes towards the past in the next section.27 There were some concerns 
about rising extreme nationalism and xenophobia in Russia and their possible links to the 
Russian state policy and impact on interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. A 38 year old 
Marketing Director from Almaty expressed it this way:  
 
Russia is not a totally foreign country to me, but I wouldn’t want to go there at the moment 
because they have skinheads and xenophobia. I am really concerned that Russians 
organised nationalist parties under the leadership of Zhirinovsky and Limonov. We are not 
the Northern Caucasus, of course, but I am concerned that somebody in Russia can overdo 
it and we’ll have a major flare up here in Kazakhstan. (Alm -7) 
                                                
27 This could be partly explained by the fact that a considerable number of Kazakhs, especially the older 
generation, considered the Soviet Union to be ‘their state’ in the sense that they saw themselves as belonging 
to the Soviet people (sovetskii narod) and benefiting from its policies and system, while post-1991 Russia was 
treated as a separate, if not completely foreign, state with only tenuous links to Kazakh interests and identity. 
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A 28 year old male Communications Manager went even further when he suggested that 
national extremism in Russia was linked to official state policy: ‘I am sure that all these 
skinheads were introduced (byli zapushcheny) by the Russian government because they 
promote, although in a perverted way, the new national idea of the Russian state.’ (Alm-16) 
 
There were also some concerns about the ‘neo-imperial’ behaviour of Russia in 
Transdniester, Georgia, Ukraine and Chechnya as a possible precedent for future action 
against Kazakhstan. Said a 41 year old Managing Director from Almaty: ‘When you think 
about what Russia have done in Chechnya and Ukraine, you think that they can do 
something similar in Kazakhstan and nobody will stop them. And this is really a concern.’ 
(Alm-15) Also there emerged very clearly the negative image that Russia and Russians 
have for Kazakhs abroad and unfavourable comparisons were made between Russian and 
Kazakh culture and Russia and Kazakhstan. An 18 year-old student from Astana revealed:  
 
When Kazakhs (kazakhi) or Kazakhstanis (kazakhstantsy) go to Turkey, they feel very 
comfortable there. I don’t know why, but Turks are suspicious of people from Russia. They 
ask ‘Are you from Russia?’ And we say: ‘No, we are from Kazakhstan!’ And their attitude 
immediately changes. I don’t think it happens because of our ethnicity (natsional’nost’), but 
rather because of our belonging to the state. (Ast-2) 
 
Here one can often feel the understandable resentment at the long-standing subordination of 
Kazakhs by the Russians at last expressed in the circumstances of their newly acquired 
independence, and the pride in Kazakhstan’s newly gained sovereign independence from 
Russia.  But despite numerous negative factors there was also a clear general awareness 
among my Kazakh respondents of the close symbiosis between Russia and Kazakhs and the 
desirability and necessity, at least in the short to medium term, of keeping Russia as the 
main economic and security partner of Kazakhstan. ‘I want Kazakhstan to build its future 
with Russia and all our neighbours,’ said a 50 year-old civil servant from Astana, ‘but first 
and foremost I want us to be friends with Russia.’ (Ast-1) A 30 year-old civil servant from 
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Almaty similarly stated: ‘I cannot imagine Kazakhstan without Russia. We’ve always lived 
together.’ (Alm-5) Some respondents claimed that Russia could be an effective security 
partner for Kazakhstan, provided it remains moderate and defines its rights and 
responsibilities.’ (Alm-7) Others stressed that Russia could be useful in protecting 
Kazakhstan from the Chinese political and economic encroachments: ‘I don’t want to live 
with the Chinese,’ said a 33 year-old female painter from Almaty, ‘and if China threatens 
us, we’ll have to hide under the protective ‘wing’ of Russia again’. (Alm-1) 
 
As regards other post-Soviet states the main points of concern seemed to be other Central 
Asian states. There did not appear to be strong feeling of making Kazakhstan’s Islamic-
Turkic neighbours their main economic or security partners, rather several of these states 
were regarded as threats (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Chechnya), and many 
negative comparisons were made between the economic and political development of 
Kazakhstan and its Central Asia and Islamic neighbours and it was stressed that caution 
was needed in dealing with them. In the words of 28 year old Communications Manager 
from Almaty: 
 
When you see the slave labour of seasonal workers from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan you 
suddenly realise how lucky we are in Kazakhstan! I am personally scared of Uzbeks – not as a 
nation, but on political grounds (po politicheskim motivam). They have a small territory, big 
population and they are cunning (oni khitrye). Russians, for example, they are a simple ‘social’ 
nation (sotsial’naya natsiya) – they work as teachers, doctors, builders, etc. And take Chechens, for 
example. Where do they work? I’ve never seen a Chechen builder or worker. They are all in the 
market (na bazare) and automarket (avtorynke). All of them! That’s why I am also afraid of them on 
political grounds.  
 
At the same time there was a strong awareness of the bond of Islamic values and Turkic 
languages and the feeling that these countries had much in common. ‘We should cooperate 
with all our [Central Asian] neighbours,’ said a 28 year old teach of literature and Russian 
language from Petropavlovsk, ‘we have similar culture, languages and similar traditions. 
And with the Kyrgyz we are like one nation.’ (P-2) 
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With regards to the West, there was a clear admiration by my Kazakh respondent of many 
aspects of western economic achievements, the European Union and the United States and 
their welfare and human rights polices, although these had negative aspects in extreme 
libertarianism and dependency culture. There was also considerable respect for national 
models of certain western states that my respondents thought Kazakhstan should learn from 
and emulate. Specifically they wanted Kazakhstan to develop its culture and language like 
France (P-1, Ast-1), to help its kin abroad like Germany and Israel (Alm-6, Ch-1,2,7, P-3) 
and to encourage all ethnic groups to think of themselves as Kazakhstanies (kazakhstantsy) 
like the United States encourages its people to be Americans (amerikantsy). A 25 year-old 
male IT programmer from Chimkent said: ‘In America all people think of themselves as 
American (amerikantsy). They don’t think that they belong to separate nationalities 
anymore. We should do something similar and teach our people that they are Kazakhstanies 
(kazakhstantsy) rather than Kazakhs or Russians’ (Ch-1). A 28 year-old teacher of Russian 
language and literature from Almaty similarly noted: ‘We should try and develop a mini-
American idea in the sense that they have a lot of nations in the US, but they are still 
American (amerikantsy). I think we should learn from that and do something similar. (Alm-
10) 
 
At the same time my Kazakh respondents expressed some resentful awareness of 
Westerners’ ignorance and low opinion of Kazakhs and other Asians and Muslims, 
especially since September 11th, and also expressed the opinion that there is much 
immorality and social problem behaviour in the West, which means that its way of life 
should not be slavishly emulated. ‘They think that we are all terrorists and Islamic 
fundamentalists now,’ said a 28 year-old Secretary from Almaty, ‘I haven’t even planned to 
go there, but I am sure that they will treat me badly.’ (Alm-9) There was also considerable 
fear and criticism of American foreign policy and its threatening interference with the 
sovereignty of other countries and the exploitative behaviour of its corporations all over the 
world, including Kazakhstan. A 50 year-old civil servant from Astana remarked: ‘America 
is a threat not only to Kazakhstan, but to all states, including the developed ones, because it 
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holds a monopoly in many spheres and exerts pressure on foreign and domestic policies of 
every state’. Said a 24 year old civil servant from Astana: ‘The United States is 
unpredictable and it takes part directly or indirectly in most wars that happen in this world. 
This makes us very vulnerable to America’s encroachments, because Kazakhstan is very 
rich in mineral resources.’ (Ast-8)  
 
With regards to the rest of Asia the overwhelming concern was with Afghanistan, as a real 
threat in terms of drugs trafficking and religious extremism and with China, as a huge 
potential threat in terms of economic expansion and military aggression. There was also 
clear resentment about the large in-migration of Chinese into Kazakhstan and fears about 
possible instability in China, combined with a deep-seated fear of China’s alien culture. A 
43 year-old female civil servant from Almaty noted: ‘I would single out China as the 
biggest threat because they have huge overpopulation and because they try to infiltrate 
Kazakhstan by any possible means. In a couple of years we’ll be their extension, a new 
Zhing Zhiang’ (Alm-14). A 28 year-old female teacher of Russian language and literature 
from Petropavlovsk also expressed a concern:  
 
China wants to take us like hostages without a single shot – they open their businesses, sell 
their second-class products and undermine our economy. They infiltrate Kazakhstan in 
huge numbers and create a springboard for conquering our territory. I’ve even seen Chinese 
maps, where Kazakh territories were marked as ‘China’, and this is really worrying’ (P-3). 
 
A small minority of my respondents believed that China deserved a certain admiration of its 
power and ancient culture and there was an awareness of the necessity of working with it as 
a trading partner. A 18 year old student from Astana said, ‘China is so big and powerful 
that we have to be on good terms with it, otherwise we wouldn’t know what they do on our 
territory.’ (Ast-2)  
 
To sum up, what emerged from my Kazakh respondents in general terms is a mixed, 
although mostly positive differentiation of Kazakh identity and culture from all the main 
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states and peoples with whom it comes into contact. This, however, was combined with a 
practical realisation of the necessity of cooperating and doing business with and learning 
from these states in the economic and security interests of Kazakhstan. What also emerged 
is no strong desire for a dramatic break with the past in terms of a general re-orientation of 
the state either in a pro-western or in a pro-Islamic or pro-Turkic direction, but a general 
acceptance, if with qualifications, of the former ‘imperial’ power Russia and other post-
Soviet states. It is interesting that Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’ (1996) has not yet emerged, 
since the ex-imperial ‘homeland state’ [of Russians] has not yet become a ‘hostile other’ in 
the way he predicted. This is due to the cautious and conciliatory policies pursued by both 
Russian and Kazakh governments, maintaining the ‘exit’ [out-migration] option for 
Russians which has defused Russian resentment. But it also reflects a typical ambivalence 
of post-colonial states in the early years of independence towards their ‘modernising’ ex-
imperial masters, seen in many ex-British and ex-French colonies. In addition the nature of 
the transition in Kazakhstan has also had an impact. The fact that competitive democratic 
politics have not developed in Kazakhstan means that there has been no competitive 
political ‘bidding’ between ethnic groups, which would have encouraged consolidation of 
their identities, and the gradual character of the economic transition has inhibited an ethnic 
polarisation on class lines, which again would have stimulated identity consolidation. This 
economic aspect is rapidly changing, but now the Russian minority has been severely 
weakened through out-migration.  
 
5.4 Internal Factors 
 
In this section I will briefly look at the 'internal' factors, which may be divided into three 
broad groups: 1) attitudes towards the recent past; 2) responses to 'nationalising' policies 
and practices; and 3) issues concerning the loyalty, integration and out-migration of the 
Russian population.  
 
5.4.1 Attitudes towards the Recent, i.e. Soviet Past 
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One major aspect, which is very revealing about the current identity of Kazakhs, is their 
attitude to their recent past, their feelings about their ‘colonial’ status in the USSR and 
about the negative and positive aspects of their pre-independence life. Just as differentiation 
from an ‘external other’ is an important aspect of the coalescence of national identity, so 
also in a ‘post-imperial’ situation, is differentiation from a ‘hostile’ or disadvantaged past, 
from which the gaining of independence has brought liberation and the opportunity for free 
national self-determination. This is why the re-writing of history tends to become such an 
important question in the emergent or newly independent states, because, as Reicher and 
Hopkins correctly noted, it aims not only to ‘supplant one national history with another’, 
but more importantly, to replace ‘one version of identity with another’ (2001:147). To 
understand how my Kazakh respondents viewed the historical revisionism of post-
independence era I selected, arguably, one of the most controversial points in Kazakh 
history – the original adhesion (prisoedinenie) of the Kazakh steppe region to Russia – and 
asked my respondents whether they considered it to be a voluntary act or colonisation 
(Table 5.6) 
 
Table  5.6 Do you think the adhesion of the Kazakh steppe region was voluntary or was it 
colonisation? (%) 
 voluntary voluntary with a subsequent 
colonization 
colonization don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 2 (2.2%) 4 (8.8%) 2 (4.4%) 0 
Astana 5 (10.8%) 3 (6.3%) 2 (4.4%) 1 (2.2%) 
Almaty 6 (12.6%) 7 (15.2%) 2 (4.4%) 4 (8.8%) 
Chimkent 1 (2.2%) 2 (4.4%) 3 (6.2%) 2 (4.4%) 
 14 (30.1%) 16 (34.7%) 9 (19.5%) 7 (15.2%) 
 
As we can see from Table 5.6, 30.1% of Kazakhs thought that Kazakh steppe region was 
joined (prisoedinen) to Russia voluntarily, 34.7% believed that that it was done 
‘voluntarily, but with a subsequent colonisation’ and 19.5% claimed that it was 
colonisation. Those respondents who subscribed to the Soviet ‘voluntary adhesion’ 
narrative (mainly between 28 and 60 years of age) claimed that Kazakhs ‘ had China on the 
one hand and Russia on the other’ and they ‘joined Russia in order to survive’ (Alm-1) ‘We 
were like between the devil and the blue sea,’ said a 34 year old painter from Almaty, ‘but 
Russia was better than China,’ (Alm-2). The younger respondents that were schooled and 
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socialised after the break up of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, tended to view the 
adhesion either as a voluntary act with subsequent colonisation or as colonisation. ‘I would 
call it ‘soft colonisation’, said a 28 year old interpreter from Almaty, ‘it wasn’t the will of 
the Kazakh people, but of the elites who ruled at that time. They wanted to repel the 
Dzhungar invasion and strengthen their Southern frontiers.’ (Alm-3) An 18 year-old student 
from Astana similarly noted: 
 
At the beginning it was voluntary, but when Kazakhs signed the documents about the 
incorporation they did not realise how strong the Russian influence would be and how it 
would change their traditional way of life. Now we have to come to terms with the 
consequences that we’ve never expected. (Ast-2)  
 
Indeed, there was a lot of confusion among my Kazakh respondents about how to view the 
revised historical accounts. Hence, only 28% trusted them, 21% not always trusted them, 
21 % did not trust them at all and 30% did not know the answer (Table 5.7). Some of my 
Kazakh respondents did not trust either Soviet or post-Soviet accounts and believed that 
‘the real history hasn’t been written yet’. (Alm-5) ‘Our new history is too fresh to be just,’ 
said a 28 year old Communications manager from Almaty, ‘When everything comes down 
in 20-30 years, we’ll see that the truth was somewhere in the middle’. (Alm-16) Other 
respondents, however, were of another opinion and claimed that they ‘trust[ed] the new 
historical accounts more because they [were] our historical versions which appeared after 
Kazakhstan gained independence.’ (P-4)  
 
Table 5.7 Do you trust the revised historical accounts (pereosmyslennym istoricheskim 
ocherkam)? 
 Trust partially trust don’t trust don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 2 (4.4%) 2 (4.4%) 0 4 (8.8%) 
Astana 3 (6.2%) 2 (4.4%) 2 (2.2%) 3 (6.3%) 
Almaty 2 (4.4%) 5 (10.8%) 7 (15.2%) 4 (8.8%) 
Chimkent 6 (12.6%) 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 2 (4.4%) 
 13 (28.2%) 10 (21.7%) 10 (21.7%) 13 (28.2%) 
 
The above quotes show that the concept of ‘coloniality’ cannot be reduced to objective or 
subjective criteria, because it is also a social construct closely linked to a particular national 
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identity and national state project (Beissinger, 1995, Smith 1998). My Kazakh respondents 
therefore have had to readjust to the revised historical narratives or at least to take them into 
account and re-evaluate the idea of empire as a continuing Russian project, which indirectly 
placed them within the ‘colonized’ camp of the ‘colonizers/colonized’ division. A 
substantial minority of my Kazakh respondents rejected or questioned the revised 
perspective (these mainly fell into the age bracket between 28-65), others accepted it 
(mainly from Chimkent and younger respondents under the age of 24), but in either case, 
their relationship with the official historiography in Kazakhstan and importantly, with the 
national state project has changed. 
 
The same trend of reassessing one’s position and identity vis-à-vis the new historical 
narratives can be traced in other questions related to historical revisionism with regard to 
the Soviet period. Specifically I asked my respondents to identity what was positive and 
what was negative in Kazakhstan during the Soviet time. The results were as follows: 
  
Table 5.6 What do you think was positive in the Soviet Union? (%) 
 % 
The economy 
 
welfare state 
development of industry and infrastructure 
 
 
84 
60 
Soviet nationality/ cultural issues 
 
Internationalism, the ideology of friendship of peoples; Soviet patriotism  
Mutual cultural influences; Kazakh and Russian cultures were enriched; 
Kazakhstan was part of a great superpower; 
Russians have had a positive influence on Kazakhs; 
 
 
35 
10 
31 
10 
 
The Soviet regime and its policies 
 
the Communist ideology – the unifying role of Lenin, Pioneers, Komsomol and CPSU 
Kazakhs were sedentarised 
The indirect impact of deportation – many clever and talented people were deported to 
Kazakhstan and contributed to its development  
 
 
10 
8 
 
2 
 
As we can see from Table 5.6, there was a clear appreciation by my Kazakh respondents of 
many aspects of the Soviet welfare and economic policies, of the Soviet policy of 
internationalism and friendship of peoples and to a smaller degree of the Communist 
ideology, even, by some, of the positive impact of Soviet deportations on Kazakhstan 
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(Table 5.6). An overwhelming majority of my respondents (84%) claimed that the Soviet 
Union provided every Soviet citizen with solid education and free healthcare and ensured 
that all Soviet children were cared for and taken into account. A 28 year-old marketing 
director from Almaty explained:  
 
I think that education and healthcare system were the best things in the Soviet Union. 
We’ve discussed recently with my friends what would be good to retain from the Soviet 
Union and our response was unanimous – education and the healthcare system. The 
USSR’s socio-political structure meant that I managed to travel around the country free of 
charge and my worldview was immediately expanded. The Soviet system spared neither 
effort nor expense on children and their upbringing. All children were included and none of 
them were left behind – they took part in various competitions and contests. And the most 
important thing, parents encouraged their children to study and to read – it was very 
prestigious (Alm-16). 
 
There was also a lot of nostalgia, especially among the older generation, for the socialist 
system (60%), which ensured ‘relative economic equality between people,’ (P-3), ‘full 
employment’ (Alm-15), ‘strong trade union culture and general feeling of economic 
‘justice.’ (Ch-1). Likewise the Soviet system was praised for the development of industry 
and infrastructure (53%), which made the life in Kazakhstan, in the words of a 43 year old 
civil servant from Almaty, ‘better and easier.’ (Alm-17).  
 
A substantial minority of Kazakhs (35%) commented on the positive role of the Soviet 
policies of internationalism and friendship between peoples, which helped to depoliticise 
ethnicity and ‘create an atmosphere of trust and unity between people.’ (Alm-15). Said a 50 
year-old civil servant from Astana: ‘In principle it did not matter what your nationality was, 
we were all Soviet people’. A 25 year-old IT programmer from Chimkent similarly noted 
that  
 
if the Soviet Union had survived for another seventy years our people would have been 
truly united and we would have been one nation (edinoi natsiei) like the Americans. They 
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also have a lot of different nations (natsii) – English, French… but the main thing is that 
they are similar now, they are American. May be we would be slightly different, but we 
would have achieved a real social equality. (Ch-1)  
 
A small minority of Kazakhs (9%), mainly the older generation, also pointed to the 
unifying role of the Communist ideology, the Pioneers, Komsomol organisations and the 
CPSU, which together with the policies of internationalism ‘gave people purpose’ (Alm-5), 
‘provided [them] with guidance and discipline’ (Ast-3) and ‘fostered patriotism for the 
Soviet motherland’ (Ch-1). Thirty one per cent of my respondents also noted that 
Kazakhstan had been part of a great superpower – a ‘country whose decisions and 
aspirations ‘mattered’ (Alm-8) and 10% believed that Russians and Russian language have 
had a positive influence on Kazakhs and their culture. ‘If we had not been part of Russia,’ 
said a 33 year old painter from Almaty, ‘we would be like Afghanistan now. Abai 
Kunanbaev said: ‘Learn Russian!’ And indeed through Russian we are able to have an open 
dialogue with the whole world and to show what we have.’ (Alm-1)  
 
With regard to the negative attitudes, my Kazakh respondents were mostly aggrieved by the 
policy of Russification which resulted in the loss of their national culture (36%), language 
(34%) and religion (15%) and by the feelings of inadequacy and ethnocultural inferiority 
that followed (21%) (Table 5.7). 
 
Table 5.7 What was negative in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period? (%) 
 % 
The Soviet regime and its policies 
 
Communist ideology, all spheres of life were ideologically tinged 
people lived behind the ‘iron curtain’, there was a complete denial of the outside world 
there was no freedom of speech, all political issues were discussed ‘in the kitchens’ 
repressions, purges, collectivisation, sedentarisation, famine 
all decisions were made in Moscow 
 
 
8 
6 
3  
47 
19 
Nationalities/ cultural issues 
 
Russification, Kazakh culture and language were forgotten 
Kazakhs were culturally and linguistically discriminated and lost self-respect 
Children learnt more about the history of Russia, than about the history of Kazakhstan 
 
 
85 
21 
4 
Economic factors 
 
economy of shortages, queues; 
 
 
8 
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Kazakhstan was a raw material appendage of Russia 15 
 
A 28 year old Managing director from Almaty explained, for example, that there was a 
state-sponsored discrimination against Kazakh schools and Kazakh-speaking children 
which resulted in a degradation of Kazakh language and Kazakh-medium education: 
 
I participated in the physics competition at school (v shkol’noi olimpiade po fizike) first at 
the town-level and then at the oblast level and I was reading up on Moscow textbooks while 
the children from Kazakh schools prepared themselves on simple textbooks. And I 
remember that I was ashamed. It was clear that rural Kazakhs would never be able to 
approach our level of preparation because we had a state-sponsored discrimination against 
Kazakh schools. (Alm-16) 
 
He also commented very eloquently that his parents lost their command of the Kazakh 
language because it did not open up career opportunities in Soviet Kazakhstan:  
 
My granddad was illiterate, but he understood that if his son (my father) didn’t know 
Russian, he would never achieve anything. Therefore, he enrolled him in the Russian 
kindergarten and then in a Russian school that were very far from our home. And only 
because of that my dad, the only person in the family, has become somebody. My granddad 
was very wise because he identified the right path for his child. He knew that if you knew 
Russian you would get a good job and be successful in life. My mum is also a case in point. 
She finished a Kazakh school, but couldn’t complete her university degree because she 
struggled to take notes in Russian. She translated them at home into Kazakh and learnt them 
and suffered like that for two years. (Alm-16).   
 
Some of my younger respondents recounted from the words of their parents that that the 
knowledge of Russian was linked to the ‘basic means of survival’ during the Soviet days 
and it forced millions of Kazakhs to learn Russian:  
 
I have nothing against the Russian language. I agree that it is great and I myself like it… 
but at the same time to force people learn Russian as it used to be during the Soviet time…. 
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If you had not known Russian, you would not have been able to survive  and wouldn’t earn 
your daily bread  (kuska hleba ne zarabotaesh). It all happened to us - my mum and dad 
told me about it (P-1) 
 
Twenty one per cent of my Kazakh respondents expressed a concern that the loss of 
Kazakh language and culture has led to an ‘inferiority complex’ (kompleks 
nepolnotsennosti) among Kazakhs and to a profound identity crisis. Said a 34 year-old male 
teacher and painter from Almaty: ‘Prior to the Soviet period the Kazakhs were proud that 
they were Kazakhs. They loved their motherland, their language and now they developed 
this ‘inferiority complex’. (Alm-2) ‘These feeling of inadequacy are so deeply ingrained in 
our people that they try to be all assertive and pompous (napyschennye) to compensate for 
it. And the roots are in the Soviet time’. (Alm-1) 
 
There was also a considerable resentment of the Soviet state-sponsored policies of 
collectivisation, sedentarisation, purges and repressions (47%), which affected the Kazakh 
nation both physically and mentally and reduced them to a minority in their national 
homeland. ‘My grandma told me,’ said a 28 year old Secretary from Almaty 
 
that our Kazakh intellectual and political elite was purged in the 1930s and that in 1933 
there was a terrible famine during which one million of Kazakhs died. And let’s take the 
December events of 1986 – we still don’t know all the truth. And people came out 
(vystupili) so that our Kazakhstanis were respected. The students were treated so badly at 
that time, they were humiliated and denigrated and this pain is still here with me. I still 
remember that anxiety when for the first time in my life I felt my nationality 
(natsional’nost’). I was told that I was Kazakh and previously we were all Soviet children. 
The Moscow ideologues called Kazakhs ‘nationalists’, although their protests was directed 
against the Moscow dictat. It’s a shame that our students were treated like that (Alm-9) 
 
There was also some resentment against numerous drawbacks of the Soviet regime such as 
censorship (15%), lack of freedom of speech (6%), the Soviet insularity from the rest of the 
world (6%), and importantly the ‘imperial’ set up between Kazakhstan and Russia whereby 
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all important decisions related to the republic were made in Moscow. A 24 year old TV and 
Radio presenter from Petropavlovsk commented: 
 
The biggest minus, I believe, was that Moscow did not coordinate their actions with our 
republic. If they wanted to carry out nuclear tests in the Aral Sea – they did, if they wanted 
to open uranium mines – they opened them, if they wanted to build the Semipalatinsk 
nuclear testing ground – they built it. Why didn’t they do it in Moscow? Now we are 
reaping the consequences, but I wish everything were different (P-1) 
 
The economic problems that my respondents mentioned only briefly included the 
resentment that Kazakhstan was a ‘raw material appendage’ of Russia (syr’evoi pridatok 
Rossii) (15%) and the economy of shortages. Said a female secretary from Almaty: 
 
It is possible to understand the distribution of plants and factories from the position of one 
owner, but after the break up of the Soviet Union it has become apparent that we had only 
mining industries. We were left in a situation when we had an incomplete production cycle 
(Alm-13). 
 
It has to be noted that a considerable number of my Kazakh respondents, mainly between 
28 and 60 years of age, considered the Soviet Union to be ‘their state’ in the sense that they 
saw themselves as belonging to the Soviet people (sovetskii narod) and benefiting from its 
policies and system. They also considered the Russian language and culture to be positive 
agents of modernisation and remained strongly influenced by and attached to the Soviet 
values and experiences. In this they strongly correlated with my Russian respondents in the 
same age range in Almaty, Astana and Petropavlovsk but less so in Chimkent. As for the 
negative assessment of the Soviet past my Kazakh respondents differed considerably from 
Russians in the sense that they tended to ‘dwell’ on the national grievances and link them 
again and again to the regime set up and economic arrangements, while Russians 
disproportionately focused on the regime and economic factors and mentioned the national 
issues only briefly. This lack of insight or insufficient insight into the national problems of 
the Soviet era indicates, as G. Schopflin suggested, that Russians were the dominant and 
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state-bearing group of the Soviet Union, and similarly, Kazakhs’ excessive preoccupation 
with the national question points to their ex-minority status (see also Brubaker 1996, 
Doane, 1997). 
 
It could also be argued that the way my Kazakh respondents presented and phrased their 
responses reveals a lot about their contemporary identities. A considerable majority of 
Kazakhs did not feel the need to ‘explain’ or justify the Soviet policies as much, although 
the older generation sometimes drew on the Soviet ideological clichés pertaining to the 
benefits of the Soviet rule in Kazakhstan, and in general they felt more confident in 
assessing the negative elements of the Soviet past, especially on the nationality question. 
The younger Kazakhs (in the age bracket between 18-25) were perhaps, the most critical of 
the Soviet period partly because they were influenced by the historical revisionism of the 
post-independence era and because, unlike their parents, they did not grow up in a context 
where the nationality problems and Kazakh national grievances in particular were 
considered a taboo subject. As a 24 year old TV and radio presenter from Petropavlovsk 
noted:  
 
What I’ve realised as a grown-up person at the time of independence is that I don’t have to 
hide anything, and our parents always had to hide their real feelings. As Vysotsky sang: 
‘All political issues we discuss in the kitchens’. I know that if somebody asks me about 
anything, I wouldn’t be able to hide what I really think about it. I will tell you honestly 
what was positive and what was negative in our Soviet past. (P-1)  
 
All the above points indicate that Kazakhs are undergoing considerable changes in their 
identity in the sense that they feel that the state ‘helps’ them to re-evaluate the past and 
makes them more comfortable and confident in the new political and socio-cultural 
environment and at the same time provides them with a protective context where they can 
express their past and present grievances and channel their energies into building a new 
positive identity.  
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5.4.2 Responses to ‘Nationalising’ Policies 
 
a) Restructuring of Public Space – Re-naming Streets, Changing State Symbols 
 
Changing state symbols and renaming streets and towns have been an important mechanism 
of transforming national perceptions and converting country into national territory in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan (Kaiser, 2004, Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). The process had had a very 
mixed reaction from the Kazakhstani population in general, but Kazakhs perhaps have had 
the most positive, if with qualifications, response to this development. A survey in 2001 
found out that 60.6% of Kazakhs viewed this process positively, 14.8% negatively and 17% 
indifferently (Kurganskaya and Dunaev, 2002:233). My survey confirms these findings. 
Fifty seven per cent of my Kazakh respondents were in favour of the renaming, 35.5% 
agreed that some re-naming should be done, but it should not be pushed to the extreme and 
only 8.8% were against it (Table 5.8) 
 
Table 5.8 How do you view the renaming of streets and towns after the break up o the Soviet 
Union? 
 Positively Do not mind some renaming, but 
it should not go into extremes 
Negatively Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 6 (12.5%) 2 (4.4%) 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 
Astana 5 (15.2%) 4 (8.8%) 1 (2.2%) 0 
Almaty 6 (12.6%) 9 (19.5%) 2 (4.4%) 0 
Chimkent 9 (19.5%) 1 (2.2%) 0 0 
Total 26 (57%) 16 (35.5%) 4 (8.8%) 1 (2%) 
 
Those respondents who supported the renaming noted that it was ‘absolutely’ (Alm-1) and 
‘vitally important’ (P-1) and that ‘the new time required new heroes and new street names.’ 
(P-7) Some of my respondents viewed the renaming as a ‘tribute to [Kazakh] ancestors 
(Alm-15), while others equated it with a post-Soviet transformation of Kazakhstan after 
independence.’ (Ch-5,7). The respondents from Chimkent were perhaps the most 
unanimous in their support for the renaming as well as the younger respondents between 18 
and 25 years of age. The latter claimed that they were able to ‘relate to the new names more 
easily’ because they ‘[did] not remember the previous names’ (Ast-2) and because they 
‘learnt about the new people at school.’ (Ch-2) 
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Those respondents who were both ‘for’ and ‘against’ the renaming usually supported the 
trend as such, but they expressed the concern that authorities pushed it to the extreme at 
time and renamed some Soviet street names unnecessarily. A 28 year old female teacher of 
Russian literature and language from Almaty explained: 
 
I think it is positive, but I also think that it was not necessary to rename Kovalevskaya 
Street into Zeinshash. Sofia Kovalevskaya was a very good woman. On the other hand it 
was fine to re-name Komsomol’skaya Street because there is no Komsomol anymore. Even 
Rakhmaninov Street should not have been renamed and Tchaikovsky Street! (Alm-10) 
 
A 43 year old female civil servant from Almaty similarly noted:  
 
It would be good to retain some historical names. It is our history after all! Lenin could’ve 
been spared because we have a strong connection with him. No matter what they say now, 
but we lived according to his system. Then, all the monuments were demolished and I was 
also against it. This is just my opinion. They could’ve been preserved so that we could tell 
our children: ‘Many years ago we lived here and we had Lenin!’ I can say the same about 
Dzerzhinsky. He has done so much for us. And now they wiped them out in one moment 
and said that they were nobodies. How come? I’ve read so many books about them – I have 
selected works of Stalin and Brezhnev and Kunaev. (Alm-17) 
 
Some of my respondents claimed that renaming was a very subjective process and for some 
people who lived in certain streets for decades the renaming was painful, even though the 
names no longer correspond to the post-Soviet reality: Said a 28 year old Marketing 
Director from Almaty:  
 
It is a very subjective thing. Unfortunately it is not the people (narod) who decide it, but a 
narrow circle of people. Recently I’ve been to a small town and they haven’t renamed their 
streets yet. There were Lenin Street, Street of Young Communards and it looked really 
weird. Young Communards? Who remembers them now? I was walking there as if it were a 
national park of old relics – everything was close to me and everything was recongnisable 
(vse bylo blizko i znakomo). But today it doesn’t look natural – it was like pictures from the 
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old life. Of course, if the person lived on the Communist Avenue and he got used to it, then 
he is of course offended that his favourite street was renamed. A friend of mine with 
advanced outlook on life thinks that Kosmonavtov (Cosmonauts) Street shouldn’t have 
been renamed into Baitursynova Koshesi. She remembers 1961 when Yuri Gagarin went 
into the open space for the first time. How happy she was! But Baitursynov also deserves to 
have a street named after him. As I said, it is all very subjective. (Alm-16) 
 
The above points indicate, as Reicher and Hopkins have pointed out, that ‘people are not a 
blank slate upon whom new pasts and new futures may be written at will’ (2002:149) and 
that ‘[t]he powerful… have to pay attention to the understanding, which people hold and 
the mundane structure of their lives’ (ibid.). Indeed, a substantial minority of my Kazakh 
respondents (35.5%), mainly in the age bracket between 25-60, indicated that the re-naming 
of streets and towns was confusing, expensive, corrupt and disrespectful of some elements 
of the Soviet past, and a small minority of Kazakhs (8.8%) rejected this process altogether. 
This shows that the re-naming campaign was not straightforward and it did not resonate 
with all or most of my Kazakh respondents. But on the whole it could be argued that the 
authorities demonstrated a wit – or rather ‘witcraft’ (Billig, 1985) through which their 
symbolic construction of public space corresponded with the interests and concerns of a 
substantial majority of Kazakhs. It should also be said that, unlike Russians, none of my 
Kazakh respondents, who complained about certain aspects of the re-naming campaign, 
perceived it as a direct threat to their existing and future status and the majority of them 
actually thought of it in a positive way. In this they differ considerably from my Russian 
respondents and other non-titular groups, who view the re-naming campaign, inter alia, as 
an effort to nationalise the state and enhance the new dominant status of the Kazakh nation.   
 
b) Language 
 
Some observers have noted that language in Kazakhstan has been perhaps the most 
contentious issue since independence because it affected not only various aspects of 
national identity, economic opportunities, conflict over resources, but, most importantly, 
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divided titular and non-titular groups and the titular group itself (Savin, 2001, Kurganskaya 
and Dunaev, 2002, Masanov, 1996, 2002, Dave, 2003, 2007). One of the key and the most 
divisive questions relating to the language problem in Kazakhstan has been the legal status 
of the two languages. The status of Kazakh is clear – it is the official state language, while 
the status of Russian is anomalous. At present it is an official language, but not the state 
language. The survey in 2001 found out that only a quarter of Kazakhs wanted Russian to 
be the second state language, while 62% of them were against it (Kurganskaya and Dunaev, 
2002:242). My small-scale survey has shown that 48% of Kazakhs were in favour of the 
introduction of Russian as a second state language and 48% were against it (Table 5.9) It 
has to be said that my survey was based on urban areas in which the majority of Kazakhs 
had attended Russian schools and whose use of Russian was therefore significantly higher 
than in rural areas and hence the difference in the results of my survey. 
 
Table 5.9 Do you think Russian should be the second state language in Kazakhstan (alongside 
Kazakh?) 
 yes no Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 3 (6.3%) 5 (10.8%) 2 (4.4%) 
Astana 6 (12.6%) 3 (6.3%) 0 
Almaty 13 (28.2%) 4 (8.8%) 1 (2.2%) 
Chimkent 0 9 (19.5%) 1 (2.2%) 
Total 22 (48%) 22 (48%) 4 (8.8%) 
 
Those of my respondents who were in favour of Russian as a second state language argued 
that Kazakhstan ‘has no other option, but to do it’ (Alm-1) and that ‘Russian is now a state 
language ‘de facto’, and it would be good to make it a state language ‘de jure’ (Alm-16). 
Some also noted that ‘the majority of the population knows Russian’ (P-4) and ‘half of the 
population is Russian and it will make their life easier’. (Ast-3) Those respondents who 
were against granting Russian the status of the second state language were concerned that 
Kazakh would be completely ‘swamped’ by Russian and there would be no restoration of 
justice. A 28 year old female lecturer of Russian language and literature from 
Petropavlovsk explained: 
 
If Russian became the second state language on a par with Kazakh then there would be no 
restoration of justice that I was talking about. That is, Russian language ‘swamps’ 
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(pogloshchaet) Kazakh anyway, that is why it is good that Kazakh has become the state 
language. (P-2)  
 
A 46 year old female civil servant from Almaty similarly said: 
 
[If Russian becomes the second state language] Kazakh will disappear completely because 
it is easier to say something in Russian than in Kazakh. We have a law – people should 
consciously speak Kazakh (soznatel’no govorit’ na kazakhskom), and not by force (a ne 
prinuditel’no). Our business correspondence is gradually switching to the Kazakh language 
and [authorities] check us and complement us on that. If you live in the country, you have 
to respect traditions of its people. (Alm-17) 
 
Some of my respondents claimed that the status of Kazakh as the only state language is 
justified because it aids the development of the Kazakh nation and has the ethnic cohesion-
building capacity. Said a 24 year old female civil servant from Astana: 
 
I thought about it and know that in some countries there are two state languages. I think in 
20-30 years we’ll be able to approach this question, but at the moment of nation-formation 
(v moment stanovleniya natsii)… We are all so to say victims of the fact that Russian 
language was forcefully imposed on us. I cannot say that I have a perfect command of 
Kazakh (v sovershenstve vladeyu kazakhskim), I know only the basics. If I marry a Southern 
Kazakh I won’t be able to adapt easily in that milieu. But I look at our people and I feel 
such pain that I don’t know my native tongue and that it does not get the sufficient 
development. Therefore, there should be some alternative measure. And in 20-30 years 
we’ll return to this question, but when the state is developing – it is not only politics and 
economics that matter, but patriotism as well! And the knowledge of Kazakh in this matter 
is not of small importance! 
 
Indeed, Donald Horowitz has argued that rising or insecure groups insist on official or state 
status for their native language because without this determined measure neither the people 
nor the language could adapt to the competitive milieu and people would not regain their 
national dignity and group worth. In this respect, language becomes a ‘quintessential 
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entitlement issue’, a ‘symbol of newfound group dignity’ and a ‘symbol of [cultural] 
domination, which aids group development and confirms its special status in a particular 
society’ (1985:219-224). 
 
Perhaps even more significant is the question of education in these languages. Here there 
were some very interesting changes in people’s attitudes.  58% of my Kazakh respondents 
were educated in Russian-language schools, although some of the younger respondents 
admitted that they changed from Russian to Kazakh schools half way through. Of the 58% 
over a third (36%) have started sending their children to Kazakh schools, though these 
parents come from Petropavlovsk, Astana and Almaty, while in Chimkent there was very 
little change in that most parents attended Kazakh-language schools and sent their children 
to Kazakh schools. One interesting finding was that there was a slight increase of 8% 
amongst parents who were educated in Kazakh-schools, but have sent their children to 
Russian-language schools. However, most of these were from more Russified Almaty and 
Petropavlovsk and the parents indicated that they saw a knowledge of Russian as an 
advantage in terms of higher education and job prospects, especially as this did not threaten 
their fluent command of Kazakh.  
 
Table 5.10 What was the main language of instruction at your school and at the school of your 
children (those who are younger than you in your family? (Kazakhs only∗∗) 
 respondent’s 
school (Kazakh-
medium) 
Respondent 
children’s school 
(Kazakh-
medium) 
Respondent’s 
school (Russian-
medium) 
Respondent’s 
child’s school 
(Russian-
medium) 
Petropavlovsk 1+2∗ (2.2%+4.4%) 4 (8.8%) 6 (12.6%) 5 (10.8%) 
Astana 2 (4.4%) 4 (8.8%) 8 (17.3%) 6 (12.6%) 
Almaty 5+1∗ (10.8%+2.2%) 8 (17.3%) 12 (26.2%) 10 (21.7%) 
Chimkent 8+2∗ (17.3%+4.4%) 10 (21.7%) 0 0 
 21 (45.6%) 26 (56.5%) 26 (56.5%) 21 (45.6%) 
∗respondent switched from a Russian to a Kazakh school half-way through 
∗∗ none of my Russian respondents went to Kazakh-medium schools and none of them sent their children to Kazakh 
schools 
 
With regard to higher education the controversial issue is whether Kazakh should be the 
normal language of instruction. The majority of Kazakhs (80%) felt that there should not a 
Kazakh language monopoly in higher education and that Russian-speakers should not be 
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compelled to study in Kazakh. My respondents admitted that at the moment there was a 
great lack of advanced educational material in Kazakh such as textbooks and also a lack of 
experienced teachers at that level. As in other areas, Kazakhs can be seen to be very 
realistic and tolerant in their understanding of the language status issue.  
 
One of the questions of my survey concerned what language would be predominantly 
spoken in Kazakhstan in 50 years time. Significantly, only a small number (11%) of 
Kazakhs thought that Kazakh would be the overwhelmingly predominant language, while 
the overwhelming majority of them (84%) felt that both Kazakh and Russian would 
continue to be spoken in Kazakhstan (Table 5.11). But these percentages conceal 
considerable uncertainty particularly among Kazakh respondents, especially from the 
Russianised Petropavlovsk, Astana and Almaty areas about the extent of the Russian 
language use in the future, if the current decline of the Russian population through 
emigration continues.  
 
Table 5.11 What language will be predominantly spoken in Kazakhstan in 50 years? 
 Kazakh Russian Both Kazakh and Russian Other languages 
Petropavlovsk 2 (4.4%) 0 7 (15.2%) 7 (15.2%) 
Astana 0 1 (2.2%) 8 (17.3%) 1 (2.2%) 
Almaty 3 (6.3%) 0 14 (30.1%) 8 (17.3%) 
Chimkent 0 0 9 (19.5%) 4 (8.8%) 
Total 5 (11%) 1 (2%) 38 (84%) 20 (41.2%) 
 
 
c) Economic and Social Issues 
 
With regard to economic and personnel issues (job prospects), a substantial minority of 
Kazakhs (42%) admitted that ethnicity was important in career advancement, although 
some (17%) felt that this was only in certain sectors as government administration and 
crucially important industries such as oil and gas (Table 5.12). 
 
Table 5.12 Is nationality important for one’s career advancement? 
 Yes No Only in certain sectors Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 5 (10.8%) 4 (8.8%) 0 2 (4.4%) 
Astana 5 (10.8%) 4 (8.8%) 0 0 
Almaty 4 (8.8%) 5 (10.8%) 8 (17.3%) 3 (6.3%) 
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Chimkent 5 (10.8%) 3 (6.3%) 0 0 
Total 19 (41%) 16 (36.7) 8 (17%) 5 (10.8%) 
 
 
With regard to the perception of which group has most benefited economically in 
independent Kazakhstan, I posed the question of which nationality has the highest 
percentage of wealthy people in the country. Overwhelmingly (73%) Kazakhs felt that the 
Kazakhs had benefited most. However, over a third of them (35%) felt that Russians could 
also achieve economic success, particularly in areas, which did not compete with Kazakhs. 
Most Kazakhs (77%) thought that other non-titular groups still have an opportunity of 
economic success (Table 5.13). 
 
Table 5.13 What nationality does have the highest percentage of wealthy people in 
Kazakhstan? 
 Kazakhs Russians Others 
Petropavlovsk 6 (12.6%) 3 (6.3%) 5 (10.8%) 
Astana 9 (19.5%) 5 (10.8%) 9 (19.5%) 
Almaty 12 (26.1%) 4 (8.8%) 12 (26.1%) 
Chimkent 6 (12.6%) 4 (8.8%) 9 (19.5%) 
Total 33 (73%) 16 (35%) 35 (77%) 
 
These data indicate that while Kazakhs feel more confident that their ethnic identity has 
become very important for their job prospects, Russians reluctantly accept this situation as 
representing the right of the titular group to operate in their own interests, but they resent 
the fact that Kazakh ethnicity and language make a difference in this way and that this is a 
fundamental obstacle preventing them from achieving career advancement in accordance 
with their skills. These two factors, ethnicity and language, associated with economic 
success, could be the most important factors consolidating identities at present and in the 
future.  
 
5.4.3 Issues Relating to Loyalty, Integration and Out-Migration of the Russian 
Population 
 
With regard to my third category of group loyalty and integration of Russians within 
Kazakhstan, this also produced an interesting mixture of responses. One question was fairly 
clear-cut. Virtually all Kazakhs (91.3%) thought that the borders of Russia should not be 
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expanded to include ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan (Table 5.14). But in contrast to 
this my question about whether Russians of Kazakhstan are culturally and mentally closer 
to Kazakhs or to the Russians of Russia produced much more ambivalent responses. My 
Kazakh respondents clearly thought that Kazakhstani Russians had more in common with 
themselves (57%) than with Russians in Russia (26%), while a substantial minority of them 
(17%) felt that the Russians had a lot in common with both groups (Table 5.15) 
 
Table 5.14 Do you think the borders of Russia should be expanded to include all ethnic 
Russians living in the near abroad? 
 Kazakhs Kazakhs Kazakhs 
Petropavlovsk 9 (19.5%) 0 1 (2.2%) 
Astana 9 (19.5%) 0 1 (2.2%) 
Almaty 16 (35.5%) 0 2 (4.4%) 
Chimkent 10 (21.7%) 0 0 
Total 42 (91.3%) 0 4 (8%) 
 
Table 5.15 Do you think Russians of Kazakhstan are culturally and mentally closer to 
Kazakhs or to Russians of Russia? 
 To Russians of Russia To Kazakhs In between 
Petropavlovsk 4 (8.8%) 2 (4.4%) 2 (4.4%) 
Astana 3 (6.3%) 5 (10.8%) 2 (4.4%) 
Almaty 4 (8.8%) 11 (23.6%) 3 (6.3%) 
Chimkent 1 (2.2%) 8 (17.3%) 1 (2.2%) 
Total 12 (26%) 26 (56.5%) 8 (17.3%) 
 
In response to my question whether Kazakhstani Russians should be loyal to Kazakhstan of 
which they hold citizenship or to Russia, their historical homeland, naturally the 
overwhelming majority of Kazakhs (75%) felt that they should be loyal to Kazakhstan, a 
significant minority (20%) thought that people should make up their minds about where 
their primary loyalty lies, and small number of Kazakhs (4%) felt that it was possible for 
Russians to be loyal to both countries (Table 5.16). What these data show is that my 
respondents agreed that the primary loyalty of Kazakhstani Russians should be to 
Kazakhstan, but they also showed some understanding of the problems that Russians have 
had following the collapse of the Soviet Union with establishing their new loyalties and 
were prepared to give them some leeway in deciding this question. 
 
Table 5.16  Do you think Russians of Kazakhstan should be loyal to Kazakhstan of which they 
hold citizenship or to Russia, their historical homeland? 
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 To 
Kazakhstan 
To Russia To both Kazakhstan 
and Russia 
People should decide 
themselves 
Petropavlovsk 6 (12.6%) 0 0 2 (4.4%) 
Astana 9 (19.5%) 0 1 (2.2%) 0 
Almaty 9 (19.5%) 0 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 
Chimkent 10 (21.7%) 0 0 0 
Total 34 
(73.9%) 
0 2 (4%) 9 (19.5%) 
 
 
There still remains the question of how much influence the Russian government should 
have in protecting the rights and freedoms of Russians in Kazakhstan in their role as 'the 
homeland' state, in Brubaker's terms (1996). This question produced an ambivalent series of 
responses. A clear majority of Kazakhs (52.1%) thought that the Russian government 
should play no role in this area. However a significant minority of Kazakhs (21.7%) felt 
that the Russian government should protect Russian rights and freedoms in Kazakhstan, 
and a further 19.5% felt that there should be such a role, but only at a minimal level. But in 
both cases the Kazakhs in these groups were motivated by a strong, almost primordial 
ethnic feeling that each national group should in some way look after their co-nationals 
abroad. What comes out of the responses to this question is, once again, the divided 
loyalties of the Russian population, but at the same time the extensive Kazakh 
understanding of their position, although with the implication that Russians should make up 
their minds on this issue and the Russian government should still have some responsibility 
in helping their co-nationals in ways that do not undermine the sovereignty of Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 5.  Do you think the Russian government should protect the rights and freedoms of the 
Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan or should they stay away and not interfere? 
 Yes Yes, but the involvement 
should be minimal 
No Don’t 
know 
Petropavlovsk 2 (4.4%) 2 (4.4%) 4 (8.8%) 1 (2.2%) 
Astana 3 (6.3%) 3 (6.3%) 4 (8.8%) 0 
Almaty 4 (8.8%) 3 (6.3%) 9 (19.5%) 2 (4.4%) 
Chimkent 1 (2.2%) 1 (2.2%) 7 (15.2%) 1 (2.2%) 
Total 10 (21.7%) 9 (19.5%) 24 (52.1%) 3 (6%) 
 
One major question, which vitally concerns both Russians and Kazakhs is that of Russian 
out-migration to the Russian Federation. While I did not have any direct question on the 
reasons for this out-migration, there was extensive material in my responses, which cast 
 167 
much light on this issue. Most Kazakhs understood that with the emergence of 
independence of Kazakhstan from the break up of the Soviet Union, there was a status 
reversal between Kazakhs and Russians as the national homeland concept predominated in 
the organisation of the new successor states. Kazakhs believed that most Russians 
emigrated in the hopes of achieving greater economic prosperity in Russia or to be reunited 
with family members. Some Kazakhs drew attention to problems Russians faced in dealing 
with the nationalising policies, which we have discussed, and even admitted that Kazakhs 
in rural areas and in the South put a lot of pressure on Russians to leave, although they also 
drew attention to the number of Russian returnees.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
To try to summarise the implications of external and internal factors for Kazakh identity, 
we can say that my responses show a continued ambivalence about this identity, but at the 
same time there is evidence amongst the younger generation and in the less Russified areas 
of Kazakhstan of a greater self-confidence and self-assertion, which could lead to 
significant change in the coming years.  
 
In general at the moment the majority of adult Kazakhs in the main cities remain strongly 
influenced by and attached to the values and experiences of the Soviet period, in which 
Russian language and culture were seen as positive agents of modernisation and 
internationalisation. So Russia and the Russian-dominated Soviet past do not yet serve as a 
real ‘hostile other’ against which the Kazakhs could strongly react and thus establish a 
strong independent identity for themselves. This trend has been strengthened by the 
cautious and conciliatory policies pursued by both Russian and Kazakh governments, 
which meant that conflict-generating ‘triadic nexus’ (nationalising state, homeland state 
and national minority) predicted by Brubaker has not so far materialised. Many Kazakhs 
still show some understanding of the feelings of Russians in the new state and are even 
prepared to admit a general responsibility of the ‘homeland state’ to look after their co-
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nationals abroad, while not approving of the direct political intervention or alteration of 
borders. Nevertheless the considerable and continuing ‘exit’ of out-migrating Russians does 
arouse suspicions about the continued commitment and ‘loyalty’ of those who remain. 
Russia as an external force and Russians as an internal sector of the population still remain 
a very important ‘defining other’, but not yet a wholly negative ‘hostile other’ for Kazakh 
identity.  
 
In addition the characteristics of Kazakhstan’s internal and economic transition have also 
strengthened the provisional and ambivalent character of the contemporary Kazakh 
identity. The fact that a true democratic transition has not taken place in Kazakhstan means 
that Kazakhs have not had to defend and assert their distinctive identity in an open, 
contested and ethnicised political system which would undoubtedly have led to rapid 
coalescence and hardening of their identity in relation to competing ethnic ‘others’. The 
nationalising policies which have been put into operation, for example in career 
opportunities, language and economic control, have mainly been a ‘nationalisation by 
stealth’ (Bohr, 1998), while maintaining an apparently ‘civic’ framework, which has 
avoided contentious, and thus differentiating, discussion and political ‘bidding’. Likewise, 
the largely gradualist approach to economic transition has avoided a strong economic 
polarisation which would probably have become ethnicised. Nazarbaev’s careful ‘guiding’ 
of the political and economic transitions of his country have avoided major external and 
internal conflicts, but this has meant that a distinct Kazakh, let alone Kazakhstani, national 
identity has been slower and more uncertain and ambivalent in its development.  
 
Nevertheless there are signs of a strengthening of a distinctive Kazakh national identity 
based on both external and internal factors as they gradually differentiate their values and 
culture from those of other groups. My respondents showed a nuanced approach to 
evaluating both Russia, including the Soviet past, and the West, as the other important 
‘defining other’ (again neither wholly positive nor wholly negative), in which a real pride 
in the distinctiveness and merits of Kazakh culture in relation to other major cultures was 
evident. China emerged much more clearly as an increasingly important ‘hostile other’, and 
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this could have a real future impact, reinforcing, as some of my respondents indicated, 
traditional ties with Russia. Particularly interesting is the ambivalent attitude towards other 
Islamic states, both within and outside the Soviet orbit. While feeling a real bond with their 
religious and Turkic-language brethren in Central Asia, Kazakhs have no desire to emulate 
their political systems and feel clearly superior in terms of their economic, political and 
cultural development to their neighbours, (these attitudes could be compared to South 
Africa’s distanced solidarity towards the other African states). Towards non-Soviet Islamic 
states there is an even greater feeling of suspicion and alienation and an anxiety not to be 
identified with a global ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. These essential orientations, stressing 
Kazakh distinctiveness and pride in their unique culture and values, will perhaps form a 
core of a future developing Kazakh identity, which will become more confident and 
assertive as Kazakhstan’s international importance as a potentially oil-rich and 
geopolitically and strategically vital state develops in the years to come.  
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6 EMERGING MINORITY IDENTITY: RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO THE 
NATIONAL-STATE IDENTITY PROJECT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KAZAKHSTAN  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will look at whether a coherent identity is coalescing among Russians – the 
largest ethnic minority in Kazakhstan – and at the factors that contribute to or inhibit its 
consolidation. The chapter will follow the same structure as Chapter 5 (emergence of new 
identity; response to the nation-state identity project of the Republic of Kazakhstan) and 
will be divided into five parts (it has to be noted, though, that any division will be 
somewhat artificial and there will be some overlaps between different sections). After the 
introduction, the second part will consider the problems of terminology in my respondents’ 
statements. In particular I will look at how Russians interpret various terms that relate to the 
nationality issue (e.g. natsiya (nation), natsional’nost’ (nationality), kazakhstantsy 
(Kazakhstanis), titul’naya gruppa (titular group), korennoi (native, indigenous), 
natsional’nye men’shinstva (national minorities), etnos, etc.) and at the inconsistency and 
uncertainty of their interpretations. In the third and fourth sections I will examine the 
different ways in which a new Russian national identity may develop in Kazakhstan. 
Specifically, I will look at how Russians react to the creation of an independent Kazakhstan 
and its new position in the world (6.3 External aspects) and at how they view various 
nationalising policies – linguistic, cultural, economic and demographic (6.4 Internal 
identity). This will be followed by a short conclusion.  
 
6.2 Problems of Terminology 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, most terms in post-Soviet nationality discourse, both popular and 
academic, have been influenced by the Soviet ‘primordial’ understanding of nationality. 
This approach has had a strong impact on my Russian respondents and they drew on Soviet 
and post-Soviet vocabulary to make sense of post-Soviet transformations.  Specifically, my 
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respondents used the terms ‘nationality’ (natsional’nost’), ‘nation’ (natsiya) and ‘people’ 
(narod) to refer to an ethnic identity of a group. These words were usually preceded by the 
adjectives ‘Kazakh’ (kazakhskii), ‘Russian’ (russkii), ‘native, indigenous’ (korennoi), 
‘titular’ (titul’nyi) or were used as synonyms for the words ‘Kazakhs’, ‘Russians’, ‘Tatar’, 
etc. It has to be noted that the term ‘nationality’ was used only to denote ethnicity 
understood as a fixed and immutable essence (as opposed to ‘grazhdanstvo’ (citizenship), 
indicating official membership of a state). A welder from Almaty, for example, explained 
that 
 
every nationality, Russians, for example, live like Russians and Kazakhs live like Kazakhs. 
I cannot say that we are similar. We are friends, yes, but otherwise we have little in 
common. They eat horse-meat and we eat fish. It is just a different life style (Alm-2,r). 
 
The above quotation shows that there is a clear link with the Soviet nationality policy 
where ‘nationality’ was defined as membership of an ethnic group or people rather than 
membership of a state and its citizenry, as is the case in the West. The terms ‘people’ and 
‘nation’, however, were used to denote both ethnic and civic concepts, which is also a 
Soviet legacy. If paired with the adjectives ‘Soviet’ (sovetskii) or ‘Kazakhstani’ 
(kazakhstanskii) these terms acquired a civic and inclusive dimension. A businesswoman 
from Astana, for example, observed that  
 
all people in Kazakhstan are still united by a community (obshchnost’) that was developed 
during the Soviet time – the Soviet people (sovetskii narod). Many still belong to this entity 
and it is our axis. Everything was threaded onto it – our culture, economy, etc. But when we 
gained independence, they [Kazakhs] have made a rapid turn towards their culture (Ast-
2,r). 
 
The terms ‘Kazakhstani people’ (kazakhstanskii narod), ‘Kazakhstani nation’ 
(kazakhstanskaya natsiya) and Kazakhstanis (kazakhstantsy) were similarly used in a civic 
sense and had the strongest resemblance to the Western concept of ‘nationality’. My 
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Russian respondents also used the terms ‘Asians’ (aziaty), ‘Oriental people’ (vostochnye 
lyudi), ‘Muslims’ (musul’mane) and ‘them’ (oni) to label Kazakhs and the words ‘us’ (my), 
‘Europeans’ (evropeitsy), ‘Christians’ (khrist’yane), and Russians-speakers’ 
(russkoyazychnye) to label themselves. The above terms, however, do not explicitly point to 
the issues of dominance and subordination between the groups. This relationship was 
reflected in concepts like titular – non-titular group/nation/nationality (titul’naya – 
netitul’naya gruppa/ natsiya/ natsional’nost’), indigenous – non-indigenous 
group/nation/nationality (korennaya – nekorennaya gruppa/ natsiya/ natsional’nost’), hosts 
– guests (khozyaeva – gosti), dominant nation – national minorities/ethnic 
diasporas/foreigners (glavnaya natsiya – natsional’nye men’shinstva, etnicheskie diaspory, 
inostrantsy).  
 
The terms ‘titular – non-titular nation’, ‘indigenous – non-indigenous nation’, ‘dominant 
nation – national minorities’ were usually understood as synonyms for Kazakhs and non-
Kazakhs and their ranked position in Kazakhstan. A civil servant from Astana explained 
that 
  
the titular nation (titul’naya natsiya) and now national minorities (natsional’nye 
men’shinstva) are going through a rapid transformation in their relations. Russians were the 
Big Brother (starshii brat) and we also had the indigenous nation (korennaya natsiya) in 
Kazakhstan. That is, there was such a pyramid of interethnic relations during the Soviet 
time. Now everything has changed – we have a titular nation which is our main/ dominant 
nation (glavnaya natsiya) and all other citizens – constitute a non-titular nation 
(netitul’naya natsiya). Those who accepted this new formula – stayed in Kazakhstan. And 
those who rejected it, left our country forever because they had the ambitions of the Big 
Brother. And we, those who stayed and who see our future in Kazakhstan have accepted a 
priori that we, Russians, have our historical motherland – Russia! We have it! And if I 
don’t like something here in Kazakhstan, I can leave for Russia. But if Kazakhstan suits me, 
I a priori accept that Kazakhstan is a land of Kazakhs in which I invested a lot of labour 
and which owes me something as well (Ast-8,r).  
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Another civil servant from Astana similarly stressed that  
 
Russians understand that they [Kazakhs] are a titular nation (titul’naya natsiya) and that 
they have the full right to do with their country what they want. We are, if not temporary 
people here, nevertherless we are a national minority (natsional’noe men’shinstvo). We 
celebrate our national culture, our traditions, we keep our connections and take care of each 
other. And they [Kazakhs]… they have made a rapid turn towards their own culture (Alm-
1,r). 
 
It has to be noted that the terms ‘titular’ and ‘non-titular’ were not understood uniformly by 
all respondents. Some of them had never heard of these concepts, others occasionally used 
them in class rather than ethnic terms. A pensioner from Petropavlovsk, for example, said 
that 
 
the titular group [i.e. the elite] is not loved by the people. No matter what your nationality 
(natsional’nost’) is… whether you are Russian, Kazakh, German or Ukrainian, people don’t 
like the new rich, oligarchs, they have nothing but negative feelings towards them. Tell me, 
how can a normal person earn millions in ten years? You can do this only by stealing! (P-
2,r). 
 
The incidents of such misunderstandings, however, were relatively low (6%). To avoid 
them my respondents used a clear and straightforward terminology like ‘hosts – guests’ 
(khozyaeva – gosti) or ‘dominant group – foreigners’ (glavnaya gruppa – inostrantsy) to 
pinpoint the power relations between the groups. An accountant from Chimkent, for 
example, noted that ‘people in Kazakhstan are divided into two groups – hosts and guests. 
If your nationality is ‘correct’ you are the host of the country (khozyain strany), but if not, 
you have to put up with it or leave’ (Ch-7). 
 
As we can see from the above, my respondents drew on the Soviet ‘primordial’ 
understanding of ethnicity and nationhood to explain the Kazakhs’ dominant and their 
subordinate positions. They somewhat accepted the moral principle that only the 
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indigenous nation could lay a legitimate claim to the territory of Kazakhstan and used this 
as a justification for their new subordinate status. In this respect, the importance of 
‘primordialism’ in the post-Soviet context lies not in the fact that it is a ‘false’ or 
‘declining’ paradigm discredited in the West (Eller & Coughlan, 1993, Tishkov, 1997), but 
that it structures the beliefs and world-outlook of post-Soviet elites and their populations 
(Suny, 2001). What is important here is that elites and people draw on this framework, 
explain the reality around them and act upon their beliefs. This point will be taken into 
account when I look at how my respondents view the external and internal transformation 
of Kazakhstan to which I now turn. 
 
6.3 External Factors 
 
6.3.1 The Break-Up of the Soviet Union and Impact of Independence 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and independence in 1991 turned Russians in Kazakhstan 
from a state-bearing people in a multi-national empire into a beleaguered minority in a new, 
potentially foreign state. As a result of these changes Russians have had to readjust to a 
new socio-political environment and experience a gradual transformation of their 
ethnonational identity that was no longer constructed and reproduced under the 
circumstances and for the purposes of the Soviet state. Some of my Russian respondents 
have noted that the ‘break-up of the Soviet Union has had a profound impact on everything, 
including the social model [sotsial’nuyu model’], the economy, the socio-political regime 
and the ideology’ (Alm-9,r). Others believed that it has ‘exposed the interethnic problems 
and contradictions that existed during the Soviet time and emancipated Kazakh national 
consciousness and self-assertiveness. This, in its turn, has provoked certain conflicts that 
never existed before’ (Ast-8,r). 
 
Indeed, the majority of my Russian respondents – 78% – believed that interethnic relations 
have deteriorated in Kazakhstan as compared with the Soviet time and a much smaller 
percentage thought that they had either improved or stayed that same (2% and 20% 
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respectively). Kazakhs, on the other hand, as we have seen in chapter 5, were more positive 
about these changes. They thought that interethnic relations had either improved or stayed 
the same (64% and 8% respectively) and only 27% said that they had become worse (Table 
6.1). Thus we can see that each group interprets ‘interethnic relations’ in terms of its own 
interests and experiences. 
 
Table 6.1 Have interethnic relations in Kazakhstan deteriorated, improved or stayed the same 
as compared with the Soviet period? (%) 
 Kazakhs Russians 
Improved 64 2 
Deteriorated 27 78 
Stayed the same 8 20 
Total 47/100 40/100 
 
Notably, most of my Russian respondents tried to reject or somehow explain this process 
by projecting it onto other post-Soviet states or the Soviet period in general. As one 
engineer from Almaty put it: 
 
During the Soviet time interethnic relations were controlled by Moscow and the federal 
laws while after independence the titular nation has started to actively reassert itself and 
establish a dominant position over other nations. In fact all titular nations in the post-Soviet 
space are trying to do the same – they assert themselves, assume a leading position in all 
spheres of life and promote their culture … which is understandable. It would be nice, 
however, if this did not affect other nationalities as much (Alm-5,r). 
 
Independence, in this respect, can be viewed as an important instrument that transformed 
interethnic relations and laid the foundations of a new order that is built around the culture 
and interests of the newly-dominant group. Hence, the majority of Kazakhs tend to identify 
with the state and its policies (although with qualifications), while Russians have more 
difficulties in doing so. The most obvious example of this is that my Russian respondents 
felt uncomfortable about the language, cultural and cadres policies28 implemented by the 
new regime and believed that they contributed to the deterioration of interethnic relations 
                                                
28 These will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.4. 
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and alienation of Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities. In the words of Igor 
Savin, Russians thought that ‘the state no longer existed for them’ (Savin, 2002:3). 
 
To sum up, independence made status reversal between Kazakhs and Russians possible, 
turned Russians into a political minority, and made them readjust to the new nationalising 
project that promotes the values and interests of the new state-defining group. The external 
(international) aspects of this process will be looked at in more detail in the next section.  
 
6.3.2 Attitudes to Key Foreign States and Peoples  
 
After gaining independence the Kazakh elites had to establish a new sovereign state and 
make foreign policy choices and alliances that would inevitably highlight the emerging 
national identity of Kazakhstan and its people. Arguably, in terms of its main international 
orientation, there have been four main options available to Kazakhstan, which are Russia 
and the post-Soviet states (or the Near Abroad), the West, the Islamic states and East and 
South-East Asia. In this section I will not go into detailed justifications for Kazakh foreign 
policy orientations, but rather briefly look at how the real choices made by the government 
correspond to the national identity as reflected in my Russian respondents (and compare it 
with my Kazakh respondents). I will also consider the relationship between my Russian 
respondents and Russia which has been increasingly portrayed as their official external 
homeland (Savin, 2002).  
 
To probe where my Russian respondents’ regional and international preferences lay, I 
asked them to identify a country or countries that Kazakhstan should build its future with 
and countries that represent the biggest threat to Kazakhstan. The results were as follows: 
 
Table 6.2 What country or countries, in your opinion, should Kazakhstan build its future 
with? (Russians) 
1 Russia and  
Post-Soviet states 
Russia (32)  
Ukraine (2); Belorussia (3); Kyrgyzstan (3); Uzbekistan (2) 
46 
2 The West USA (6), UK (2); France (1); Germany (3); Poland (1); Europe, 
EC, the West (12) 
28 
3 East/ South-East 
Asia 
China (4); Japan (1); India (1) 6 
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4 Non-Soviet Islamic 
states 
Turkey (1); Iran (1) 2 
 
Table 6.3 What country or countries, in your opinion, represent the biggest threat to 
Kazakhstan? (Russians) 
1 Islamic states Afghanistan (15); Iran (4); Iraq (2); Turkey (1); Islamic states 
(7) 
30 
2 East Asia China (14) 14 
3 Russia and Post-
Soviet states 
Tajikistan (5); Uzbekistan (5); Chechnya (1), Russia (1) 12 
4 The West USA (6) 6 
 
As we can see from the tables, the post-Soviet states (45) (particularly Russia) and the 
countries of the West (28) were clearly preferred by my Russian respondents, while the 
East, South-East Asian and Muslim states had less appeal (6 and 2 respectively). The 
Muslim states (30) and China from the East Asian region (14) were thought to represent the 
biggest threat to Kazakhstan, followed by Central Asian states from the post-Soviet space 
(12) and the United States from the West (6). 
 
If we look at the results more closely, we can see that the overwhelming majority of 
Russians (82%) believed that Russia could and should be the closest ally of Kazakhstan in 
the future and only 2% thought of it as a threat. Some respondents tried to emphasize that 
the link with Russia was ‘absolutely’ (P-4, r) and ‘vitally important’ (Ast-3, r) and that it 
was ‘possible to name many countries, but Russia should always be the first’ (P-7, r). In 
stark contrast to the Kazakhs, my Russian respondents did not equate Russia with tsarist 
and Soviet colonialism or refer to the rise of Russian nationalism and xenophobia. They did 
not invidiously compare Russia with Kazakhstan and generally held favourable opinions of 
Russia. There was, however, some concern that ‘Russian politicians, like Zhirinovsky, 
incite ethnic prejudice among Russians and that this could make the life [of Russians in 
Kazakhstan] more difficult’ (Alm-6,r). 
 
As for the Western states, my respondents generally viewed them very positively with the 
partial exception of the United States. Specifically, the European Union and West European 
states were considered to be a ‘model and a target to move towards’ (Ast-8), while the USA 
was both admired for its ‘achievements in the economic and technological spheres’ and 
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resented for the ‘aggressive policies around the world’ (P-2, Alm-5). Non ex-Soviet Islamic 
states, on the other hand, were usually associated with ‘backwardness’ (otstalost’), drugs, 
arms and international terrorism and the overwhelming majority of Russians – 75% - 
thought that Kazakhstan should distance itself from this region. As one civil servant from 
Astana put it, 
 
I don’t want to say this, but I think that Islamic states and the Asian part of the world in 
general are associated with such a thing as ‘backwardness’. By this I mean that these states 
have a lot of ‘dark’ moments in their development and they try to cling onto some ‘dark’ 
religious things that go back into the past. Both Kazakhs and Russian Kazakhstanis (i 
kazakhi, i russkie kazakhstantsy) are concerned about it and don’t want to put up with it. 
And this very fact makes Kazakhstan a more predictable state that differs from all other 
Asian, Muslim and religion-orientated states (Ast-8,r).  
 
As for the East and South-East Asian regions, my respondents expressed some limited 
interest in Japan, China and India, but this was overshadowed by a strong concern that 
China could pose a significant demographic, economic, political, and military threat to the 
country. ‘We have thousands of them [Chinese] already’, said a teacher of Russian 
literature from Almaty, ‘A few more and Kazakhstan will be a province of China, a new 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Alm-9,r).  
 
In this respect, there is much in common between my Russian and Kazakh respondents and 
their external perception of the world. Kazakhs, however, had a more ambiguous view of 
Russia, particularly in the light of the rise of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia, while 
Russians mostly did not ‘notice’ these processes. There were several references to the 
activity of the ultra-right nationalist parties, but they were invariably linked to the reactions 
of Kazakhs and possible subsequent deterioration in Kazakh-Russian relations. Notably, 
my Russian respondents were not affected by the ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’ factors, when 
talking about Russia or the West, although some of them admitted (those who had been to 
the West) that they were indirectly associated with these issues because of their belonging 
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to Kazakhstan. They were more concerned about the ‘Russian’ factor (i.e. close association 
with Russia) and its negative perception in the West as it adversely affected their ethnic 
identification. Kazakhs, on the other hand, tried to both disengage themselves from and 
embrace their ‘Asianness’ and ‘Islamic identity’, while the ‘Russian’ factor was less of an 
issue for them because, possibly, it represented a superficial rather than a fundamental part 
of their ethnonational identity.  
 
We can conclude, therefore, that although both Russians and Kazakhs have fairly similar 
external orientations at the moment, these attitudes may change in the future because both 
groups have different elements in their identity that may affect the attitudinal trajectories 
through internal (within Kazakhstan) and external interaction. The status reversal between 
the groups, the Russian policies towards Russians abroad and the real choices of the 
Kazakhstani elites (including their rhetoric) will play an important part in this process. And 
these responses related to foreign policy were not shaped by socioeconomic factors.   
 
6.3.3 Russia as an External Homeland 
 
After the break up of the Soviet Union Russians in Kazakhstan have been exposed to the 
‘nationalising’ nationalism of Kazakhstan, ‘homeland’ nationalism of Russia, and 
moderating effects of the transnational political institutions (TPIs) that have pressured both 
‘nationalising’ and ‘homeland’ states to comply with the Western norms of the citizen-
homeland (Brubaker, 1996, G. Smith, 1999). All these influences have had a strong impact 
on the re-territorialization of Russian ethnonational identity.  
 
In Kazakhstan, partially as a result of pressure from the TPIs and partly as a result of the 
Soviet institutional legacy and partly, also, as a result of Nazarbaev’s deliberately cautious 
and consensual state-building approach, the nationalising process has involved a peculiar 
hybrid between ‘nationalising’ and ‘citizen-homeland’ models. Arguably, this process has 
so far consisted of three distinctive strategies. The first has sought to create a civic identity 
wherein all ethnic groups would transcend their ethnic differences and merge into one 
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Kazakhstani nation. The second has encouraged each citizen of Kazakhstan to be a 
representative of its ethnonational community whose core identity is legitimized within the 
territorial affiliation of Kazakhstan (i.e. Kazakhstani-Russian, Kazakhstani-German, etc.). 
And the third can be seen as an elaboration of the second track which Jørn Holm-Hansen 
labelled as ‘multiple re-ethnification’ (1999). This strategy has tried to ensure that ethnicity 
remains a primary identity, while territorial attachments are channeled to remote ethno-
national homelands away from Kazakhstan. The latter strategy, in the opinion of Alexander 
C. Diener, has ‘diminish[ed] the likelihood of assimilation to a patriotic ideal and 
enhance[d] the propensity for transnationalism to generate from ethno-national identities’ 
(2004:4). It has also led to disempowerment of minorities and reduced the possibility of 
ethnic bidding and violence (Kolstø, 1999, Holm-Hansen, 1999, Dave, 2007).  
 
Re-territorialization of Russian ethno-national identity has been further aided by Russia’s 
‘homeland’ nationalism, in that Russian elites in the Russian Federation made the Russian 
diaspora in the Near Abroad a central concept in defining Russian national identity. In 
particular, since 1992 the settler issue has been used to ‘consolidate a new political elite 
around a self-image of Russia as the historical ‘homeland’ for the Russian-speaking 
communities outside Russia (the diaspora) with Russia directly responsible for their well-
being’ (Melvin, 1995:23). It has also helped to ‘establish and legitimize extraterritorial 
influence and control, as Russia has sought to do in the near abroad’ (Brubaker, 1996:140). 
Thus, the Russian minority in Kazakhstan has been exposed to various conflicting policies 
and practices that made Russian loyalties, in the words of one respondent, ‘divided and 
contradictory’ (Ast-8,r). These ‘divisions’ and ‘contradictions’ can be also partly explained 
by the Soviet-style primordial understanding of ethnicity and nationhood on which the 
participants of the ‘triadic nexus’ heavily drew. 
 
Specifically, the majority of my Russian respondents were ‘split’ both culturally and 
politically between the two states. Indeed, 40% of them thought that the Russians of 
Kazakhstan were culturally and mentally closer (blizhe v kul’turnom i mirovozzrencheskom 
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plane) to the Russians of Russia, 20% claimed that they were closer to Kazakhs, and 40% 
said that they were ‘somewhere in between’ (Table 6.4). 
 
Table 6.4 Do you think that Russians of Kazakhstan are culturally and mentally closer to the 
Kazakh population of Kazakhstan or to the Russian population of Russia? (Russians) 
 To Russians of Russia to Kazakhs In between 
Petropavlovsk 5 2 1 
Astana 3 1 7 
Almaty 3 1 7 
Chimkent 5 4 1 
Total  16 (40%) 8 (20%) 16 (40%) 
 
Some Russians claimed that they were closer to Russia because they ‘[did] not speak 
Kazakh, but read Russian literature, watched Russian TV and [their] life was based on 
Russian traditions’ (Alm-1,r). Others stressed that there had been a lot of assimilation 
between Russians and Kazakhs, but ‘a Russian is still closer to another Russian because 
they are of the same nationality’ (Alm-5). Interestingly, those respondents who have been 
to Russia said that ‘Kazakh’ Russians (kazakhskie russkie) were ‘kinder, softer and more 
open to other nationalities than ‘pure’ Russians’ (chistye rossiyane) (Alm-3,6,7,r, Ast-5,r). 
The latter were described as more ‘racist’ (Alm-6,r), ‘chauvinist’ (Alm-7,9,r) and ‘rude’ 
(Alm-7,8,r) despite the fact that they ‘looked the same, spoke the same language and were 
close in other respects’ (Alm-9,r). 
 
In the political sphere my Russian respondents were similarly split between the two states, 
although this division was not as dramatic as in the cultural sphere. Fifty four per cent of 
my respondents thought that Russians in Kazakhstan should be loyal to Kazakhstan of 
which they hold citizenship and only 2% said that they should be loyal to Russia. Twelve 
percent, however, claimed that Russians could be attached to both states and 32% said that 
it was ‘each person’s private business/ affair’ (lichnoe delo kazhdogo) (Alm-8,r) (Table 
6.3). 
 
Table 6.4 Do you think that the Russians of Kazakhstan should be loyal to Kazakhstan of 
which they hold citizenship or to their historical homeland? (Russians) 
 to Kazakhstan To Russia To both Kazakhstan and Russia up to them 
Petropavlovsk 6 0 0 4 
Astana 5 0 3 2 
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Almaty 6 0 2 2 
Chimkent 5 1 0 3 
Total 22 (54%) 1 (2%) 5 (12%) 12 (32%) 
 
Although not strictly comparable, these findings are not dissimilar to those of Hagendoorn, 
Linssen and Tumanov who argued that 61% of Russians identified with Kazakhstan and 
only 12% identified with Russia (2001:40). If compared with the results of the early survey 
by Nurbulat Masanov (1996), one can argue that there has been an increase in identification 
with the republic among Russians by approximately 20-30%.29 This increase can be partly 
related to continuing out-migration of Russians that stripped the community of its most 
nationalistic members and left those most willing to accommodate to the new state. At the 
same time, the fact that more than 40% of Russians opted for a ‘divided loyalty’ or for a 
‘personal choice of loyalty’ is an indication that they are still confused about their position 
in Kazakhstan and have too much to lose by making an outspoken choice. In other words, 
they are still unsure ‘whether titulars will let them ‘pass’ as titulars, whether they will have 
rights as equal citizens and whether Russia will protect their interests’ (Hagendoorn, 
Linssen, and Tumanov, 2001:134). The ‘split’ loyalty can be also explained by the 
difficulty of disentangling the cultural and political attachments and make a clear-cut 
distinction between them. The complexity of this task is well-illustrated by one civil 
servant from Astana:  
 
Our ethnic roots (etnicheskie korni) impose a great deal of responsibility on us. That’s why 
we have to strengthen these roots and our links with our historical motherland. But these are 
different things! I think that every Russian should remember that he is a citizen of 
Kazakhstan and that his civic loyalty (grazhdanskaya priverzhennost’) should be to this 
country. God, what a difficult question! I can see now that it can be quite divisive. If we 
assume, for example, that there will be a war between Kazakhstan and Russia, how would 
you behave? I don’t even want to think about it. That’s why, I believe, our officials should 
think about these things and not put us into a situation where we have to choose between 
states (Ast-8,r). 
                                                
29 Masanov found that 31.3% of Russians identified themselves as citizens of Kazakhstan, 27% did not, and 
39% had difficulty in answering the question (Masanov, 1996:50,108).  
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Russian political attachment to Russia or Kazakhstan can be also seen from how my 
respondents view Russian political intervention in Kazakhstan. Hagendoorn, Linssen and 
Tumanov have argued that while for the titular group Russian intervention is a threat, for 
Russians it is not as clear-cut. For those Russians who have little faith in the titular policies 
and practices of the titular group, Russian influence may be a comfort, while for those who 
identify as citizens of Kazakhstan it may be a threat (2001:127-129). Drawing on this 
insight we can assume that most of my Russian respondents (let alone Kazakhs) should 
view Russian political intervention as a threat given their high level of identification with 
Kazakhstan (54%) and low identification with Russia (2%). In reality, however, the 
reaction of my respondents was varied, depending on the level and aims of possible 
involvement. Notably, the majority of my Russian respondents (72%) rejected the idea of 
Russian border expansion, claiming that it would provoke ‘long-term conflicts’ (Ast-8,r), 
‘bloodshed’ (Ast-3,r) and ‘interethnic tensions’ (P-4,r) (Table 6.6). At the same time, 
however, they supported a more limited Russian involvement that would ‘benefit 
everybody, but above all the people who do not live on their historical territories’ (Alm-5,r) 
(Tables 6.7): 
 
Table 6.6 Do you think the borders of Russia should be expanded to include all ethnic 
Russians living in the near abroad? (Russians) 
 No Yes Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 5 4 1 
Astana 9 0 1 
Almaty 9 1 0 
Chimkent 6 4 0 
Total 29 (72%) 9 (22%) 2 (5%) 
 
Table 6.7 Do you think that the Russian government should protect the rights and freedoms of 
the Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan or should they stay away and not interfere? (Russians) 
 Yes Yes, but this involvement 
should be limited 
No Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 7 0 0 3 
Astana 3 2 4 1 
Almaty 5 2 3 0 
Chimkent 3 2 3 2 
Total 18 (45%) 6 (15%) 10 (25%) 6 (15%) 
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Some of my Russian respondents drew on the Russian (rossiiskaya) and Kazakhstani 
‘homeland’ and ‘nationalising’ rhetoric as well as on the primordial understanding of 
ethnicity and nationhood to substantiate their claims for continuing Russian support. 
Others, however, were against any Russian involvement. The negative consequences of 
such relationship were emphasized by one high-ranking civil servant from Astana: 
 
I remember we had a delegation from the Russian Duma who had to collect some 
information on the Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan. At that point we had Desyatnik as the 
Akim of the East-Kazakhstan oblast and he tried to earn points with his ‘storytelling’ 
(rosskaznyami). Indeed, if you collect some nonsense at a grass root level and raise it to the 
highest level it will result in some investigations, won’t it? At the same time all these 
Russian delegations have a minimal effect on our society and it makes me really angry 
when politicians try to take advantage of it. Don’t take me wrong, I don’t want to hide or 
silence these problems, but at least not to use them for the wrong political purposes (Ast-
8,r). 
 
The fact that a quarter of my Russian respondents were against Russian political or military 
intervention and 15% favoured limited or ‘civilized’ form of involvement is an indication 
that they ‘are careful not to do anything that may bring on retaliation [of the dominant 
group]’ (Shibutani & Kwan, 1965:302-303, Hagendoorn and Poppe, 2004).30 This is, 
possibly, a sign that Russians are gradually developing a minority identity or mentality31 
whereby they try to hide that they could be a threat to the titular group. At the same time, 
however, this process is still complicated by the Russian tendency to look towards ‘their’ 
government and to lack self-reliance, which is typical of the declining former dominant 
group (Wright, 2004:37-38). Indeed, more that 50% of my Russian respondents favoured 
Russian involvement in one form or another, which supports the above argument. 
Interestingly, the trend to resort to one’s ethnic government can be attributed to the 
                                                
30 (It is quite interesting that a considerable number of my respondents did not want Russian involvement. It 
could be that they are developing a minority identity, but at the same time they could still strongly identify 
with Kazakhstan and it may happen so that they haven’t radicalized yet, they haven’t encountered the 
nationalising policies and practices directly. And hence they are more committed to Kazakhstan.    
31 On the minority mentality see Shibutani and Kwan, 1965, Van den Berghe, 1978, and Wright, 2004. 
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‘primordial link’ between the ethnic group and its historical motherland which is believed 
to be legitimate by most ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. This possibly clarifies why 39% of 
Kazakhs thought that Russia should have a limited involvement in Kazakh internal affairs if 
Russians’ rights are violated.  
 
To sum up, the Russian link with their external homeland is an important identity-
generating factor for Russians in Kazakhstan. It makes them feel Russian and therefore 
different from Kazakhs, but at the same time they are not Russian in the sense of belonging 
to a Russian state. They are no longer Russians as part of Russia and increasingly as 
people’s life experiences change they would feel different from Russians who live in 
Russia proper. The ‘minority-homeland’ link, in this respect, has been instrumental in 
deconstructing Russian ex-dominant identity and making it external for the national-state 
project of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It has also helped to legitimate the newly dominant 
Kazakh identity and to act as a testing device for a political and cultural loyalty towards 
Kazakhs and Kazakhstan. At the same time, because of the restraint shown by both Russian 
and Kazakh governments and because of the ‘exit’ safety-valve for Russians agreed by 
them, Brubaker’s conflictual ‘triadic nexus’ has not (yet) developed. 
 
6.4 Internal Factors 
 
In this section I will look at how Russians view various nationalising policies – cultural, 
linguistic, economic and demographic – and at the impact they have had on their ethno-
national self-conception. 
 
In the Soviet period Russian identity was almost entirely fused with the Russian-Imperial 
and the Soviet structures of power which resulted in Russian ethnicity being blurred, as a 
distinct ethnic category, with other identities, and particularly with a supra-national Soviet 
identity (Melvin, 1995, Laitin, 1998, Hosking, 2004). Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the increasing ethnic and national identification of the titular populations many 
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Russians in the near abroad have, for the first time, begun to consider themselves as 
members of the Russian nation (Melvin, 1995, Tolz, 1998, Eschment, 1999). This Russian 
identity has been formulated not on the basis of explicit ethnic criteria, but rather in 
political, socio-economic or cultural-linguistic terms (Melvin, 1995:126-127). In other 
words, Russians have come to identify themselves in ethnic terms and as a political 
minority as a result of their interaction with the nationalising projects of the post-Soviet 
states.  
 
As argued in Chapter 4, following the radical status reversal between Kazakhs and 
Russians, Kazakh ethnonational identity has been placed at the centre of the national-state 
identity project of Kazakhstan, while Russian ethnonational identity was ‘demoted’ to a 
secondary level. To create a unified and distinctive nation, the new Kazakhstani elites have 
tried to unearth, appropriate and exploit the ethno-symbolic resources at their disposal (e.g. 
customs, language, toponyms and ethnonyms, heroes, myths and state iconography, as we 
saw in chapter 4). This process has been justified in terms of fostering the ‘cultural-
spiritual’ rebirth of the Kazakh people and creating a new Kazakhstani identity for all 
citizens of Kazakhstan irrespective of their nationality (Nazarbaev, 1999). The last two 
justifications were controversially reconciled by stating that the whole citizenry of 
Kazakhstan would ultimately identify with (or at least relate to) Kazakh culture and 
language and this link would hold the new political community together (ibid.). Thus, the 
civil element of the national idea of Kazakhstan has had to co-exist with nationalising 
policies and practices which are manifested, inter alia, in the ‘revised histories, the 
iconography of the new regime, the privileged status accorded to the titular language and 
the exclusion of members of non-eponymous groups from the echelons of power’ (Bohr, 
1998:139). These policies and Russian reaction towards them will be looked at in more 
detail in the next sections.  
 
6.4.1 The Past as a Hostile Other – Reassessment of the Soviet Legacy 
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Some observers have argued that the main reasons behind the revision of history in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan have been the need to restore the pride and dignity of the indigenous 
Kazakh nation (Aimaganbetova, 2003) and to provide the legitimacy for its dominance in 
its own homeland (Bohr, 1998, Masanov, 2002, Diener, 2004). These objectives have been 
tackled by numerous contemporary historiographers who tried to find ‘blank spots’ in 
Kazakhstan’s history, reappraise the policies of Russification, collectivisation and 
sedentarisation and establish the ancient origins of Kazakh ethnogenesis and statehood 
(Masanov, 2002). Some of these ideas have been championed by President Nazarbaev 
himself who sponsored a six-volume series of the revised Kazakh history (1996-1998) and 
published, among other things, a book ‘In the Current of History’ (1999). 
 
To understand how my Russian respondents viewed this historical revisionism, I selected, 
arguably, one of the most controversial points in Kazakh history – the original adhesion 
(prisoedinenie) of Kazakh steppe region to Russia and asked my respondents whether they 
considered it to be a voluntary act or colonization (Table 6.8): 
 
Table 6.8 Do you think the adhesion of the Kazakh steppe region to Russia was voluntary or 
was it colonization? 
 Voluntary Both voluntary and by 
force 
Colonisation Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 8 0 2 0 
Astana 7 3 0 0 
Almaty 5 4 0 1 
Chimkent 9 1 0 0 
Total 29 (72%) 8 (20%) 2 (6%) 1 (2%) 
 
The majority of my respondents –  72% –  thought that the Kazakh steppe region joined 
Russia voluntarily, 20% stressed that it happened both voluntarily and by force and only 
6% used the word ‘colonisation’. These results can be partly explained by the age of my 
respondents most of whom were socialized during the Soviet time and found it difficult to 
‘change their point of view’ (Alm-1,r). It could also be a reaction to the word ‘colonisation’ 
which has had a very negative connotation during the post-Soviet period and could 
potentially damage the Russian position in Kazakhstan (if it had not already affected it). 
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Hence, 38% did not trust the revised accounts, 32% ‘did not always trust them’ and only 
10% were comfortable with the revision (Table 6.9): 
 
Table 6.9  Do you trust the revised historical accounts (pereosmyslennye istoricheskie ocherki)? 
(Russians)  
 No Not always Yes Don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 4 0 1 5 
Astana 1 7 1 1 
Almaty 5 4 0 1 
Chimkent 5 2 2 1 
Total 15 (38%) 13 (32%) 4 (10%) 8 (20%) 
  
Notably, some of my respondents did not trust ‘either Soviet or post-Soviet accounts’ 
(Alm-6,r, Ast-8,r) and believed that historians would ‘serve anybody who is in power’ 
(Alm-7.9,r). A designer from Almaty explained: 
 
I myself did a historical degree and I know well how our professors had to re-write our 
history and adjust it to the new state idea. I think our elites (vlasti) are not interested in 
researching it professionally at the moment. May be they will be in the future, I don’t know. 
And Russia doesn’t care about it either. That’s why I decided to do another degree because 
suddenly I felt bored and hurt. I’ve understood that it was all meaningless. It was stupid to 
listen to the old fairy-tales of our professors and repeat them. I didn’t like it and started 
questioning everything (Alm-8,r). 
 
A civil servant from Astana similarly said that historical revisions were started by 
somebody who could benefit from them: 
 
We all know that Kazakh Khans asked Anna Ioanovna to join Russia and protect them from 
the Dzhungar invasion. If in doubt you can have a look at the documents in the archives. 
That’s why, I think, somebody wanted to portray it as colonization and benefit by it (Ast-
1,r) 
 
The above quotations show that the notion of ‘coloniality’ cannot be reduced to objective or 
subjective criteria, because it is also a social construct closely linked to the very nature of 
national identity and national state project (Beissinger, 1995, Smith, G, 1998). My Russian 
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respondents, therefore, have had to readjust to the revised historical narratives and re-
evaluate the idea of empire as a continuing Russian project. This indirectly placed them 
within the ‘colonizers’ camp of the ‘colonizers/colonized’ division and loosely defined 
them as an ‘out-group’ against whom a disunited titular group could potentially unite and 
on whom they could blame their failures and frustrations.32 Some of my respondents 
rejected the revised perspective (these mainly fell into the age bracket between 28 -70), 
others accepted it (mostly under the age 21), but in either case their relationship with the 
official historiography in Kazakhstan and, more importantly, with the national state identity 
project has changed. The same trend of reassessing one’s position and identity vis-à-vis the 
new historical narrative can be traced in other questions related to historical revisionism. 
Specifically, I asked my respondents to identify what was positive and what was negative 
in Kazakhstan during the Soviet time. The results were as follows: 
 
Table 6.10 What was positive in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period? (Russians) 
 The Soviet economy and social policy 
- Welfare provisions – free education, healthcare services, housing, support for single 
mothers and disabled, free children and youth organisations, full employment, no division 
between rich and poor (36); 
- Development of industry and infrastructure (17) 
53 
 The Soviet nationality policy  
- Internationalism, ideology of friendship of peoples, the Soviet people, national equality, 
people did not notice nationality; all-human values (obschechelovecheskie tsennosti) were 
promoted by the state (10) (25%)  
- Mutual cultural influence (10) (25%); 
- Deportations – many clever and talented people were sent to Kazakhstan and contributed 
to the development of the republic  (2) (5%) 
- Kazakhstan owes its sovereignty to the Soviet Union, Kazakhs have become a more 
homogenous modern nation (2) (5%) 
28 
 The totalitarian political system  
- the Communist ideology – the unifying role of Lenin, Pioneers, Komsomol, and CPSU; 
Soviet patriotism (2) (5%); 
- Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union – a great superpower (2) (5%); 
- Kazakhs were sedentarised (4) (9%) 
8 
 Total 89 
 
 
Table 6.11  What, in your opinion, was negative in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period? 
(Kazakhs) 
1 The Soviet political system 
- there was a complete denial of the outside world (3); 
 
 
                                                
32 For a useful discussion of the concepts ‘enemy’ and  ‘hostile other’ see Greenfeld, 1992 (Ch.1), Prizel, 
1998 (Ch. 1,2.), Spencer & Wollman, 2002 (Ch. 3), Waller and Linklater, 2003.  
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- There was no freedom of speech, all political issues were discussed ‘in the kitchens’ (3); 
- Communist ideology (4) 
- The regime encouraged people to be passive and dependent on the state, individuality 
was suppressed and censored (2) (6%); 
- Repressions, purges, collectivisation, sedentarisation, hunger – all nationalities, including 
Kazakhs were affected (3) 
- all decisions were made in Moscow  (1)  
- education was ideologically tinged (1) 
 
 
 
 
17 
 The Soviet nationalities policy 
- Kazakh language and culture were forgotten, Russification (3) 
- Nobody knew Kazakhstan and Kazakhs in the world (as if they never existed) (1) 
- Loss of national dignity (1) 
- Cultural discrimination of Kazakhs (1)  
- children learnt more about the history of Russia and the world than about the history 
Kazakhstan (1) 
7 
8 The Soviet economy 
- Kazakhstan was a ‘raw material appendage’ of Russia (3) (15%); 
- Economy of shortages, queues (5) 
 
 
8 
 Total 22 
 
As we can see from the tables, my Russian respondents viewed the Soviet system in a 
three-dimensional way (politics, economics, and culture (national issues)), with ‘national 
issues’ being mostly a positive dimension. Unlike Kazakhs, they did not ‘dwell on’ the 
nationality issue – which is a testimony to their ex-dominant status in the Soviet Union 
(Schöpflin, 2000:243) – but rather enumerated the national grievances of Kazakhs as 
constructed by the new nation-builders. These grievances were usually filtered through the 
eyes of the elites or Kazakhs which placed my respondents outside the new narratives and 
sometimes in the role of ‘aggressors’ that caused Kazakhs to suffer. As a pensioner from 
Chimkent put it: ‘Now they say that the Russian language was imposed on them [Kazakhs] 
and that we destroyed their culture and language. It’s all very difficult to come to terms 
with’ (Ch-1,r).  
 
Indeed, as Bhavna Dave put it, ‘the dissolution of the Soviet Union led the new 
nationalizing states and their elites to conflate Russian ethnonational and imperial 
identities, whereas ordinary Russians outside Russia found themselves grappling with the 
contradictory legacy of the imperial, national and regional elements of their identity’ 
(2007:127). This fusion or conflation of Russian and imperial identities has been 
instrumental in de-legitimating Russian identity in Kazakhstan and placing it outside the 
core of the national-state identity project.  
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6.4.2 Restructuring of the ‘Public Space’: Renaming Streets, Changing State 
Symbols 
  
Changing state symbols and renaming streets and towns have been an equally important 
mechanism of transforming national perceptions and converting land into national territory 
(Melvin, 1995, Masanov, 2002, Karin & Chebotarev, 2002, Kaiser, 2002). This process has 
had a very mixed reaction from the population in general, but Russians were particularly 
sensitive that ‘their’ history was going. A survey in 2001 found out that 71.8% of Russians 
viewed this process negatively, 16% indifferently and only 5.2% positively (Kurganskaya 
& Dunaev, 2002:233). My small-scale survey confirms these findings. 52% of my 
respondents were against re-naming, 20% said that they agreed with some changes, but 
thought that the authorities pushed it too far at time and only 15% were comfortable with 
the revision (Table 6.12) 
 
Table 6.12 How do you view the renaming of streets and towns after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union? 
 negatively do not mind some renaming but it 
shouldn’t go into extremes 
Positively do not care 
Petropavlovsk 6 3 1 0 
Astana 5 4 1 0 
Almaty 5 2 1 2 
Chimkent 5 1 3 1 
 21 (52%) 10 (20%) 6 (15%) 3 (7%) 
 
Interestingly, the symbolic cultural sphere was the only section where my respondents 
expressed themselves quite feely and openly within the boundaries of a set question. This 
usually did not happen in other sections (related, for example, to the upwards mobility or 
access to power in Kazakhstan) where I had to use extensive probing or search for clues in 
other sections of the interviews. This was possibly the case because symbolic sphere is an 
abstract area that maps all participants and allows them to transfer their feelings onto a 
symbol or symbols without being politically incorrect or openly nationalistic.  
 
Specifically, my respondents thought that ‘renaming’ of streets and towns was a ‘waste of 
money’ and that ‘authorities should have increased pensions, improved roads and helped 
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the poor instead’ (Alm-3,r). Some were also concerned that the Soviet history was going 
and that the authorities could have saved at least some names to remember the past. ‘This is 
a policy of fear’, said a historian from Almaty, ‘as if people say to themselves: ‘This did 
not happen to us!’ How come it did not happen when it did?’ (Alm-8,r). There was also 
some appreciation that the re-naming process was undemocratic and corrupt. A doctor from 
Astana explained:  
 
When we found out that out streets were re-named, not only me, but many people were 
shocked. This is possibly a natural psychological reaction. The impression was as if 
somebody deliberately marked it: ‘This is now ours, Kazakhs!’ Let’s take, for example, 
Cosmonauts’ Street… Why was it renamed? We have so many heroes that we don’t know. 
Even Kazakhs don’t know these so-called ‘prominent’ people. This is true nationalization 
[natsionalizatsiya]! To put it simply, it is nationalism and it hurts! (Ast-7). 
 
Other respondents similarly stressed that they did not like the changes, but they ‘could not 
do anything about it and had to submit to it’ [dolzhny byli podchinit’sya]. ‘After all we live 
in Kazakhstan’, explained a businesswoman from Astana, ‘and Kazakhstan gained 
independence’ (Ast-2,r).  
 
It has to be mentioned that many Kazakh respondents viewed the process of renaming 
streets and towns negatively and claimed that it was financially costly, corrupt and 
disrespectful of the Soviet past. They, however, did not perceive this process as being a 
direct threat to their existing and future status, and a considerable number of Kazakhs 
thought of it in a positive way. Russians, on the other hand, were concerned not only that 
their history was going, but their status as well. This process was very pronounced in the 
older generation and respondents from the North (Petropavlovsk) and less noticeable in 
respondents under the age 21.  
 
Robert J. Kaiser has argued that the process of binding nation to homeland or ‘ ‘blood’ to 
‘soil’ is critical to nation-making, in that it delimits not only those people and places that 
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belong within the nation, but also and perhaps more importantly marks of ethnonational 
Others that do not’ (2004:232). In this respect the official invocation of national symbols is 
an ‘other’-forming process and it plays an important role in the construction of Us and 
Them. My Russian respondents, and especially the older generation and respondents from 
the North, were particularly concerned that elements of their identity had been gradually 
removed from the public space and the on-going national state project. 
 
6.4.3 Language Policy 
 
Some observers have argued that language in Kazakhstan has been a particularly 
contentious issue not only because it affected various aspects of national identity, state 
capacity, economic opportunities and conflict over resources, but because it divided titular 
and non-titular groups, especially the European ones (Savin, 2001, Kurganskaya & Dunaev, 
2002, Dave, 2003, 2007). As one engineer from Almaty put it:  
 
In Kazakhstan people speak many languages, but two of them prevail. One is our state 
language (Kazakh) and another is a language of interethnic communication (Russian). This 
separates people because we have two options, but we cannot do with one of them because 
Kazakhs don’t want to abandon their language… and they are right. At the same time, the 
majority of the population, the absolute majority speaks Russian. And this divides us (Alm-
5,r) 
 
Some of my Russian respondents claimed that the language policy has affected their 
upwards mobility, disrupted the common educational space with Russia and generally 
contributed to ethnic tensions and Russian out-migration from Kazakhstan. ‘People are not 
confident that their children will master Kazakh’, said a civil servant from Astana, ‘that’s 
why they think that there is no future here’ (Ast-8,r).  
 
Some, however, believed that the introduction of Russian as a second state language could 
improve the situation and ‘give a glimpse of hope that Russian [would] definitely stay (Ast-
1,r). 90% of my respondents held this view and only 10% thought that ‘Kazakh should be 
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the only state language’ (Ch-6,r). The latter were mainly in the age bracket 18-21 or were 
planning to out-migrate in the nearest future. These trends concur with those cited by 
Kurganskaya and Dunaev who argued that 81% of Russians favoured the introduction of 
Russian as a second state language and only 5% supported the option of Kazakh as the only 
state language (2002:242). This suggests that Russians in Kazakhstan are anxious to 
‘properly’ institutionalize Russian and ensure its continuing reproduction. As a result, any 
concessions made by the government have been insufficient to ‘satisfy them as to their 
deeper existential fears’ (Schöpflin, 2000:250). This explains, among other things, that 
none of my Russian respondents supported a Kazakh-medium school or university 
education and started sending their children to Kazakh schools.33 Ninety four per cent of 
them, however, viewed Kazakh as a useful asset that could help them and their children to 
‘improve career chances and life in general’ (Alm-5,r).  
 
In this respect, my Russian respondents partially supported linguistic Kazakhization while 
practically undermining the programme. Indeed, only 4% of them were studying Kazakh on 
a regular basis, all of whom were from Chimkent. This indecisiveness and lack of initiative 
as regards learning and speaking Kazakh can be related, inter alia, to the following factors: 
Firstly, some of my respondents were concerned that the Russian-speaking context was 
shrinking and that Kazakh was increasingly used by the state institutions and individuals as 
a device to check Russians’ loyalty to Kazakhs and Kazakhstan. Secondly, the language 
issue was believed to be closely related to career prospects, especially where access to 
power and resources was concerned. Some of my respondents thought that this link was 
illegitimate given the poor facilities for learning the Kazakh language. Thirdly, the 
language issue was seen as having a loose connection to the colonial discourse where 
Russians were indirectly implicated in undermining Kazakh culture and language. This put 
additional pressure on my Russian respondents who had to be the carriers of the ex-
dominant identity while at the same time adopting a minority stance. Moreover, the wide 
                                                
33 Pal Kolstø in his early survey of 1996 has shown that almost no non-Kazakhs had started sending their 
children to Kazakh schools. Among Russians there was a negligible increase from 0.7% in the previous 
generation to 3.2 in 1996, whereas the share of Kazakh children attending Kazakh schools increased from 
57% in the past generation to some 66% in 1996 (Malkova, Kolstø, Melberg, 1999:247).  
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cultural divide between Kazakhs and Russians, lack of democratic practices and 
considerable out-migration of Russians from Kazakhstan further alienated Russians from 
learning the language. All the above factors made Russians less secure in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan and some of them transferred their negative feelings onto the state language as 
a protest against the situation.  
 
6.4.4 Economic and Career Issues 
 
The economic transition from a Soviet command economy to the market economy has 
similarly generated a lot of anxiety, upheaval and dislocation for the Kazakhstani 
population. It has contributed not only to the rapid division of society into rich and poor, 
but also to the gradual growth of nationalism between different ethnic groups.  
 
It has to be noted that during the early days of independence (1991-1998) economic and 
nationality issues were not usually conflated by the Russian and other minority groups. 
This is well reflected in the earlier survey (1996) of Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg who 
argued that there was only a small correlation between ethnicity and economic success in 
Kazakhstan (1999:232-233). In particular, they argued that their respondents viewed 
‘property and income’ (coefficient 1.6234), ‘education’ (1.70), ‘individual qualities’ (1.77) 
and ‘profession’ (1.86) as more important attributes for attaining material well-being than 
‘religious faith’ (2.62), ‘ethnicity’ (2.97), and ‘gender’ (3.26). These findings were 
indirectly borne out by the data related to the distribution of wealth in Kazakhstan. 
Specifically, 48.8% of Russians and 46.5% of Kazakhs believed that wealth in Kazakhstan 
was distributed ‘independently of nationality’, while 41.6% of Russians and 27.9 % of 
Kazakhs claimed that Kazakhs were the richest group in the republic (ibid. 235). In this 
respect, Malkova et al’s findings are a good snapshot of the transitional phase where 
Russians viewed the changing economic situation both in ‘naked class’ terms (Weber, 
1991) and as an emerging ethno-social hierarchy with Kazakhs at the top. These trends 
                                                
34 A low coefficient indicates strong agreement with the statement. Complete agreement among all members 
of the group gives coefficient 1, and complete disagreement gives the coefficient 4. For more on the use of 
coefficients in this survey, see Malkova et al 1999:233, 275-280. 
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remain open even fifteen years after independence although the conflation of economic and 
national issues has intensified in recent years.  
 
Specifically, 90% of my Russian respondents believed that Kazakhs had the highest 
percentage of rich people in Kazakhstan, followed by Russians (45%), Koreans (25%), 
Jews (17%), Uzbeks (17%), and other small (malochislennye) nationalities (Table 6.13).  
 
Table 6.13 Which nationality has the highest percentage of rich people in Kazakhstan? (%) 
 Petropavlovsk Astana Almaty Chimkent Total 
Kazakhs 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 90 
Russians 10 15 10 10 45 
Koreans 2.5 5 7.5 10 25 
Jews 2.5 7.5 5 2.5 17 
Uzbeks 0 2.5 2.5 12.5 17 
Chechens 5 2.5 2.5 5 15 
Germans 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 10 
Tatars 0 0 0 10 10 
Ukrainians 2.5 5 0 0 7.5 
Belorussians 0 2.5 0 0 2.5 
Independent of 
nationality 
2.5 0 5 0 7.3 
 
This indicates that economic opportunities are still open to Russians and other non-titular 
groups ‘as long as they do not cut across the Kazakh interests’ (P-5,r). Indeed, some of my 
Russian respondents made a conscious distinction between the ability to earn money by 
whatever means possible and the ability to have a well-paid job in the government or oil-
related business. The latter route, in the opinion of a designer from Almaty, ‘was largely 
closed to Russians’ (Alm-6,r).  
 
This trend was somewhat visible in the early survey of Nurbulat Masanov who claimed that 
38.2% of Russians viewed their nationality as an obstacle to their career advancement and 
only 30.7% thought that it did not affect their chances (Masanov, 1996:18,48). My small 
scale survey confirms these findings and registers an increase in ethnicisation of the career 
opportunity perceptions. Notably, 80% of my Russian respondents believed that nationality 
was important for one’s career advancement in Kazakhstan as opposed to 10% who said 
that it was not. Five per cent, however, were convinced that nationality was ‘very important 
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in the political, military or resource-rich economic spheres, while in technical or ‘middle’ 
business areas it [was] less important’ (Alm-6,r) (Table 6.14). 
 
Table 6.14 Is nationality important for one’s career advancement in Kazakhstan? (%) 
 Yes No Only in certain spheres don’t know 
Petropavlovsk 20 2.5 0 2.5 
Astana 22.5 2.5 0 0 
Almaty 17.5 2.5 5 0 
Chimkent 20 2.5 0 2.5 
 80 10 5 5 
 
These data indirectly correspond with the findings of V.N Khlyupin who pointed out that 
the ministries with the most extensive Kazakhisation have been the economically and 
politically vital ministries of oil and gas, foreign affairs, information and press, and justice, 
all of which had become about 80% Kazakh (Khlyupin, 1998:52). Erlan Karin and Andrei 
Chebotarev similarly stressed that ‘representatives of the indigenous population constitute 
80 to 90% of the administrative elites’ (2002:52). This possibly explains why some of my 
respondents felt that their cause was ‘lost’ and that they had little legitimacy in these 
structures. A civil servant from Astana explains: 
 
I myself worked for one of the ministries several years ago. When I went to other state 
institutions with different tasks what struck me most was that everybody was Kazakh. I 
didn’t care whether they were Kazakh or Kyrgyz or Russian or Uzbek, but what impressed 
me was a picture of very big open space offices with mono-ethnic Kazakh clerical workers. 
When you hear statistics or dry words that ‘state institutions and central elite are 
monopolized by Kazakhs’, it doesn’t impress you because it has nothing to do with your 
daily life. But when you witness it with your own eyes, it strikes you, it makes you think. I 
remember myself as part of a very colorful and vibrant society. In Almaty, where I was 
born, I was always surrounded by Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Koreans, etc. 
And now this ‘vibrancy’ is not reflected in our institutions anymore. I think that something 
should be done about it, but at the same time I know that most people who work in these 
institutions do not necessarily ‘hate’ me or other Russians or Germans, they just try to help 
their relatives in a time of hardship (Ast-10,r). 
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A civil servant from Almaty similarly stressed that ‘all employment decisions in 
Kazakhstan are now in the hands of our titular nation. It would be nice, however, if people 
were hired and promoted irrespective of their nationality, but I don’t know whether 
Kazakhs are ready to give us this opportunity’ (Alm-10,r). In this respect, my Russian 
respondents have had a dual attitude towards the ethnicisation of political and economic 
structures in Kazakhstan. On the one hand, they thought that Kazakhs had the right to make 
certain recruitment decisions given their special status in Kazakhstan, but on the other 
hand, they believed that some of these decisions were unjust or badly made (although not 
intentionally and initially anti-Russian or anti-minorities) and that Kazakhs could have 
done more to include other ethnic groups in the political and economic structures.  
 
This dual or ambiguous attitude of Russians is well captured by V.D. Kurganskaya and V. 
Y. Dunaev who argued that the insufficient representation of non-Kazakhs in the power 
structures is a result of tension between the democratic and ethnocratic strands of the 
national-state project of Kazakhstan. Specifically they stressed that integration of various 
ethnic groups into the Kazakhstani society was achieved through the nationally-neutral 
‘market organisation’ model (model’ rynochnoi samoorganizatsii) and the ethnically-
infused ‘state-communal, traditional’ model (etatistski-obshchinnaya, traditsionalistskaya 
model’). These models were applied to the multiethnic Kazakhstani society in such a way 
that they contributed to increased ethnic polarization between groups rather than interethnic 
and societal compromise (Kurganskaya & Dunaev, 2002: 43-45). In other words, the initial 
advent of capitalism divided the Kazakhstani society into rich and poor, but at the same 
time it activated ethnicity as people started to cope with such division. Twenty five per cent 
of my Russian respondents, for example, claimed that ‘all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan try 
to help their own nationalities – Kazakhs help Kazakhs, Russian support Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belorussians, etc – and all this creates an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust between people’ (Alm-3,r). Fifty five per cent also noted that Kazakhs more than 
Russians and other European groups tend to take care of their relatives and promote them 
once they assume a position of power. ‘When a Kazakh comes to power,’ said an artist 
from Almaty, ‘he brings along his whole team of relatives, compatriots (zemlyaki) and 
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representatives of his clan or zhuz. That’s how they survive and protect each other’ (Alm-
7,r). All this was thought to contribute to Kazakhisation of power structures as Russians 
and other non-titulars are usually excluded from ethnic and sub-ethnic divisions of Kazakhs 
(see Panarin, 1999, Kurganskaya & Dunaev, 2002, Masanov, 2002) 
 
Thus, one can argue that the economic transition from the command to the market economy 
in Kazakhstan has interacted with the political and national transitions and divided the 
Kazakhstani population both along the class and ethnic lines. And the group that has access 
to power and resources is ultimately better positioned to compete in this situation by 
blocking the upward mobility of other groups.  
 
6.4.5 Demographic Issues 
 
In the last section I will briefly look at how my respondents interpret various choices they 
have had after Kazakhstan gained independence, namely exit, voice and loyalty 
(Hirschman, 1981) and at how these choices affect their ethno-national understanding.  
 
Will Kymlicka has argued that minorities have four basic options: (1) emigrate en masse, 
(2) accept integration into the majority culture, (3) seek some form of self-government to 
maintain their own societal culture, and (4) accept permanent marginalization (Kymlicka, 
2001:22). Some commentators have pointed out that a considerable number of Russians in 
Kazakhstan chose the first option of emigration over integration (Sadovskaya, 1998, 
Panarin, 1999, Dave, 2007), Indeed, the overall share of the Russian population has 
dropped from 6,227,549 in 1989 to 3,945,116 in 2007 or from 37.8% to 25.6% (Chinn & 
Kaiser, 1996:189, Shokamanov & Musabek, 2007:44). Some explained this shift by the 
difficulty of the Russian-speaking population to ‘adapt to the unpredictable forces of the 
market economy, while feeling a tremendous psychological discomfort caused by the need 
to adjust to the ethnocratic pressure of the new regime’ (Masanov, 1999:145). Others saw 
the  that the out-migration was caused by the ‘anticipation of a deterioration of the 
[Russian] political and cultural status following the elevation of Kazakh as the state 
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language and the accompanying belief that their children would grow up as ‘second class 
citizens’ in the new Kazakh-dominated state’ (Dave, 2007:128).  
 
My small-scale survey confirms these findings. Specifically, my Russians respondents 
claimed that various nationalising policies and practices (72%) and economic issues (50%) 
were the main factors that pushed Russians to take the exit route. These were followed by 
the changes in size and concentration of the Russian group in Kazakhstan (20%), the 
negative attitudes of the newly-empowered Kazakhs to minorities (20%), the favourable 
attitudes of Russia’s Russians towards Russian migrants (17%) and the regime factor 
(authoritarianism) that fosters korenizatsyia and discrimination against the non-titular 
population (Table 6.16):  
 
Table 6.16  Factors that foster out-migration (or exit) from Kazakhstan (%)35 
1.Nationalising policies and practices                                                                                                                             (72%) 
          a) language policy (37.5%) 
   b) employment policy (25%) 
   c) rewriting of history (2.5%) 
   d) changing street names (2.5%) 
          e) status reversal between Kazakhs and Russians – some Russians could not put up with it and left (2.5%) 
          f) nationalist rhetoric of the elites/ Kazakh intelligentsia (2.5%) 
2. Economic issues                                                                                                                                                            (50%) 
          a) unemployment and poverty (20%) 
          b) professionals and rich Russians leave for Russia and America because they want the ‘ready-made’ comforts of the 
          developed states, in Kazakhstan they have to develop these (2.5%) 
          c) every ethnic group tries to support their own nationality which means that minorities have fewer opportunities 
          because they don’t have access to power and resources (12.5%) 
          d) Russians and Russian-speaking non-titular minorities encounter blocked mobility in the state and resource-rich 
          economic spheres – that’s why they have or will have a lower socio-economic status than Kazakhs (12.5%) 
          e) Kazakhs are tempted to marginalize all non-titular groups, force them out of the country, raise the status of 
          the indigenous citizen (as in the Arab countries) and redistribute oil money among ethnic Kazakhs (2.5%) 
3. Size, concentration or rootedness of Russians in Kazakhstan                                                                                    (20%) 
          a) the Russian genetic pool is diminishing in Kazakhstan as all talented, beautiful, well off and strong Russians are 
          leaving or have left (7.5%) 
          b) it is quite uncomfortable when you have only a few Russians around when you were used to many – you feel 
          alienated and marginalized (5%) 
          c) Kazakhs tend to marry within their own ethnic group which means that Russians have fewer possibilities to 
                                                
35 This table was loosely structured according to Brubaker’s suggestion on how to analyse Russian out-
migration after the break up of the Soviet Union. Brubaker identified four main factors that might affect 
migration: (1) ethnodemographic variables such as the size, concentration and rootedness of the Russian 
population, (2) the terms of membership (nationalising policies) and the texture of everyday life for Russians 
(the attitudes of the titular group) in the new nation-state, (3) prospective economic and political advantages, 
and (4) the orientation and policies of the Russian state towards the various communities of diaspora Russians 
(Brubaker, 1996: 173-178).  
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          merge, mix and share in their identity, power and access to resources (5%) 
          d) Russians have a high mortality and low birth rate which means that they will be quickly swamped by Kazakhs 
          (2.5%) 
4. Attitude of the newly empowered titular group to the new minorities                                                                        (20%) 
          a)  Kazakhs have become more aggressive and assertive after independence. They have understood that they have 
          power and access to resources and this gives them bigger leverage over all other ethnic groups, including Russians 
          (5%) 
          b) a section of the Kazakh intelligentsia and the majority of Kazakh youth have become increasingly radicalised, 
          intolerant and nationalistic (5%) 
          c) occasionally Kazakhs pick on Russians and other Europeans in the streets and tell them to go to their historical  
          homelands (this happened mainly in Chimkent) (7.5%) 
          d) some Kazakhs have been radicalised by Russians’ insecurity and complains about nationalising policies that  
          promote Kazakh interests (2.5%) 
5. Interaction with Russia and Russia’s Russians                                                                                                         (17%) 
          a) Russia is an ethnic homeland where Russians can go and have a reasonably normal life (7.5%) 
          b) Russia’s Russians are close to ‘Kazakh’ Russians because they are of the same nationality, speak the same       
          language and share in the same pain and humiliation that was brought on by the break up of the Soviet Union (10%) 
6. Regime type                                                                                                                                                                   (5%) 
          a) authoritiarianism stimulates corruption, nepotism, ‘korenizatsiya’ of state institutions and discrimination against 
          non-titular groups (2.5%) 
c) authoritarianism has generally undermined the position of Russians in Kazakhstan as they have not had any 
official ‘voice’ options to challenge their position (this was the case especially at the beginning of independence when 
the Russian group was big) (2.5%) 
 
These findings are again borne out by other surveys. A survey in 2001 found that 51.6% of 
Russians thought that emigration was linked to the language question, followed by 
unemployment (44.8%), lack of future opportunities for their children (36.7%) and lack of 
personal opportunities in Kazakhstan (30.6%). The wish to live in one’s own historical 
homeland (3.6%) and with one’s relatives (1.6%), however, scored low in the overall list of 
reasons which is possibly an indication that political and economic factors were the primary 
factors behind Russian emigration (Kurganskaya & Dunaev, 2002:186-187).   
 
Notably, some observers have treated the lack of voice among Russians as a factor that 
contributes to out-migration from Kazakhstan. Elena Sadovskaya, for example, pointed out 
that the general social apathy of the Kazakhstani population, the lack of Russian leadership 
and the lack of democratic traditions in protecting one’s interests and rights forced Russians 
to address their new situation at the individual rather than group level (i.e. through 
emigration) (Sadovskaya, 1998:82-83, see also Panarin, 1999, Kolstø, 1999). My Russian 
respondents similarly raised a lot of concerns about their present and future situation in 
Kazakhstan, but none of them were planning to voice these concerns at the public or state 
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level. Some believed that their ‘personal opinion [would] not change anything’ and that 
their ‘efforts would be wasted’ (Alm-5,r). Others said that they did not want to antagonize 
the ‘security and power structures (silovye struktury) and endanger the future of their 
children’ (Alm-7,r). ‘Look at what happened to Sarsembaev and Duvanov’, said a civil 
servant from Astana, ‘I can’t afford this type of behaviour. I’ve got a family to feed’ (Alm-
10,r). That’s why many thought that it would be better to either leave Kazakhstan for 
Russia or stay in Kazakhstan as long as the situation is still tolerable. In this respect my 
Russian respondents continued the Soviet tradition of ‘kitchen talks’ (kukhonnye 
razgovory) and ‘private analysis of events’ (obsuzhdenie problem v uzkom krugu) and 
channeled their discontent either to the possibility of out-migration or loyalty to the state, 
however imperfect.  
 
It has to be noted that the ‘loyalty’ option as understood and explained by my respondents 
should not be seen as an attempt to integrate into Kazakhstani society on new terms, but 
rather to find common points of reference with the new state and the empowered titular 
group and to continue the Soviet status quo. By the ‘Soviet status quo’ I mean the 
possibility to use Russian in all spheres of life, to be able to work and earn a living and not 
to be picked on by the empowered titular group. Specifically, 52% of my Russian 
respondents claimed that the warm and positive attitude of Kazakhs made them stay in (or 
loyal to) Kazakhstan. This was followed by the feeling of attachment (or rootedness) to 
Kazakhstan (42%), unfavourable perceptions of Russia as a foreign state (32%), relatively 
inclusive nationalising policies (30%) and the ability to earn a good living in Kazakhstan 
(25%) (Table 6.17): 
 
Table 6.  Factors that foster ‘loyalty’ options (%) 
1. Attitude of the newly empowered titular group to the new minorities                                                                         (52%) 
          a) Kazakhs lived with Russians and other ethnic groups for many decades, if not centuries, and they got used to each  
          other, became tolerant, although may be accumulated some prejudices (37.5%) 
          b) Kazakhs are hospitable, inclusive and treat all nationalities well (15%) 
2. Size, concentration or rootedness of Russians in Kazakhstan                                                                                     (42%) 
          a) Kazakhstan is a motherland for Russians that they love dearly (42.5%)  
3. Interaction with Russia and ethnic Russians                                                                                                                (32%) 
          a) Russia is a foreign country (7.5%) 
          b) It is very difficult to change a place of residence where you know everything and go somewhere where you’ve 
          never been, but which is supposedly your ‘ethnic homeland’ (5%) 
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          c) Russia’s Russians are more racist, xenophobic, rude and assertive than ‘Kazakh’ Russians (20%) 
4. Nationalising policies and practices                                                                                                                              (30%) 
   a) official rhetoric – the elites usually call for tolerance and interethnic peace and accord (7.5%) 
   b) the authorities promote culture of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, organise ‘days of ethnic culture’ (5%) 
   c) status reversal between Kazakhs and Russians (primordial understanding) - Russians believe that the status reversal 
   and nationalising policies are partially legitimate because it is a Kazakh land and Kazakhs can do whatever they want 
   with it (17.5%) 
5. Economic issues                                                                                                                                                             (25%) 
          a) Russians can still earn a good living in Kazakhstan and lead a relatively normal life (7.5%) 
          b) improvement in the economy will hopefully improve interethnic relations in the country (12.5%) 
          c) although the divisions between rich and poor are there, the socio-economic divisions between Kazakhs and 
          Russians are yet not as pronounced (5%) 
6. Regime type                                                                                                                                                                    (2.5%) 
          a) authoritarianism paradoxically serves the interests of Russians in Kazakhstan because the regime suppresses the  
          growing ethno-nationalist interests of the Kazakh-speaking counter-elites and Kazakh-speaking section of the Kazakh  
          population. And given Russian diminishing numbers in Kazakhstan democracy will mean increasing 
          Kazakhization of the public spheres (2.5%) 
 
 
Interestingly, the economic factor was relegated to the fifth position whereas all other 
factors can be loosely grouped as ‘political’. This possibly indicates that although the 
economic issue is of great importance to minorities, the political factor is even more 
important as it affects not only their pursuit of economic interests, but their ability to pursue 
any interests. It is not surprising, then, that my respondents placed such a strong emphasis 
on the political and cultural context because it makes their life tolerable in the new 
sovereign Kazakhstan.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to find out whether some coherent identity is coalescing among 
Russians – the largest minority in Kazakhstan – and to analyse the factors that promote or 
inhibit its consolidation. As we can see from the sections above, most of my Russian 
respondents were in a state of confusion and none of them have developed a stable minority 
identity. That is, my respondents have had to come to terms with their Soviet, imperial, 
Russian, Kazakhstani and minority identities, internalize their meanings and implications 
and re-evaluate their position with regard to the new state and the empowered titular group. 
All this has had to be achieved in a very short time-span and it is no wonder that elements 
of different identities have mixed and fused in a contradictory way. This process was 
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particularly prominent in the respondents aged between twenty five and thirty five who did 
not stand firmly either in the Soviet past, or in the post-Soviet Kazakhstani period. The 
older generation (40-70) and the younger generation (under 21) were more consistent and 
stable in their senses of belonging and they anchored most of their attitudes, explanations 
and perceptions in the era in which they were socialized.  
 
The inability to quickly ‘switch’ from the Soviet imperial to the Kazakhstani Russian 
minority identity is not totally unexpected, though. As we argued in Chapter 2, the political, 
economic and national transitions are lengthy processes (especially in  multiethnic states) 
and it is only natural that people’s identities interact with these transitions and are also in a 
state of transition. The incomplete character of the democratic transition means that 
Russians have lacked an effective mechanism for expressing the ‘voice’ of their community 
in competitive politics, which has probably inhibited the development of their new identity, 
while at the same time the continued ‘exit’ option of outmigration to Russia has reinforced 
the provisional character of their position. In the same way the gradualist character of the 
economic transition has not yet produced an ethnicised class polarization which would have 
focused Russians on identity choices. At the same time, however, one can also discern 
certain trends that are strengthening, but have not been realised yet. These are the general 
ethnicisation of Russian consciousness and a hardening of subordination and status ranking 
between Kazakhs and Russians. 
 
George Schöpflin has argued that  
the ethnicisation of the state [implies] that only members of the ethnic majority have any 
chance to access to power, that political power is monopolized by the ethnic majority for its 
own purposes, that the symbolic and liturgical  aspects of the state are appropriated by the 
majority and that the cultural reproduction of the majority becomes the overriding concern 
of the state, now permeated by majority interests, while ethnic minorities are marginalized 
by all the means available to the state apparatus, legal, administrative, political, economic, 
and so on (2000:252). 
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My Russians respondents have experienced some elements of ethnicisation of sovereign 
Kazakhstan and their Russian, Soviet-imperial and Kazakhstani-minority identities were 
highlighted against this background. These trends will probably continue to grow given the 
changing demographic situation in the country, the out-migration of the Russian-speaking 
population, and increased confidence of the Kazakh elites associated with the rapid influx 
of oil revenues.  
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7 MAPPING ETHNONATIONAL INTERACTION BETWEEN KAZAKHS AND 
RUSSIANS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will look at patterns of ethnic stratification and ethnonational interaction 
between Kazakhs and Russians during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. In particular I 
shall try to ‘map’ or schematize ethnic stratification in Kazakhstan by drawing on the 
model devised by D. Horowitz (1985) and elaborated by A. Juska (1999) and by 
extrapolating two additional models from it that will attempt to capture the dynamics of 
ethnic re-stratification between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. I shall also supplement 
and clarify the developments in ethnic stratification by ‘mapping’ ethnonational relations 
between Kazakhs and Russians and locating their type in a generalized scheme of types of 
ethnic interaction developed by R.A. Schermerhorn (1970), which I discussed in chapter 
two. This will help to indicate changes in status over time by locating the status position in 
the Soviet period and the likely future position towards which the status relations are 
moving. Finally, I shall consider the usefulness of the explanatory variables suggested by 
Horowitz and Schermerhorn in determining the patterns of ethnic interaction.   
 
7.2 Mapping ethnonational interaction between Kazakhs and Russians 
 
7.2.1 Structures of Ethnic Stratification in Kazakhstan 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the methods and models elaborated by Donald Horowitz 
(1985) and R.A. Schermerhorn (1970) were not designed to map the interaction between 
ethnonational identities. Horowitz, for example, was primarily concerned with the sources 
and patterns of ethnic conflicts and how they can be ameliorated, while Schermerhorn was 
interested in developing a research framework for investigating problems of integration in 
multi-ethnic societies. Nevertheless, the diagrammatic schemas of Horowitz and 
Schermerhorn can be usefully adapted to map the ethnonational identities and to trace the 
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changes in these identities over time. D. Horowitz (1985, chapters 1,5) has presented a 
detailed analysis and graphic representation of ranked and unranked ethnic systems as well 
as factors that lead to conflict under both circumstances. Drawing on this discussion, 
Arunas Juska (1999) argued that ethnic stratification36 in late Soviet Kazakhstan was 
characterized by a rigid-competitive type (Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 Patterns of ethnic stratification in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period 
 
 
  
                             Late Soviet era 
 
R – Russian Population 
I – Indigenous (Kazakh) Population  
Source: Juska 1999:530 
 
It has to be noted that Juska’s scheme does not reflect the ‘dual power’ situation very 
accurately because power in the Soviet period was exercised differently in different sectors. 
Thus in the key sectors of fundamental policy-making (political, economic, military and 
socio-ideological) power lay with the Slavic-dominated centre and the Slavic-dominated 
political elite, while for purely Kazakhstan-related affairs effective power was wielded 
increasingly by Kazakhs, the nominally dominant nationality of the Kazakh SSR, and all 
the parameters of this power were set from the centre and then applied by Kazakhs to the 
best possible advantage of their people and republic. This was particularly true during the 
Brezhnev period when Kazakhs had accumulated considerable power in the administrative 
structures of the republic, but at the same time their identity was still rooted in and 
                                                
36 Juska defined ethnic stratification as ‘unequal access to power, resources and status among individuals of 
different ethnic origins… which is achieved through and stabilized by, institutions, laws, norms and values' 
(ibid. 547). 
I 
R 
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hierarchically subordinated to the overall structure of the Soviet state (Olcott, 1995, 
Cummings, 2005, Dave, 2007). Hence the scheme from Juska indicating an apparently 
equal sharing of power at the top is not strictly accurate, though it is clear that no 
diagrammatic schema can adequately reflect all the complexities of the Soviet and post-
Soviet ethnic situation in Kazakhstan, but what they can do is highlight key aspects of this 
situation, which can help to trace the trends of change between one situation and another.  
 
Juska has pointed out that the ‘rigid-competitive’ type of ethnic stratification in late Soviet 
Kazakhstan was partly an outcome of conquest and incorporation of Kazakh territories into 
the Russian empire and later into the Soviet Union and partly a result of the Soviet 
nationality policy that insitutionalised a dual power system in the republic (see also 
Willerton, 1992, Olcott, 1995, Brubaker, 1996, Smith, 1998, Cummings, 2005). Willerton, 
for example, has noted that a ‘policy of diarchy’ in Kazakhstan had emerged in the 1950s 
as an extension of korenizatsiya policies, in which the first secretary was typically of the 
titular nationality, while the second secretary was Russian or of other Slavic origin. The 
first secretary served as a link between the Centre and the local population, while the 
second exercised real power. This power distribution ensured that by the end of the Soviet 
period the Russians had established their status as ‘first among equals’ in the Soviet Union 
as a whole, but at the same time they were increasingly challenged by the Kazakh titular 
group, who had become more urbanized, educated and upwardly mobile over time 
(Karklins, 1989, Chinn & Kaiser, 1996, Brubaker, 1996). The Soviet nationality policy, 
therefore, had been instrumental in triggering, in the words of Frederic Barth (1969:20), a 
‘niche overlap’ between Kazakhs and Russians and leading to the increase in inter-ethnic 
competition between them for elite positions in the republic (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996). It has 
to be stressed, however, that despite the pressure and competition from Kazakhs in the 
political and socio-economic spheres, the ethnic stratification pattern between Kazakhs and 
Russians was still relatively ‘unranked’ in the sense that the Soviet state artificially 
supported the ‘dual power’ structure both by force and compromise. This situation changed 
dramatically when the Soviet Union collapsed and the central Soviet power structures were 
removed from the republic.  
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To illustrate the post-Soviet dynamics and to map the gradual re-stratification and the 
emergence of majority/ minority and dominant/ subordinate identities and the role reversal 
that post-Soviet and nation-building brings, I have adapted Juska’s original model (Figure 
7.2, Sector A) and extrapolated from it my own two additional models – a transitional 
independence model (Sector B) and a consolidated independence model (Sector C). The 
purpose of these schemas is to make a graphic representation of the general power 
relationships between the indigenous and non-indigenous groups in Kazakhstan and how 
these have changed between the late Soviet era and the period of my research in 2003/2004. 
It has to be stressed that these graphic representations are not exactly proportionate, but 
instead they are intended to illustrate the general interrelationship between Kazakhs and 
Russians (both at the elite and grassroots’ level) and convey the very rough proportions of 
power wielded by both groups during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (the elites are 
being at the top of the diagrams and the masses down below). 
 
Figure 1. Ethnic stratification patterns in Soviet and post-Soviet Kazakhstan 
       A            B            C 
 
        Late Soviet era              Transitional                                 Consolidated  
           independence model                   independence model 
 
R – Russian Population 
I – Indigenous (Kazakh) Population  
Sector A: Juska 1999:530,  
Sectors B and C: my own extrapolation 
   
The transitional independence model (Sector B, Figure 7.2) illustrates the gradual 
restratification process in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and it is characterised by a mix of the 
R 
I 
 
I 
R 
I 
R 
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Soviet stratification patterns and the new emerging stratification with ethnic Kazakhs at the 
top. That is, as one section of the dual power system that was dominated by Russians and 
Slavs was gradually destroyed along with much of the influence, which its members 
wielded, the way became clear for the previously local Kazakh networks to assume control 
of the national and local administration. Some observers have noted, that gradual 
Kazakhisation of the state and government structures, while showing elements of 
disempowerment on an ethnic basis, has resulted not from virulent Kazakh nationalism and 
the desire to establish an ethnic hierarchy in the country, but from the deep seated rivalries 
within the new nomenklatura of Kazakhstan (Edmunds, 1998, Masanov, 2002). This trend 
was accompanied by the apathy of the general population towards political activity in 
general and towards the ideological tenets of ethnic nationalism in particular and there was 
a low level of social support shown for all the ethnically oriented parties. As a result ethnic 
tension in the 1990s remained low key, despite some discontent among Russians in the 
northern oblasts.  
 
The above argument links well with the findings of Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg (1999) 
who argued that in the early to mid 1990s there was, to use Weber’s terms, a ‘naked class 
situation’37 in the economic sector of Kazakhstan with only limited stratification by ethnic 
status. Specifically, they claimed that their respondents viewed ethnicity as a ‘not very 
important’ (26.1%) or ‘not important at all’ (39.5%) factor to succeed in Kazakhstan. By 
contrast, ‘property and income’ (57.9%), ‘education’ (53.3%), ‘individual qualities’ 
(45.2%) and ‘profession’ (47%) were seen as more important qualities to obtain material 
well–being. These trends were also indirectly reflected in the question on the distribution of 
wealth in post-Soviet Kazakhstan (Table 7.1). 
 
                                                
37 Weber noted that ‘epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of 
predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic 
transformations. And every slowing down of the shifting of economic stratifications leads, 
in due course, to the growth of status structures and makes for a resuscitation of the 
important role of social honour’. This usually happens when the bases of acquisition and 
distribution of goods become relatively stable (Weber, 1991:194-195, emphasis added). 
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Table 7.1  In which ethnic group do we find the richest people? % (multiple answers 
possible) 
 Kazakhs Russians 
Kazakhs 27.9 41.6 
Russians 9.3 11.2 
Jews 11.7 5.4 
Others 6.1 8.3 
Foreigners 8.5 3.7 
Independent 46.5 48.4 
D/K  7.4 4.2 
A/F  376 409 
Data derived from GI survey, see Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg;1999, 235  
 
As we can see from the table, almost half of the respondents believed that wealth in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan was distributed independently of nationality. The ‘naked class situation’, 
however, had a parallel stratification by ethnic status as most respondents were able to 
identify some nationalities as wealthier than others. Specifically, both Kazakhs and 
Russians believed that opulence could be found among the Kazakhs (27% and 41.6% 
respectively) and to a lesser extent among the Russians (9.3% and 11.2%) and others 
(17.8% and 13.7%). Malkova et al. have claimed that these results might reveal either 
actual differences in the distribution of wealth in society or perceived differences produced 
by ethnic stereotypes and other circumstances (1999:234). These data, however, may also 
point to the ambivalence and flux in people’s minds that were still influenced by the Soviet 
patterns of ethnic stratification and by the emerging ethnonational trends. In particular, one 
can see the impact of the Soviet ‘dual power’ system, which manifests in the ‘sharing’ of 
two lead positions by Kazakhs and Russians (although this ‘sharing’ is somewhat skewed 
towards Kazakhs which points to the development of a new stratification pattern), and the 
impact of the Soviet nationalities policy and Soviet culture, which used to stabilize 
interethnic competition and provide people with a context within which they could compete 
and pursue their economic interests - hence the perception that wealth in Kazakhstan was 
distributed independently of nationality.  
 
My small-scale survey indicates that there has been a small qualitative shift since Malkova 
et al. survey was carried out in 1996 (Table 7.2): 
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Table 7.2 What nationality (natsional’nost’) has the highest percentage of wealthy  
people in Kazakhstan? (2004) 
 Kazakhs Russians 
Kazakhs 33 (70%) 37 (85%) 
Russians 16 (34%) 16 (34%) 
Koreans 9 5 
Jews 9 4 
Chechens 4 5 
Uzbeks 6 2 
Germans 3 3 
 
Specifically, unlike the Malkova et al. respondents, my respondents rarely, if at all, 
believed that wealth in Kazakhstan was distributed independently of nationality. Instead 
they preferred to identify one or several ethnic groups that they considered ‘wealthy’. The 
overwhelming majority of Russians (85%) and to a lesser extent Kazakhs (70%) believed 
that the Kazakhs benefited the most. Some Kazakhs, however, were quick to point out that 
‘only a very small group of Kazakhs [were] extremely rich, but the majority [were] 
extremely poor’ (Alm-6), and that ‘the majority of wealthy Kazakhs [were] from the South 
or Almaty because that’s where all the money [was] circulating’ (P-1). Other Kazakhs 
pointed to a special link between Kazakhs and Kazakhstan and linked it to their economic 
achievement’ (Ast-2). Said an 18 year old student from Astana: ‘Kazakhs now hold the 
whole state structure – that’s why they are the first. In other states it may be quite different’ 
(Ast-2). By contrast, my Russian respondents believed that Kazakhs were better off because 
‘they [had] access to all good jobs and high positions in the country and this [gave] them 
access to big money’ (Ast-10). Some also stressed that Kazakhs ‘[had] it all because ‘the 
President [was] a Kazakh’ (Alm-9) and because ‘Kazakhs [were] now the numerical 
majority in the country’ (P-4). Interestingly, over a third of Kazakhs (35%) and rather fewer 
Russians (25%) felt that Russians could also achieve economic success, particularly in 
areas which did not compete with Kazakhs; and most Kazakhs (77%) and to a lesser extent 
Russians (55%) thought that other non-titular groups have an opportunity of economic 
success. 
 
The above data indicate that my Russian respondents associate changes in wealth 
distribution with the nationalizing policies and practices that disproportionately benefit the 
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titular population, while Kazakhs, being naturally more defensive on this matter, believe 
that these changes are ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ given that they are the titular group and 
they have the right to operate in their own economic interests. It has to be noted that the 
impact of the Soviet ‘dual power’ system is still discernible in my data, although the 
distance between Kazakhs and Russians has become more pronounced now (as compared 
to the Malkova et al’ findings). My results also suggest that a new stratification pattern is 
emerging given that both my Kazakh and Russian respondents believed that non-titular 
access to power and resources was limited and that Russians and other non-titular groups 
were able to pursue economic success provided they did not directly compete with Kazakhs 
and cut across their economic interests.  
 
Turning next to the political sphere in the early to mid 1990s, the new regime represented a 
mix of ethnocratic and consociational elements, which allowed Russians and Slavs to 
participate in government structures while ensuring that the state and its institutions 
remained under tight titular group control (Juska, 1999, Olcott, 2002). The consociational 
arrangements were influenced, inter alia, by the size of the Russian population and its 
important role in the economy, the high Russification level among Kazakhs, the original 
civic orientation of the national-state project of Kazakhstan and the cautious approach of 
the Kazakh elites to the gradual removal of the Soviet dual power system, given 
Kazakhstan’s political and economic dependence on the Russian Federation (Juska, 
1999:542).  
 
Although not strictly comparable, the above argument is not dissimilar to that of S. 
Cummings who looked at the social origins of the Kazakhstani elites during the first decade 
of independence (2005, Chapter 3). She argued that the case of Kazakhstan fits the 
agglutination model rather than the independence model. The agglutination model, as 
defined by Harold D. Lasswell (1965), suggests that there is a strong link between an 
individual’s place in the political, economic and ethno-cultural hierarchies so that the 
economically and culturally privileged group appropriates political leadership. By contrast, 
the independence model posits only an insignificant correlation between political status and 
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socio-economic status and there is no discrimination on the basis of education, occupation, 
family background, age, sex, religion and ethnicity. S. Cummings has maintained that there 
was no strong correlation between most demographic attributes and particular career 
patterns in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, apart from ethnicity and gender. Being an ethnic 
Kazakh and a male, in her opinion, ‘[gave] an individual a considerably better chance of 
becoming a member of the political elite than would being non-Kazakh or female or both’ 
(2005:75). At the same time, however, she stressed that if a non-Kazakh male had strong 
connections from the Soviet time as well as particular educational and occupational 
attributes he could also survive in power (ibid.).  
 
In this respect it can be argued that during the first ten years of independence the political 
stratification pattern in Kazakhstan contained elements of both the Soviet policy of 
‘diarchy’, whose effects have been gradually waning and the emerging stratification system 
with ethnic Kazakhs at the top. This hybrid pattern can be well illustrated by the 
Kazakhization of regional appointments (Table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3 Ethnicity and the Regional elite 
 1991 1992 1995 2000 % of ethnic 
Kazakhs 1999* 
 1st Sec/ Dep Governor/Dep Akim/ 1st Dep Akim  
Aktyubinsk R/K** K/R R/K K 70.7 
Almaty K/R K/R K/R K 59.5 
East Kazakhstan R/K K/R R/R G 48.5 
Atyrau K/R K/R K/K K 89.0 
Zhambyl K/K K/K K/K K 65.5 
Zhezkazgan R/K R/K K/K Abolished  
Karaganda R/K R/K R/K K 37.6 
Kzylorda K/K K/K K/K K 94.2 
Kokshetau K/R K/R K/K Abolished  
Kostanai R/K K/R K/R K 31.1 
Mangystau R/K R/K K/K K 78.7 
Pavlodar R/K K/K K/K K 38.2 
North Kazakhstan R/K G/K G/K K 29.5 
Semey K/R K/R K/R Abolished  
Taldykorgan K/R K/R K/R Abolished  
Turgai K/R K/R K/R Abolished  
West Kazakhstan K/R K/K K/K K 64.8 
Akmola G/K G/K G/K K 37.4 
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South Kazakhstan R/K K/K K/R K 67.6 
Almaty City K/K K/R K/R R 38.5 
Leninsk Town R/K R/R R/R   
Astana City N/A N/A N/A  40.9 
Source: Itogi perepisi naseleniya 1999 goda v Respublike Kazakhstan. 1999. Almaty: Agentstvo 
respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike. 
G = German; K = Kazakh; R = Russian 
Derived from Cummings (2005:70-80) 
 
As we can see from the table, 60% of regional First Secretaries in 1991 were Kazakh, 70% 
of akims were Kazakh in 1995 and 88% were Kazakh by 2000. Of the 54 akims between 
1991 and 2001 78% were Kazakh, 12% were Russian and 10% were other. Notably, by 
2000 the Soviet ‘dual power’ system whereby a Kazakh head would be normally deputied 
by a Russian and vice versa, was no longer the rule. These findings concur with those of 
Kurganskaya and Dunaev who argued that by 2001 in all of Kazakhstan’s regions the non-
titular population was under-represented in regional state bureaucracies (2002:86). They 
also claimed that this trend was likely to grow as the number of non-titular representatives 
in the under-30 age group had decreased from 34.4% in 1998 to 29.1% in 1999 (ibid.: 84). 
The evidence here suggests that there has been a gradual shift from a Soviet pattern of 
ethnic stratification to a more straightforward ranking with one ethnic group at the top. This 
transformation, however, is still in progress and its results are less revealing than they are 
likely to be in the coming years when mobility slows down and political institutions 
consolidate.  
 
To map ethnic stratification in post-Soviet Kazakhstan I employed in my own work Pineo’s 
scales of social standing of ethnic groups (1977). Social standing or social prestige, 
according to some observers, depends on the position of a group in three coexisting systems 
of social stratification: class, ethnicity (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965, Greer 1974) and access 
to political power and social honour (Horowitz, 1985, Weber, 1991). To elicit a ranking of 
ethnic groups I asked my respondents to put a card with the name of the most ‘prestigious’ 
group at the top, with the name of the least ‘prestigious’ group at the bottom, and to arrange 
all other groups according to their ‘social standing’ in Kazakhstani society38 (Table 7.4). 
                                                
38 During my research I used 18 cards with the names of the following groups: Azeri, Belorussians, 
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Table 7.4  Social ranking of Kazakhs and Russians in post-Soviet Kazakhstan (2003/2004) % 
 Kazakhs Russians 
Petropavlovsk   
the respondent placed ‘Kazakhs’ at the top 2 4 
‘Russians’ at the top  2 1 
both ‘Kazakhs’ and ‘Russians’ at the top 3 2 
Astana   
the respondent placed ‘Kazakhs’ at the top 7 9 
‘Russians’ at the top  0 0 
both ‘Kazakhs’ and ‘Russians’ at the top 3 1 
Almaty   
the respondent placed ‘Kazakhs’ at the top 12 9 
‘Russians’ at the top  0 0 
both ‘Kazakhs’ and ‘Russians’ at the top 5 1 
Chimkent   
the respondent placed ‘Kazakhs’ at the top 10 10 
‘Russians’ at the top  0 0 
both ‘Kazakhs’ and ‘Russians’ at the top 0 0 
Total   
the respondent placed ‘Kazakhs’ at the top 31/42 (71%) 32/39 (82%) 
‘Russians’ at the top  2 (4%) 1 (2%) 
both ‘Kazakhs’ and ‘Russians’ at the top 11 (26 %) 4 (12%) 
 
As we can see from the table, the overwhelming majority of Kazakhs and Russians – 71% 
and 82% respectively – believed that Kazakhs had the highest social standing in 
Kazakhstan. These results, however, were less decisive in the North than in the South. In 
Petropavlovsk, for example, both my Kazakh and Russian respondents (4% and 2% 
respectively) put a card with the ‘Russian’ group at the top. This did not happen in Astana, 
Almaty or Chimkent. Remarkably, a considerable number of Kazakhs (26%) and Russians 
(12%) opted for a double card, placing both Kazakhs and Russians at the top.39 Russians, 
however, were less inclined to think that they shared the most prestigious social position 
with Kazakhs. This possibly reflects their anticipation of a diminished role in the new 
                                                                                                                                               
Chechens, Chinese, Germans, Gypsies, Jews, Kazakhs, Koreans, Kyrgyz, Poles, Russians, Tatars, Tajiks, 
Turkmens, Turks, Uigurs, Ukrainians. For the purposes of this chapter I will focus on two groups – Kazakhs 
and Russians.  
39 During my pilot study I did not have this option, but after several instances I allowed people to arrange the 
cards as they saw fit. It has to be also mentioned that a considerable number of my Kazakh and Russian 
respondents lumped in Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and sometimes Germans and Poles as one 
category. In Chimkent these groups were frequently called ‘Europeans’ (evropeitsy), and in Petropavlovsk 
they were labeled ‘Slavs’ (slavyane).  
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sovereign Kazakhstan. Kazakhs, on the contrary, believed that the Russian position was 
still relatively strong and that they had not stepped down to the level where all other 
‘secondary’ groups were. Interestingly, in Chimkent there was unanimous agreement that 
Kazakhs carried the most prestige as a group. This, perhaps, indicates that Chimkent is a 
Kazakh-dominated town where ‘Russians don’t play a noticeable role and won’t have a big 
chance’ (Ch-3).  
 
The findings here do not substantially differ from those of other surveys (Malkova et al. 
1999, Kurganskaya and Dunaev 2002, Cummings 2005) as again we can see the continuing 
effect of Soviet institutions, but the emerging ethno-national trends are more clearly 
pronounced, . There is some indication, however, that Kazakhs and Russians are gradually 
reconsidering the Soviet structure of superordination/ subordination and are moving 
towards a new ethnic hierarchy. This process is still largely in flux in Petropavlovsk, 
Astana and Almaty and can be approximated to the transitional independence model 
(Figure 7.2, sector B) and is virtually complete in Chimkent where it can be mapped 
somewhere between the transitional and consolidated independence models (Figure 7.2, 
sectors B and C). 
 
7.2.2 Patterns and Trends of Ethnic Interaction 
 
To trace patterns of change in the interaction between Kazakhs and Russians and to map 
the developments in their identities, Horowitz’s model of ranked and unranked ethnic 
systems can be usefully supplemented by Schermerhorn’s models that specify detailed 
patterns of integration between ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies. Schermerhorn, as 
noted in chapter two, does not talk about identity formation as such, but his theory and 
models can be usefully applied to probe the identities of both dominant and subordinate 
groups and sketch the trends in their development. As with the Horowitz-Juska model, 
Schermerhorn’s models do not accurately account for the dual character of the Soviet 
power/ legitimacy system, which continued to have an influence on ethnic groups and their 
interaction after Kazakhstan gained independence. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
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research I have to assume that Russians were the dominant ethnic group in the overall 
Soviet power structure, while Kazakhs were the subordinate group, but with special rights 
and privileges in their ‘own’ republic, which is, of course, an oversimplification of the 
actual situation. This will have to be taken into account when mapping Kazakh and Russian 
ethnonational identities over time.   
 
The first model of Schermerhorn looks at the patterns of social domination and legitimacy 
perspectives (Figure 7.3) 
 
Figure 7.3  Paradigm of social domination and legitimacy perspectives 
                L-L (1)                                            L-PL (2)                                          L-I (3)                   
 
 
 
 
 
                PL-L (4)                                        PL-PL (5)                                        PL-I (6) 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
                   I-L (7)                                               I-PL (8)                                        
I-I (9) 
 
 
 
Source: Schermerhorn, 1970:70. 
 
 
 
L- legitimate; PL – partly legitimate; I – illegitimate. 
Source: Schermerhorn 1970:7040, my underlining 
 
Legitimacy, as noted by Coser (1956:37), is a ‘crucial intervening variable without which it 
is impossible to predict whether feelings of hostility arising out of an unequal distribution 
                                                
40 For a detailed description of this paradigm see Chapter 2. 
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of privileges and rights actually lead to conflict’. Therefore, the more the groups view their 
power relationship as legitimate, the less their identities will be pronounced and politicized 
and vice versa. To reflect the views of Kazakhs and Russians on the legitimacy of their 
power relations in a longitudinal perspective, I arranged the cells 5, 2 and (3) in a sequence. 
That is, the Soviet period can be best characterised by cell 5, whereby both subordinate and 
dominant groups showed some form of compromise, making an imperfect accommodation 
possible. Kazakhs, for example, viewed the Soviet regime and the special position of 
Russians in the Soviet power structure as only partly legitimate because, unlike Russians 
and other Slavs, they were limited in their career opportunities outside the Kazakh SSR and 
could realise themselves mainly as ‘subalterns’ under Russian supervision in their own 
republic (Laitin, 1998, Juska, 1999). This situation was, however, compensated for by the 
policies of korenizatsiya, which provided preferential treatment for members of the 
eponymous nation living in their ‘own’ republic, as well as by the welfare provisions, 
modernisation policies and internationalist ideology, which partly contributed to the 
legitimacy of the Soviet (and by extension of the Russian) rule in Kazakhstan. Russians, by 
contrast, tended to resent korenizatsiya policies that furthered the interests of the titular 
nation, but at the same time, paradoxically, they viewed this arrangement as at least partly 
legitimate because Kazakhstan, as devised by the Soviet nationality policy, was thought to 
‘belong’ to the titular or indigenous group in the primordial sense of the term (Karklins, 
1989). Thus, there was some imperfect accommodation and integration between Kazakhs 
and Russians during the Soviet period, which was encouraged and sustained by the Soviet 
regime both by force and compromise. This helped to depoliticise Kazakh and Russian 
ethnonational identities, but at the same time to increase the latent competition and conflict 
between the groups over time. 
 
After the break up of the Soviet Union and the gaining of independence there has been a 
shift in Kazakh-Russian relations from cell 5 to cell 2 or to somewhere between cell 2 and 
3.  Kazakhs, as argued in Chapter 5, tended to view their newly acquired power and the 
right to nationalise the state as ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ while Russians found it difficult to 
come to terms with their new minority status and protect their interests as such. Instead they 
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still positioned themselves as an alternative axis or core around which all other ethnic 
groups used to integrate (Kurganskaya & Dunaev, 2002, 2003). Thus, although Russians 
understood and accepted the Kazakhs’ right to nationalise the state in principle, they have 
been very sensitive to any real or perceived nationalising policies and practices. It could be 
also argued that as some Russians were unable or unwilling to cope with the pressures of 
the nationalising regime and opted for outmigration or ‘exit’, the position of these Russians 
can be mapped somewhere between sector 2 and sector 3 as they perceive the nationalising 
state as discriminatory.  
 
Schermerhorn’s second model looks at the patterns of cultural congruence between ethnic 
groups in contexts where power differentials are involved (Fig. 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4 Paradigm representing legitimacy definitions of unequal power distributions where 
cultural variations occur                                                                         
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Source: Schermerhorn 1970:7541 
 
 
                                                
41 For a detailed explanation of this paradigm, see Chapter 2. 
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Again, as explained in chapter 2, Schermerhorn’s main concern here is with social 
integration, but clearly cultural congruence or the lack of it has a strong impact on the 
development of national identity, which is the subject of my research. Thus, a high degree 
of cultural congruence42 will tend, in the right circumstances, to produce less distinctive 
identities, whereas strong cultural divergence will tend to strengthen identities. In 
particular, as Schermerhorn points out, that large power differentials can reinforce cultural 
divergence in the formation of identity.  
 
During the Soviet period, Kazakh-Russian relations can be mapped somewhere between 
sector A and sector C. The complexity of the mapping is determined by the dual power 
structure between Kazakhs and Russians, i.e., Kazakh-Russian power differentials were 
relatively small at the republican level where the two groups ‘shared’ the political, 
economic and cultural domains, but at the same time they were large at the all-Union level 
where Russians had an obvious advantage. Coupled with relative cultural incongruity 
between the groups, the unequal power distribution made the dual power system (and by 
extension Kazakh-Russian relations) inherently unstable in the long-run. This became 
evident when the Soviet Union collapsed, the ‘dual power system’ broke down and 
nationalising policies were put in place to re-establish the titular group’s dominant position 
in the republic. 
 
After the break up of the Soviet Union there has been a shift in Kazakh-Russian power 
differentials from sectors A and C to sector A. That is, there has been a shift from the 
Soviet dual power structure where Kazakhs and Russians had large power differentials at 
the all-Union level and small power differentials at the republican level to the post-Soviet 
single power structure where Kazakhs have gradually come to dominate in all spheres of 
economy and polity. Schermerhorn has argued that all the above combinations apart from 
sector B (large power differentials and relative cultural congruity) tend to produce conflict 
between groups. This does not necessarily imply violent conflict, but we can assume that 
                                                
42 By cultural congruence is meant a high degree of commonality/ shared cultural norms and practices; in 
particular a shared language, but also common religious, moral and political values, shared historical 
experience and even shared beliefs about the physical characteristics of the group. 
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the sudden and dramatic shift from the Soviet to post-Soviet pattern of power differentials 
has caused a considerable dislocation and anxiety among the groups, expressed in the 
Russian case in out-migration, while the new pattern of power differentials coupled with a 
relative cultural incongruity between Kazakhs and Russians has suggested a lengthy and 
difficult process of integration of Russians into the Kazakhstani society (Kolstø, 1999, 
Kurganskaya and Dunaev, 2002). As a result, this could potentially lead to the 
strengthening of both identities in the long-term as the groups can become differentiated 
and mutually alienated from each other through the interaction process. Indeed, the fact that 
the Kazakhstani elites are not settling for a serious integration of Russians into the 
Kazakhstani culture, but rather fostering some kind of apartheid system in which Russians 
are allowed to keep quietly in their zone, mainly the economic niche, indicates that 
economic growth and inclusive citizenship have not worked and that the two main ethnic 
groups are treading separate paths. In other words, instead of being integrated, the conflict 
between Kazakhs and Russians could take the form of not actual antagonism, but just 
leading separate lives and agreeing to differ.  
 
Schermerhorn’s last typology looks at the reciprocal goal definition between the dominant 
and subordinate groups and links their combined choices to integration or conflict (Fig. 
7.5).  
Figure 7.5 Congruent and incongruent orientations toward centripetal and centrifugal trends 
of subordinates as viewed by themselves and superordinates 
A                         B 
Superordinates Cp   Cf Tending toward integration 
Subordinates Cp   Cf   
   Assimilation          Cultural Pluralism 
   Incorporation   Autonomy 
 
C     D 
Superordinates Cf   Cp Tending toward conflict 
Subordinates Cf   Cp   
Forced segregation                 Forced assimilation 
                                   with resistance                        with resistance 
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Cp – Centripetal trends; Cf – Centrifugal trends  
Source: Schermerhorn 1970:83 
 
Again, we can assume that if the goals of both dominant and subordinate groups converge, 
this will lead to integration and less pronounced and politicized identities, but if the goals 
are incompatible, conflict will arise and identities will be strengthened through interaction. 
Using the above typology, the Kazakh-Russian reciprocal goal definition pattern during the 
Soviet period can be mapped somewhere between sectors B and C (Figure 7.5). That is, 
both Kazakhs and Russians tended to support, although to various extents and in different 
ways, pluralist and multicultural solutions to the national question. This manifested itself in 
the virtually endogamous marriage patterns between Kazakhs and Russians and in the 
support for the federal structure of the Soviet Union and korenizatsiya policies that 
provided Kazakhs with relative cultural and political autonomy (Karklins, 1989, Edmunds, 
1998). At the same time, Kazakhs, as the nominally titular or dominant nationality in 
Kazakhstan, were frustrated by their inability to nationalize their republic as they saw fit 
and by the need to share the political and socio-economic space with Russians (Brubaker, 
1996). Their career mobility in the wider Soviet Union was also cut short by their relative 
cultural incongruity with Russians and by the partial and weak integration in the broader 
Soviet system (Laitin, 1998, Seidimbek, 2001, Gali, 2002) (Sector C). 
 
After the break up of the Soviet system there has been a change in Kazakh and Russian 
views on reciprocal goal definition which can be mapped somewhere between sectors B 
and C, but now the dominant role has become performed by the Kazakh group. The pattern 
of cultural pluralism and autonomy (Sector B) can be illustrated by the general 
unwillingness of Russians to ‘jump over the cultural divide’ (Kolstø, 1999), even if the 
attitudes they are met with among the Kazakh population are fairly encouraging and 
sympathetic. Indeed, as Kurganskaya and Dunaev (2002, 2003) have pointed out Russians 
still position themselves as the cultural axis around which all other groups used to integrate 
and they are still struggling to accept their minority status and to protect their interests as 
such. The pattern of forced segregation with resistance (Sector C) can be illustrated by the 
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controversy and tension that have arisen over the political integration which Russians are 
being denied and by the increasing pressure from the nationalizing state and 
nationalistically-minded members of the titular nation who urge non-Kazakhs to learn 
Kazakh and be 'loyal' to the new state (Gali 2002, Eschment 2001)  
 
7.3 Explaining Ethnic Interaction 
 
The question now arises why a particular group or groups occupy a place in the above 
taxonomies and why their status changes over time. Both Horowitz and Schermerhorn 
presented a number of causative variables which attempted to explain the pattern of 
ethnonational interactions. Although the variables they use are designed to map and explain 
the patterns of integration in multi-ethnic society (in Schermerhorn’s case) and the patterns 
of ethnic conflict (in Horowitz’s case), some of them can be usefully applied to the 
ethnonational situation in Kazakhstan. Schermerhorn draws attention to four salient factors: 
1) cultural congruence, 2) social exclusion of subordinate groups 3) the degree of 
legitimacy of the dominant group and 4) influence of comparisons with other culturally 
similar societies. As discussed in chapter two, some of these factors were later applied by 
Horowitz in his classic analysis of post-colonial ethnic problems. 
 
With regard to the question of the degree of cultural congruence as a factor promoting 
integration and inclusiveness we have seen that in the Soviet period, particularly in the 
Brezhnev period, a degree of shared values of commitment to the Soviet state had been 
achieved, which to some extent overcame the natural historical dissonance between Kazakh 
and Russian cultures. But at the same time the korenizatsiya policies which formed part of 
the Soviet quasi-federal system greatly increased Kazakh control of the running of their 
republic and thereby of their natural ‘ownership’ of the state, leading to a greater awareness 
of the distinctiveness and value of their own culture. So when the Soviet Union collapsed 
these shared Soviet values rapidly declined which meant that the difference and 
incompatibility between Kazakh and Russian cultures and values became more obvious. 
The nation-building project of the independent Kazakh state and its nationalizing policies 
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removed the limitations inherent in the korenizatsiya policy and elevated Kazakh 
ownership of the state to a central principle. The symbolic reorientation of the state and its 
practical personnel policies emphasized the cultural and social subordination of the ex-
dominant Russians. It was clear from the expressed attitudes of my respondents that they 
were becoming more aware of the political and social differences which made up their 
identities.  
 
In terms of the second factor, namely the social exclusion of subordinate groups, we have 
seen that Russians are increasingly excluded from the career structure of the central 
administration of the state. In the national state project Russians are allocated a subordinate 
and limited role in the same way that the Kazakhs had a subordinate and limited role within 
the Soviet state. They are viewed as the diaspora of an external state and therefore are 
excluded from a defining role in the character of the state. This leads us on to the third 
factor, namely the degree of legitimacy which the dominant group enjoys. We have seen 
that in the Soviet period both Russians within the Soviet state as a whole and the Kazakhs 
within Kazakhstan enjoyed a partial legitimacy. With independence Kazakhs started view 
their ownership of the state as completely legitimate whereas Russians find it difficult to 
come to terms with this delegitimation of their dominance within the state. This status 
reversal has necessitated a re-structuring of the identities of both groups.  
 
And finally, Schermerhorn draws attention, as an intervening variable, to the influence of 
culturally similar societies in this process. In the Soviet Union Kazakhstan had little contact 
with the outside world and its main cultural comparisons were within the Soviet Union 
itself. In the independence period a feeling of solidarity with other Islamic societies on the 
one hand, and with other post-colonial states in general on the other, has started to develop. 
But this does not substantially affect their acceptance of the political and economic power 
of the West combined with continued cooperation with post-Soviet states, so as an 
intervening variable this factor has yet to have a major importance.  
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As we shall see in the conclusion, a range of other long-terms and short-term factors are 
also important in the explanation of this very complex phenomenon, including transition 
theories and international factors. But Schermerhorn and Horowitz offered a very useful 
framework for analyzing the internal factors which determine changes in ethnic 
stratification.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have tried to map the trends of interaction between Kazakh and Russian 
identities from the Soviet period to the post-independence period, terminating with my 
research in 2003/2004. In my view, the clearest graphic illustration of the fundamental 
changes in ethnic stratification is provided by the adaptation, which I have made to Juska’s 
model, which is derived from the classic study of ranked ethnic systems and ethnic conflict 
by Horowitz. I then tried to apply the more elaborated models of ethnic interaction 
presented in Schermerhorn’s study to the situation reflected by my respondents in 
Kazakhstan. While the ethnic situation in both Soviet and post-Soviet Kazakhstan was not 
exactly reflected in Schermerhorn’s taxonomies, the application of this broader research 
framework revealed many factors which found an echo with my respondents. Finally, I 
offered some preliminary explanation of the trends in ethnic stratification derived from the 
explanatory variables suggested by Schermerhorn and Horowitz, however, this is only a 
partial explanation of this interaction and we will return to the question of how to explain 
ethnic interaction in terms of other theories in the conclusion. 
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8 CONCLUSION  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this conclusion I shall first summarise and explain the main findings of my research 
chapters (chapters 4-7) in relation to my three research questions, in each case with an 
initial statement of theory and then summary of the findings indicating how they relate to 
the theory, highlighting the main findings in the text; in the second section I shall 
summarise the main scholarly contributions which I believe my research makes, and finally 
in the third section suggest ways in which my research can be developed and supplemented 
in further research projects. In general terms I shall argue that while my research findings 
show continued uncertainty and provisionality in both Kazakh and Russian identities, 
which confirms the broad trend of previous surveys, they also indicate signs of change in 
the emergence of more consolidated dominant and subordinate identities in the less 
Russified areas like Chimkent and among the younger generation, while by contrast the 
older generations of Russians, particularly in the more Russified areas, find it difficult to 
accept the delegitimation of their dominant status as reflected in the nationalizing policies 
pursued by the new state. In theoretical terms these findings confirm the importance of the 
study of ethnic stratification, which has not received sufficient attention in previous 
research in this area. In explaining these developments I found that the character of the 
transition and also of the ‘prior regime type’ in Kazakhstan has had a significant effect on 
ethnic relationships, but also that international factors, such as those presented in 
Brubaker’s (1996) ‘triadic’ model, and internal factors, elaborated by Schermerhorn (1970) 
and Horowitz (1985), were also important. 
 
8.2 Summary and Explanation of Main Findings 
 
8.2.1 The Character of Kazakh and Russian Identities in 2003-2004 
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As I argued in chapter 2 (2.3 and 2.4) the identity of ethnic and national groups is a 
complex mix of variables formed by both internal and external influences. A.Smith, whose 
model of national identity I have broadly followed, analysed the various linguistic, 
historical, political, economic, religious and other cultural elements which make up this 
wide-ranging concept. His main focus was on the internal character and development of 
national identity. But other authors, notably R.Brubaker, have emphasised that interaction 
with external forces is quite as important in the development of national identity, 
particularly for newly independent states: the impact of a hostile (or, on the other hand, an 
attractive) ‘other/ (often in the form of the former ‘imperial’ state) and attitudes of ‘national 
minorities’ towards their ‘parent’ state (and vice versa) are often crucial in the 
consolidation of new national identities. Hence in drawing up my survey questions I tried to 
focus on the key internal and external variables which these theories suggested were the 
most important elements and determinants of national identities.  
 
My first research question concerned the character of the identities of Kazakhs and 
Russians in Kazakhstan at the time of my research in 2003-2004: were there signs at 
that time of the consolidation of new, stable identities based on a new post-
independence stratification of dominant and subordinate ethnic groups? In chapters 5 
and 6 I looked at the external and internal factors, which shaped the ethnonational identities 
of Kazakhs and Russians. The external factors that I covered in these chapters include the 
attitudes of Kazakhs and Russians to the creation of independent Kazakhstan and to key 
foreign states and peoples, the internal factors include the attitudes of both groups to the 
Soviet past, to the nationalising policies and practices of the new state and to the questions 
of loyalty of the non-titular population and especially Russians.  
 
To take the external factors first I asked about attitudes to independence, which in itself, 
as Clifford Geertz has pointed out, enables the dominant group ‘to be recognized as 
responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions ‘matter’’, to ensure that their 
‘identity [is] publicly acknowledged as having import, a social assertion of self as ‘being 
somebody in the world,’ and beyond that to ‘play[] a part in the larger arena of world 
 229 
politics,’ or exercise[] influence among nations’ (1963:108). What emerged from my 
Kazakh respondents is predominantly positive attitudes towards Kazakhstan’s 
independence, which is to be expected in a newly-independent titular group trying to 
establish their distinctiveness and national identity. There was a clear awareness among my 
Kazakh respondents that independence has had a positive impact on their status as a group 
and on their relations with other groups. They frequently linked independence to ‘freedom’ 
and ‘democratisation’ and stressed that it enabled Kazakhs to speak their mind, to reassert 
their national values and to come to terms with difficult episodes in the Soviet past. 
Independence in this respect has had a major impact on Kazakh identity.  
 
What emerged from my Russian respondents, by contrast, is predominantly negative or 
neutral attitudes towards Kazakhstan’s independence, which is understandable in an ex-
dominant group struggling to come to terms with their new subordinate position in a new 
and potentially foreign state. There was some awareness among my Russian respondents 
that independence has had a negative impact on their status and on the interethnic relations 
in general. They stressed that since independence they have become the recipients of the 
titular group’s discontent about the state of their culture, language and their negative 
identity that developed during the Soviet time. These perceptions were the strongest in 
Chimkent and the weakest in Almaty. There was also a lot of anxiety that independence has 
severed the links between Kazakhstan and Russia, leaving the Kazakhstani Russians 
vulnerable and exposed to the nationalising policies of the new state. Unlike my Kazakh 
respondents, who saw themselves as being empowered by Kazakhstan’s independence and 
lifted from non-existence to the world stage, my Russian respondents usually felt confused, 
anxious and constantly on the defensive, which is a typical characteristic of a former 
dominant group developing a minority identity (Doane (1997), Wright (2004)).  
 
Thus what we find is that the very fact of independence and its implications set the 
framework of a new status stratification for the main ethnic groups in Kazakhstan: for 
Kazakhs this reveals a new 'grown-up' self-confidence and an awareness of the positive 
value of Kazakh culture in relation to the outside world which is not, however, yet an 
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assertive dominant identity, but for Russians there is a real and anxious sense of a new 
subordinate status which they find difficult to accept and the perception of Russia as an 
attractive 'homeland' state in Brubaker’s (1996) terms.   
 
As for the attitudes to key foreign states and peoples, which studies, such as that by 
Greenfeld (1992) on ‘ressentiment’, show, often crucially indicate the character of the 
identity of national groups, what seems to appear from my Kazakh respondents is a 
positive differentiation of Kazakh identity from all main states and peoples with whom it 
comes into contact. But in general Kazakhs still remained in the post-Soviet, post-imperial 
cultural orientation feeling closest to Russia, despite their growing discomfort about the 
rise of Russian nationalism and xenophobia and the neo-imperial behaviour of Russia in the 
Near Abroad. With regard to the West, there was a strong admiration for many aspects of 
western economic, political and cultural achievements, but there was also some resentful 
awareness of Westerners’ low opinion of Asians and Muslims (especially since 11th 
September) and rejection of some elements of western culture and life that they believed 
should not be slavishly emulated. While there was a noticeable common feeling with their 
Islamic and Turkic neighbours, but there were also strong doubts, as shown in the fear that 
some of these states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are a source of 
drugs and arms trafficking, religious extremism and international terrorism. China, 
however, emerged as an object of real fear and threat perception which related to the 
economic, demographic, military and cultural expansion. The universally negative 
attitudes, which I found in my survey, are a bit ironic because China undoubtedly is 
becoming the biggest investor in the gas and oil industry in Kazakhstan. But experience has 
shown that big investors are not necessarily popular with the local population and that was 
certainly true of China in the 1960s in Africa.  
 
With regard to my Russian respondents, their external orientations were very similar to 
those of Kazakhs, although with several important qualifications. Russians failed to notice 
the more threatening aspects of Russian behaviour which concerned Kazakhs. There were 
several references to the activity of the ultra-right nationalist parties, but they were 
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invariably linked to the reactions of Kazakhs and possible subsequent deterioration in 
Kazakh-Russian relations. My Russian respondents understandably showed an unqualified 
positive attitude towards Russia and the West and a predominantly negative one towards 
the Islamic states. China, on the other hand, was the only country on which both Kazakh 
and Russian attitudes converged.  
 
On Russia itself there were some interesting findings with regard to the question of how 
much influence the Russian government should have in protecting the rights and 
freedoms of Russians in Kazakhstan in their role as ‘the homeland’ state. This question 
produced an ambivalent series of responses. A clear majority of Kazakhs (53%) though 
that the Russian government should play no role in this area. However a significant 
minority (22%) felt that the Russian government should protect Russian rights and 
freedoms in Kazakhstan, and a further 20% felt that there should be such a role, but only at 
a minimal level. But in both cases the Kazakhs in these groups were motivated by a strong, 
almost primordial ethnic feeling that each national group should in some way look after 
their co-nationals abroad. Amongst Russians almost half (45%) felt that the Russian 
government should have a protective role, but a significant minority (25%) felt that this 
should not be the case. What comes out of the responses to this question is, once again, the 
divided loyalties of the Russian population, but at the same time the extensive Kazakh 
understanding of their position, although with the implication that Russians should make up 
their own minds on this issue and the Russian government should still have some 
responsibility in helping their co-nationals in ways that do not undermine the sovereignty of 
Kazakhstan.  
 
What these results on external relations show is that for Kazakhs Russia has not yet 
emerged as a ‘hostile other’ which might help consolidate their new identity (even to the 
extent that almost half recognise Russia’s right in some way to protect its co-nationals in 
Kazakhstan), but that China has the potential to become such a ‘hostile other’ in the future. 
For Russians Russia is clearly an ‘attractive other’, but not implying a threat to the 
sovereignty of Kazakhstan; but the Islamic states and China are emerging as ‘hostile 
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others’, increasing their sense of alienation in Kazakhstan. However, it should be pointed 
out that all the above ‘external’ attitudes were usually conflated by my respondents with 
attitudes to internal ethnic relations in Kazakhstan, as we shall see in the next sections, and 
the speed and details of their new orientations will depend greatly on the economic and 
military relations between Kazakhstan and various states as her oil-resources are gradually 
developed. 
 
As for ‘internal’ factors, they may be divided into three broad groups: 1) attitudes 
towards the recent, i.e. Soviet past; 2) responses to 'nationalising' policies and practices; 
and 3) issues concerning the loyalty and integration of the Russian population.  
 
(1) Attitudes towards the Soviet past, i.e. Kazakhs’ and Russians’ feelings about their 
status in the USSR and their historical experiences and in general about the positive and 
negative aspects of their pre-independence life, are very revealing about their current 
identities. Perceptions of the past are often as important as external factors in revealing and 
forming identities. What emerged from my survey is a lot of similarities in the way my 
Kazakh and Russian respondents perceived the ‘positive’ side of the Soviet Union. There 
was a clear appreciation by both groups of many aspects of the Soviet economic and 
welfare policies, of the Soviet policy of internationalism and friendship of peoples and to a 
smaller degree of the Communist ideology. The latter aspect was usually brought up by the 
older respondents (in the age bracket between 30-65) who pointed to the unifying role of 
Lenin, Pioneers and Komsomol organisations and the CPSU. Notably, some Kazakh 
respondents stressed that Kazakhstan was part of a great superpower – the USSR and that 
Russians have had a positive influence on Kazakhs and Kazakhstan. A small number of 
Russians, on the other hand, stressed that Kazakhstan owed its sovereignty to the Soviet 
Union – a factor not mentioned by the Kazakhs.  
 
As for the negative attitudes, my Kazakh and Russian respondents differed considerably 
in their perceptions of the Soviet past and they placed different emphases on the national 
and cultural issues, regime factors and economic problems. Kazakhs, for example, were 
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mostly aggrieved by the policy of Russification which resulted in the loss of their national 
culture and language and by the state-sponsored policies of collectivisation, sedentarisation 
and purges, which affected the Kazakh nation both physically and mentally and reduced 
them to a minority in their national homeland. There was also some resentment of the 
numerous drawbacks of the Soviet regime such as censorship, lack of freedom of speech, 
the Soviet insularity (zakrytost’) from the rest of the world, and importantly, the ‘imperial’ 
set up between Kazakhstan and Russia, whereby all important decisions related to the 
republic were made in Moscow. The economic problems, which were covered only briefly, 
included the Soviet economy of shortages and the treatment of Kazakhstan as a ‘raw 
material appendage’ of Russia (syr’evoi pridatok Rossii). Russians, by contrast, 
disproportionately focused on the regime and economic factors and mentioned the 
nationality problems only briefly. Unlike Kazakhs, they did not ‘dwell’ on the national 
grievances and link them again and again to the regime set up and economic arrangements, 
but rather looked at these problems as they were constructed by the Kazakh elites or 
Kazakhs. This lack of insight (or insufficient insight) into the national problems of the 
Soviet era indicates, as G. Schöpflin (2000) suggested, that Russians were the dominant 
and state-bearing group of the Soviet Union, and similarly, Kazakhs’ excessive 
preoccupation with the national question points to their ex-minority status (see also 
Brubaker 1996, Doane, 1997). 
 
These findings show that for Kazakhs the past, like the external environment, is not yet an 
unqualified ‘hostile other’ determining their identity, but it may soon become so as feelings 
of injustice about the imperial past are increasingly used in political rhetoric. What we can 
see is that independence involves a reevaluation of the past: Kazakhs feel that the state 
‘helps’ them to re-evaluate the past and make them more comfortable and confident in the 
new political and socio-cultural environment, while Russians feel that the new state, in 
Igor Savin’s (2001) terms, ‘no longer exists for them’ and that they have to be on the 
defensive to protect what is left positive of their identity.  
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(2) With regard to ‘nationalising’ policies (to use Brubaker's term discussed in chapter 
two) I made an explicit analysis, based on primary sources, of the theory, operation and 
development of these policies in Kazakhstan in Chapter 4, in relation to the Kazakhstani 
national state project. I found that this project started with a very cautious approach to 
the character of citizenship, which can be termed broadly ‘civic’ or inclusive in character 
rather than strictly 'nationalising' in Brubaker's sense. Though Kazakh became the official 
state language, Russian continued to have a major practical status as the ‘language of 
interethnic communication’, and in terms of equality before the law in all major aspects of 
civic life there was no overt ‘nationalising’ discrimination. Nevertheless, from the start the 
‘civic’ project contained at its core an ‘ethno-national' concept of the state, in the sense 
that the state was viewed as the national homeland of the Kazakh people, which thus has a 
prior right to ‘ownership’ of the state and to the determination of its ‘national’ character, 
that is to introduce ‘nationalising’ policies in order to restore the perceived loss of 
historical status and cultural expression of the Kazakh people. In fact such restorative 
policies have been gradually implemented: the use of the Kazakh language has been 
gradually extended in administration and education; preference for Kazakhs in 
administration has increased; attempts have been made to increase the ethnic imbalance by 
encouraging in-migration of Kazakhs from other countries and not hindering the out-
migration of Russians; and in most national symbols Kazakh cultural features have been 
increasingly dominant. So while the legal aspects of the original civic project have not been 
radically changed, the actual character of civic life and the whole national ‘image’ of the 
state have been increasingly changed by de facto ‘nationalising’ policies. This is confirmed 
by the tone of Nazarbaev’s recent pronouncements on this question, revealing a much more 
confident assertion of Kazakh ethnic dominance in the character of the state.  
 
It is the reaction to these ‘nationalising’ changes by both Russians and Kazakhs which has 
significantly impacted their identities and which I tried to investigate in my survey. I 
grouped nationalising policies into: 1) language and educational issues; 2) economic and 
personnel issues; and 3) issues of Russian integration and loyalty.  
 
 235 
(1) Let us start with language use, which is usually regarded, particularly by Laitin (1998),  
as one of the key determinants or instruments of ethnonational identity. One of the key 
questions is the legal status of the two languages. The status of Kazakh is clear – it is the 
official state language. It is the status of Russian which is anomalous. At present the 
position is that Russian is as an official language, but not the state language. How did my 
respondents react to this position? As can be expected, 95 % of Russians wanted Russian to 
be the second state language alongside Kazakh. Interestingly, as many as 48% of Kazakhs 
agreed with this, reflecting the continued practical dominance in everyday life. But it must 
be said that my survey was based on urban areas in which the majority of Kazakhs had 
attended Russian schools and whose use of Russian was therefore significantly higher than 
in rural areas. However, another 48% of my Kazakh respondents did not want Russian to 
have the status of joint state language because they felt that there was a danger that Kazakh 
would be in effect swamped by Russian and that therefore the historical injustice of the 
diminution of the use of Kazakh would not be reversed. 
 
Perhaps even more significant is the question of education in these languages. Here there 
were some important changes in peoples’ attitudes. In the case of Russians the position is 
clear. Russians continued to send their children only to Russian-language schools. In the 
case of Kazakhs the position is more ambiguous. 58% of my Kazakh respondents were 
educated in Russian-language schools, although some of the younger respondents admitted 
that they changed from Russian to Kazakh schools half way through to improve their career 
prospects. Of the 58% over a third (36%) have started sending their children to Kazakh 
schools, though these parents come from Petropavlovsk, Astana and Almaty, while in 
Chimkent there was very little change in that most parents attended Kazakh-language 
schools and sent their children to Kazakh schools. One interesting finding was that there 
was a slight increase of 8% amongst parents who were educated in Kazakh schools, but 
have sent their children to Russian-language schools. However, most of these were from 
more Russified Almaty and Petropavlovsk and the parents indicated that they saw a 
knowledge of Russian as an advantage in terms of higher education and job prospects, 
especially as this did not threaten their fluent command of Kazakh.  
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With regard to higher education the controversial issue is whether Kazakh should be the 
normal language of instruction. Russians virtually unanimously felt that this would be a 
negative development because it would cut off Kazakhstani students from access to Russian 
educational material and exchange and severely inhibit Russian access to higher education. 
With regards to Kazakhs, interestingly, the great majority of them (80%) felt that there 
should not be a Kazakh language monopoly in higher education and that Russian-speakers 
should not be compelled to study in Kazakh. My respondents admitted that at the moment 
there was a great lack of advanced educational material in Kazakh such as textbooks and 
also a lack of experienced teachers at that level. As in other areas, Kazakhs can be seen to 
be very pragmatic and realistic in their understanding of the language status issue.  
 
One of the questions of my survey concerned what language would be predominantly 
spoken in Kazakhstan in 50 years time. Significantly, only a small number (11%) of 
Kazakhs thought that Kazakh would be the overwhelmingly predominant language, 
although rather more Russians (22%) were worried about this prospect. The overwhelming 
majority of Kazakhs (84%) and a substantial majority of Russians (62%) felt that both 
Kazakh and Russian would continue to be spoken in Kazakhstan [note correction]. But 
these percentages conceal considerable uncertainty particularly among Russians and 
Russian-speaking Kazakhs about the extent of the Russian language use in the future, if the 
current decline of the Russian population through emigration continues. My survey also 
revealed that while in the case of Russians the use of Russian at all levels remains a 
crucial part of their identity and continued status, most of them (80%) wanted their 
children to have a good knowledge of Kazakh as a second language to improve their job 
prospects and to help them adapt more comfortably to life in independent Kazakhstan. But 
in practice they contradicted this stated belief by sending their children to Russian-language 
schools. With regard to Kazakhs the position is more ambivalent. Half of them believed 
that Kazakh should remain the only second state language in order to defend and develop 
Kazakh culture, but realistically understood the continued use of Russian, particularly in 
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higher education as being inevitable, which once again reflected the provisional and 
ambivalent character of Kazakh cultural identity.  
 
To summarise, what my findings on attitudes to language and educational issues show is 
that for Kazakhs the issue of the status of the Kazakh language and its use in education is 
not yet such a crucial determinant of their new identity as we might expect from 
comparative studies. Russian is still used as the main public language by many Kazakhs 
and is still seen as the language of modernization which is more useful than Kazakh in 
higher education and the wider world. But at the same time there is a clear wish that 
Kazakh should have the status of the official state language and that Russian should have a 
subordinate, unofficial status. Of course, my survey was biased towards urban Kazakhs; for 
rural Kazakhs the use of Kazakh would be far higher and would have a stronger association 
with a dominant Kazakh status. For Russians, on the other hand, the increasing 
‘Kazakhisation’ of education and public life is a clear threat to their cultural status and 
reinforces the awareness of their subordinate 'minority' status, making clear their ‘cultural 
incongruence’ with Kazakhs, which may, as Schermerhorn suggests, create future tension 
and conflict.   
 
(2) My second category of nationalising policies, concerning economic and personnel 
issues, I found to be perhaps the most important. The overwhelming majority of Russians 
(80%) felt that being a Kazakh crucially affected job prospects, although some of them 
(5%) felt that this only applied to certain sectors, and all of them were from Almaty. With 
regard to Kazakhs as many as 42% admitted that ethnicity was important in career 
advancement, although some (17%) felt that this was only in certain sectors as government 
administration and important industries such as oil and gas. With regard to the perception 
of which group has  most benefited economically in independent Kazakhstan, I posed the 
question of which nationality has the highest percentage of wealthy people in the 
country. Overwhelmingly (85%) the Russians and to a lesser extent the Kazakhs (73%) felt 
that the Kazakhs had benefited most. However, over a third of Kazakhs (35%) and rather 
fewer Russians (25%) felt that Russians could also achieve economic success, particularly 
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in areas which did not compete with Kazakhs. Most Kazakhs (77%) and to a lesser extent 
Russians (55%) thought that other non-titular groups still have an opportunity of economic 
success. These data indicate that while Kazakhs feel more confident that their ethnic 
identity has become very important for their job prospects, Russians reluctantly accept this 
situation as representing the right of the titular group to operate in their own interests, but 
they resent the fact that Kazakh ethnicity and language make a difference in this way and 
that this is a fundamental obstacle preventing them from achieving career advancement in 
accordance with their skills. These two factors, ethnicity and language, associated with 
economic success, could be the most important factors consolidating identities at present 
and in the future.  
 
(3) With regard to my third category of group loyalty and integration of Russians within 
Kazakhstan, this also produced an interesting mixture of responses. One question was fairly 
clear cut. Virtually all Kazakhs thought that the borders of Russia should not be expanded 
to include ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan and this view was shared by most Russians 
(72%), although a minority of Russians (22%) were in favour of some sort of territorial 
alteration.  But in contrast to this my question about whether Russians of Kazakhstan are 
culturally and mentally closer to Kazakhs or to the Russians of Russia produced much 
more ambivalent responses. A large minority of Russians (40%) felt that they were closer 
to their Russian compatriots in Russia, although 20% felt that they were closer to Kazakhs 
(but most of these came from Chimkent). My Kazakh respondents clearly thought that 
Kazakhstani Russians had more in common with themselves (57%) than with Russians in 
Russia (26%). A substantial minority of both ethnic groups (17% of Kazakhs and 40% of 
Russians) felt that the Russians had a lot in common with both groups. In response to my 
question whether Kazakhstani Russians should be loyal to Kazakhstan of which they 
hold citizenship or to Russia, their historical homeland, naturally the overwhelming 
majority of Kazakhs (75%) felt that they should be loyal to Kazakhstan, although a 
significant minority (20%) felt that people should make up their own minds about where 
their primary loyalty lies. 54% of Russians felt that they should be loyal to Kazakhstan, but 
a significant minority (32%) thought that people should make up their own minds between 
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these loyalties. And a small number of both groups (4% of Kazakhs and 12% of Russians) 
felt that it was possible for Russians to be loyal to both countries. What these data show is 
that both groups agree that the primary loyalty of Kazakhstani Russians should be to 
Kazakhstan, but the Kazakhs show some understanding of the problems that Russians have 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union with establishing their new loyalties and are 
prepared to give them some leeway in deciding this question. They also show, interestingly, 
that a substantial proportion of both groups recognise quite a strong degree of ‘cultural 
congruence’ (in Schermerhorn’s terms) in the sense of shared values between the two 
groups, which, of course, mitigates identity differentiation and the potential for conflict. 
 
One fundamental issue affecting Russian ‘loyalty’ and integration is that of Russian out-
migration to the Russian Federation. While I did not have any direct question on the 
reasons for this out-migration, there was extensive material in my responses which cast 
much light on this issue. Most Kazakhs understood that with the emergence of 
independence of Kazakhstan from the break up of the Soviet Union, there was a clear status 
reversal between Kazakhs and Russians as the national homeland concept predominated in 
the organisation of the new successor states. Kazakhs believe that most Russians emigrated 
in the hopes of achieving greater economic prosperity in Russia or to be reunited with 
family members. Some Kazakhs drew attention to problems Russians faced in dealing with 
the nationalising policies, which we have discussed and even admitted that Kazakhs in rural 
areas and in the South put a lot of pressure on Russians to leave, although they also drew 
attention to the number of Russian returnees.  For Russians it was clearly the nationalising 
policies which were decisive particularly language and employment policies, which affect 
general life prospects for Russians. Some also drew attention to the difficulties of living 
amongst a declining Russian population and the resentful attitudes of some of the Kazakh 
intelligentsia and the majority of the Kazakh youth displayed towards Russians.  
 
To try to summarise the implications of my findings on external and internal factors 
for Russian and Kazakh identities. The Kazakhs were proud of their new independent 
status but still quite positively oriented towards Russia and understanding of the dilemmas 
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faced by the Russian population in Kazakhstan; they felt justified in taking restorative 
action through nationalising policies but were still ambivalent on the crucial issues of 
language and education. The Russians in Kazakhstan were more clearly aware of their 
subordinate status in the new state and attracted to Russia as a ‘motherland state’ and were 
concerned about increasing Kazakhisation in employment and education; but they 
supported the sovereignty of Kazakhstan and acknowledged the right of Kazakhs to 
determine the character of ‘their’ state. Nevertheless there were signs of hardening of 
attitudes on both sides, particularly in the less Russianised areas like Chimkent and 
amongst the older generation of Russians (geographical area and age group are the two 
most important factors limiting general statements). As more Russians are prepared to 
consider out-migration to Russia, Kazakhs become more doubtful of Russians’ loyalty to 
Kazakhstan. In general it is clear that a new stratified system of identities is taking shape, 
but Kazakhs are still not quite confident of their dominant status, while Russians already 
feel they have a clear subordinate position. 
 
8.2.2 Kazakh-Russian Interaction from the Late Soviet Period to 2004 
 
I have argued, first of all, that I have made a snapshot of how Kazakh and Russian 
identities were in 2003/ 2004 and I have tried to indicate the importance of various internal 
and external factors in these identities. It is important, however, in order to understand the 
significance of this snapshot, to see it against a developing historical context taken 
from the Soviet period onwards. For this I have used the various surveys, which were 
carried out in the periods both before and after independence and theoretical models of 
ethnonational interaction related to status and power.  
 
I argued above that both internal and external factors were important in the make-up and 
formation of national identity. However, what is usually left out of discussions of national 
identity is that the various ethnic groups in a country interact with one another, particularly 
in relation to access to political and economic power, and the resultant pattern of status 
stratification (domination and subordination) is a very important element in the make-up of 
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the identities of these groups. To elucidate this I turned to another body of theory, that on 
ethnic interaction, which was mainly developed to analyse social integration or conflict, 
but in fact can be helpfully applied to the study of development of identities. In chapter two 
I discussed the contributions made by Shibutani & Kwan, Hennayake, Horowitz and 
Schermerhorn in analysing the emergence and significance of ethnic stratification and how 
this relates to identity formation. However, it is also important to bear in mind the impact 
of external interaction on identity, and here Brubaker (with his ‘triadic’ interaction model, 
supplemented by G.Smith) has made an important contribution. Linking internal and 
external aspects I have also used A.Hirschman’s concepts of ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’, 
originally developed to explain behaviour of personnel in business concerns.  
 
I tried to apply the concepts and models of these theories to answer my second research 
question, which was how have Kazakh and Russian identities interacted in the period 
since independence and what mutual effects has that produced on their identities? To 
obtain a general picture of how Kazakhs and Russians have interacted in a longitudinal 
perspective, I employed Horowitz’s (1985) original model of ethnic stratification adapted 
by Juska (1999) and extrapolated my own two additional models from it – a 
transitional independence model and a consolidated independence model. The Juska 
model provided a very rough representation of proportion of power between Kazakhs and 
Russians in late Soviet Kazakhstan. What I found, as I argued in chapters 2 and 7, is that 
this model is not entirely satisfactory because while it presents the rough equality of 
Russians and Kazakhs at the top it does not accurately characterize the complexity of the 
dual power situation. That is, Russians were primarily concentrated in the sectors of 
strategic policy-making, such as the political, socio-ideological, economic and military 
spheres, while Kazakhs wielded power in the administrative and cultural spheres within 
‘their’ republic.   
 
Since Kazakhstan gained independence there has been a gradual shift from a Soviet pattern 
of ethnic stratification to a new pattern with ethnic Kazakhs at the top. That is, as one 
section of the dual power system that was dominated by Russians and Slavs was gradually 
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destroyed along with much of the influence, which its members wielded, the way became 
clear for the previously local Kazakh networks to assume control of the national and local 
administration. This trend was accompanied by the continuation of the Soviet patterns of 
ethnic stratification and the ambiguity that were still lingering in people’s minds, especially 
in the older Soviet generation, who have not come to terms with the changes and have not 
internalized new developments. 
 
These two trends – of gradual ethnification and continuation of patterns of Soviet ethnic 
stratification – are reflected in the ‘transitional independence model’ that I extrapolated 
from Juska’s model, and they have been also supported by a number of surveys that were 
carried out in Kazakhstan during the first ten years of independence. The survey of 
Malkova et al. (1999), for example, found that in the early to mid 1990s there was, to use 
Weber’s terms, a ‘naked class situation’ in the economic sector of Kazakhstan with only 
limited stratification by ethnic status. Similarly, in the political sphere the new regime, as 
we have seen, represented a mix of ethnocratic and consociational elements, which allowed 
Russians and Slavs to participate in government structures while ensuring that the state and 
its institutions remained under firm titular group control. The consociational arrangements, 
however, have been gradually waning since 1995 with the system being, in the view of 
some authors, completely dismantled by 2000 (Cummings, 2005). 
 
My small-scale survey both confirmed that there was a lot of confusion about how my 
Kazakh and Russian respondents perceived their identities and indicated that there has been 
a small qualitative shift towards a more clear-cut ethnic hierarchy with ethnic Kazakhs at 
the top, which is reflected in the transitional independence model. To obtain a general 
picture of where Kazakh and Russian identities were in 2003/2004 and an idea of the ethnic 
stratification or the social standing of ethnic groups in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, I employed 
Pineo’s (1998) scales of social standing of ethnic groups. My survey has revealed that the 
overwhelming majority of the Kazakh and Russian respondents (71% and 82% 
respectively) believed that Kazakhs had the highest social standing in Kazakhstani society, 
although these results were less decisive in the North than in the South. In Petropavlovsk a 
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small number of Kazakhs and Russians  (4% and 2% respectively) thought that Russians 
carried the most prestige as a group. This was not the case in Astana, Almaty or Chimkent. 
Interestingly, a considerable number of Kazakhs and Russians (26% and 12%) were 
convinced that Kazakhs and Russians shared the most prestigious social position in 
Kazakhstan, which reflects the continuing, although diminishing influence of Soviet 
institutions and the Soviet dual power system. Russians, however, were less inclined to 
think this way, which points to their anticipation of a diminished role in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan.  
 
The above findings show that the Soviet pattern of ethnic stratification has not been 
completely dismantled yet and the perception of some of my respondents that Kazakhs and 
Russians shared the highest social standing in Kazakhstan is a prime example of it. There 
is, however, some indication that Kazakhs and Russians are gradually reconsidering the 
Soviet structure of dominance/subordination and are moving towards a new ethnic 
hierarchy with ethnic Kazakhs at the top. This process is virtually complete in Chimkent 
and is still largely in flux in Petropavlovsk, Astana and Almaty. 
 
In addition to tracing the general trends in the shift from the Soviet to the post-Soviet 
situation by using my adaptations of the Horowitz-Juska model, I tried to map particular 
patterns and sequences of ethnocultural interaction between Kazakh and Russian 
identities over time by applying Schermerhorn’s models of social domination and 
legitimacy perceptions, power differentials and cultural congruence, and reciprocal goal 
definition. Although these models, as argued in chapters 2 and 7, do not accurately account 
for the dual character of the Soviet power/ legitimacy structure and are primarily intended 
to analyse the constitutive elements of social integration rather than the emergence of 
identities, nevertheless Schermerhorn’s perspectives clearly have a strong impact on 
identity and I found them in many respects to be illuminating.  
 
Schermerhorn’s first model relating to social domination and legitimacy perceptions 
argues that the degree to which both dominant and subordinate groups view social 
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domination as legitimate indicates the degree of social cohesion and integration. From the 
identity viewpoint this means that when the pattern of social domination and stratification 
is accepted as legitimate by both dominant and subordinate groups it tends to weaken or 
blunt their identities, but if it is considered illegitimate then this tends to cause more 
interaction between the groups and produces stronger polarization of identities (they 
become ‘hostile others’). As argued in chapter 7, during the later Soviet period Kazakhs 
and Russians viewed their status positions as partly legitimate, making an imperfect 
accommodation possible. These perceptions were sustained by the Soviet federal structure, 
whereby Russians dominated in all the major military, security, top party spheres, while 
Kazakhs wielded power in the administrative and cultural spheres. Ultimately at the 
national level the Russians had a greater status and power, but in terms of the effect on 
people’s lives in the republic the Kazakhs, as a ‘titular’ group of the Kazakh SSR, had a 
considerable and growing amount of power, even though they were not visible at the top of 
the Soviet power hierarchy. 
 
In the early post-independence period there was little or no polarization of identities 
because people still accepted the Russian dominance of culture and language in society and 
because Russian played a crucial role in the economy. This, however, started to change 
gradually as Kazakhs viewed their new status and the right to determine the character of the 
new state as ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’, while Russians had come to understand that their 
power had been de-legitimated and that they had to come to terms with their new minority 
status and ultimately be subordinate to Kazakh language and culture. These patterns of 
gradual mutual adjustment of the two groups to new statuses and perceptions of their 
legitimacy can be seen in the survey material of 1994 to 2003 and are also illustrated in the 
findings of my surveys of 2003-4. My findings made clear that while many Kazakhs are 
still not confident of the reality and legitimacy of their new status as the ‘state-bearing’ 
group, they are increasingly assertive of their right to achieve this status, while most 
Russians seem to reluctantly accept the legitimacy of the Kazakhs post-independence 
status, though they find it difficult to come to terms with their own newly subordinate 
position. In particular my findings on the impact of ‘nationalising policies’ showed that 
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Russians were worried by Kazakh dominance of political and cultural life, while Kazakhs 
were increasingly confident in the legitimacy of these policies, encouraging a 
corresponding consolidation of their statuses and identities. 
 
Schermerhorn’s second model relating to power differentials and cultural congruence, 
can throw much light on the social interaction of this period and is reflected in my survey 
findings of 2003-4. Schermerhorn’s point was that if the cultural congruence between the 
dominant and subordinate groups of a state's population is low (i.e., where they belong to 
very different cultures) then social integration will be more difficult. From the identity 
point of view this means that where the cultural values which differentiate the various 
groups are increasingly stressed, their identities will be more easily consolidated. It is clear 
that the Kazakh and Russian languages and cultural traditions are very different, and this 
was to an extent recognised in the Soviet system, which encouraged local languages and 
the use of local personnel (korenizatsiya) in the republics, but these differences were 
overlaid by the dominance of Russian language and culture, and Russian personnel, at the 
top (USSR) level of the power system. This linkage between cultural incongruence and 
power differentials should, on Schermerhorn’s model, produce an unstable and potentially 
conflictual situation, and this was perhaps reflected in the growth of Kazakh power in the 
republic in the later Brezhnev period. 
 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union there has been a gradual shift from the Soviet 
dual power structure to the post-Soviet single power structure  (i.e. large power 
differentials between groups) whereby Kazakhs have come to dominate in all spheres of 
economy and polity. In the immediate post-independence period the Russian dominance of 
culture persisted, with surveys indicating a lack of confidence by Kazakhs in asserting their 
culture and continued attachment to the ‘imperial’ modernising culture. But my findings 
showed that by 2003-4 this was changing. Despite some continuing doubts and 
uncertainties Kazakhs were becoming more confident in implementing ‘nationalising 
policies’ in the cultural area to assert the dominance of their group in determining the 
character of the nation. As we saw in chapter 4 this cultural dominance was built in to the 
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constitutional description of the state and led to an increasing emphasis on the 
encouragement of Kazakh language and culture. By the time of my survey it was obvious 
that both groups were moving further apart culturally, leading to a greater differentiation 
of their identities. However my findings also showed, interestingly, that a significant 
proportion of both groups felt that Russians in Kazakhstan had more in common with 
Kazakhs than with Russians in the Russian Federation, suggesting that cultural polarisation 
was far from absolute (see p.236 above). 
 
Schermerhorn’s third model relating to reciprocal goal definition argues that social 
integration is more likely if, despite cultural differences between dominant and subordinate 
groups, they could share many key goals for the society. Clearly also differences in group 
identities will be fewer and less conflictual where they share strong societal values and 
goals (Schermerhorn was undoubtedly thinking of the USA as an example of this). During 
the Soviet period there were very clear shared societal goals which potentially united 
Kazakhs and Russians, even though these goals were arguably imposed in an ‘imperial’ 
manner without free discussion and assent. Much emphasis was placed on integration of the 
various cultures through unifying ideological instruction. Many of these goals and values of 
the Soviet system became deeply imbedded in the cultures of its peoples, so that in the 
immediate post-Soviet period many aspects of Soviet life and the ‘modernising’ impact of 
its system continued to be valued, even though as a political and economic system it had 
collapsed before independence. As I have described in chapter 4, after Kazakhstan gained 
independence Kazakhs held out an offer of a project of a different shared value system with 
different subordinate and dominant statuses, but one they hoped everybody might accept, 
which was that Kazakhs determine the character of the state as Kazakhs, but all other ethnic 
groups had a place within it as fully legitimate citizens. This attempt to substitute the Soviet 
shared project by a new Kazakhstani national project fairly soon got into difficulties, 
because it struck no chord with the Russians. As my findings in chapter 6 showed, Russians 
were not prepared to accept the dominance of Kazakh culture and language and while they 
might agree that Kazakhs had a ‘primordial’ right to determine the character of the state, 
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they were not prepared to follow that up by an interest in Kazakh culture and language. The 
Kazakh response was disappointment and resentment and increasing ethnicisation.  
 
My findings of 2003-4 showed that Kazakhs and Russians at the time of my survey had 
developed increasingly different goal orientations. Although I found that Kazakhs 
continued to value several aspects of the Soviet past and its values (welfarism and industrial 
modernisation and urbanisation in particular) they were increasingly questioning its 
‘imperial’ character, the suppression of Kazakh culture and its political autonomy. With the 
increasing assertion of ‘nationalising policies’ the societal goals of the new state became 
different from the old Soviet state and I found that Kazakhs were becoming more confident 
in asserting them. Since these goals were largely associated with the ‘Kazakh’ nature of the 
state and the right of the Kazakhs to direct it, this was likely to stimulate alienation in the 
newly subordinate Russian population, which clearly emerged from my surveys. As their 
shared goals decreased, so the cultural identities of the two main interacting groups 
became more sharply differentiated. This was reflected in the increasing doubts both 
groups had about the integration and loyalty of the Russian population, doubts which were 
justified by the high level of Russian emigration, creating the emergence of a 'hostile other' 
situation, in which identities typically consolidate rapidly.  
 
To summarise my findings in relation to my second research question, my adaptations 
of the Horowitz-Juska ethnic stratification model offered a useful general map of the 
changing power and status relationships between the ethnic groups from the Soviet to the 
post-Soviet periods. By applying Schermerhorn’s taxonomies of ethnic dominant-
subordinate stratification it was possible to trace the salience of legitimacy, cultural 
congruence and shared goals as determinants of status, and therefore identity, 
differentiation, reflected in the attitudes of my respondents. This tended to confirm my 
conclusion on the first research question that a new ‘ranked’ ethnic stratification is taking 
shape in Kazakhstan but that it is not yet fully consolidated for either group. As we 
discussed in chapter 2 and 7 Horowitz and Schermerhorn also suggest a series of causative 
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variables which help to explain these trends and patterns of interaction. We shall consider 
these in the next section.  
 
8.2.3 Explaining the Interaction and Development of Kazakh and Russian Identities 
 
My third research question was: why have Kazakh and Russian identities interacted 
in the way they have done, or why after nearly 14 years of independence both Kazakh and 
Russian identities are still quite uncertain and in many respects unclear even though in both 
cases they are showing signs of coalescence? As I argued in the Introduction, questions of 
identity and especially of the development and interaction of identities cannot be 
approached with the classic social science testing of one or two variables, and in any case 
such a rigorous methodology would hardly be possible in the circumstances of 
contemporary Kazakhstan. Rather we need a broader, multi-factoral approach, more 
characteristic of history or social anthropology, to understand and explain the complexities 
of this phenomenon. Two groups of explanations can possibly help to illuminate the 
situation. These include (1) historical or pre-independence factors and (2) factors of the 
post-independence period related to the features of the political and economic transition. 
It has to be noted, that these answers can only be tentative as it is impossible to provide 
clear proof of any of the proposed explanations. Given the complexity of the phenomenon 
of national identity and the number of factors involved, it is difficult to test and prove them 
in a precise way. All I can do here is to make some suggestions of probabilities, which 
together make an attempt to explain or clarify the trends in identity development. 
 
As for the historical explanations, there are certain long-term factors, which still have 
salience for identity development in Kazakhstan. These were often referred to by my 
respondents, both Kazakh and Russian, but not in a way which could serve as a direct 
explanation of the character and development of their identities. So they formed more the 
indispensable background to the analysis of these identities.  
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As was pointed out in chapter two, transition theorists have often stressed the importance 
of understanding the ‘prior regime type’ of a country in transition because of the impact 
this has on the character and pace of the transition. Linz and Stepan (1996) created a 
typology of four non-democratic regimes (authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-
totalitarianism and sultanism), explaining the different sets of problems such regimes posed 
for the development of democracy. As was pointed out, this typology does not adequately 
explain the developments of identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, since it takes no account 
of the syndrome of post-imperialism, and ‘post-totalitarian’ is not a useful label for the 
whole of the USSR in the 1980s because of the very different characteristics of power 
relationships in the fifteen Union Republics which had evolved in the Brezhnev period (e.g. 
contrasting the democratic-oriented Baltic republics with the authoritarian-traditional 
character of Central Asia). But the idea of the ‘prior regime type’ can be usefully 
applied to explain transition in identity-formation as they used it to explain problems in 
developing democratic transition, in the sense of long-term background factors, which 
formed important constraints for the development of identity. These can be briefly 
summarised as follows. 
 
The striking thing about both Kazakh and Russian identities in Kazakhstan in the 
immediate pre-independence period was their ambivalence and incompleteness. As 
discussed in chapter three, the formation of a unified Kazakh national identity was, 
ironically, largely the result of Soviet structures (the quasi-federal system) and policies 
(sedentarisation, collectivisation, settler in-migration) and was still incomplete in that 
earlier clan and regional loyalties were still important and because Kazakh national identity 
could not be fully expressed within the framework of the Soviet power system. The ‘titular’ 
Kazakh nationality was nominally dominant within the boundaries of the Kazakh SSR and 
during the Brezhnev period Kazakhs had accumulated considerable power in the 
administrative structures of the republic, but at the same time it was rooted in and 
hierarchically subordinated to the Slavic-dominated overall power structure. But the 
Russian national identity in Kazakhstan was also ambivalent and limited, in the sense that, 
while they formed part of the Russian cultural and political dominance of the whole USSR, 
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firstly, the USSR was never openly declared to be a Russian national state and the RSFSR’s 
role in this respect was very partial and, secondly, within the Kazakh SSR Russians had to 
co-exist with an increasingly cohesive and powerful ‘titular’ Kazakh nationality. As 
discussed in chapter 7 (when this situation was fitted into the interaction models of 
Horowitz/ Juska and Schermerhorn), the stratification relationships (dominance-
subordination) of both ethnic groups were complex and provisional and varied between 
different sectors of life and this meant that their identities were also ambivalent. This needs 
to be borne in mind when we discuss the status-reversal in power relationships, which is 
gradually producing new identities in the post-independence period, since it probably 
accounts for the continued ambivalence of their identities.  
 
As for the post-independence or transition factors, these could be divided into (a) 
general factors determining ethnic interaction; (b) political transition which includes a post-
imperial element to it; (c) economic transition and (c) international factors.  
 
First, let us deal with the general factors determining ethnic interaction suggested by 
Schermerhorn and Horowitz. Strictly speaking these are factors, which applied both to pre-
independence and post independence periods, but they are most relevant for the post-
independence period. As we showed above, these factors shed considerable light on the 
processes of ethnic interaction and the trends of its development. The question of the 
decline in shared values and the consequent ethnicisation and increased cultural dissonance 
is one which concerned many of my respondents. The declared ‘ownership’ of the newly 
independent state by the Kazakhs and the nationalizing policies which have promoted the 
dominance of their language and culture have demonstrated to the Russians their 
subordinate and almost alien status within the country. Secondly, as a result of this, the 
increasing exclusion of Russians from the central career structure of the state and from a 
defining role in determining the character of the state is a major factor in persuading 
Russians to emigrate or to maintain a defensive separate social position within the state. 
With regard to the degree of legitimacy of dominant group power, Russians partly 
recognize the right of the indigenous group to determine the character of the state, but find 
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it difficult to come to terms with the delegitimation of their own social position within that 
state. These factors together, along with the longer-term factors which we shall shortly 
discuss, have greatly influenced the new patterns of domination and subordination between 
ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.  
 
Turning to explanations offered by theories of transition, political transition theory has 
suggested that national unity is necessary to achieve a successful democratic transition 
(Rustow, 1970, Dahl, 1989; Miller, 1996, Canovan, 1996, Linz & Stepan, 1996) and that 
democratic transition is much more difficult, although not impossible, to achieve in multi-
ethnic states because politics tends to become highly politicised and develop into ethnic 
differences (Linz & Stepan, 1996, Snyder, 1998). In other words, in democratising multi-
ethnic states there is a potentially high risk of ethnic conflict and identity problems because 
both the majority group and the minorities are given the opportunity to voice their opinions, 
to form parties around their opinions and to push their points of view which would lead to 
conflicts in words, if not in war. This has the effect of coalescing the identities very rapidly 
as various groups try to differentiate themselves from the competing or ‘hostile’ other in an 
open system.  
 
The Kazakhstani case, arguably, fits in well with the democratisation transition theories 
because there has been no fully-fledged democratic transition and therefore the contentious 
bargaining and competition that democratisation brings have not been allowed. Hence 
Kazakh and Russian identities remained relatively uncertain and unconsolidated. On the 
other hand, however, in the states which remain authoritarian and have not made a full 
transition to democracy, there is still an increase in identity problems because in the new 
state the elites have to establish a new identity and authority and in doing so they set up a 
reaction with other minorities’ identities, although this reaction is suppressed. That is, the 
expectation from transition literature is that even in the case of an imperfect transition, the 
problems of ethnic and national identities become more salient. This seems to be the case in 
Kazakhstan, although the process has been more gradual and less extreme than in other 
Central Asian states.  
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Rather than through democratic bargaining, both the Kazakh majority and the Russian 
minority have, as my discussion of my findings above in 8.2.2 showed, reacted to the 
nationalising policies and practices and the ‘internationalist’ rhetoric of the new elites, 
which have had in the one case a stimulating and in the other case a dampening effect on 
their identities and encouraged their partial consolidation. Moreover, in Hirschman’s terms, 
the ‘voice’ option has been very limited for both the Kazakh majority and Russian 
minorities in the sense that both groups did not have the chance to interact with each other 
and exchange opinions on a mass level (the ‘battles’ were fought mainly in the narrow 
academic circles, some local newspapers and on internet sites). This also meant that 
Russian minorities, unlike their Russian counterparts in the Baltic states, have not been able 
to agitate for their rights on the basis of national or international human or civic rights 
legislation, but rather have been forced to consider the option of out-migration from 
Kazakhstan or loyalty to the new state, however imperfect.   
 
Thus, the lack of democratic transition in Kazakhstan has meant that in the short-term both 
Kazakhs and Russians did not have means of open expression and competition and hence 
their identities remained less clearly differentiated and consolidated, but that in the longer 
term the non-democratic ethnicisation of the state has tended to consolidate identies. 
Indeed, some political theorists have argued that in the long-term authoritarianism offers no 
solution to ethnic diversity within a state, but puts conflicts on a long fuse (Snyder, 1998) 
and it gradually strengthens ethno-national identities. But it could also be argued that in the 
long-term authoritarianism can at least partly dampen the discontent of minorities, and 
soften their ethnic identities, provided there is an ‘exit’ option available for the disgruntled 
minority members and provided that the remaining minority members accept the legitimacy 
of the empowered group’s new status and adapt their expectations to the new situation.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, one important aspect of transition in post-Soviet states is their post-
imperial character. This has not always been given sufficient importance as a distinctive 
type of ‘prior regime type’ in the well-known typologies, such as that of Linz and Stepan, 
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though it is clearly related to the post-authoritarian type.  I believe that the comparative 
literature on the ‘post-imperial’ or ‘post-colonial’ states provides additional important 
insights into the particular trajectories of identities in Kazakhstan. While the description of 
the USSR as an ‘empire’ and its Union republics as ‘colonies’ is not uncontroversial, it is 
clear that in its subordination of local cultures and personnel to the needs and direction of 
the Russian- (or Slavic-) dominated, centralised and authoritarian state Kazakhstan’s 
experience can usefully be described as ‘post-imperial’ (Beissinger, 1995, Smith, 1998). 
This literature shows that, after gaining independence, newly empowered elites, if they 
have not emerged from a long national liberation struggle or civil war (which polarises and 
thus consolidates identities more quickly), are often very cautious and for long somewhat 
deferential towards their former imperial masters and uncertain about their own ‘national’ 
culture and the character which should be given to the state which they have inherited, in 
particular as its boundaries were devised in the interests of the former imperial power and 
many members of the formerly dominant ‘imperial’ people are still resident in the country 
and perform vital economic roles. The peaceful and rather reluctant character of 
Kazakhstan’s acquisition of independence fits well into this pattern. However, it is also 
clear from the comparative literature that, as the stability of the state and its government 
becomes established, and if it is not challenged by external aggression or internal strife, the 
dominant elite and its associated ethnic group gain a greater confidence in asserting their 
own culture and start to exhibit a more aggressive and critical view of their previous 
‘imperial’ history and a greater determination to restore the dominant status which they see 
as a right, with the resultant downgrading of the rights and status of the ‘post-imperial’ 
groups still living in the country.  
 
In the findings of my survey we see these feelings increasingly clearly reflected, 
particularly amongst younger people and in the less Russianised areas of the country, in the 
newly dominant and subordinate ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. We also see that ideas of 
imperial exploitation, or at any rate injustice are increasingly used in the political rhetoric 
of the dominant group. Thus, while the absence of real democratic transition, with its open 
contestation between freely formed political parties, which tend to be ethnicised in a multi-
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ethnic country, helps to explain the rather slow assertion and re-stratification of 
Kazakhstan's ethnic identities, the imperial/colonial character of the country’s ‘prior regime 
type’ helps to explain the difficulties which the new titular group have faced in determining 
and asserting their newly independent identity and which the formerly dominant group have 
had in understanding and accepting the changed character of their situation. 
 
With regard to economic transition it has to be said that there has been very little research 
or even discussion about the impact of the character of economic transition on ethnic 
identities. But it is clear that very rapid ‘shock-therapy’ transition with its dramatic social 
effects (regional economic shifts, unemployment, increase in poverty) can, in a multi-ethnic 
country, polarise a population along ethnic lines, which, like political contestation, rapidly 
consolidates ethnic identities. In the case of Kazakhstan, however, a much more gradual, if 
persistent, approach was adopted which continued for a long time to give the Russian 
population a strong economic role, which has thus diminished their need for a strong ethnic 
‘voice’, as has their access to the possibility of emigration to Russia. However, it is clear 
from the responses to my survey, in which particularly Russian fears about their increasing 
exclusion from key career structures are clearly expressed, that with the gradual 
development of Kazakhstan’s potentially rich economy one may anticipate that economic 
factors will have an increasing long-term effect on the development of identities, as the 
various groups struggle to gain advantage from economic development. 
 
International factors (3) have also been very important in the development of 
Kazakhstan’s identities. Relations with the ‘homeland’ state (in Brubaker’s terms), i.e. the 
Russian Federation, have been crucial. On the one hand Nazarbaev has been very careful to 
cooperate closely with Russia and to be initially very conciliatory to Kazakhstan’s Russian 
population, while on the other Russia has offered a safety net for discontented Russians in 
Kazakhstan to emigrate without much difficulty to the Russian Federation, thus providing 
an ‘exit’ option which weakens the ‘voice’ pressure (in Hirschman’s terms) which would 
otherwise have built up amongst Russians. Likewise Russia has made no territorial claims 
on Kazakhstan or attempted to undermine the loyalties of the Russian population (unlike in 
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the Baltic states), and therefore has not served as the ‘threatening’ type of ‘homeland state’ 
which Brubaker’s scenario implies. At the same time in more recent years the confidence of 
Kazakhstan’s political elite in its long-term economic prospects and in its independent 
international status (e.g., in chairing the OSCE in 2010) has increased and with it its 
internal emphasis on Kazakh culture and values, which is gradually intensifying the 
‘nationalising’ stance to which both Kazakhs and Russians are responding. The attitudes of 
my respondents, as discussed above in 8.2.2, confirm the salience of these factors in the 
development of their identities.  
 
Thus in terms of my analytical framework this complex of historical factors (‘prior regime 
type’), transition theories and international interaction theories have been helpful in 
contributing to an explanation of my findings concerning the character and developmental 
trends of Kazakhstan's identities. 
 
8.3 Scholarly Contributions and Further Research 
 
It is hoped that the arguments and data presented in this thesis have made three distinctive 
contributions to the study of ethnic and national identities in Kazakhstan. The first one is 
the theoretical analysis, a synthesis of several theoretical literatures and approaches 
(theories of nationalism and ethnicity, transition theories, theories of ethnic interaction and 
stratification, post-imperialism, etc.), which I brought together in Chapter 2 into an overall 
analytical framework for interpreting my empirical data. To my knowledge this is the first 
time these approaches and literatures have been presented in this way to interpret the 
development of ethnic and national identities (in particular theories of transition and ethnic 
stratification, as well as Hirschman’s ‘strategies’, have not been used in this way before), 
and it is hoped that this theoretical framework and review makes a contribution to the study 
of ethnic and national identity. I also hope to have made a contribution to understanding 
differences between Soviet/post-Soviet and standard western academic approaches to the 
central concepts of ethnicity and nationalism. 
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The second contribution is the material on the national-state project of Kazakhstan, 
presented in chapter 4, which is based on the original primary sources – speeches, 
documents, books, etc.  This primary material has enabled me to better understand the 
developing character of official policy in this area and explain to some extent the character 
of the Kazakh and Russian response to these policies.  
 
The third contribution is my own survey material and the analysis of substantive data. 
Specifically, I have collected and analysed data of more recent date than most surveys and 
which are based on in-depth and wide-ranging interviews, which reveal much more about 
the complexity and uncertainty of identity perceptions of both Russians and Kazakhs than 
other previous mass surveys. These data have helped me to establish the details and the 
trends of ethnic identity interaction and identify the emergence of important differences 
from the findings of previous surveys (Masanov (1996), etc.), which indicate that the trend 
of strengthening of both Kazakh and Russian identities is emerging more clearly in recent 
years.  
 
Of course I have to acknowledge that there are limitations to my research data and 
analytical framework. Specifically, the range of my survey is much narrower than that of 
the mass surveys both geographically and socially and I was not able to devise a survey, 
which could satisfactorily investigate every aspect of national identity in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan and interview as many respondents as some authors did who conducted mass 
surveys on the same subject. Similarly, although my analytical framework is composed of 
numerous insights from different literatures, this makes it difficult to establish clear lines of 
causation. That said I have to stress that identity formation is a very complex phenomenon 
in which single-cause explanations would be insufficient and in which no line of 
explanation can be conclusively proved. All we can hope to do here is to provide some 
insights into the probable reasons for the patterns and trends that have been identified. 
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My thesis mainly dealt with the issues of a transitional period, a period of uncertainty and 
flux in the sphere of national identities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Now Kazakhstan enters 
a very important stage in its development. If in the early years of independence the Kazakh 
leadership moved very cautiously in order to keep both Kazakh and Russian groups on side, 
now it has become much more confident and nationalistic in its governmental policies. This 
in turn may cause greater and speedier consolidation of both Kazakh and Russian identities 
given that the political agendas have become much clearer and the onset of oil revenues 
made the elites more confident in asserting Kazakh identity. In this respect the future 
research can focus on a period where there will be a much stronger nationalizing state and 
where the interaction between various identities are likely to be much sharper than anything 
I particularly dealt with, while there will also be probably increasing ethnic differentiation 
in class terms as economic development increases.   
 
It should also be noted that it is very difficult to carry out empirical research on identities in 
the political circumstances of contemporary Kazakhstan and this partly accounts for the 
under-researched nature and evolution of Kazakhstani identities. This, however, raises 
interesting comparative issues for the study of ethnic interaction. For example, it would be 
interesting to know whether the Kazakhstani model which I have presented is 
representative of other post-Soviet Central Asian states and thus whether there is emerging 
a distinctive ‘Central Asian’ model of ethnic interaction which differs from that of other 
areas of the post-Soviet space (the Baltic states, the Slavic states, the Caucasus). It would 
also be interesting to apply the distinctive features of my analytical framework to these 
other post-Soviet areas and to see whether common state-building and ethnic-stratification 
patterns can be established. Other possible areas of research could look at the theoretical 
and empirical issues of nationhood and nationality in Kazakhstan, at the differences 
between Western and Soviet/post-Soviet concepts and at their impact on both the official 
national identity project, on the academic debates within this area and on the general mass 
of the population. 
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APPENDIX 1 – DETAILS OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Details of Kazakh respondents 
 
Petropavlovsk # 1 age 24, gender: male, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: Almatinskaya 
obl., education: higher, profession: TV presenter. 
 
Petropavlovsk #  2 age: 28, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Petropavlovskaya obl., education: higher, profession: lecturer of Russian language and 
literature 
 
Petropavlovsk # 3 age: 32, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk, education: higher, profession: doctor. 
 
Petropavlovsk # 4 age: 20, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Severokazahstanskaya obl., education: incomplete higher, profession: student 
 
Petropavlovsk # 5 age: gender: 20, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: Petropavlovsk, 
education: incomplete higher, profession: secretary 
 
Petropavlovsk # 6 age: 21, gender: male, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Severokazahstanskaya obl., education: vocational, incomplete higher, profession: lawer’s 
assistant 
 
Petropavlovsk # 7 age: 25, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: Pavlodar, 
education: higher, profession: surgeon. 
 
Petropavlovsk # 8 age: 55, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Petropavlovskaya obl., education: vocational, profession: director of the private enterprise. 
 
Petropavlovsk # 9 age: 39, gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: 
Petropavlovskaya obl., education: higher; profession: doctor 
 
 
Astana # 1 age: 50; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: state structure, high level 
 
Astana # 2 age: 18; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
incomplete higher; profession: student 
 
Astana # 3 age: 41; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: company director 
 
Astana # 4 age: 27; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Akmolinskaya obl; 
education: vocational; profession: café assistant 
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Astana # 5 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Semipalatinsk; 
education: higher; profession: primary teacher 
 
Astana # 6 age: 26; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Semipalatinsk; 
education: vocational; profession: nurse 
 
Astana # 7 age: 27; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Northern Kazakhstan; 
education: vocational; profession: factory worker  
 
Astana # 8 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: South-Kazakhstan 
obl.; education: higher; profession: civil servant, lawer 
 
Astana # 9 age: 53; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Akmolinskaya obl.; 
education: vocational; profession: secretary in the civil service 
 
Astana # 10 age: 25; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Semipalatinsk; 
education: higher; profession: lawer 
 
 
Almaty # 1 age: 33; gender: female, nationality: Kazakh, place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession architect-designer, painter 
 
Almaty # 2 age: 34; gender male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Aktyubinsk; 
education: higher; profession: teacher of painting and technical drawing 
 
Almaty #  3 age: 29; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: translator  
 
Almaty #  4 age 27; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Kyzylordinskaya 
obl.; education: higher; profession: civic servant, middle level. 
 
Almaty # 5  age: 30; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Taldykurgan; 
education: higher; profession: civil servant, middle level; journalist 
 
Almaty # 6 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: pianist, musician, teacher of music 
 
Almaty # 7 age: 38; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Petropavlovsk; 
education: higher; profession: HR manager  
 
Almaty # 8 age: 42; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Aktyubinskaya obl.; 
education: higher; profession: lecturer at the university 
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Almaty # 9 age: 28; gender: female; nationality Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: lecturer at the University 
 
Almaty # 10 age: 28; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; 
education: higher; profession: teacher of Russian language and literature 
 
Almaty #  11 age: 63; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: South Kazakhstan 
obl.; education: higher; profession: pensioner, former diplomat 
 
Almaty #  12 age: 54; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth Kustaniskaya obl.; 
education: higher; profession: civil servant, engineer-electrician 
 
Almaty #  13 age: 22; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almatinskaya 
obl.; education: higher; profession: secretary in civil service 
 
Almaty #  14 age: 43; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; 
education: higher; profession: civil servant, HR, finance. 
 
Almaty #  15 age: 4; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Dzhambulskaya 
obl.; education: higher; profession: businessman 
 
Almaty #  16 age: 28; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Kustanaiskaya obl.; 
education: higher; profession: marketing manager 
 
Almaty # 17 age: 46; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; 
education: higher; profession: civil servant – middle level 
 
Almaty #18 age: 47; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Almaty; 
education: higher; profession: secretary 
 
 
Chimkent # 1 age: 25; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Chimkentskaya 
obl; education: higher; profession: engineer-programmer 
 
Chimkent # 2 age: 18; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: vocational; profession: computer assistant 
 
Chimkent # 3 age: 62; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: higher; profession: GP, lecturer at the university 
 
Chimkent # 4 age: 23; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: South Kazakhstan 
obl.; education: incomplete higher; profession: student, nurse 
 
Chimkent # 5 age: 21; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Aktyubinskaya 
obl.; education: incomplete higher; profession: student, nurse 
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Chimkent # 6 age: 36; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Tadjikistan; 
education: higher; profession: teacher of Russian language and literature 
 
Chimkent # 7 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: higher; profession: civil service 
 
Chimkent # 8 age: 22; gender: Kazakh; nationality: incomplete higher; place of birth: 
Atyrau; education: incomplete higher; profession: student 
 
Chimkent # 9 age: 18; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: Tajikistan; 
education: incomplete higher; profession: student, dentist 
 
Chimkent # 10 age: 31; gender: male; nationality: Kazakh; place of birth: South 
Kazakhstan oblast; education: higher; profession: accountant 
 
 
 
Details of Russian respondents 
 
Petropavlovsk # 1 age: 53; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk; education: higher; profession: primary school teacher 
 
Petropavlovsk # 2 age: 81; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Troitsk, 
Russia; education: vocational; profession: pensioner, ex-military 
  
Petropavlovsk # 3 age: 55; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavkovsk ; education: higher; profession: businessman, manager  
 
Petropavlovsk # 4 age: 49; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: North-
Kazakhstan region; education: higher; profession: doctor 
 
Petropavlovsk # 5 age: 32; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk; education: vocational; profession: worker 
 
Petropavlovsk # 6 age: 21; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk; education: higher; profession: fireman,  
 
Petropavlovsk # 7 age: 22; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk; education: vocational; profession: nurse 
 
Petropavlovsk # 8 age: 25; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: 
Petropavlovsk; education: vocational; profession: barperson 
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Astana # 1 age: 56; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Russia; education: 
higher; profession: civil service, high level 
 
Astana # 2 age: 53; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Akmola; education: 
higher; profession: company director 
 
Astana # 3 age: 51; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: engineer 
 
Astana # 4 age: 33; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: company manager 
 
Astana # 5 age: 35; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Pavlodar; 
education: higher; profession: manager 
 
Astana # 6 age: 53; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Russia; education: 
higher; profession: civil service, middle level 
 
Astana # 7 age: 54; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth:  Karaganda; 
education: higher; profession: doctor 
 
Astana # 8 age: 52; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Pavlodar ; 
education: manager; profession: company manager 
 
Astana # 9 age: 54; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Pavlodar; education: 
higher; profession: civil service, high level 
 
Astana # 10 age: 23; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Petropavlovsk; 
education: vocational; profession: nurse 
 
 
Almaty # 1 age: 46; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: 
higher; profession: civil service, middle level 
 
Almaty # 2 age: 61; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Tbilisi, Georgia; 
education: vocational; profession: welder  
 
Almaty # 3 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth:  Almaty; 
education: higher; profession: secretary 
 
Almaty #4 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher;  
profession: housewife 
 
Almaty # 5 age: 53; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher;  
profession: engineer 
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Almaty # 6 age: 28; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher;  
profession: architect 
 
Almaty # 7 age: 28; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: incomplete  
higher; profession: actor 
 
Almaty # 8 age 28; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher; 
profession: designer 
 
Almaty # 9 age 32; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher;  
profession: teacher of literature 
 
Almaty # 10 age: 28; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Almaty; education: higher;  
profession: manager 
 
Chimkent # 1 age: 55; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; education: higher; 
profession: pensioner, ex-accountant 
 
Chimkent # 2 age: 31; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; education:  
higher; profession: secretary 
 
Chimkent # 3 gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: South Kazakhstan 
region; education: higher; profession: doctor 
 
Chimkent # 4 age: 24 ; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Kustanai; 
education: vocational; profession: hairdresser 
 
Chimkent # 5 age 25; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; education: vocational; 
profession: beautician 
 
Chimkent # 6 age: 19; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: incomplete higher; profession: student 
 
Chimkent # 7 age: 24; gender: female; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: incomplete higher; profession: secretary 
 
Chimkent # 8 age: 26; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: incomplete higher; profession: student 
 
Chimkent # 9 age: 43; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: vocational; profession: driver 
 
Chimkent # 10 age: 18; gender: male; nationality: Russian; place of birth: Chimkent; 
education: incomplete higher; profession: student 
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APPENDIX 2 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
I. Межнациональные отношения 
Interethnic relations 
 
1) Как вы считаете, улучшились или ухудшились межнациональные отношения в Казахстане после 
получения независимости? 
 (Do you think interethnic relations have improved, deteriorated or stayed the same in Kazakhstan since 
independence?) 
 
2. Что повлияло на то, что межнациональные отношения улучшились/ ухудшились? 
(What factors do you think have caused interethnic relations to improve/ deteriorate?) 
  
3. Что можно сделать, чтоб межнациональные отношения стали лучше?  
(What do you think can be done to improve interethnic relations?) 
 
4. Близко ли казахское население и русское население, проживающее в Казахстане, в культурном, 
мировоззренческом плане или существуют определенные различия? 
(Do you think Kazakhs and the Russians of Kazakhstan are close in culture and outlook or do they differ 
in this respect?) 
 
5. Как вы думаете, русское население Казахстана стоит ближе в культурном, мировоззренческом 
плане к казахскому населению или к русскому населению, проживающему в России? 
(Do you think the Russians of Kazakhstan are closer in culture and outlook to the Kazakhs or to the 
Russians of Russia?) 
 
6. Что, по вашему, объединяет казахов как группу и отличает их от остальной части населения в 
Казахстане?  
(What do you think unifies Kazakhs as a group and differentiates them from the rest of the population?) 
 
7. Что объединяет коренную/ титульную часть населения с некоренной /нетитульной? 
What unifies the indigenous / titular and non-indigenous/ non-titular groups? 
 
8. Как вы думаете, что разъединяет коренное/ титульное и некоренное/ нетитульное население в 
Казахстане?  
(What do you think separates the indigenous/ titular and the non-indigenous/ non-titular groups/ 
population from one another in Kazakhstan?) 
  
9. Если бы у вас была реальная возможность и влияние что-нибудь изменить в сфере 
межнациональных отношений, чтобы вы предложили? 
(If you had a real opportunity and the influence to change something for the better in interethnic relations, 
what would you do?) 
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10. Как вы считаете, то, что сейчас происходит в Казахстане в межнациональных отношениях, это 
закономерный процесс, восстановление справедливости иди здесь есть какая-то доля 
дискриминации? 
(Do you consider the developments in the inter-ethnic sphere in Kazakhstan to be a ‘natural’ process and 
‘restoration of justice’ or do you think there is a degree of discrimination in them? 
 
II. Языковые вопросы 
Language issues 
 
11. На каком языке вы разговариваете дома? 
(What language do you speak at home?) 
 
12. На каком языке ваши дети разговаривают дома?  
(What language do your children speak at home?)  
 
13. На каком языке вы разговариваете на работе, в общественных местах? 
(What language do you speak at work and in public places?) 
 
14. На каком языке люди разговаривают на работе в общественных местах вокруг вас? 
(What language do the people round you  speak at work and in public places?) 
 
15. Какой был основной язык обучения в вашей школе? 
(What was the main language of instruction at your school?) 
 
16. Какой основной язык обучения в школе ваших детей (тех, кто младше вас в семье? 
(What is the main language of instruction at your children’s school (or that attended by the younger 
members of your family)? 
 
17. На каком языке, по вашему мнению, будут говорить в Казахстане через 50 лет? 
(What language will be predominantly spoken in Kazakhstan in 50 years?) 
 
18. Хотели бы вы, чтобы ваши дети в совершенстве владели казахским языком? 
(Would you like your children to learn the Kazakh language?) 
 
19. Считаете ли вы, что русский язык должен стать государственным как и казахский? 
(Do you think Russian should be the second state language in Kazakhstan alongside Kazakh?) 
 
20. Считаете ли вы, что русские и русскоязычная часть населения должна обучаться на казахском 
языке в школах и институтах?  
(Do you think that Russians and other Russian-speakers should be taught at the universities in Kazakh? 
 
III. Общественная культура 
Public culture 
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21. Знаете ли вы новый гимн Казахстана? 
(Do you know the new national anthem of Kazakhstan?) 
 
22. Как вы считаете, объединяет ли он людей, живущих в Казахстане?  
(Do you think it unites all the people living in Kazakhstan?) 
 
23. Можете ли вы назвать новые государственные праздники Казахстана и их даты? 
(Can you name the new state holidays of Kazakhstan and their dates?) 
 
24. Как вы думаете, повысился или понизился уровень патриотизма в Казахстане по сравнению с 
советским временем? 
(Do you think the level of patriotism in Kazakhstan has become higher/ lower as compared with the 
Soviet period?) 
  
25. Можете ли вы вспомнить, назвать такой момент, когда вы испытывали гордость, что вы 
гражданин Казахтана? 
(Can you think of a moment/ situation when you felt proud that you are a citizen of Kazakhstan?) 
 
26. Можете ли вы вспомнить, назвать такой момент, когда вы испытывали неловкое чувство или 
чувство обиды, досады, связанные с Казахстаном? 
(Can you think of a moment/ situation when you felt uncomfortable or embarrassed that you are a citizen 
of Kazakhstan?) 
 
27. Как бы вы в нескольких словах или предложениях сформулировали национальную идею 
республики Казахстан? 
(How would you define the national idea of Kazakhstan in several words or sentences?) 
 
IV. История 
History 
 
28. Казахстан находился в составе СССР 70 лет. Как вы считаете, что было положительного в 
Казахстане за советское время?  
(Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet Union for 70 years. What do you think was positive in Kazakhstan 
during the Soviet period?) 
 
29. Что было отрицательного в Казахстане за советское время? 
(What do you think was negative in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period?  
 
30. Чего было больше за советское время в Казахстане – отрицательного или положительного? 
What predominated during the Soviet period – the negative or the positive aspects? 
 
31. Как вы считаете, присоединение Казахстана к России было добровольным или это была 
колонизация? 
(Do you think the adhesion of the Kazakh steppe region to Russia was voluntary or was it colonization?) 
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32. Доверяете ли вы современным переосмысленным историческим повествованиям? 
(Do you trust the revised historical accounts?) 
 
33. Кто по вашему новым национальный герой Казахстана?  
(Who do you think is a national hero/ heroes of Kazakhstan (both past and present)? 
 
33. Как вы относитесь к переименованию улиц и городов после распада Советского Союза?  
(How do you view the renaming of streets and towns after the break up of the Soviet Union? 
 
V. Религия 
Religion 
 
34. Верите ли вы в Бога? 
(Do you believe in God?) 
 
35. Какая у вас религия? 
(What is your religious denomination?) 
 
36. Можете ли вы назвать основные принципы вашей религии? 
(What are the main principles of your religion?) 
 
37. Соблюдаете ли вы какие-нибудь религиозные правила/ обряды, отмечаете ли религиозные 
праздники? 
(Do you observe any religious principles or rituals, or celebrate religious holidays?) 
 
VI. Экономические и карьерные вопросы 
Economic and career issues 
 
38. Как вы оцениваете настоящую экономическую ситуацию в Казахстане?   
(How do you view the current economic situation in Kazakhstan?) 
 
39. Как изменилось ваше материальное положение по сравнению с советским временем? (Как 
изменилось материальное положение вашей семьи по сравнению с советским временем?) 
(How has your (your family’s) economic situation changed as compared to the Soviet period?) 
 
40. Как бы вы оценили свое материальное положение по сравнению с большинством людей в 
Казахстане? (Вы находитесь на самом верху, выше среднего, по середине, ниже среднего, в самом 
низу) 
(How would you rate your material/ economic position as compared to most people in Kazakhstan (are 
you are the top, above average, in the middle, below average, at the bottom?) 
 
41. Как вы думаете, улучшиться или ухудшиться ваш материальный уровень жизни в будущие 5 
лет? 
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(Do you think your economic situation will improve, deteriorate or stay the same in the next 5 years?) 
42. Как вы считаете, какая национальность имеет наибольший процент богатых людей по 
республике? 
(Which nationality has the highest percentage of rich people in Kazakhstan?) 
 
43. Важна ли сейчас национальность для продвижения вперед в плане карьеры в Казахстане? 
(Is nationality important for one’s career advancement in Kazakhstan?)  
 
44. Как вы думаете, может ли быть президентом Казахстана представитель некоренной 
национальности? 
(Do you think a person from the non-indigenous/ non-titular nationality can become the President of 
Kazakhstan?) 
 
VII. Политические вопросы 
Political issues 
 
45. Как вы оцениваете настоящую политическую ситуацию в Казахстане? Она улучшилась, 
ухудшилась, осталась на прежнем уровне? 
(How do you view the current political situation in Kazakhstan?) 
 
46. Согласны ли вы, что в Казахстане существует свобода слова? 
(Do you agree that there is freedom of speech in Kazakhstan?) 
 
47. Казахстанское правительство работает в интересах всех людей Казахстана? 
(Does the Kazakhstani government work in the interest of all people in Kazakhstan?) 
 
48. Считаете ли вы, что в будущем представители всех национальностей будут жить в мире в 
Казахстане? 
(Do you think that all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan will live in peace in the future?) 
 
49. Считаете ли вы, что Казахстан должен иметь свою собственную национальную армию? 
(Do you think Kazakhstan should have its own national army?) 
 
50. Предпочли ли вы, если бы Советский Союз существовал до сих пор? 
(Would you prefer it if the Soviet Union still existed?) 
 
51. Считаете ли вы, что люди в Казахстане слишком сильно критикуют свою страну? 
(Do you think that people in Kazakhstan criticize their country too much?) 
 
52. Считаете ли вы, что люди, живущие в Казахстане, должны поддерживать свою страну в любых 
правильных или неправильных ситуациях? 
(Do you think that people in Kazakhstan should support their country in any situation right or wrong?) 
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53. Считаете ли вы, что в Казахстане обращаются с русским и русскоязычным населением 
недостаточно справедливо, и что у них должно быть больше [культурных и языковых] прав, чем 
они имеют сейчас? 
(Do you think that Russians and Russian-speakers are treated fairly enough in Kazakhstan, i.e. that they 
should have more [cultural and linguistic] rights than they have now? 
 
54. Считаете ли вы, что национальность не должна влиять на те преимущества, которые человек 
получает от государства? 
(Do you think that one’s ethnic background should not determine the privileges that a person receives 
from the state?)  
 
55. Считаете ли вы, что границы России должны быть расширены, чтобы включить в себя всех 
этнических русских, проживающих в ближнем зарубежье? 
(Do you think the borders of Russia should be expanded to include all ethnic Russians living in the near 
abroad?) 
 
56. Считаете ли вы, что русские, живущие в Казахстане, должны быть верными Казахстану, чьими 
гражданами они являются, а не своим историческим родинам? 
(Do you think the Russians of Kazakhstan should be loyal to Kazakhstan of which they are citizens or to 
Russia, their historical homeland?) 
 
57. Считаете ли вы, что правительство России не должно заниматься правами и свободами 
этнических русских, проживающих в Казахстане, a должны заниматься своими внутрениими 
делами и не вмешиваться в национальную политику Казахстана, даже если это касается их диаспор. 
(Do you think the Russian government should protect the rights and freedoms of the Russian diaspora in 
Kazakhstan or should they stay away and not interfere?) 
 
58. Откуда, по вашему мнению, исходит национальная внешняя опасность для Казахстана?  
(What country or countries represent the biggest threat to Kazakhstan?) 
 
59. С какими странами вы бы хотели, чтобы Казахстан строил свое будущее? 
(What country or countries would you like Kazakhstan to build its future with?)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
